

MASTERPIECES OF ELOQUENCE

FAMOUS ORATIONS OF GREAT WORLD
LEADERS FROM EARLY GREECE
TO THE PRESENT TIME

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CONTENTS

VOLUME TWO

DEMOSTHENES

The First Olynthiac.....	439
The Second Olynthiac.....	449
The Third Olynthiac.....	456
The First Philippic.....	466
The Oration on the Peace.....	481
The Second Philippic.....	489
The Oration on Halonnesus.....	501
The Oration on the Chersonese.....	511
The Third Philippic.....	529
The Fourth Philippic.....	549
The Oration on the Letter.....	569
The Letter of Philip.....	577
The Oration on the Duties of the State.....	587
The Oration on the Navy Boards.....	598
The Oration on the Liberty of the Rhodians.....	611
The Oration for the Megalopolitans.....	624
The Oration on the Treaty with Alexander.....	637

DINARCHUS

Speech Against Aristogiton.....	649
---------------------------------	-----

SCIPIO AFRICANUS

Speech in his Defence [A Fragment].....	654
---	-----

CATO

Defence of the Rhodians.....	656
Speech in Support of the Oppian Law.....	659
Speech on the Treatment of the Catilinarian Conspirators..	735

CAIUS GRACCHUS

Speech on the Revenue.....	665
----------------------------	-----

CONTENTS

CRASSUS

Speech in Defence of Cneius Plancus.....	667
--	-----

CATILINE

Speech to the Conspirators.....	669
Speech to the Troops.....	671


CICERO

First Oration Against Catiline.....	675
Second Oration Against Catiline.....	694
Third Oration Against Catiline.....	710
Fourth Oration Against Catiline.....	740
First Oration Against Verres.....	755
Fourth Book of the Second Pleading in the Prosecution of Verres About the Statues.....	781

CÆSAR

On the Treatment of the Catilinarian Conspirators.....	728
--	-----

ORATIONS



DEMOSTHENES

THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

OLYNTHUS was a city in Macedonia, at the head of the Toronaic gulf, and north of the peninsula of Pallene. It was colonized by a people from Chalcis in Eubœa, and commanded a large district called Chalcidice, in which there were thirty-two cities. Over all this tract the sway of Olynthus was considerable, and she had waged wars anciently with Athens and Sparta, and been formidable to Philip's predecessors on the throne of Macedon. Soon after Philip's accession, the Olynthians had disputes with him, which were at first accommodated, and he gratified them by the cession of Anthemus. They then joined him in a war against Athens, and he gave up to them Potidæa, which had yielded to their united arms. After the lapse of some years, during which Philip had greatly increased his power, and acquired considerable influence in Thessaly and Thrace, the Olynthians became alarmed, and began to think him too dangerous a neighbor. The immediate cause of rupture was an attack which he made on one of the Chalcidian towns. An embassy was instantly sent to Athens, to negotiate an alliance. Philip, considering this as an infraction of their treaty with him, declared war against them, and invaded their territory. A second embassy was sent to Athens, pressing for assistance. The question was debated in the popular assembly. Demades, an orator of considerable ability, but prodigate character, opposed the alliance. Many speakers were heard; and at length Demosthenes rose to support the prayer of the embassy, delivering one of those clear and forcible speeches which seldom failed to make a strong impression on his audience. The alliance was accepted, and succors voted.

The orator here delicately touches on the law of Eubulus, which had made it capital to propose that the Theoric fund should be applied to military service. This fund was in fact the surplus revenue of the civil administration, which by the ancient law was appropriated to the defence of the commonwealth; but it had by various means been diverted from that purpose, and expended in largesses to the people, to enable them to attend the theatre, and other public shows and amusements. The law of Eubulus perpetuated this abuse. Demosthenes, seeing the necessity of a war supply, hints that this absurd law ought to be abolished, but does not openly propose it.

There has been much difference of opinion among the learned as to the order of
(439)

the three Olynthiac orations; nor is it certain whether they were spoken on the occasion of one embassy, or several embassies. The curious may consult Bishop Thirlwall's Appendix to the fifth volume of his Grecian History, and Jacobs' Introduction to his translation. I have followed the common order, as adopted by Bekker, whose edition of Demosthenes is the text of this translation; and indeed my opinion is, on the whole, in favor of preserving the common order.

I BELIEVE, men of Athens, you would give much to know what is the true policy to be adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the case, you should be willing to hear with attention those who offer you their counsel. Besides that you will have the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I esteem it part of your good fortune that many fit suggestions will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from them all you may easily choose what is profitable.

The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand, if you care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in the matter.¹ My own opinion is, vote succor immediately, and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before; send also ambassadors to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For the danger is that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other times (his threats may well be believed), slandering us and urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some of our

¹ This is a cautious way of hinting at the general reluctance to adopt a vigorous policy. And the reader will observe the use of the first person, whereby the orator includes himself in the same insinuation.

main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the very cause of Philip's strength is a circumstance favorable to you. His having it in his sole power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and everywhere accompanying his army, is a great advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but, for a peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians that now they are fighting, not for glory or a slice of territory, but to save their country from destruction and servitude. They know how he treated those Amphipolitans who surrendered to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance. And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all else of importance considered, I say, you must take heart and spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing undone. No plea or pretence is left you for declining your duty. What you were all so clamorous about that the Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has, of itself, come to pass, and in a way most advantageous to you. For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they might have been slippery allies, with minds but half resolved, perhaps: but since they hate him on a quarrel of their own, their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when we returned from succoring the Eubœans, and Hierax and

Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform,² urging us to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of Eubœa, you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pagasæ, and the other places (not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt and reasonable succor, we should have found Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king of Macedon ever was. Here, then, is come a crisis, this of Olynthus, self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And, methinks, men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our acceptance, I must regard as manifestations of divine favor. It is much the same as in money matters. If a man keep what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if he lose it by imprudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation. So in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even the good which the gods send them; for every prior event is judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athe-

² The hustings from which the speakers addressed the people. It was cut to the height of ten feet out of the rock which formed the boundary wall of the assembly; and was ascended by a flight of steps.

nians, we must be exceedingly careful of our future measures, that by amendment therein we may efface the shame of the past. Should we abandon these men,³ too, and Philip reduce Olynthus, let any one tell me, what is to prevent him marching where he pleases? Does any one of you, Athenians, compute or consider the means by which Philip, originally weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa next, Methone afterward, he invaded Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pheræ, Pagasæ, Magnesia, everywhere exactly as he pleased, he departed for Thrace; where, after displacing some kings and establishing others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Pæonia, that against Arymbas,⁴ and some others.

Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you, Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one thing after another, and the activity which forms part of Philip's habit and existence, which makes it impossible for him to rest content with his achievements. If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has done, and yours to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what the end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple as not to know that the war yonder will soon be here, if we are careless? And should this happen, I fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so will it

³ Here he points to the Olynthian ambassadors.

⁴ Arymbas was a king of the Molossians in Epirus, and uncle of Olympias, Philip's wife.

be with us; found to have paid dear for our idleness and self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts, and struggle for the salvation of our country.

To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show what measures the case requires, is a part of a counsellor. I am not ignorant, Athenians, that frequently, when any disappointment happens, you are angry, not with the parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I suppress what I deem for your interest. I say, then, you must give a twofold assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns, and send out troops for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the expedition will be fruitless. For should he, suffering your incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will easily march to the defence of his kingdom; or, should you only throw succor into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time prevail over the besieged. Your assistance, therefore, must be effective and twofold.

Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund than any people; and you receive it just as you please. If ye will assign this to your troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or rather ye have none at all. How, then? some man may exclaim: do you move that this be a military fund? Verily, not I.* My opinion, indeed, is that there should

* There is some studied obscurity in this passage, owing to the necessity under which the speaker lay of avoiding the penalty of the law; and a little

be soldiers raised, and a military fund, and one and the same regulation for receiving and performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that all must contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little. Money must be had; without it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other ways and means. Choose which ye think expedient; and put hands to the work, while it is yet time.

It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's affairs now stand. They are not, as they appear, or as an inattentive observer might pronounce, in very good trim, or in the most favorable position. He would never have commenced this war had he imagined he must fight. He expected to carry everything on the first advance, and has been mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles and dispirits him; another is the state of Thessaly. That people were always, you know, treacherous to all men; and just as they ever have been, they are to Philip. They have resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasæ, and have prevented his fortifying Magnesia; and I was told they would no longer allow him to take the revenue of their harbors and markets, which they say should be applied to the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip. Now, if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much straitened

quiet satire on his countrymen, who seemed desirous of eating their pudding and having it too. The logic of the argument runs thus—My opinion is, that we ought to have a military fund, and that no man should receive public money, without performing public service. However, as you prefer taking the public money to pay for your places at the festivals, I will not break the law by moving to apply that money to another purpose. Only you gain nothing by it; for, as the troops must be paid, there must be an extraordinary contribution, or property tax, to meet the exigency of the case.

for paying his mercenaries. And surely we must suppose that Pæonians and Illyrians, and all such people, would rather be free and independent than under subjection; for they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant. So report says, and I can well believe it; for undeserved success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it appears often that to maintain prosperity is harder than to acquire it. Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his difficulty as your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the war, sending embassies where required, taking arms yourselves, exciting all other people; for if Philip got such an opportunity against us, and there was a war on our frontier, how eagerly think ye he would attack you! Then are you not ashamed that the very damage which you would suffer, if he had the power, you dare not seize the moment to inflict on him?

And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now the choice, whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold out, you will fight there and distress his dominions, enjoying your own home in peace. If Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his marching here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who cannot defend their own country without your assistance. Or some other ally? But, good sir, he will not desire! Strange indeed, if, what he is thought foolhardy for prating now, this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument. If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only, and take the necessaries for camp-service from the land (I mean, without an enemy therein), your agricultural popu-

lation would sustain, I believe, greater damage than what the whole expense of the late war⁶ amounted to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected? There is the insult, too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any damage, to right-thinking men.

On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our succor, and drive off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance which they happily possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the young,⁷ that gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they may become redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the orators, that they may pass a good account⁸ of their statesmanship; for on the result of measures will depend your judgment of their conduct. May it for every cause be prosperous.

⁶ The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.

⁷ Strictly, *those of the military age*, which was from eighteen years to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were liable only to serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison the walls. Afterward they were liable to any military service, under the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens.

⁸ Every man, who is required to justify the acts for which he is responsible, may be said to be "called to account." But Demosthenes speaks with peculiar reference to those accounts, which men in official situations at Athens were required to render at the close of their administration.

THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and resolved to send succors. But the sending of them was delayed, partly by the contrivance of the opposite faction, partly from the reluctance of the people themselves to engage in a war with Philip. Demosthenes stimulates them to exertion, and encourages them, by showing that Philip's power is not so great as it appears

ON MANY occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the gods to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the present. That here are men prepared for a war with Philip, possessed of a neighboring territory and some power, and (what is most important) so fixed in their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an extraordinary act of divine beneficence. It must then be our care, Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances have been; as it would be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have abandoned not only cities and places that once belonged to us, but also the allies and advantages provided by fortune.

To dilate, Athenians, on Philip's power, and by such discourse to incite you to your duty, I think improper: and why? Because all that may be said on that score involves matter of glory for him, and misconduct on our part. The more he has transcended his repute, the more is he universally admired; you, as you have used your advantages unworthily, have incurred the greater disgrace.

This topic, then, I shall pass over. Indeed, Athenians, a correct observer will find the source of his greatness here,¹ and not in himself. But of measures, for which Philip's partisans deserve his gratitude and your vengeance, I see no occasion to speak now. Other things are open to me, which it concerns you all to know, and which must, on a due examination, Athenians, reflect great disgrace on Philip. To these will I address myself.

To call him perjured and treacherous, without showing what he has done, might justly be termed idle abuse. But to go through all his actions and convict him in detail, will take, as it happens, but a short time, and is expedient, I think, for two reasons: first, that his baseness may appear in its true light; secondly, that they, whose terror imagines Philip to be invincible, may see he has run through all the artifices by which he rose to greatness, and his career is just come to an end. I myself, men of Athens, should most assuredly have regarded Philip as an object of fear and admiration, had I seen him exalted by honorable conduct; but observing and considering I find, that in the beginning, when certain persons drove away the Olynthians who desired a conference with us, he gained over our simplicity by engaging to surrender Amphipolis, and to execute the secret article² once so famous; afterward he

¹ In this assembly, by the contrivance of venal orators, or through the supineness of the people. In the first Philippic there is a more pointed allusion to the practice of Philip's adherents, who are charged with sending him secret intelligence of what passed at home. Such men as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, perhaps Demades and others are referred to. Æschines had not yet begun to be a friend of Philip.

² A secret intrigue was carried on between Philip and the Athenians, by which he engaged to put Amphipolis in their hands, but on the understanding that they would deliver up Pydna to him. Demosthenes only mentions the former part of the arrangement, the latter not being honorable to his countrymen.

got the friendship of the Olynthians, by taking Potidæa from you, wronging you his former allies, and delivering it to them; and lastly now the Thessalians, by promising to surrender Magnesia, and undertake the Phocian war on their behalf. In short, none who have dealt with him has he not deceived. He has risen by conciliating and cajoling the weakness of every people in turn who knew him not. As, therefore, by such means he rose, when every people imagined he would advance their interest, so ought he by the same means to be pulled down again, when the selfish aim of his whole policy is exposed. To this crisis, O Athenians, are Philip's affairs come; or let any man stand forward and prove to me, or rather to you, that my assertions are false, or that men whom Philip has once overreached will trust him hereafter, or that the Thessalians who have been degraded into servitude would not gladly become free.

But if any among you, though agreeing in these statements, thinks that Philip will maintain his power by having occupied forts and havens and the like, this is a mistake. True, when a confederacy subsists by goodwill, and all parties to the war have a common interest, men are willing to co-operate and bear hardships and persevere. But when one has grown strong, like Philip, by rapacity and artifice, on the first pretext, the slightest reverse, all is overturned and broken up. Impossible is it—impossible, Athenians—to acquire a solid power by injustice and perjury and falsehood. Such things last for once, or for a short period; maybe they blossom fairly with hope; but in time they are discovered and drop away. As a house, a ship, or the like, ought to have the lower parts firmest, so in human conduct, I ween, the principle and founda-

tion should be just and true. But this is not so in Philip's conduct.

I say, then, we should at once aid the Olynthians (the best and quickest way that can be suggested will please me most) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some of our measures, and to stir up the rest; for they have now resolved to demand Pagasæ, and remonstrate about Magnesia. But look to this, Athenians, that our envoys shall not only make speeches, but have some real proof that we have gone forth as becomes our country, and are engaged in action. All speech without action appears vain and idle, but especially that of our commonwealth; as the more we are thought to excel therein, the more is our speaking distrusted by all. You must show yourselves greatly reformed, greatly changed, contributing, serving personally, acting promptly, before any one will pay attention to you. And if ye will perform these duties properly and becomingly, Athenians, not only will it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor state of his native empire and power will be revealed.

To speak roundly, the Macedonian power and empire is very well as a help, as it was for you in Timotheus's time against the Olynthians; likewise for them against Potidæa the conjunction was important; and lately it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the regnant house: and the accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly useful. But the Macedonian is feeble of itself, and full of defects. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's greatness, his wars and his expeditions, have made it more insecure than it was originally. Think not, Athenians, that Philip and his

subjects have the same likings. He desires glory, makes that his passion, is ready for any consequence of adventure and peril, preferring to a life of safety the honor of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did before. They have no share in the glorious result; ever harassed by these excursions up and down, they suffer and toil incessantly, allowed no leisure for their employments or private concerns, unable even to dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed on account of the war. By this then may easily be seen how the Macedonians in general are disposed to Philip. His mercenaries and guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained soldiers, but, as I heard from one who had been in the country, a man incapable of falsehood, they are no better than others. For if there be any among them experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous of such men and drives them away, he says, wishing to keep the glory of all actions to himself; his jealousy (among other failings) being excessive. Or if any man be generally good and virtuous, unable to bear Philip's daily intemperances, drunkenness, and indecencies,^{*} he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character, who will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you. My information is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as worse rascals than mountebanks, Callias the town-slave and the like of him, antic-jesters, and composers of ribald songs to lampoon

^{*} The original signifies a certain lascivious dance, which formed a part of riotous festivities. We gather from history that the orator's description here is not wholly untrue, though exaggerated. It has been observed, that Philip's partiality for drinking and dancing, his drollery, and a dash of scurrility in his character, endeared him especially to the Thessalians.

their companions, such persons Philip caresses and keeps about him. Small matters these may be thought, Athenians, but to the wise they are strong indications of his character and wrongheadedness. Success perhaps throws a shade over them now; prosperity is a famous hider of such blemishes; but, on any miscarriage, they will be fully exposed. And this (trust me, Athenians) will appear in no long time, if the gods so will and you determine. For as in the human body a man in health feels not partial ailments, but, when illness occurs, all are in motion, whether it be a rupture or a sprain or anything else unsound; so with states and monarchs, while they wage external war, their weaknesses are undiscerned by most men, but the tug of a frontier war betrays all.

If any of you think Philip a formidable opponent, because they see he is fortunate, such reasoning is prudent, Athenians. Fortune has indeed a great preponderance—nay, is everything, in human affairs. Not but that, if I had the choice, I should prefer our fortune to Philip's, would you but moderately perform your duty. For I see you have many more claims to the divine favor than he has. But we sit doing nothing; and a man idle himself cannot require even his friends to act for him, much less the gods. No wonder then that he, marching and toiling in person, present on all occasions, neglecting no time or season, prevails over us delaying and voting and inquiring. I marvel not at that; the contrary would have been marvellous, if we doing none of the duties of war had beaten one doing all. But this surprises me, that formerly, Athenians, you resisted the Lacedæmonians for the rights of Greece, and rejecting many opportunities of selfish gain, to secure the rights of others, expended your property in

contributions, and bore the brunt of the battle; yet now you are loth to serve, slow to contribute, in defence of your own possessions, and, though you have often saved the other nations of Greece collectively and individually, under your own losses you sit still. This surprises me, and one thing more, Athenians; that not one of you can reckon how long your war with Philip has lasted and what you have been doing while the time has passed. You surely know that while you have been delaying, expecting others to act, accusing, trying one another, expecting again, doing much the same as ye do now, all the time has passed away. Then are ye so senseless, Athenians, as to imagine that the same measures which have brought the country from a prosperous to a poor condition will bring it from a poor to a prosperous? Unreasonable were this and unnatural; for all things are easier kept than gotten. The war now has left us nothing to keep; we have all to get, and the work must be done by ourselves. I say then, you must contribute money, serve in person with alacrity, accuse no one, till you have gained your objects; then, judging from facts, honor the deserving, punish offenders; let there be no pretences or defaults on your own part; for you cannot harshly scrutinize the conduct of others, unless you have done what is right yourselves. Why, think you, do all the generals⁴ whom you commission avoid this

⁴ A system of employing mercenary troops sprang up at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when there were numerous Grecian bands accustomed to warfare and seeking employment. Such troops were eagerly sought for by the Persian satraps and their king, by such men as Jason of Pheræ, Dionysius of Syracuse, or Philomelus of Phocis. Athens, which had partially employed mercenaries before, began to make use of them on a large scale, while her citizens preferred staying at home, to attend to commerce, politics, and idle amusements. The ill effects however were soon apparent. Athenian generals, ill supplied with money, and having little control over their followers, were

war, and seek wars of their own (for of the generals too must a little truth be told)? Because here the prizes of the war are yours; for example, if Amphipolis be taken, you will immediately recover it; the commanders have all the risk and no reward. But in the other case the risks are less, and the gains belong to the commanders and soldiers; Lampsacus,* Sigeum, the vessels which they plunder. So they proceed to secure their several interests: you, when you look at the bad state of your affairs, bring the generals to trial; but when they get a hearing and plead these necessities, you dismiss them. The result is that, while you are quarrelling and divided, some holding one opinion, some another, the commonwealth goes wrong. Formerly, Athenians, you had boards[†] for taxes; now you have boards for politics. There is an orator presiding on either side, a general under him, and three hundred men to shout; the rest of you are attached to the one party or the other. This you must leave off; be yourselves again; establish a general liberty of speech, deliberation, and action. If some are appointed to command as with royal authority, some to be ship-captains, taxpayers, soldiers by compulsion, others only to vote against them, and help

tempted or obliged to engage in enterprises unconnected with, and often adverse to, the interests of their country. Sometimes the general, as well as the troops, was an alien, and could be very little depended on.

* Chares, the Athenian general, was said to have received these Asiatic cities from Artabazus, the Persian satrap, in return for the service he had performed. Probably it was some authority or privileges in those cities, not the actual dominion, that was conferred upon him.

† This refers to the boards for management of the property-tax at Athens. The argument of Demosthenes is as follows: The three hundred wealthier citizens, who were associated by law for purposes of taxation, had become a clique for political purposes, with an orator at their head (he intentionally uses the term *chairman of the board*) to conduct the business of the assembly, while they stood to shout and applaud his speeches. The general, who held a judicial court to decide disputes about the property-tax, and who in matters of state ought to be independent, was subservient to the orator, who defended him in the popular assembly.

in nothing besides, no duty will be seasonably performed; the aggrieved parties will still fail you, and you will have to punish them instead of your enemies. I say, in short, you must all fairly contribute, according to each man's ability; take your turns of service till you have all been afield; give every speaker a hearing, and adopt the best counsel, not what this or that person advises. If ye act thus, not only will ye praise the speaker at the moment, but yourselves afterward, when the condition of the country is improved.

THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

THE ARGUMENT

THE Athenians had despatched succors to Olynthus, and received, as Libanius says, some favorable intelligence; more probably, however, some vague rumors, which led them to imagine the danger was for the time averted. They began, very prematurely, as the result showed, to be confident of success, and talked of punishing Philip for his presumption. In this they were encouraged by certain foolish orators, who sought to flatter the national prejudices. Demosthenes in this oration strives to check the arrogance of the people; reminds them of the necessity of defensive rather than offensive measures, and especially of the importance of preserving their allies. He again adverts (and this time more boldly) to the law of Eubulus, which he intimates ought to be repealed; and he exhorts the Athenians generally to make strenuous exertions against Philip.

NOT the same ideas, men of Athens, are presented to me, when I look at our condition, and when at the speeches which are delivered. The speeches, I find, are about punishing Philip; but our condition is come to this, that we must mind we are not first damaged ourselves. Therefore, it seems to me, these orators commit the simple error of not laying before you the true subject of debate. That once we might safely have held

our own and punished Philip, too, I know well enough; both have been possible in my own time, not very long ago. But now, I am persuaded, it is sufficient in the first instance to effect the preservation of our allies. When this has been secured, one may look out for revenge on Philip; but before we lay the foundation right, I deem it idle to talk about the end.

The present crisis, O Athenians, requires, if any ever did, much thought and counsel. Not that I am puzzled what advice to give in the matter; I am only doubtful in what way, Athenians, to address you thereupon. For I have been taught, both by hearsay and experience, that most of your advantages have escaped you, from unwillingness to do your duty, not from ignorance. I request you, if I speak my mind, to be patient, and consider only whether I speak the truth, and with a view to future amendment. You see to what wretched plight we are reduced by some men haranguing for popularity.

I think it necessary, however, first to recall to your memory a few past events. You remember, Athenians, when news came three or four years ago, that Philip was in Thrace besieging Heræum.¹ It was then the fifth month,² and after much discussion and tumult in the assembly you resolved to launch forty galleys, that every citizen under forty-five³ should embark, and a tax be

¹ A fortress on the Propontis (now Sea of Marmora), near Perinthus. This was a post of importance to the Athenians, who received large supplies of corn from that district.

² Corresponding nearly to our November. The Attic year began in July, and contained twelve lunar months, of alternately twenty-nine and thirty days. The Greeks attempted to make the lunar and solar courses coincide by cycles of years, but fell into great confusion.

³ This large proportion of the serviceable citizens shows the alarm at Athens. Philip's illness seems to have put a stop to his progress in Thrace at this period. Immediately on his recovery he began his aggression against Olynthus.

raised of sixty talents. That year passed; the first, second, third month arrived; in that month, reluctantly, after the mysteries,⁴ you despatched Charidemus with ten empty ships and five talents in money; for as Philip was reported to be sick or dead (both rumors came) you thought there was no longer any occasion for succors, and discontinued the armament. But that was the very occasion; if we had then sent our succors quickly, as we resolved, Philip would not have been saved to trouble us now.

Those events cannot be altered. But here is the crisis of another war, the cause why I mentioned the past that you may not repeat your error. How shall we deal with it, men of Athens? If you lend not the utmost possible aid, see how you will have manœuvred everything for Philip's benefit. There were the Olynthians, possessed of some power; and matters stood thus: Philip distrusted them, and they Philip. We negotiated for peace with them; this hampered (as it were) and annoyed Philip that a great city, reconciled to us, should be watching opportunities against him. We thought it necessary by all means to make that people his enemies; and lo, what erewhile you clamored for, has somehow or other been accomplished. Then what remains, Athenians, but to assist them vigorously and promptly? I know not. For besides the disgrace that would fall upon us, if we sacrificed any of our interests, I am alarmed for the consequences, seeing how the Thebans are affected toward us, the Phocian treasury exhausted, nothing to prevent Philip, when he has subdued what lies before him, from turning to matters here. Whoever postpones until then the per-

⁴ The Eleusinian Mysteries, in honor of Ceres and Proserpine, called The Mysteries from their peculiar sanctity.

formance of his duty, wishes to see the peril at hand, when he may hear of it elsewhere, and to seek auxiliaries for himself, when he may be auxiliary to others; for that this will be the issue, if we throw away our present advantage, we all know pretty well.

But, it may be said, we have resolved that succors are necessary, and we will send them; tell us only how. Marvel not then, Athenians, if I say something to astonish the multitude. Appoint law revisers:^{*} at their session enact no statutes, for you have enough, but repeal those which are at present injurious; I mean, just plainly, the laws concerning our theatrical fund, and some concerning the troops, whereof the former divide the military fund among stayers-at-home for theatrical amusement, the latter indemnify deserters, and so dishearten men well inclined to the service. When you have repealed these, and made the road to good counsel safe, then find a man to propose what you all know to be desirable. But before doing so, look not for one who will advise good measures and be destroyed by you for his pains. Such a person you will not find, especially as the only result would be, for the adviser and mover to suffer wrongfully, and, without forwarding matters, to render good counsel still more dangerous in future. Besides, Athenians, you should require the same men to repeal these laws who have introduced them. It is unjust that their authors should enjoy a popularity which has

^{*} A provision was made by Solon for a periodical revision of the Athenian laws by means of a legislative committee. They were chosen by lot from the judicial body, on a reference to them by a vote of the popular assembly. Demosthenes says, "enact no statutes," instead of saying "let the committee enact no statutes." This is because the committee would be taken from the people themselves, and the part is treated as the whole.

injured the commonwealth, while the adviser of salutary measures suffers by a displeasure that may lead to general improvement. Till this is set right, Athenians, look not that any one should be so powerful with you as to transgress these laws with impunity, or so senseless as to plunge into ruin right before him.

Another thing, too, you should observe, Athenians, that a decree is worth nothing, without a readiness on your part to do what you determine. Could decrees of themselves compel you to perform your duty, or execute what they prescribe, neither would you with many decrees have accomplished little or nothing, nor would Philip have insulted you so long. Had it depended on decrees, he would have been chastised long ago. But the course of things is otherwise. Action, posterior in order of time to speaking and voting, is in efficacy prior and superior. This requisite you want; the others you possess. There are among you, Athenians, men competent to advise what is needful, and you are exceedingly quick at understanding it; ay, and you will be able now to perform it, if you act rightly. For what time or season would you have better than the present? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has not the man got possession of all our strongholds? And if he become master of this country, shall we not incur foul disgrace? Are not they, to whom we promised sure protection in case of war, at this moment in hostilities? Is he not an enemy, holding our possessions—a barbarian⁶—anything you like to call

⁶ *Barbarians* (among the Greeks) designates persons who were not of Hellenic origin. Alexander, an ancestor of Philip, had obtained admission to the Olympic games by proving himself to be of Argive descent. But the Macedonian people were scarcely considered as Greeks till a much later period; and Demosthenes speaks rather with reference to the nation than to Philip personally.

him? But, O heavens! after permitting, almost helping him to accomplish these things, shall we inquire who were to blame for them? I know we shall not take the blame to ourselves. For so in battles, no runaway accuses himself, but his general, his neighbor, any one rather; though, sure enough, the defeat is owing to all the runaways; for each who accuses the rest might have stood his ground, and had each done so, they would have conquered. Now, then, does any man not give the best advice? Let another rise and give it, but not censure the last speaker. Does a second give better advice? Follow it, and success attend you! Perhaps it is not pleasant: but that is not the speaker's fault, unless he omits some needful prayer. To pray is simple enough, Athenians, collecting all that one desires in a short petition: but to decide, when measures are the subject of consideration, is not quite so easy; for we must choose the profitable rather than the pleasant, where both are not compatible.

But if any one can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it may be asked. I grant it, if this were possible: but I wonder if any man ever was or will be able, after wasting his means in useless expenses, to find means for useful. The wishes of men are, indeed, a great help to such arguments, and therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit, for every man believes what he wishes, though the reality is often different. See, then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and you will be able to serve and have pay. It becomes not a wise or magnanimous people to neglect military operations for want of money, and bear disgraces like these; or, while you snatch up arms to

march against Corinthians and Megarians, to let Philip enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your troops.

I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offence: I am not so foolish or perverse as to provoke your displeasure without intending your good: but I think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement of the commonweal to the gratification of his audience. And I hear, as perhaps you do, that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians after this form and fashion;—Aristides, Nicias, my namesake,¹ Pericles. But since these orators have appeared, who ask, What is your pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige you? the public welfare is complimented away for a moment's popularity, and these are the results; the orators thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what a summary contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours. It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you may still be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at home. Our forefathers, whom the speakers humored not nor caressed, as these men caress you, for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks by general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious trophies they erected for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to

¹ Demosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian war, who defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in Sicily.

envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and consecrated furniture that posterity has no power to surpass them. In private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our constitution that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had, or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no grander than those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth. By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods, brother-like among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.

So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness or resemblance? I pass over other topics, on which I could expatiate; but observe: in this utter absence of competitors (Lacedæmonians depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the supremacy with us), when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory, and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come forward and tell me by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? Look at the men of

whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from obscurity to honor; some have made their private houses more splendid than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined their fortunes have been exalted.

What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously then, and now goes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his share of honor, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen dispose of emoluments; through them everything is done; you, the people, enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you paltry beeves;⁸ and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be similar. By Ceres, I should not wonder if I, for mentioning these things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects; I marvel, indeed, you have allowed it here.

⁸ Entertainments were frequently given to the people after sacrifices, at which a very small part of the victim was devoted to the gods, such as the legs, and intestines, the rest being kept for more profane purposes. The Athenians were remarkably extravagant in sacrifices. Demades, ridiculing the donations of public meat, compared the republic to an old woman sitting at home in slippers and supping her broth. Demosthenes charges the magistrates with supplying lean and poor oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy and large.

Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military service and act worthily of yourselves; would you employ these domestic superfluities as a means to gain advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians, perhaps you might gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of these perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for the sick. As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the patient to die, so your allowances are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor yet permit you to reject them and turn to something else. Thus do they increase the general apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you stipendiary service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all, Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public, may be what the state requires. Is peace to be had? You are better at home, under no compulsion to act dishonorably from indigence. Is there such an emergency as the present? Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your country's cause, maintained by those very allowances. Is any one of you beyond the military age? What he now irregularly takes without doing service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting needful business. Thus, without derogating from or adding to our political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into order, establishing a uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in war, for sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give to idlers the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and helpless, to hear that such a one's mercenaries are victorious; as we now do. Not that I blame any one who does you a service: I only call upon you, Athenians, to perform on your own account those

duties for which you honor strangers, and not to surrender that post of dignity which, won through many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.

I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you will adopt that course which is best for the country and yourselves.

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

PHILIP, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward the pass of Thermopylæ, which, however, he found occupied by the Athenians, who had sent a force for the purpose of preventing his advance. Being baffled there, he directed his march into Thrace, and alarmed the Athenians for the safety of their dominions in the Chersonese. At the same time he sent a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and Imbrus, infested the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even insulted her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing the cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes, or extending his own influence over other parts of Thrace, where he established or expelled the rulers, as it suited him. It was just at that time that Demosthenes spoke the following oration, the first in which he called the attention of his countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's power. He had become convinced by the course of events, and by observing the restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to fear from him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly appreciated the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as he was now by the friendship of Thesaly, possessed of a navy and maritime towns, and relieved from the presence of any powerful neighbors. What were the precise views of Demosthenes as to the extent of the impending danger, we cannot say. It was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to awaken them from their lethargy. This he does in a speech, which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his countrymen; points out both their weakness and their strength; rouses them to a sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it; recommends not any extraordinary efforts, for which at the moment there was no urgent

necessity, and to make which would have exceeded their power, but unfolds a scheme, simple and feasible, ~~suited~~ the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.

HAD the question for debate been anything new, Athenians, I should have waited till most of the usual speakers¹ had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking, I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the subject of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity for deliberating now.

First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the same, there would be no hope of amendment.

Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember; how vast a power the Lacedæmonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war² against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that

¹ By an ancient ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years of age were first called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased to be in force; but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate. There could be frequent occasions for departing from such a custom, and Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking first.

² He refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans against Lacedæmon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos. That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers.

nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take for example the strength of the Lacedæmonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidæa and Methone and all the region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion. But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of war, that the possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present, those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such principle, he has won everything and keeps it, either by way of conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side with and respect those whom they see prepared and willing to make proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now, though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give his service to the state, be ready to give it without excuse, the wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing himself, while his neighbor does everything for

him, you shall then with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are who hate and fear and envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has advanced, who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and, while we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then, Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now? Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one another—is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should anything befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his own strength as by our negligence. And again; should anything happen to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them as you pleased;

but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis, you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor counsels at hand.

However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I say no more.

As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you from your difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the best and speediest method (in my judgment) of providing all the necessities, I shall endeavor to inform you forthwith, making only one request, men of Athens. When you have heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And let none think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak most to the purpose (for what has already happened we shall not be able to prevent by our present armament); but he that shows what and how great and whence procured must be the force capable of enduring, till either we have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall we escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show, without offence to any other man who has a plan to offer. My promise indeed is large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my judges.

First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships,³ and hold ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require also an equipment of

³ The Athenian ship of war at this time was the "trireme," or galley with three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak with a sharp iron head, which, in a charge (generally made at the broadside), was able to shatter the planks of the enemy's vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew and marines. These last were usually ten for each ship, but the number was often increased.

transports for half the cavalry,⁴ and sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden marches from his own country to Thermopylæ, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to Eubœa,⁵ and formerly (they say) to Haliartus,⁶ and very lately to Thermopylæ. And although you should not pursue just the course I would advise, it is no slight matter that Philip, knowing you to be in readiness—know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own people who report everything to him—may either keep quiet from apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard, there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,⁷ but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend—and beware of doing what has often

⁴ The total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one hundred.

⁵ The expedition about five years before, when the Thebans had sent an army to Eubœa, and Timotheus roused his countrymen to expel them from the island.

⁶ B.C. 395, when the war between Thebes and Sparta had begun, and Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.

⁷ Literally "written in letters"; that is, promised to the generals or allies, but never sent.

been injurious—thinking all measures below the occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish the least—rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right, serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so as to relieve one another: the rest should be mercenaries. And with them two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.

Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force, therefore, must not be over-large (for there is not pay or subsistence), nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary troops at Corinth,* commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others, and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told that these mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the Lacedæmonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves,

* He alludes to the time when Corinth, Athens, Thebes, and Argos were allied against Sparta, and held a congress at Corinth, B.C. 394. The allies were at first defeated, but Iphicrates gained some successes, and acquired considerable reputation by cutting off a small division of Spartan infantry.

they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go off to Artabazus⁹ or anywhere rather, and the general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses, both of general and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as inspectors of the general's conduct. The way we manage things now is a mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed, you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals¹⁰ of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians; should there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own commanders, that the force might really be the state's? Or should your general of horse sail to Lemnos,¹¹ while Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting

⁹ Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social war, having no money to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a victory for the satrap, and received a supply of money. But this led to a complaint and menace of war by the king, which brought serious consequences.

¹⁰ There were chosen at Athens every year, ten generals (one for each tribe) ten captains (one for each tribe), two generals of cavalry, ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe).

In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division, both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would be present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took place in later times when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three Athenian generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period only one. Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which we can well understand, viz., the necessity of officering the foreign mercenaries from home.

¹¹ To assist at a religious ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where many Athenians resided.

for your possessions? I speak not as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the person be.

Perhaps you admit the justice of these statements, but wish principally to hear about the supplies, what they must be and whence procured. I will satisfy you. Supplies, then, for maintenance, mere rations for these troops, come to ninety talents and a little more: for ten swift galleys forty talents, twenty minas a month to every ship; for two thousand soldiers forty more, that each soldier may receive for rations ten drachms a month; and for two hundred horsemen, each receiving thirty drachms a month, twelve talents. Should any one think rations for the men a small provision, he judges erroneously. Furnish that, and I am sure the army itself will, without injuring any Greek or ally, procure everything else from the war, so as to make out their full pay. I am ready to join the fleet as a volunteer, and submit to anything, if this be not so. Now for the ways and means of the supply, which I demand from you.

[Statement¹⁹ of ways and means]

This, Athenians, is what we have been able to devise. When you vote upon the resolutions, pass what you²⁰ approve, that you may oppose Philip, not only by decrees and letters, but by action also.

I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and the whole arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of the hostile country, and consider that Philip by

¹⁹ Here the clerk or secretary reads the scheme drawn up by Demosthenes, in the preparing of which he was probably assisted by the financial officers of the state. What follows was, according to Dionysius, spoken at a different time.

²⁰ *I.e.*, some measure, if not mine, whereby the war may be waged effectually.

the winds and seasons of the year gets the start in most of his operations, watching for the trade-winds¹⁴ or the winter to commence them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On this account we must carry on the war not with hasty levies (or we shall be too late for everything), but with a permanent force and power. You may use as winter quarters for your troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Sciathus, and the islands¹⁵ in that neighborhood, which have harbors and corn and all necessities for an army. In the season of the year, when it is easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they will easily take their station off the coast itself and at the entrances of the seaports.

How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed by you will determine as occasion requires. What you must find is stated in my bill. If, men of Athens, you will furnish the supplies which I mention, and then, after completing your preparations of soldiers, ships, cavalry, will oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service, and, while you become your own paymasters and commissaries, demand from your general an account of his conduct, you will cease to be always discussing the same questions without forwarding them in the least, and besides, Athenians, not only will you cut off his greatest revenue—What is this? He maintains war against you through the resources of your allies, by his piracies on their navigation—But what next? You will be out of the reach of injury yourselves: he will not do as in time past, when falling upon Lemnos and

¹⁴ The Etesian winds blowing from the northwest in July, which would impede a voyage from Athens to Macedonia and Thrace.

¹⁵ As Scopelus, Halonnesus, Peparethus, which were then subject to Athens.

Imbrus he carried off your citizens captive, seizing the vessels at Geræstus he levied an incalculable sum, and lastly, made a descent at Marathon and carried off the sacred galley¹⁶ from our coast, and you could neither prevent these things nor send succors by the appointed time. But how is it, think you, Athenians, that the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals¹⁷ take place always at the appointed time, whether expert or unqualified persons be chosen to conduct either of them, whereon you expend larger sums than upon any armament, and which are more numerous attended and magnificent than almost anything in the world; while all your armaments are after the time, as that to Methone, to Pagasæ, to Potidæa? Because in the former case everything is ordered by law, and each of you knows long beforehand who is the choir-master¹⁸ of his tribe, who the gymnastic¹⁹ master, when, from whom, and what he is to receive, and what to do. Nothing there is left unascertained or undefined: whereas in the business of war and its preparations all is irregular, unsettled, indefinite. Therefore, no sooner have we heard anything, than we appoint ship captains, dispute with them

¹⁶ A ship called "Paralus," generally used on religious missions or to carry public despatches.

¹⁷ The Panathenaic festivals were in honor of Pallas or Athene, the protectress of Athens, and commemorated also the union of the old Attic towns under one government. There were two, the greater held every fourth year, the lesser annually. They were celebrated with sacrifices, races, gymnastic and musical contests, and various other amusements and solemnities, among which was the carrying the pictured robe of Pallas to her temple.

¹⁸ The choregus, or choir-master, of each tribe, had to defray the expenses of the choruses, whether dramatic, lyric, or musical which formed part of the entertainment on solemn occasions. This was one of the burdensome offices to which men of property were liable at Athens.

¹⁹ The gymnasiarch, like the choregus, had a burden imposed on him by his tribe, to make certain provisions for the gymnasium, public place or school of exercise. Some of the contests at the festivals being of a gymnastic nature, such as the Torch-race, it was his duty to make arrangements for them, and more particularly to select the ablest youths of the school for performers.

on the exchanges," and consider about ways and means; then it is resolved that resident aliens and householders shall embark, then to put yourselves on board instead: but during these delays the objects of our expedition are lost; for the time of action we waste in preparation, and favorable moments wait not our evasions and delays. The forces that we imagine we possess in the meantime are found, when the crisis comes, utterly insufficient. And Philip has arrived at such a pitch of arrogance, as to send the following letter to the Eubœans:

[The letter is read]

Of that which has been read, Athenians, most is true, unhappily true; perhaps not agreeable to hear. And if what one passes over in speaking, to avoid offence, one could pass over in reality, it is right to humor the audience: but if graciousness of speech, where it is out of place, does harm in action, shameful is it, Athenians, to delude ourselves, and by putting off everything unpleasant to miss the time for all operations, and be unable even to understand that skilful makers of war should not follow circumstances, but be in advance of them; that just as a general may be expected to lead his armies, so are men of prudent counsel to guide circumstances, in order that their resolutions may be accomplished, not their motions determined by the event. Yet you, Athenians, with larger means than any people—ships, infantry, cavalry, and revenue—have never up to this day

³⁰ For every ship of war a captain, or trierarch, was appointed, whose duty it was, not merely to command, but take charge of the vessel, keep it in repair, and bear the expense (partly or wholly) of equipping it. In the Peloponnesian war we find the charge laid upon two joint captains, and afterward it was borne by an association formed like the *Symmoræ* of the Property Tax.

made proper use of any of them; and your war with Philip differs in no respect from the boxing of barbarians. For among them the party struck feels always for the blow; strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look in the face he cannot nor will. So you, if you hear of Philip in the Chersonese, vote to send relief there, if at Thermopylæ, the same; if anywhere else, you run after his heels up and down, and are commanded by him; no plan have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see beforehand, only "when you learn that something is done, or about to be done. Formerly, perhaps, this was allowable: now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our proceedings, has put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of things which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that none of you, Athenians, notices with concern and anger that the beginning of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will not stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for this? And if you despatch empty galleys and hopes from this or that person, think ye all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not

²¹ This loose mode of expression, which is found in the original, I designedly retain.

make a descent upon his coast? Where, then, shall we land? some one asks. The war itself, men of Athens, will discover the rotten parts of his empire, if we make a trial; but if we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse and malign one another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, were a portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with the rest, Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but where you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes from the hustings, nothing that you desire is done; your enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of such an armament. For it is impossible—ay, impossible, for one man to execute all your wishes: to promise,²² and assert, and accuse this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are ruined. The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here are persons easily found who tell you lies of his conduct; you vote at random from what you hear: what, then, can be expected?

How is this to cease, Athenians? When you make the same persons soldiers, and witnesses of the general's conduct, and judges when they return home at his audit;²³ so that you may not only hear of your own affairs, but be present to see them. So disgraceful is our condition now that every general is twice or thrice tried before you for his life, though none dares even once to

²² Chares is particularly alluded to. The "promises of Chares" passed into a proverb.

²³ The audit or scrutiny of his conduct which every officer of the republic had to undergo, before a jury if necessary, at the end of his administration. In the case of a general, the scrutiny would be like a court-martial. The Athenian people, says Demosthenes, as represented by the citizen soldiers, would themselves be witnesses of the general's conduct. These same soldiers, when they came home, or at least a portion of them, might serve on the jury; and so the people would be both witnesses and judges.

hazard his life against the enemy; they prefer the death of kidnappers and thieves to that which becomes them; for it is a malefactor's part to die by sentence of the law, a general's to die in battle. Among ourselves, some go about and say that Philip is concerting with the Lacedæmonians the destruction of Thebes and the dissolution of republics; some, that he has sent envoys to the king;* others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria: so we wander about, each inventing stories. For my part, Athenians, by the gods, I believe that Philip is intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits, and has many such dreams in his imagination, seeing the absence of opponents, and elated by success; but most certainly he has no such plan of action, as to let the silliest people among us know what his intentions are; for the silliest are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy, who robs us of our own and has long insulted us; that wherever we have expected aid from any quarter, it has been found hostile, and that the future depends on ourselves, and unless we are willing to fight him there, we shall, perhaps, be compelled to fight here. This let us remember, and then we shall have determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves it will be disastrous, unless you attend to your duty, and are willing to act as becomes you.

As for me, never before have I courted favor, by speaking what I am not convinced is for your good, and now I have spoken my whole mind frankly and unreservedly. I could have wished, knowing the advantage of good

* The king of Persia, generally called *the king* by the Greeks.

counsel to you, I were equally certain of its advantage to the counsellor: so should I have spoken with more satisfaction. Now, with an uncertainty of the consequence to myself, but with a conviction that you will benefit by adopting it, I proffer my advice. I trust only that what is most for the common benefit will prevail.

THE ORATION ON THE PEACE

THE ARGUMENT

TO UNDERSTAND as well the subject of this oration as the motives of Demosthenes, who here recommends a course of action different from the vigorous measures counselled by him on other occasions, it is necessary to take a short review of the preceding events, and observe the position in which Athens stood at the time when the speech was delivered.

Philip, after taking Olynthus, turned his thoughts to new objects, of which the more immediate were, first to get possession of the Greek towns on the Hellespont and the Chersonese; secondly, to get a footing in southern Greece. The first of these seemed comparatively easy since the reduction of Olynthus; the second was more difficult, and could only be accomplished by the aid or sufferance of certain Greek states. But the continuance of the Sacred war afforded Philip an opportunity of which he skilfully availed himself. Phalaecus, son of Onomarchus, had maintained his ground against the enemy, and both Thebans and Thessalians began to be desirous of Macedonian aid. But Athens was in alliance with Phocis, and Philip had seen some few years before, when the Athenians occupied the pass of Thermopylæ, that they were still capable of vigorous efforts, if under able direction or any strong excitement. It became therefore his policy to conciliate Athens for the present. He caused it to be announced by means of his agents and partisans, that he was desirous of peace, and reports of various acts of kindness done by him to Athenian citizens in Macedonia were studiously disseminated. This seems to have been the period at which Philip gained over to his interest, or even retained in his service, divers active members of the Athenian assembly. Among them was Philocrates, who first made a formal motion, that Philip should have leave to open a negotiation. Soon after he carried a decree to send ambassadors to Philip, and ten were despatched, among them Philocrates himself, Eschines, and Demosthenes. They returned with a letter from Philip,

and were soon followed by three Macedonian envoys of high distinction, Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus. The Athenians met in assembly; peace was determined on, and the ambassadors were again ordered to sail to Macedonia to receive the oath of Philip. In the meantime Philip had marched into Thrace, where he defeated Cersobleptes, the king of that country, and took possession of a part of his dominions. From this expedition he had not returned when the Athenian ambassadors arrived at Pella, the Macedonian capital. Here they waited a month, and, on Philip's return, were induced by that monarch, who had secretly prepared for his invasion of Phocis, to accompany him as far as Phæræ in Thessaly. From Phæræ they departed for Athens, and Philip marched straight to Thermopylæ. The Athenians, deceived by his promises, were lulled into security; Phalæcus, seeing no hope of assistance, withdrew from Phocis, while Philip, strengthened by the forces of Thessaly and Thebes, overran the country, and took possession of Delphi. An Amphictyonic council was convened to sit in judgment on the sacrilegious Phocians. Sentence was passed on them, which (besides other penalties) deprived them of their seat in the council of Amphictyons, and transferred their privileges to the king of Macedonia.

The first intelligence of these transactions was received at Athens with consternation. Measures were taken to put the city in a state of defence, as if an invasion were threatened. Philip sent a calm letter of remonstrance, which allayed the fears of the people, but did not abate their anger and ill humor. A feeling of disappointment was mingled with shame for their own credulity, and alarm at the increase of Macedonian influence. They saw, too, with deep vexation, that Philip, instead of conferring any benefit upon Athens, as they had fondly hoped he would, had exerted himself to promote the advantage of Thebes, which, by his assistance, recovered her subject Bœotian towns, and even obtained some of the Phocian territory for herself. Nothing more strongly marked the state of public feeling at Athens, than her refusal at this time to attend the Pythian games, at which Philip had been chosen to preside by the Amphictyonic decree. The Athenians by absenting themselves made a sort of protest against his election.

It was in this state of things that Macedonian ambassadors, accompanied by Thessalian and Bœotian, arrived at Athens, to demand from her a formal sanction of the decree by which Philip had become a member of the Amphictyonic council. An assembly was held to consider the question. The people were exceedingly clamorous, and applauded those orators who opposed the claim of Philip. Æschines, who supported it, could scarcely obtain a hearing. Demosthenes at length addressed the assembly, and, without advising any dishonorable submission, or even direct concession to what the envoys required, strongly dissuaded his countrymen from taking any course which might draw Athens into a war. It was not that Philip was less to be dreaded now than he was before; on the contrary, his power

had greatly increased; but this was not the time to provoke his hostility, backed as he was by Thessaly and Thebes; and even if Athens could stand alone against such a combination, a mere Amphictyonic title was not a proper subject of quarrel.

It appears that the Athenians came to no formal vote on this matter, but their anger was so far calmed by the arguments of Demosthenes, that the envoys departed with full confidence that the peace would not be broken.

I SEE, men of Athens, our affairs are in great perplexity and confusion, not only because many interests have been sacrificed, and it is useless to make fine speeches about them, but because, for preserving what remains, you cannot agree upon any single expedient, some holding one opinion, and some another. And besides, perplexing and difficult as deliberation of itself is, you, Athenians, have rendered it far more so. For other men usually hold counsel before action, you hold it after: the result of which during all the time of my remembrance has been, that the censurer of your errors gets repute and credit as a good speaker, while your interests and objects of deliberation are lost. Yet, even under these circumstances, I believe, and I have risen with the persuasion that if you will desist from wrangling and tumult, and listen as becomes men on a political consultation of such importance, I shall be able to suggest and advise measures by which our affairs may be improved and our losses retrieved.

Well as I know, Athenians, that to talk before you of one's self and one's own counsels is a successful artifice with unscrupulous men, I think it so vulgar and offensive, that I shrink from it even in a case of necessity. However, I think you will better appreciate what I shall say now, by calling to mind a little that I said on former occasions. For example, Athenians, when they were advising you in

the troubles of Euboea to assist Plutarch, and undertake a discreditable and expensive war, I, and I alone, stood forward to oppose it, and was nearly torn to pieces by the men who for petty lucre have seduced you into many grievous errors. A short time later, when you incurred disgrace, and suffered what no mortals ever did from parties whom they assisted, you all acknowledged the worthlessness of their counsels who misled you, and the soundness of mine. Again, Athenians, when I saw that Neoptolemus the actor, privileged under color of his profession, was doing serious mischief to the state, managing and directing things at Athens on Philip's behalf, I came and informed you, not from any private enmity or malice, as subsequent occurrences have shown. And herein I shall not blame the advocates of Neoptolemus (for there was none), but you yourselves; for had you been seeing a tragedy in the temple of Bacchus, instead of it being a debate on the public weal and safety, you could not have heard him with more partiality, or me with more intolerance. But I suppose you all now understand that he made his journey to the enemy, in order (as he said) to get the debts there owing to him, and defray thereout his public charges at home; and, after urging this argument, that it was hard to reproach men who brought over their effects from abroad. as soon as he obtained security through the peace he converted into money all the real estate which he possessed here, and has gone off with it to Philip. Thus two of my warnings, justly and rightfully pronounced in accordance with the truth, testify in my favor as a counsellor. A third, men of Athens, I will mention, this one only, and straight proceed to the subject of my address. When we ambassadors, after receiving the oaths on the peace, had

returned, and certain men were promising that Thespiæ and Platæ would be repeopled; that Philip, if he got the mastery, would save the Phocians, and disperse the population of Thebes; that Oropus would be yours, and Eubœa given as compensation for Amphipolis, with more of the like hopes and delusions, which led you on, against policy, equity and honor, to abandon the Phocians; you will find, I neither aided in any of these deceits, nor held my tongue. I warned you, as you surely remember, that I knew not of these things nor expected them, and deemed it all idle gossip.

These instances, wherein I have shown greater foresight than others, I mention not by way of boast, nor ascribe, Athenians, to any sagacity of my own, nor will I pretend to discover or discern the future from any but two causes, which I will state: first, men of Athens, through good fortune, which I observe beats all the craft and cleverness of man; secondly, because I judge and estimate things disinterestedly, and no one can show that any lucre is attached to my politics or my speeches. Therefore, whatever be your true policy, as indicated by the circumstances, I have a correct view of it; but when you put money on one side as in a balance, it carries away and pulls down the judgment with it, and he that does so can no longer reason upon anything justly or soundly.

The first thing which I maintain to be necessary is this. Whether you seek to obtain allies, or contribution,¹ or aught else for the state, do it without disturbing the present peace; not that it is very glorious or worthy of

¹ *I.e.*, money contributed by allies. When the Athenians re-established their confederacy, which had been dissolved by the Peloponnesian war, the payments received from the allies received the name of *contributions*, as less obnoxious than *tribute*.

you, but, whatever be its character, it had better suited our interests never to have made peace than to break it ourselves: for we have thrown away many advantages, which would have rendered the war then safer and easier for us than it can be now. Secondly, Athenians, we must take care that these people assembled and calling themselves Amphietyons³ are not by us necessitated, or furnished with a plea, to make a common war against us. I grant, if we renewed the war with Philip on account of Amphipolis, or any such private quarrel, in which Thesalians, Argives and Thebans are not concerned, none of them would join in it, and least of all—hear me before you cry out—the Thebans: not that they are kindly disposed to us, or would not gratify Philip, but they see clearly, stupid as one may think them, that, if they had a war with you, the hardships would all be theirs, while another sat waiting for the advantages. Therefore they would not throw themselves into it, unless the ground and origin of the war were common. So if we again went to war with the Thebans for Oropus or any private cause, I should fear no disaster, because our respective auxiliaries would assist us or them, if either country were invaded,

³ The Amphietyonic league, at the head of which Philip was now placed, was a federal union of Hellenic (or Greek) tribes, having for its object the maintenance of a common religion and nationality. The various deputies met twice a year, in the spring at Delphi, in the autumn at Anthela near Thermopylae. They met, not only to celebrate games and festivals, but to transact the business of the league, to determine questions of international law and religion. The oracular sanctity of Delphi gave a dignity to these meetings, but the rivalry and jealousies of the more powerful Greek states did not permit them (in general) to be controlled by Amphietyonic decrees. The three Sacred wars are instances in which their decrees were enforced by combination; but in the last two, for which Philip's aid was invited, there was but little enthusiasm in the cause from any motive of religion or patriotism. The meeting at which Philip had been chosen president was so tumultuous and irregular, that the Athenians would not allow it to be a legal convocation of the Amphietyonic body. Philip greatly resented this, because his election was considered to establish the title of his countrymen to rank among the Greek nations.

but would join with neither in aggression. Such is the spirit of alliances that are worth regard, and so the thing naturally is. People are not friendly either to us or the Thebans, to the extent of equally desiring our safety and our predominance. Safe they would all have us for their own sakes; dominant, so as to become their masters, they would not have either of us. What then, say I, is the danger? what to be guarded against? Lest in the coming war there be found a common plea, a common grievance for all. If Argives, and Messenians, and Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians, who are in league with them, are hostile to us on account of our negotiating with the Lacedæmonians and seeming to take up some of their enterprises; if the Thebans are (as they say) our enemies, and will be more so, because we harbor their exiles and in every way manifest our aversion to them; Thessalians again, because we harbor the Phocian exiles, and Philip, because we oppose his admission to the Amphictyonic body; I fear that, each incensed on a private quarrel, they will combine to bring war upon you, setting up the decrees of the Amphictyons, and be drawn on (beyond what their single interests require) to battle it with us, as they did with the Phocians. For you are surely aware, that now the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians have co-operated, without having each exactly the same views. For example, the Thebans could not hinder Philip from advancing and occupying the passes, nor yet from coming last and having the credit of their labors. True, in respect of territorial acquisition, something has been done for them; but in regard to honor and reputation, they have fared wretchedly; since, had Philip not stepped in, they would (it seems) have got nothing. This

was not agreeable to them, but having the wish without the power to obtain Orchomenos and Coronea, they submitted to it all. Of Philip, you know, some persons venture to say, that he would not have given Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, but was compelled to do so. I wish them joy of their opinion,³ but thus far I believe that he cared not so much about that business, as he desired to occupy the passes, and have the glory of the war, as being determined by his agency, and the direction of the Pythian games. Such were the objects of his ambition. The Thessalians wished not either Philip or Thebes to be aggrandized, since in both they saw danger to themselves; but sought to obtain these two advantages, the synod at Thermopylæ, and the privileges at Delphi;⁴ for which objects they aided the confederacy. Thus you will find that each party has been led into many acts unwillingly; and against this danger, being such as I describe, you must take precautions.

³ Demosthenes did not entirely scout the suggestion made with regard to Philip's views; but perhaps he thought that Philip could not venture to offend his Theban allies then; and one of the means of humbling Athens was, to increase the power of her neighbor. If it be asked why Philip might not have seized upon Elatea at this time, as well as eight years later, I should say, not on account of the peace with Athens, but because he desired to rest upon his Amphictyonic honors, and have the full benefit of the moral ascendancy which he had acquired. It was not clear that his grand object, which was rather to lead than to conquer Greece, might not be obtained without a war against any of her principal states. Afterward, when the Athenians, under the active administration of Demosthenes, baffled his efforts in the north, and showed a determination to counteract all his projects, it became necessary for him to strike a decisive blow, even at the risk of irritating Thebes. He ran this risk, and succeeded, but not without danger.

⁴ The Thessalians were peculiarly aggrieved by their exclusion (during the Sacred war) from the national synod, and from the oracle and festivities of Delphi. Their country had been the cradle of the Hellenic race, their deputies were the most numerous in the council, and their vicinity to the places of meeting gave them a greater interest in the proceedings. Hence they most eagerly pressed for punishment of the Phocians. To gratify the Thessalians, Philip put them in possession of Nicea, one of the towns near the pass of Thermopylæ, but even there he kept a Macedonian garrison. The Thebans had expected to have that town themselves, and were disappointed.

Must we then do as we are bidden, for fear of the consequences? and do you recommend this? Far from it. I advise you so to act, as not to compromise your dignity, to avoid war, to prove yourselves right-thinking, just-speaking men. With those who think we should boldly suffer anything, and do not foresee the war, I would reason thus. We permit the Thebans to have Oropus; and if one asked us why, and required a true answer, we should say, To avoid war. And to Philip now we have ceded Amphipolis by treaty, and allow the Cardians⁵ to be excepted from the other people of the Chersonese; and the Carian⁶ to seize the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to detain⁷ our vessels; evidently because we think the tranquillity of peace more beneficial than strife and contest about such questions. It were folly then and utter absurdity, after dealing thus with each party singly on matters of vital moment to ourselves, to battle now with them all for a shadow at Delphi.

THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of Philip was called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions between Sparta and her old enemies afforded him an occasion of interference. The Spartans had never abandoned their right to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested

⁵ Cardia was a city at the northwestern extremity of the Chersonese, and from its position on the isthmus was considered the key of the peninsula. Among the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes, Cardia had not been included; but the Athenians afterward laid claim to it, and Philip supported the Cardians in resisting that claim.

⁶ Idrieus, king of Caria, who was now in possession of these islands, which had revolted from Athens in the Social war.

⁷ Compel them to go into their port to pay harbor duties.

from them by Epaminondas; and since Thebes was no longer to be feared, they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost power. The Argives and the Arcadians of Megalopolis were in league with Messenia, but Sparta had her allies in the Peloponnesus, and even Athens was suspected of favoring her cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities had taken place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the Peninsula. The progress which Macedonian influence was making there having alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with an embassy to counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos, addressed the people, and pointed out the dangers to which all Greece was exposed by Philip's ambition. It seems that he failed in rousing their suspicions, or they were too much occupied by an immediate peril to heed one that appeared remote. Philip, however, resented this proceeding on the part of the Athenians, and sent an embassy to expostulate with them, especially on the charge of bad faith and treachery which had been preferred against him by Demosthenes. Ambassadors from Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens and Lacedæmon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties of Peloponnesus. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly; repeating the substance of what he had said to the Peloponnesians, vindicating his own conduct, and denouncing the Macedonian party at Athens. The embassy led to no immediate result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.

IN ALL the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made on our behalf are thought just and generous,¹ and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of Athens brought that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece, the more difficult it becomes to advise

¹ *Generous*, as regards the Greek states, whose independence the Athenians stand up for. This praise Demosthenes frequently claims for his countrymen, and, compared with the rest of the Greeks, they deserved it.

you how to act. The cause lies in all of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings shrink from our duty, of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only declaim on the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue justly, or comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his designs, are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest about; Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and there is no trouble: but if we are to take measures for the correction of these evils, to prevent their insensible progress, and the rising up of a mighty power, against which we could have no defence, then our course of deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and agreeable.

First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons why I am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may give your adherence to them.

Thus, then, I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master of after the peace? Thermop-

ylæ and the Phocian state. Well, and how used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace, quiet, or justice, he saw plainly that to a people of our character and principles nothing could he offer or give that would induce you for self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you, having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him in everything else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal, when Alexander,* this man's ancestor, came as herald to

* Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks. The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is related by Herodotus.

negotiate, but preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention, though none could ever speak them worthily, and, therefore, I must be silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought, then, if he chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached himself to them, he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.

Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the least open to him. He that bids the Lacedæmonians resign Messene, how can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans, to have acted on a conviction of justice?

But, forsooth, he was compelled—this plea remains—he made concessions against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust the Thebans; and some carry news about that he will fortify Elatea. All this he intends and will intend, I dare say; but to

attack the Lacedæmonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected himself with a great force. The Lacedæmonians, who are enemies of Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed, will he now preserve?

And who can believe this? I cannot think that Philip, either if he was forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove to a correct observer that his whole plan of action is against our state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him, since by retaining what belongs to you he secures the rest of his dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he deemed himself unsafe at home. He knows, therefore, both that he is plotting against you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you. Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from dulness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is better they should be repeated to you.

Ye men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have brooked to hear anything against Philip at those times, when he surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidæa, taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicæa and Magnesia, they expected to have the decemvirate* which is now established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylæ† would take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may never know him

* Thessaly was anciently divided into four districts, each called a *tetras*, and this was restored soon after the termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great Thessalian families by a division of power. The decemvirate here spoken of was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we adopt the opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of ten, or that each city was placed under ten governors. Jacobs understands the word *decemvirate* not to refer to any positive form of government, but generally to designate a *tyranny*, such as that which the Lacedæmonians used to introduce into conquered cities. However this be, Philip seems to have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the decadarchy, should be his own creatures.

† *Pylæ*, which signifies *gates*, was a name applied by the Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of *Thermopylæ*, which opened through the ridges of Mount Ceta into the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot sulphurous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountains.

for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands, and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking deliverance from war, you find a master?

They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship and promises. And no wonder that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion, will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's ease and indulgence prevail over distant advantage.

As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the assembly to decide upon.

[Here the proposed answer was read]

It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never have submitted to go

as ambassador, and you would certainly not have discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace, would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay, and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared—after the peace, when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when, perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the abandonment of Thermopylæ and the Phocians—that I, being a water drinker,⁵ was naturally a churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would do just as you desired, fortify Thespiæ and Platæa, humble the Thebans, cut through the Chersonese⁶ at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Eubœa in exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries. And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination before you, and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no

⁵ It was Philocrates who said this. There were many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.

⁶ This peninsula being exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce Acte, to protect the Athenian settlements.

longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I fear, then, as your ambassadors have concealed the purpose for which they know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on persons most in their power. While, therefore, the mischief is only coming and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was¹ persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylæ, by the command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus, and has brought it to this that your deliberation must be, not about claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defence of your home and a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and, indeed, it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would he have marched with a land force by Phocis and Thermopylæ: he must either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.

¹ He means *Æschines*.

THE ORATION ON HALONNESUS

THE ARGUMENT

THE occasion from which this oration has received its title, was a dispute between Philip and the Athenians concerning the small island of Halonnesus, which lies off the coast of Thessaly, below the entrance to the Thermaic gulf. A group of small islands here, among which were also Sciathus, Scopelus, and Peparethus, belonged to Athens. Halonnesus, not long after the termination of the Phocian war, was taken by a pirate named Sostratus. He, having given annoyance to Philip, was expelled by that king from the island; but Philip, instead of restoring it to the Athenians, kept it in his own hands. At this the Athenians took umbrage, and probably thought that Halonnesus being so near to Euboea, as well as to the other islands, it might be dangerous to leave it in Philip's possession. An embassy was sent to Macedonia, B.C. 343, to negotiate about this, and also various other subjects of dispute which at that time existed, such as Amphipolis, Potidæa, and the affairs of the Chersonese. At the head of the embassy was Hegesippus, a friend of Demosthenes. The claims made by the Athenians were deemed by Philip so preposterous that he rejected them at once, and dismissed the envoys. Soon after, he sent an embassy to Athens, with a letter written by himself, in which he pointed out the extravagance of their demands, but expressed his willingness to make certain concessions. With respect to Halonnesus, he contended that it had become his by conquest, the Athenians having lost it, but offered to make them a present of the island. The letter was read in the assembly. All that we know of it is from the following speech, in which the orator comments on its various statements, and endeavors to show that Philip was in the wrong. The whole of the speech has not come down to us; for it appears to have contained a resolution, moved by the orator, by way of reply to Philip.

Most modern critics, following Libanius, have come to the opinion, that not Demosthenes, but Hegesippus, was the author of this oration. The argument rests, not only upon the style of the oration itself, which is beneath the general character of Demosthenes, but also on collateral circumstances. There is, indeed, good evidence that Demosthenes made a speech on the same question, and also that he took the same views upon it as Hegesippus, with whom he generally agreed in politics. This may account for the fact, that the only extant speech on the subject has been attributed to Demosthenes, when his own is lost.

THE ORATION ON HALONNESUS

MEN of Athens, never can we who maintain your rights in this assembly be deterred by the complaints of Philip from advising you for the best. It would be monstrous, if our privilege on the hustings could be destroyed by his epistles. I will first, men of Athens, go through the articles of Philip's letter; and then I will answer the statements of the ambassadors.

Philip begins about Halonnesus, saying, it belongs to him, but he gives it you. He denies your claim to restitution, as he neither took it from Athens, nor detains it from her. He addressed the like argument to us, on our embassy to Macedon; that he had won the island from pirates, and it was properly his own. It is not difficult to deprive him of this argument by showing its fallacy. All pirates seizing places wrongfully, and fortifying themselves therein, make excursions to annoy other people. One who has chastised and vanquished the pirates surely cannot urge with reason that what they robbed the owners of becomes his property. If you grant this, then, supposing that pirates seized a place in Attica, or Lemnos, or Imbrus, or Scyrus, and some persons dislodged the pirates, what is to prevent that place where the pirates were, and which belonged to us, from instantly becoming their property who chastised the pirates? Philip is not ignorant of the injustice of this plea; he knows it better than any one; but he expects you will be cajoled by a set of men, who, having undertaken to manage things here as he desires, are performing that service now. Moreover, he cannot fail to see that under either title, whichever you adopt,

you will have the island, whether it be given, or given back. Why, then, is it material to him, not to use the just phrase and restore it to you, but to use the unjust, and make it a present? His object is, not to charge it to you as an obligation (for such an obligation would be ridiculous), but to display to all Greece that the Athenians are glad to receive their maritime dependencies from the Macedonian. This you must not allow, men of Athens.

When he says that he wishes to submit to arbitration on these questions, he only mocks you, in asking Athenians to refer a dispute with a man of Pella concerning their title to the islands. And besides, if your power, which delivered Greece, is unable to preserve your maritime dominion, and the judges to whom you refer, and with whom the award rests, preserve it for you, supposing Philip does not corrupt them; do you not confessedly, by taking such course, renounce all possessions on the continent, and demonstrate to the world that you will not contend with him for any, when even for possessions on the sea, where you consider your strength lies, you contend not by arms, but litigation?

Further, he says he has sent commissioners here to settle a judicial treaty,¹ to be in force not after ratification in your court, as the law commands, but after reference

¹ Arrangements were sometimes made between different countries for the administration of justice between their respective people. These arrangements would embrace certain general principles of jurisprudence, according to which any dispute between a native and an alien should be determined by the tribunal of either country; the complainant always seeking justice in the court of his adversary's domicile. Thus, supposing such a legal tariff to be agreed upon between Athens and Philip, an Athenian having a complaint against one of his subjects would prefer his suit in Macedonia, but the judge must decide the cause not entirely by Macedonian law, but in accordance with the articles of the compact; and conversely if a Macedonian were the plaintiff.

to him; giving an appeal to himself from your judgment. He wishes to get this advantage of you, and procure an admission in the treaty, that you make no complaint for his aggressions on Potidæa, but confirm the lawfulness both of his taking and holding it. Yet the Athenians who dwelt in Potidæa, while they were not at war, but in alliance with Philip, and notwithstanding the oath which Philip swore to the inhabitants of Potidæa, were deprived by him of their property. I say, he wishes to get your absolute acknowledgment, that you complain not of these wrongful acts, nor deem yourselves injured. That there is no need of a judicial treaty between Athens and Macedonia, past times may suffice to show. Neither Amyntas, Philip's father, nor any other kings of Macedon, ever had such a contract with our state; although the intercourse between us was formerly greater than it is now: for Macedonia was dependent on us, and paid us tribute,* and we then resorted to their ports, and they to ours, more frequently than now, and there were not the monthly sittings punctually held, as at present, for mercantile causes,[†] dispensing with the necessity of a law-treaty between such distant countries. Though nothing of the sort then existed, it was not requisite to make a treaty, so that people should sail from Macedonia to Athens for justice, or Athenians to Macedonia: we obtained redress by their laws and they by ours. Be assured, therefore, these articles are drawn

* We have seen a similar boast in the third Olynthiac. But neither of the statements is to be understood as strictly true. While the kings of Macedonia possessed no towns on the coast, they (no doubt) submitted to the maritime supremacy of Athens, and paid harbor dues and tolls, which might be called tribute in loose language.

[†] The sittings here alluded to had not very long been established. They were held in the six winter months for the speedy trial of mercantile suits.

for an admission that you have no further pretence for claiming Potidæa.

As to pirates, you ought jointly, he says, you and himself, to guard the sea against these depredators: but he really asks to be introduced by us to maritime power, for you to confess that you are unable even to keep guard of the sea without Philip, and further for the privilege to be granted him of sailing about and touching at the islands under the pretence of watching pirates, so that he may corrupt the islanders and seduce them from you; and besides restoring to Thasus⁴ by means of your commanders the exiles whom he harbored, he designs to gain over the other islands, by sending his agents to sail with your commanders on the joint protective service. And yet some persons deny that he wants the sea. But, without any want, he is equipping galleys, building docks, seeking to send out armaments and incur no trifling expense for maritime enterprises on which he sets no value.

Do you think, then, Athenians, that Philip would ask you to make these concessions, if he did not despise you, and rely on the men whom he has chosen to be his friends here? men who are not ashamed to live for Philip and not for their country, and think they carry home his presents, when all at home they sell!

Concerning the peace, which the ambassadors sent by him⁵ permitted us to amend, because we made an amend-

⁴ Thasus is an island off the coast of Thrace opposite the mouth of the Nestus. It was celebrated for its wine, and also for its marble quarries and mines. The gold mines on the adjacent continent belonged to the Thasians, when they were seized by Philip. The island, having been wrested from the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war, was afterward recovered, and at this time they kept a garrison in it.

⁵ This Macedonian embassy preceded the one from Athens which Hegesippus conducted, and which conveyed the Athenian proposals for the amendment of the treaty.

ment which all mankind allow to be just, that each party should hold his own, he denies that he gave the permission, or that his ambassadors so stated to you; doubtless, having been instructed by his friends here, that you remember not what is said before the people. This, however, of all things it is impossible for you to forget; since it was in the same assembly that his ambassadors addressed you, and that the decree was drawn; and so it is not possible, as the words had just been spoken and the decree was instantly read, that you could have passed a resolution which misrepresented the ambassadors. Wherefore, this charge in his letter is not against me, but against you, that you sent a decree in answer to something which you never heard. And the ambassadors themselves, whom the decree misrepresented, when you read them your answer and invited them to partake your hospitality, ventured not to come forward and say, "You misrepresent us, Athenians, and make us to have stated what we never did," but went their way in silence.

I wish, men of Athens (as Python,* who was then ambassador, obtained credit with you for his address), to remind you of the very words which he spoke. I am sure you will remember them; they were exactly like what Philip has now written. While he complained of us who decry Philip, he found fault with you also, that notwithstanding his intentions to serve you, his preference of your

* Python of Byzantium, who was an able speaker and diplomatist, and employed with great advantage by Philip in his negotiations with other states. Demosthenes seems to have been the only man who could cope with him, and boasts in his speech on the Crown that on one occasion he reduced him to silence in the presence of a multitude of ambassadors. Perhaps it was on the embassy here referred to; or it might be on that which gave occasion to the second Philippic. It is probable, but not certain, that this was the same Python who murdered Cotys, king of Thrace.

friendship to that of any of the Greeks, you oppose him yourselves, and listen to slanderers who ask him for money and abuse him: that by such language—when people report that he was calumniated, and you listened to it—his feelings are altered, finding himself mistrusted by those whom he had purposed to befriend. He therefore advised the public speakers not to disparage the peace, for it were better not to break peace; but if there were aught amiss in the articles, to rectify it, as Philip would concur in any resolution of yours. Should they persist in slander, without proposing anything themselves, by which the peace might stand and Philip cease to be suspected, you ought not (he said) to attend to such persons.

You heard and approved these statements, and said that Python's argument was just. And just it was. But he made those statements, not that any articles might be cancelled which were advantageous to Philip, and for the insertion of which he had spent large sums of money, but at the suggestion of his instructors here, who thought no man would move anything counter to the decree of Philocrates, which lost Amphipolis. I, men of Athens, have never dared to make an unlawful motion, but I made one contravening the decree of Philocrates, which was unlawful, as I will show. The decree of Philocrates, according to which you lost Amphipolis, ran counter to the former decrees, through which you acquired that territory. Therefore that decree of Philocrates was unlawful, and it was impossible for the author of a legal motion to move in accordance with an unlawful decree. But moving in accordance with those former decrees, which were lawful and preserved your territory, I moved a lawful resolution, and convicted Philip of deceiving you, and desiring, not to

amend the peace, but to bring your honest counsellors into discredit.

That he then allowed the amendment and now denies it, you all know. But he says Amphipolis belongs to him, because you declared it to be his, when you resolved he should keep what he held.¹ You did indeed pass that resolution, but not that Amphipolis should be his: for it is possible to hold the property of another, and all holders hold not their own. Many possess what belongs to others; therefore this sophistry of his is absurd. And he remembers the decree of Philocrates, but has forgotten the letter which he sent you when he was besieging Amphipolis, in which he acknowledged that Amphipolis was yours; for he promised after its reduction to restore it to Athens, as it belonged to her, and not to the holders. So they, it seems, who occupied Amphipolis before Philip's conquest, held the domain of Athenians, but, since Philip has conquered it, he holds not the domain of Athenians, but his own. Olynthus, too, Apollonia and Pallene, belong to him, not by usurpation, but in his own right. Think you he studies in all his despatches to you, to show himself by word and deed an observer of what the world calls justice, or rather has he set it at defiance, when a land, which the Greeks and the Persian monarch have voted and acknowledged to be yours, he asserts to be not yours, but his own?

As to the other amendment which you made in the articles, that the Greeks not included in the peace should be free and independent, and, if any one attacked them,

¹ The treaty had for its basis the principle of the *uti possidetis*, to adopt the expression of modern diplomacy. According to the true construction of this, Amphipolis would belong to Philip, and the reasoning of the orator is unsound. But no doubt, in the whole affair of Amphipolis, and the peace also, Philip overreached the Athenians.

should be succored by all parties to the treaty, you deeming it equitable and righteous, that not only we and our allies, and Philip and his allies, should enjoy the peace, while those who were neither our allies nor Philip's were exposed, and might be oppressed by the powerful, but that they also should have security by your peace, and we should lay down our arms and enjoy peace in reality; although he confesses in the letter, as you hear, that this amendment is just, and that he allows it, he has taken their town from the Pheræans and put a garrison in the citadel, doubtless to make them independent; he marches against Ambracia,⁸ bursts into three Cassopian⁹ cities, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elatea, colonies of Elis, after ravaging their territories, and gives them in vassalage to his kinsman Alexander. Proofs how much he desires the freedom and independence of Greece!

Respecting his continual promises of doing you important service, he says that I misrepresent and slander him to the Greeks; for he never promised you anything. So impudent is this man, who has written in a letter, which is now in the senate house (when he declared he would silence us his opponents if the peace were made), that he would confer on you such an obligation as, were he sure of the peace, he would instantly communicate; implying that these favors, intended for us in the event of peace,

⁸ Philip's expedition against Ambracia followed the campaign in Epirus, which took place in B.C. 343. His designs against Ambracia were defeated by the exertions of the Athenians, who formed a league against him, and sent troops to assist the Ambracians. Demosthenes in the third Philippic speaks of an embassy, in which both himself and Hegesippus were engaged, which had the effect of stopping Philip's invasion of Ambracia and Peloponnesus.

⁹ Cassopia is a district of Epirus, which Philip invaded, B.C. 343, and added to the kingdom of Alexander his brother-in-law, between whom and Philip's uncle, Arymbas, the province of Epirus was divided. The Cassopian Elatea must not be confounded with the Phocian.

were ready and provided. After the peace was made, the good things intended for us all vanished, and among the Greeks has been wrought such ruin as you have seen. In his present letter he promises you, that if you will trust his friends and advocates, and punish us who slander him to the people, he will greatly serve you. Such, however, will be the character of his service; he will not return you your own, for he claims it himself; nor will his grants be in this part of the world, for fear of offending the Greeks: but I suppose some other land and locality will be found where his gifts may take effect.

As to the places which he has taken during the peace, taken from you in contempt of the treaty and violation of its terms, since he has nothing to urge, but stands convicted of injustice, he offers to submit to a fair and impartial tribunal, on a question which, of all others, requires no arbitration, for the number of days determines it. We all know the month and the day when the peace was concluded. As surely do we know in what month and on what day Serrium, Ergisce, and the Sacred Mount¹⁰ were taken. These transactions are not so obscure; they need no trial; it is notorious to all which month was the earlier, that in which the peace was signed or that in which the places were captured.

He says also that he has returned all our prisoners who were taken in war. Yet in the case of that Carystian,¹¹ the

¹⁰ These were places in Thrace, taken by Philip from Cersobleptes.

¹¹ Carystus is a town of Eubœa. The Proxenus, or public friend of a foreign state, was one who protected its interests in his own country, performing duties not unlike that of a modern consul. A relation of mutual hospitality subsisted between him and the citizens of the friendly state; and he was expected to entertain the ambassadors, or any persons who came on public business.

friend of our state, for whom you sent three embassies to demand his liberty, Philip was so anxious to oblige you that he killed the man, and would not even suffer him to be taken up for burial.

It is worth while to examine what he writes to you about the Chersonese, and likewise to ascertain what his conduct is. All the district beyond Agora,¹⁸ as if it were his own, and belonged not to you, he has given into the possession of Apollonides the Cardian. Yet the boundary of the Chersonese is not Agora, but the altar of Terminal Jupiter, which is between Pteleum and Leuce-Acte, where the canal was to be cut through the Chersonese, as the inscription on the altar of Terminal Jupiter shows. Mark the words:

This holy altar built by native hands,
'Twixt Pteleum and the Chalky Beach it stands,
Stands for the limit of their just domains,
The guardian He who in Olympus reigns.

This territory, large as most of you know it to be, he claims: part he enjoys himself, part he has given to others, and so he reduces all your property into his possession. And not only does he appropriate the country beyond Agora, but also with reference to the Cardians, who dwell on this side Agora, he writes in his present letter, that if you have any difference with the Cardians (who dwell in your dominions), you must refer it to arbitration. They have a difference with you; see if it is about a small mat-

¹⁸ This was a place in the Chersonese, the whole of which, except Cardia, belonged to Athens. The orator contends, that the boundary of the Chersonese was a line drawn across the isthmus from Pteleum to Leuce-Acte, the latter of which places was probably named from the white cliffs on the beach. In the centre of this line was erected the altar, which anciently separated the boundaries of those towns. Agora was within the line.

ter. They say, the land they inhabit belongs to them, not to you; that yours are mere occupations in a foreign country, theirs are possessions in their own; and that your fellow-citizen, Callippus of Pæania,¹⁸ alleged this in a decree. And here they are right; he did so allege, and, on my indicting him for an unlawful measure, you acquitted him; and thus he has caused your title to the land to be contested. But if you could bring yourselves to refer this dispute with the Cardians, whether the land be yours or theirs, why should not the other people of the Chersonese be dealt with on the same principle? His treatment of you is so insolent, that he says, if the Cardians will not submit to arbitration, he will compel them, as if you were unable even to compel Cardians to do you justice. As you are unable, he says he will himself compel them. Don't you really find him a great benefactor? And some men have declared this epistle to be well written; men who are far more deserving of your detestation than Philip. He, by constant opposition to you, acquires honor and signal advantage for himself: Athenians who exhibit zeal, not for their country, but for Philip, are wretches that ought to be exterminated by you, if you carry your brains in your temples, and not trodden down in your heels.

It now remains that to this well-drawn epistle and the speeches of the ambassadors I propose an answer, which in my opinion is just and expedient for Athens.

¹⁸ Pæania is one of the townships into which Attica was divided. Libanius says, it was Hegesippus who preferred this indictment against Callippus.

THE ORATION ON THE CHERSONESE

THE ARGUMENT

THE Athenians had sent a body of citizens, commanded by Diopithes, to receive allotments of land in the Chersonese, and at the same time to protect the interests of Athens by acting as an army of observation. They soon fell into disputes with the Cardians about the limits of their territory. Philip, who at this time was engaged in a Thracian war, sent assistance to the Cardians; but Diopithes, having collected a troop of mercenaries, kept the field successfully, and, not content with acting on the defensive, carried the war into Thrace, assisted the enemies of Philip, and wrested from him some of his conquests. Philip, who, as we have seen in the last oration, had written before to the Athenians on the subject of Cardia, now wrote them a letter complaining of the conduct of Diopithes, charging them with an infringement of the peace. This letter arrived early in the summer of the year B.C. 342, and an assembly was immediately called to consider what measures should be taken. The Macedonian party were vehement in denouncing Diopithes, and urging his recall. Demosthenes, seeing that Athens, though nominally at peace with Philip, was really defending herself against his aggressions, rose to justify Diopithes, insisted on the necessity, which he had so strongly urged in the first Philippic, of keeping a permanent force on the northern coast, and contended that the army of Diopithes should rather be reinforced than recalled at a time when its presence was peculiarly necessary. He again warns his countrymen of impending danger, and points out the measures which, as men of spirit and prudence, they ought to pursue.

This oration is full of good sense and manly eloquence. It had the success which it deserved. Diopithes was continued in his command; and the exertions of Athens in the next few years had the effect of preserving the Chersonese and the Bosphorus.

Diopithes was father to Menander, the celebrated comic poet, whose plays have been copied by Terence.

IT WERE just, men of Athens, that the orators in your assembly should make no speeches to gratify either friendship or malice, but every one declare what he considers for the best, especially when you are deliberating on public measures of importance. However, since there

are persons who are impelled to address you from factious motives, or others which I cannot name, it becomes you, Athenians, the majority, laying all else aside, to determine and to do what you find beneficial to the state. The serious question here is, the position of the Chersonese, and the campaign in Thrace, which Philip has now for upward of ten months been carrying on; yet most of the speeches have been about Diopithes, his conduct and designs. It seems to me that on a charge against any of these men, whom according to the laws you may punish when you please, it is in your option either to proceed immediately or at a later time, and needless for me, or for any one, to argue the point strongly; but for the defence of our dominions, which Philip, our standing enemy, and now in great force about the Hellespont, is making haste to conquer, and, if we are once too late, we shall never recover, our duty is to consult and prepare with the utmost speed, and not for clamors and charges about other matters to run off from this.

I wonder at many things which are commonly said here, but I have been particularly surprised, Athenians, at what I lately heard a man declare in the Council,¹ that a statesman's advice should be, either to make war decidedly, or to observe the peace. True; if Philip keeps quiet, neither holding any of our territories contrary to the treaty, nor packing a world of enemies against us, there is nothing to say: peace we must absolutely observe, and I see every readiness on your part. But if the conditions of the peace, which we swore to, are recorded and open to inspection; if it appears that, from the beginning (before Diopithes

¹ The Council or Senate of Five Hundred, of which Demosthenes became a member when he was thirty-six years of age.

and the settlers,² who are accused as authors of the war, ever sailed from Athens), Philip has robbed us of divers territories, of which you still complain in these unrepealed resolutions, and has been all along incessantly gathering the spoil of other nations, Greek and barbarian, for the materials of an attack upon you, what mean they by saying we must have war or peace? We have no choice in the matter: there remains but one most just and necessary course, which these men purposely overlook. What is it? To defend ourselves against an aggressor. Unless indeed they mean that, so long as Philip keeps aloof from Attica and Piræus, he neither wrongs you nor commits hostility.³ But if they put our rights on this principle, and so define the peace, besides that the argument is iniquitous, monstrous, and perilous for Athens, as I imagine is evident to all, it happens also to be inconsistent with their complaint against Diopithes. For why, I wonder, should we give Philip license to do what he pleases, provided he abstain from Attica, while Diopithes is not suffered even to assist the Thracians, without our saying that he makes war? Here, it will be granted, they are shown in the wrong: but the mercenaries make sad work ravaging the Hellespontine coast, and Diopithes has no right to detain vessels, and we must not allow him! Well; be it so! I am content. Yet I think, if they really give this counsel in good faith, as their object is to disband a force in your service, while they denounce the general who maintains it, they ought likewise to show that Philip's army will be disbanded if

² The settlers were citizens sent out to receive parcels of land in some country dependent on Athens, but who still retained rights of Athenian citizenship, whether or not they permanently resided abroad.

³ Philip sought to conquer Athens in Thrace, as Napoleon to conquer England in Egypt or Portugal.

you follow their advice. Otherwise, observe, they just bring the country into the same way, through which all our past measures have miscarried. For you surely know, that by nothing in the world has Philip beaten us so much as by being earlier in his operations. He with an army always attending him, knowing his own designs, pounces on whom he pleases in a moment:⁴ we, when we hear that something is going on, begin to bustle and prepare. Methinks the result is, that he very quietly secures what he goes for; we arrive too late, and have incurred all the expense for nothing. Our enmity and our hostile intention we manifest, and get the disgrace of missing the time for action.

Then be sure, Athenians, now, that all the rest is talk and pretence, the real aim and contrivance is, that while you remain at home, and the country has no force abroad, Philip may accomplish what he pleases without interruption. First, consider what is actually going on. Philip is staying with a large army in Thrace, and sending for reinforcements, as eye-witnesses report, from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now, should he wait for the trade-winds, and then march to the siege of Byzantium,⁵ think ye the Byzantines would persist in their present folly, and would not invite you and implore your assistance? I don't believe it. No; they will receive any people, even those they distrust more than us, sooner than surrender their city to Philip; unless indeed he is beforehand with them and cap-

⁴ More closely, "is upon the enemy, whom he pleases to attack, in a moment."

⁵ Athens and Byzantium had not been on good terms since the Social war. Even at this period the Byzantines looked with more suspicion upon the Athenians than on Philip. Yet less than a year elapsed before the predictions of Demosthenes were fulfilled. Athens was in alliance with Byzantium, and defending her successfully against Philip.

tures it. If then we are unable to sail northward, and there be no help at hand, nothing can prevent their destruction. Well! the men are infatuated and besotted. Very likely; yet they must be rescued for all that, because it is good for Athens. And this also is not clear to us, that he will not attack the Chersonese: nay, if we may judge from the letter which he sent us, he says he will chastise the people in the Chersonese. Then if the present army be kept on foot, it will be able to defend that country, and attack some of Philip's dominions; but if it be once disbanded, what shall we do, if he march against the Chersonese? Try Diopithes, I suppose. And how will our affairs be bettered? But we shall send succor from Athens. And suppose the winds prevent us? Oh, but he won't come! And who will insure that? Do you mark and consider, men of Athens, the approaching season of the year, against which certain persons desire to get the Hellespont clear of you, and deliver it up to Philip? Suppose he should leave Thrace, and, without going near Chersonesus or Byzantium (I beg you also to consider this), he should invade Chalcis or Megara, as he lately did Oreus,* think you it is better to resist him here and suffer the war to approach Attica, or to find employment for him yonder? I think the last.

With such facts and arguments before you, so far from disparaging and seeking to disband this army, which Diopithes is endeavoring to organize for Athens, you ought yourselves to provide an additional one, to support him with money and other friendly co-operation. For if Philip were asked, "Which would you prefer, that these soldiers

* Oreus of Euboea was betrayed to Philip not long before this time, as explained in the third Philippic. The designs of Philip on Megara were baffled.

of Diopithes, whatever be their character (I dispute not about that), should thrive and have credit at Athens, and be reinforced with the assistance of the state, or that they should be dispersed and destroyed at the instance of calumniators and accusers?"—I think he would say the latter. And what Philip would pray to the gods for certain persons among us are bringing about; and after this you ask how the state is ruined!

I wish, therefore, to examine with freedom our present affairs, to consider how we are dealing with them, and what we are ourselves about. We like not to contribute money, we dare not take the field, we cannot abstain from the public funds, we neither give supplies to Diopithes nor approve what he finds for himself, but grumble and inquire how he got them, and what he intends to do, and the like; and yet, though thus disposed, we are not willing to mind our own business, but with our mouths applaud those who speak worthily of the state, while in action we co-operate with their adversaries. You like always to ask the speaker—What must we do? I will ask you this—What must I say? For if you will neither contribute, nor take the field, nor abstain from the public funds, nor give supplies to Diopithes, nor let alone what he finds for himself, nor be content to mind your own business, I have nothing to say. If to these men, so prompt to accuse and calumniate, you already give such a license, as to hear them complain by anticipation of projects which they impute to Diopithes, what can one say?

But the probable effect of such conduct some of you should hear. I will speak frankly; indeed, I could not speak otherwise. All the generals who have ever sailed from Athens (or let me suffer any penalty) take money

from Chians, from Erythræans,⁷ from whom they severally can, I mean from the people who dwell in Asia. Those who have one or two galleys take less, those who have a greater fleet, more. And the givers give not, either the small or the larger sums, for nothing (they are not so mad), but by way of bargain, that the merchants who leave their harbors may not be wronged or plundered, that their vessels may be convoyed, or the like. They say they give benevolences:⁸ that is the name of the presents. And so Diopithes, having an army, is well aware that all these people will give money: for how else do you suppose that a man who has received nothing from you, and has nothing of his own to pay withal, can maintain his troops? From the skies? Impossible. He goes on with what he collects, begs, or borrows. Therefore they, who accuse him before you, in effect warn all people to give him nothing, as being sure to be punished for his intentions, much more for his acts, either as principal or auxiliary. Hence their clamors—he is preparing a siege! he is giving up the Greeks! So concerned are many of these persons for the Asiatic Greeks: perhaps quicker to feel for strangers than for their country. And this is the meaning of our sending another general to the Hellespont.⁹ Why, if Diopithes commits outrage and detains vessels, a small, very small summons, men of Athens, can stop it all; and

⁷ Erythræ is a city of Asia Minor.

⁸ It is singular that the same name should be given so many centuries after to the illegal contributions which were extorted by some English kings from their subjects, under the pretence of their being voluntary gifts. Edward the Fourth and Henry the Seventh were most oppressive in this way.

⁹ The argument is—This is what my opponents mean by recommending that another general should be sent to supersede and send back Diopithes. Such a course is wholly unnecessary, for you can summon him home by an order of state.

the laws prescribe this, to impeach the guilty parties, but not to watch them ourselves at a great expense and with a large navy, for that were the extreme of madness. Against our enemies, whom we cannot bring under the laws, it is right and needful to maintain troops, and despatch a fleet, and contribute money; but against ourselves a decree, an impeachment, the state-galley," are sufficient. Thus would men of discretion act; malignant and mischievous politicians would proceed as these do. And that certain of these men are thus disposed, bad though it be, is not the worst. For you of the assembly are so minded now that if any one comes forward and says that Diopithes is the author of all your misfortunes, or Chares, or Aristophon, or what citizen he likes to name, you instantly assent and shout approbation; but if one rises to speak the truth—Athenians, you are trifling; of all these misfortunes and troubles Philip is the cause; had he only kept quiet, the state would have had no trouble—you are unable to contradict these statements, yet, methinks, you are annoyed, and feel as if something were lost. The reason is—and pray allow me, when I speak for the best, to speak freely—certain statesmen have long since got you to be severe and terrible in the assemblies, in warlike preparations feeble and contemptible. If the party blamed be one whom you are certain to find within your reach, you say ay, and are content: but if one be accused whom you cannot punish without vanquishing him by arms, you appear confounded and pained at the exposure. It ought, Athenians, to have been the reverse; your statesmen should

¹⁰ The *Paralus*, or the *Salaminia*, which were employed for state purposes, and sometimes to fetch home criminals to be tried or punished. Thus the *Salaminia* was despatched to bring Alcibiades back from Sicily.

have accustomed you to be mild and merciful in the assembly, since there your dealings are with citizens and allies; in warlike preparations they should have shown you to be terrible and severe, since in them the contest is with adversaries and foes. But by excessive coaxing and humoring they have brought you to such a condition that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at hearing nothing but compliments, while in your measures and proceedings you are putting everything to hazard.

By Jupiter! suppose the Greeks called you to account for the opportunities which you have indolently lost, and asked you, saying, "Men of Athens, you send us ambassadors on every occasion, and assert that Philip is plotting against us and all the Greeks, and that we should take precautions against the man, and more to the same effect" (we must admit and acknowledge it; for so we do): "and yet, O ye wretchedest of mankind, though Philip has been ten months away, and by illness and winter and wars prevented from returning home, you have neither liberated Eubœa, nor recovered any of your dominions. He, on the contrary, while you were staying at home, at leisure, in health (if men so acting may be called in health), established two rulers in Eubœa, one like a hostile fortress opposite Attica, one threatening Sciathus;" and these nuisances you have never got rid of; not even this would ye attempt; you have submitted, left the road open to him clearly, and made it manifest that, if he died a hundred times, you would stir never a step the more. Then

¹¹ Clitarchus was established in Eretria, which is opposite the coast of Athens; Philistides in Oreus, which is in the north of Eubœa. The island of Sciathus is a little above Eubœa, and off the Magnesian coast of Thessaly. As the group of islands, of which Sciathus was one, belonged to Athens, Oreus was a dangerous position to be occupied by an enemy.

wherefore send embassies and make accusations and give us trouble?" If they asked this, what could we answer or say, men of Athens? I really cannot tell.

There are some persons, indeed, who imagine they confute the speaker by asking, What must we do? I can give them a perfectly just and true answer—Do not what you are now doing: however, I will enter into more full detail; and I trust they will be as ready to act as to interrogate. First, men of Athens, you must be satisfied in your minds that Philip is at war with the republic, and has broken the peace (pray cease reproaching one another about this); that he is ill-disposed and hostile to all Athens, to her very ground, and (I may say) to all her inhabitants, even those who think they oblige him most. Or let them look at Euthycrates and Lasthenes the Olynthians,¹⁸ who fancied themselves on the most friendly footing with him, but, since they betrayed their country, are sunk to the most abject state. But there is nothing that his wars and his schemes are directed against so much as our constitution; nothing in the world is he so earnest to destroy. And this policy is in some sort natural for him. He knows perfectly that even if he conquer everything else, he can hold nothing secure, while your democracy subsists; but on the occurrence of any reverse (and many may happen to a man), all who are now under constraint will come and seek refuge with you. For you are not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; you are famous for checking the usurper or depriving him of his conquest; ever ready to molest the aspirants

¹⁸ They betrayed Olynthus to Philip, and went to reside afterward at his court. But they were universally scouted as traitors, and on their complaining to Philip, he said, the Macedonians were a plain-spoken people, who called a spade a spade.

for empire, and vindicate the liberties of all people. He likes not that a free spirit should proceed from Athens to watch the moments of his peril: far otherwise; nor is his reasoning weak or idle. First, then, you must assume him for this reason to be an irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy: without such conviction upon your minds you will have no zeal for public duty. Secondly, you must be assured that all his operations and contrivances are planned against our country, and, wherever he is resisted, the resistance will be for our benefit. None of you surely is so foolish as to suppose that Philip covets those miseries in Thrace (for what else can one call Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and the places which he is taking and conquering now?), and to get them endures toils and winters and the extreme of danger, but covets not the Athenian harbors, and docks, and galleys, and silver mines,¹³ and revenues of such value; and that he will suffer you to keep them, while for the sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in the midst of horrors.¹⁴ Impossible. The object of that and every other enterprise is to become master here. What, then, is the duty of wise men? With these assurances and convictions, to lay aside an indolence which is becoming outrageous and incurable, to pay contributions and to call upon your allies, see to and provide for the continuance of the present force that, as Philip has a power ready to injure and enslave all the Greeks, so you may have one ready to save and to succor all. It is not

¹³ The mines of Laurium in Attica.

¹⁴ The original signifies a pit, into which condemned criminals were thrown at Athens. It is pretty much the same as if we were to speak of the black hole: and the horrors of Thrace would convey to an Athenian the same sort of idea as the horrors of Siberia to us.

possible with hasty levies to perform any effective service. You must have an army on foot, provide maintenance for it, and paymasters and commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care shall be taken of your funds, and demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of the campaign. If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel Philip to observe a just peace and abide in his own country (the greatest of all blessings), or you will fight him on equal terms.

It may be thought, and truly enough, that these are affairs of great expense and toil and trouble: yet only consider what the consequences to us must be, if we decline these measures, and you will find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose some god would be your surety—for certainly no mortal could guarantee such an event—that, notwithstanding you kept quiet and abandoned everything, Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all the gods, it were disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the character of Athens and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish ease to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my own part, I would rather die than have given such counsel; though, if another man advises it, and you are satisfied, well and good; make no resistance, abandon all. If however no man holds this opinion, if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the more we let Philip conquer the more ruthless and powerful an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to perform our duty? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long

ago: and surely you must deprecate that of slaves. What is the difference? To a freeman, the greatest necessity is shame for his proceedings; I know not what greater you can suggest: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to mention!

I would gladly enter into every particular, and show how certain politicians abuse you; but I confine myself to one. When any question about Philip arises, people start up and cry, What a blessing it is to be at peace! what a burden to maintain a large army! certain persons wish to plunder our treasury!—and more to the same effect; by which they amuse you, and leave him at leisure to do what he pleases. The result is, to you, Athenians, ease and idleness for the present, which, I fear, you may hereafter think dearly purchased; to these men, popularity and payment for their speeches. Methinks it is not you that need persuading to peace, who sit here pacifically disposed; but the person who commits hostilities: let him be persuaded, and all is ready on your part. Burdensome we should deem, not what we expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of our refusal to do so. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by a plan for its safe keeping, not by abandonment of our interests. But this very thing makes me indignant, that some of you, Athenians, are grieved at the thought of your treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to keep it safe and to chastise the peculator, yet are not grieved at Philip's conduct, seizing thus successively on every country in Greece, and seizing them for his designs upon you.

What then is the reason, men of Athens, that while Philip is thus openly in arms, committing aggressions, capturing cities, none of these persons ever say that he is

making war; but they denounce as authors of the war whoever advises you to oppose him and prevent these losses? I will explain. Their desire is that any anger which may be naturally excited by your sufferings in the war may be turned upon your honest counsellors, so that you may try them instead of resisting Philip, and they themselves be accusers instead of paying the penalty of their conduct. Such is the meaning of their assertion that there is a war party among you; and such is the object of this present debate. I am indeed sure, that, before any Athenian moved a declaration of war, Philip had taken many of our possessions, and recently sent succor to Cardia. If however we choose to assume that he is not at war with us, it were extreme folly in him to convince us of our mistake. But when he marches to attack us, what shall we say? He will assure us that he is not making war, as he assured the people of Oreus when his troops were in their country, as he assured the Pheræans before he assaulted their walls, and the Olynthians at first, until he was actually in their territories with his army. Shall we then declare that men who bid us defend ourselves make war? If so, we must be slaves: nothing else remains, if we neither resist nor are suffered to be at peace. And remember, you have more at stake than other people: Philip seeks not to subdue, but to extirpate our city. He knows for certain you will not submit to servitude; you could not if you would, being accustomed to empire; and if you get the opportunity, you will be able to give him more annoyance than all the rest of the world.

You must therefore be convinced that this is a struggle for existence: these men who have sold themselves to Philip you must execrate and cudgel to death; for it is

impossible, impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have punished your enemies (his ministers) at home. They will be the stumbling-blocks that prevent your reaching the others. Why do you suppose Philip now insults you (for to this, in my opinion, his conduct amounts), and while to other people, though he deceives them, he at least renders services, he is already threatening you? For example, the Thessalians by many benefits he seduced into their present servitude: how he cheated the wretched Olynthians, first giving them Potidæa and divers other things, no man can describe: now he is enticing the Thebans by giving up to them Bœotia, and delivering them from a toilsome and vexatious war. Thus did each of these people grasp a certain advantage, but some of them have suffered what all the world knows, others will suffer what may hereafter befall them. From you—all that has been taken I recount not: but in the very making of the peace, how have you been abused! how despoiled! Of Phocis, Thermopylæ, places in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself! Does he not now possess the city of Cardia and avow it? Wherefore, I say, deals he thus with other people, and not in the same manner with you? Because yours is the only state in which a privilege is allowed of speaking for the enemy, and an individual taking a bribe may safely address the assembly, though you have been robbed of your dominions. It was not safe at Olynthus to be Philip's advocate, unless the Olynthian commonalty had shared the advantage by possession of Potidæa: it was not safe in Thessaly to be Philip's advocate, unless the people of Thessaly had shared the advantage, by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylæan synod: it was not safe in Thebes, until he gave

up Boeotia to them and destroyed the Phocians. Yet at Athens, though Philip has deprived you of Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, nay, is even making Eubœa a fortress to curb us, and advancing to attack Byzantium,¹⁵ it is safe to speak on Philip's behalf. Therefore of these men, some, from being poor, have become rapidly rich, from nameless and obscure, have become honored and distinguished; you have done the reverse, fallen from honor to obscurity, from wealth to poverty; for I deem the riches of a state, allies, confidence, attachment, of all which you are destitute. And from your neglecting these matters and suffering them to be lost, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are abject and forlorn, magnificent in the abundance of your market, but in provision for actual need ridiculous. I observe, however, that some of our orators take different thought for you and for themselves. You, they say, should be quiet even under injustice; they cannot live in quiet among you themselves, though no man injures them.

Then some one steps forward and says, "Why, you won't move any resolution, or run any risk;" you are cowardly and faint-hearted." Let me say this: bold, brutal, and impudent I neither am nor wish to be; yet, methinks, I possess far more courage than your headstrong politicians. For a man who, neglecting the interest of the state, tries, confiscates, bribes, accuses, does not act from any courage,

¹⁵ Not that Philip had commenced any operations against Byzantium, but from his march in that direction Demosthenes rightly conjectured that he had designs thereupon.

¹⁶ By subjecting yourself to an "indictment for having proposed an illegal decree"; and also to the general responsibility which a statesman incurred by advising important measures.

Athenians; the popularity of his speeches and his measures serves for a pledge of security, and he is bold without danger. But one who acting for the best frequently opposes your wishes, who never speaks to flatter but always to benefit you, and adopts a line of policy in which more depends on fortune than on calculations, while he makes himself responsible to you for both, this is a courageous man, ay, and a useful citizen is he; not they who for ephemeral pleasure have thrown away the main resources of the country; whom I am so far from emulating or esteeming as worthy citizens of Athens, that if I were asked to declare what service I had done the state, although, ye men of Athens, I could mention services as ship-captain and choir-master, payment of contributions, ransom of prisoners, and similar acts of liberality, I would mention none of them; I would say that I espouse a different course of politics from these, that although I might perhaps, like others, accuse and bribe and confiscate and do everything which these men do, I have never engaged myself in such a task, never been induced either by avarice or ambition; I continue to offer counsel, by which I sink below others in your regard; but you, if you followed it, would be exalted. So perhaps might one speak without offence. I consider it not the part of an honest citizen to devise measures by which I shall speedily become the first among you, and you the last among nations: with the measures of good citizens the advancement of their country should keep pace: their counsel should still be the salutary, rather than the agreeable: to the latter will nature herself incline; to the former a good citizen must direct by argument and instruction.

I have ere now heard an objection of this kind, that

true it is I always advise for the best, yet my services are only words, and you want deeds and something practical. Upon which I will tell you my sentiments without reserve. I do not think a counsellor has any other business but to give the best advice: and that this is so, I can easily demonstrate. You are aware doubtless that the brave Timotheus once harangued the people, urging them to send troops and save the Eubœans, when the Thebans were attempting their conquest; and to this effect he spake:—"What? do you deliberate," said he, "when you have Thebans in the island, how to deal with them, how to proceed? Will you not cover the sea, Athenians, with your galleys? Will you not start up and march to Piræus? will you not launch your vessels?" Thus Timotheus spoke and you acted," and through both together success was obtained. But had his advice been ever so good, as it was, and you shrunk from exertion and disregarded it, would any of those results have accrued to Athens? Impossible. Then do likewise in regard to my counsels or any other man's; for action look to yourselves, to the orator for the best instruction in his power.

I will sum up my advice, and quit the platform. I say, you must contribute money, maintain the existing troops, rectifying what abuses you may discover, but not on the first accusation disbanding the force. Send out ambassadors everywhere, to instruct, to warn, to effect what they can for Athens. Yet further I say, punish your corrupt

¹⁷ Diocles and Chares conducted this expedition, which took place B.C. 357, and which, after various combats in the island of Eubœa, ended in the expulsion of the Thebans. Just at that time the finances of the Athenians were exceedingly low, and the generosity of the wealthier citizens was largely taxed to provide necessaries for the armament. Demosthenes himself came forward as a liberal contributor.

statesmen, execrate them at all times and places, to prove that men of virtue and honorable conduct have consulted wisely both for others and themselves. If you thus attend to your affairs, and cease entirely neglecting them, perhaps, perhaps even yet they may improve. But while ye sit here, zealous as far as clamor and applause, laggards when any action is required, I see not how any talking, unaided by your needful exertions, can possibly save the country.

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

THIS speech was delivered about three months after the last, while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had happened which called for any special consultation; but Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip's enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the difference between Philip's new method of warfare and that adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of corresponding measures for defence. The peaceful professions of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendancy were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment, before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice of Demosthenes now is, to despatch reinforcements to the Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.

The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the Propontine cities, fully justified the warnings of Demosthenes. And the extraordinary activity which the Athenians displayed in resisting him shows that the

exertions of the orator had their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an able and effective minister.

MANY speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstances may have brought us to this state; our affairs have not declined from one or two causes only: but, if you rightly examine, you will find it chiefly owing to the orators, who study to please you rather than advise for the best. Some of whom, Athenians, seeking to maintain the basis of their own power and repute, have no forethought for the future, and therefore think you also ought to have none; others, accusing and calumniating practical statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in such occupation to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and do what he pleases. Politics of this kind are common here, but are the causes of your failures and embarrassment. I beg, Athenians, that you will not resent my plain speaking of the truth. Only consider. You hold liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of all residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure of it even to foreigners and slaves, and

many servants may be seen among you speaking their thoughts more freely than citizens in some other states; and yet you have altogether banished it from your councils. The result has been that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you are brought to the utmost peril. If such be your disposition now, I must be silent; if you will listen to good advice without flattery, I am ready to speak. For though our affairs are in a deplorable condition, though many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox, and yet a truth, am I about to state. That which is the most lamentable in the past is best for the future. How is this? Because you performed no part of your duty, great or small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done all that became you, and your situation were the same, there would be no hope of amendment. Philip has indeed prevailed over your sloth and negligence, but not over the country: you have not been worsted; you have not even bestirred yourselves.

If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war, one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or advises a measure of defence is in danger of being accused afterward as author of the war.

I will first, then, examine and determine this point, whether it be in our power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if it depends on us (to begin with this), I say we ought to maintain peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace, while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a madman, or he talks of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.

If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with us, we are the simplest of mortals: for he would not declare that, though he marched even against Attica and Piræus, at least if we may judge from his conduct to others. For example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he was forty furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though before that time, whenever he was accused of such an intent, he took it ill and sent ambassadors to justify himself. Again, he marched toward the Phocians as if they were allies, and there were Phocian envoys who accompanied his march, and many among you contended that his advance would not benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late as a friend and ally, yet he has taken possession of Pheræ: and lastly he

told these wretched people of Oreus¹ that he had sent his soldiers out of goodwill to visit them, as he heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it was the part of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such occasions. People who would never have harmed him, though they might have adopted measures of defence, he chose to deceive rather than warn them of his attack; and think ye he would declare war against you before he began it, and that while you are willing to be deceived? Impossible. He would be the silliest of mankind, if, while you the injured parties make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own countrymen, he should terminate your intestine strife and jealousies, warn you to turn against him, and remove the pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to amuse you, that he makes no war upon Athens. O heavens! would any rational being judge by words, rather than by actions, who is at peace with him and who at war? Surely none. Well, then; Philip immediately after the peace, before Diopithes was in command or the settlers in the Chersonese had been sent out, took Serrium and Doriscus, and expelled from Serrium and the Sacred Mount the troops whom your general had stationed there.² What do you call such conduct? He had sworn the peace. Don't say—what does it signify? how is the

¹ When he established his creature Philistides in the government of Oreus, as mentioned in the last oration and at the end of this.

² This general was Chares, to whom Cersobleptes had intrusted the defence of those places. The Sacred Mount was a fortified position on the northern coast of the Hellespont. It was here that Miltocythes intrenched himself, when he rebelled against Cotys; and Philip took possession of it just before the peace with Athens was concluded, as being important to his operations against Cersobleptes. The statement of Demosthenes, that the oaths had then been taken, is incorrect; for they were sworn afterward in Thessaly. But the argument is substantially the same; for the peace had been agreed to, and the ratification was purposely delayed by Philip, to gain time for the completion of his designs.

state concerned?—Whether it be a trifling matter, or of no concernment to you, is a different question: religion and justice have the same obligation, be the subject of the offence great or small. Tell me now; when he sends mercenaries into Chersonesus, which the king and all the Greeks have acknowledged to be yours, when he avows himself an auxiliary and writes us word so, what are such proceedings? He says he is not at war; I cannot, however, admit such conduct to be an observance of the peace; far otherwise: I say, by his attempt on Megara,* by his setting up despotism in Eubœa, by his present advance into Thrace, by his intrigues in Peloponnesus, by the whole course of operations with his army, he has been breaking the peace and making war upon you; unless, indeed, you will say that those who establish batteries are not at war, until they apply them to the walls. But that you will not say: for whoever contrives and prepares the means for my conquest, is at war with me, before he darts or draws the bow. What, if anything should happen, is the risk you run? The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of Megara and Eubœa to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnesians with him. Then can I allow that one who sets such an engine at work against Athens is at peace with her? Quite the contrary. From the day that he destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend yourselves instantly,

* Not long before this oration was delivered, Philip was suspected of a design to seize Megara. Demosthenes gives an account of a conspiracy between two Megarians, Ptoeodorus and Perilaus, to introduce Macedonian troops into the city. Phocion was sent by the Athenians to Megara, with the consent of the Megarian people, to protect them against foreign attack. He fortified the city and port, connecting them by long walls, and put them in security. The occupation of Megara by Philip must have been most perilous to Athens, especially while Eubœa and Thebes were in his interest; he would thus have inclosed her as it were in a net.

and I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may wish in vain to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other counsellors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion about Chersonesus or Byzantium out of place. Succor them—I advise that—watch that no harm befalls them, send all necessary supplies to your troops in that quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as being in the utmost peril. I must tell you why I am so alarmed at the state of our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct, you may share them, and make some provision at least for yourselves, however disinclined to do so for others: but if, in your judgment, I talk nonsense and absurdity, you may treat me as crazed, and not listen to me, either now or in future.

That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown mighty, that the Greeks are jealous and quarrelling among themselves, that it was far more wonderful for him to rise from that insignificance, than it would now be, after so many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I observe that all people, beginning with you, have conceded to him a right, which in former times has been the subject of contest in every Grecian war. And what is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleeing and pillaging the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three years, the Lacedæmonians for twenty-nine; and the Thebans had some power in these latter times after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you, my countrymen, nor Thebans nor Lacedæmonians, were ever licensed by the Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise. When you, or rather the Athenians of that time, appeared to be

dealing harshly with certain people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens, thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her. So, when the Lacedæmonians became masters and succeeded to your empire, on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations,⁴ a general war was declared against them, even by such as had no cause of complaint. But wherefore mention other people? We ourselves and the Lacedæmonians, although at the outset we could not allege any mutual injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done to our neighbors. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of Athens, than the wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip has been uppermost, he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay, they are scarcely a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in a few words. Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all which he has so cruelly destroyed that a visitor could hardly tell if they were ever inhabited: and of the Phocians, so considerable a people exterminated, I say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to parcel her out, not only by cities, but also by provinces, for subjection? Are not the Eubœan states governed now by

⁴ The Spartans, whose severe military discipline rendered them far the best soldiers in Greece, were totally unfit to manage the empire, at the head of which they found themselves after the humiliation of Athens. Their attempt to force an oligarchy upon every dependent state was an unwise policy, which made them generally odious. The decemvirates of Lysander, and the governors established in various Greek cities to maintain Lacedæmonian influence, were regarded as instruments of tyranny. It was found that Spartan governors and generals, when away from home, gave loose to their vicious inclinations, as if to indemnify themselves for the strictness of domestic discipline.

despots, and that in an island near to Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Nor does he write so and not act accordingly. He is gone to the Hellespont; he marched formerly against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he possesses;⁵ he plotted lately to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains the man's ambition. And we, the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending embassies to one another about it and expressing indignation, are in such a miserable state, so intrenched in our separate towns, that to this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we cannot combine, or form any association for succor and alliance; we look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving (methinks) to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or striving for the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant that Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is coming even on those that yet seem very far removed. And you must be sensible that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedæmonians or from us, was at least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune, committed some fault or error in the management of it; on that ground one would consider him open to censure and reproach, yet it could not be said that he was an alien, and not heir to the property which he so dealt with.

⁵ That is to say, a Macedonian faction prevailed in Elis. The democratical party had some time before endeavored to regain the ascendancy, by aid of the Phocian mercenaries of Phalæcus; but they had been defeated by the troops of Arcadia and Elis.

But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what he had no interest in—heavens! how much more heinous and hateful would all have pronounced it! And yet in regard to Philip and his conduct they feel not this, although he is not only no Greek and nowise akin to Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honorable to mention; in fact, a vile fellow of Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not be purchased formerly.

What is wanting to make his insolence complete? Besides his destruction of Grecian cities, does he not hold the Pythian games, the common festival of Greece, and, if he comes not himself, send his vassals to preside? Is he not master of Thermopylæ and the passes into Greece, and holds he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole Amphictyonic body, and got preaudience of the oracle,⁶ to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Does he not write to the Thessalians, what form of government to adopt? send mercenaries to Porthmus,⁷ to expel the Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler? Yet the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as they would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on himself, none trying to prevent it. And not only are the outrages which he does to Greece submitted to, but even the private wrongs of every people:

⁶ This privilege, which had belonged to the Phocians, was transferred to Philip. It was considered an advantage as well as an honor in ancient times; for there were only certain days appointed in every month when the oracle could be consulted, and the order of consultation was determined by lot in common cases. The Delphians used to confer the right of preconsultation on particular states or persons as a reward for some service or act of piety. Thus the Spartans received it; and Cræsus, king of Lydia, for the magnificent presents which he sent to the temple.

⁷ Porthmus was the port of Eretria, on the strait, opposite Athens. The circumstances are stated by Demosthenes at the latter end of the speech.

nothing can go beyond this! Has he not wronged the Corinthians by attacking Ambracia⁸ and Leucas? the Achaïans, by swearing to give Naupactus⁹ to the Ætolians? from the Thebans taken Echinus?¹⁰ Is he not marching against the Byzantines his allies? From us—I omit the rest—but keeps he not Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese? Still under these indignities we are all slack and disheartened, and look toward our neighbors, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And how think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how will he act, when he gets each separately under his control?

But what has caused the mischief? There must be some cause, some good reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are eager for servitude. There was something, men of Athens, something in the hearts of the multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof has ruined all, and thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this? Nothing subtle or clever: simply that whoever took money from the aspirants for power or the corrupters of Greece were universally detested: it was dreadful to be convicted of bribery;

⁸ Divers colonies were planted on the northwestern coast of Greece by the Corinthians, and also by the Corcyraeans, who were themselves colonists from Corinth. Among them were Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Leucas afterward became insular, by cutting through the isthmus. Philip's meditated attack was in B.C. 343, after the conquest of Cassopia. Leucas, by its insular position, would have been convenient for a descent on Peloponnesus. We have seen that this design of Philip was baffled by the exertions of Demosthenes.

⁹ Naupactus, now *Lepanto*, lay on the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it came into the hands of the Achaïans, from whom it was taken by Epaminondas, but after his death they regained it. The Ætolians got possession of the town some time after, perhaps by Macedonian assistance.

¹⁰ The Echinus here mentioned was a city on the northern coast of the Malian gulf in Thessaly.

the severest punishment was inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The favorable moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against those that discharge all their duty, could not be bought from orators or generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor anything of the kind. But now all such principles have been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange by which Greece is ruined and diseased. What are they? Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter if he confesses it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those that denounce the crime; all the usual attendants upon corruption." For as to ships and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be reckoned as constituting national strength—assuredly the Greeks of our day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless, unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these traffickers.

That such is the present state of things, you must see, without requiring my testimony: that it was different in former times, I will demonstrate, not by speaking my own words, but by showing an inscription of your ancestors, which they graved on a brazen column and deposited in the citadel, not for their own benefit (they were right-minded enough without such records), but for a memorial and example to instruct you, how seriously such conduct should be taken up. What says the inscription then? It says: "Let Arthmius, son of Pythonax the Zelite," be de-

¹¹ He glances more particularly at Philocrates, Demades and Æschines.

¹² Zelea is a town in Mysia. Arthmius was sent by Artaxerxes into Peloponnesus to stir up a war against the Athenians, who had irritated him by the assistance which they lent to Egypt.

clared an outlaw, and an enemy of the Athenian people and their allies, him and his family." Then the cause is written why this was done: because he brought the Median gold into Peloponnesus. That is the inscription. By the gods! only consider and reflect among yourselves, what must have been the spirit, what the dignity of those Athenians who acted so. One Arthmius a Zelite, subject of the king (for Zelea is in Asia), because in his master's service he brought gold into Peloponnesus, not to Athens, they proclaimed an enemy of the Athenians and their allies, him and his family, and outlawed. That is, not the outlawry commonly spoken of: for what would a Zelite care, to be excluded from Athenian franchises? It means not that; but in the statutes of homicide it is written, in cases where a prosecution for murder is not allowed, but killing is sanctioned, "and let him die an outlaw," says the legislator: by which he means that whoever kills such a person shall be unpolluted.¹⁸ Therefore they considered that the preservation of all Greece was their own concern (but for such opinion they would not have cared whether people in Peloponnesus were bought and corrupted): and whomsoever they discovered taking bribes, they chastised and punished so severely as to record their names in brass. The natural result was that Greece was formidable to the Barbarian, not the Barbarian to Greece. 'Tis not so now: since neither in this nor in other respects are your sentiments the same. But what are they? You know yourselves: why am I to upbraid you with everything? The Greeks in general are alike and no better than you. Therefore I say, our present affairs demand earnest attention and

¹⁸ That is, his act being justifiable homicide, he shall not be deemed (in a religious point of view) impure.

wholesome counsel. Shall I say what? Do you bid me, and won't you be angry?

[*Here is read the public document which Demosthenes produces, after which he resumes his address*"]

There is a foolish saying of persons who wish to make us easy, that Philip is not yet as powerful as the Lacedæmonians were formerly, who ruled everywhere by land and sea, and had the king for their ally, and nothing withstood them; yet Athens resisted even that nation, and was not destroyed. I myself believe, that, while everything has received great improvement, and the present bears no resemblance to the past, nothing has been so changed and improved as the practice of war. For anciently, as I am informed, the Lacedæmonians and all Grecian people would for four or five months, during the season¹⁴ only, invade and ravage the land of their enemies with heavy-armed and national troops, and return home again: and their ideas were so old-fashioned, or rather national, they never purchased an advantage from any; theirs was a legitimate and open warfare. But now you doubtless perceive that the majority of disasters have been effected by treason; nothing is done in fair field or combat. You hear of Philip marching where he pleases, not because he commands troops of the line, but because he has attached to him a host of skirmishers, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and the like. When with these he falls upon a people in civil dissension,

¹⁴ The Secretary of the Assembly stood by the side of the orator, and read any public documents, such as statutes, decrees, bills and the like, which the orator desired to refer to or to verify. It does not appear what the document was which Demosthenes caused to be read here.

¹⁵ The campaigning season, during the summer and fine time of the year. The Peloponnesians generally invaded Attica when the corn was ripe, burning and plundering all in their route. Thucydides in his history divides the year into two parts, summer and winter.

and none (for mistrust) will march out to defend the country, he applies engines and besieges them. I need not mention that he makes no difference between winter and summer, that he has no stated season of repose. You, knowing these things, reflecting on them, must not let the war approach your territories, nor get your necks broken, relying on the simplicity of the old war with the Lacedæmonians, but take the longest time beforehand for defensive measures and preparations, see that he stirs not from home, avoid any decisive engagement. For a war, if we choose, men of Athens, to pursue a right course, we have many natural advantages; such as the position of his kingdom, which we may extensively plunder and ravage, and a thousand more; but for a battle he is better trained than we are.

Nor is it enough to adopt these resolutions and oppose him by warlike measures: you must on calculation and on principle abhor his advocates here, remembering that it is impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have chastised those who are his ministers within the city. Which, by Jupiter and all the gods, you cannot and will not do! You have arrived at such a pitch of folly or madness or—I know not what to call it: I am tempted often to think that some evil genius is driving you to ruin—for the sake of scandal or envy or jest or any other cause, you command hirelings to speak (some of whom would not deny themselves to be hirelings), and laugh when they abuse people. And this, bad as it is, is not the worst: you have allowed these persons more liberty for their political conduct than your faithful counsellors: and see what evils are caused by listening to such men with indulgence. I will mention facts that you will all remember.

In Olynthus some of the statesmen were in Philip's interest, doing everything for him; some were on the honest side, aiming to preserve their fellow-citizens from slavery. Which party now destroyed their country? or which betrayed the cavalry," by whose betrayal Olynthus fell? The creatures of Philip; they that, while the city stood, slandered and calumniated the honest counsellors so effectually that the Olynthian people were induced to banish Apollonides.

Nor is it there only, and nowhere else, that such practice has been ruinous. In Eretria, when, after riddance of Plutarch" and his mercenaries, the people got possession of their city and of Porthmus, some were for bringing the government over to you, others to Philip. His partisans were generally, rather exclusively, attended to by the wretched and unfortunate Eretrians, who at length were persuaded to expel their faithful advisers. Philip, their ally and friend, sent Hipponicus and a thousand mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus, and established three rulers, Hipparchus, Automedon, Clitarchus. Since that he has driven them out of the country, twice attempting their deliverance: once he sent the troops with Eurylochus, afterward those of Parmenio.

What need of many words? In Oreus Philip's agents were Philistides, Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapæus, who now hold the government: that was quite notorious: one Euphræus, a man that formerly dwelt here among you, was laboring for freedom and independence. How this

¹⁶ After Olynthus was besieged by Philip, various sallies were made from the city, some of which were successful. But the treachery of Lasthenes and his accomplices ruined all. A body of five hundred horse were led by him into an ambuscade, and captured by the besiegers.

¹⁷ When he was expelled by Phocion after the battle of Tamynæ, B.C. 354.

man was in other respects insulted and trampled on by the people of Oreus, were long to tell: but a year before the capture, discovering what Philistides and his accomplices were about, he laid an information against them for treason. A multitude then combining, having Philip for their paymaster, and acting under his direction, take Euphræus off to prison as a disturber of the public peace. Seeing which, the people of Oreus, instead of assisting the one and beating the others to death, with them were not angry, but said his punishment was just and rejoiced at it. So the conspirators, having full liberty of action, laid their schemes and took their measures for the surrender of the city; if any of the people observed it, they were silent and intimidated, remembering the treatment of Euphræus; and so wretched was their condition that on the approach of such a calamity none dared to utter a word, until the enemy drew up before the walls: then some were for defence, others for betrayal. Since the city was thus basely and wickedly taken, the traitors have held despotic rule; people who formerly rescued them, and were ready for any maltreatment of Euphræus, they have either banished or put to death; Euphræus killed himself, proving by deed that he had resisted Philip honestly and purely for the good of his countrymen.

What can be the reason—perhaps you wonder—why the Olynthians and Eretrians and Orites were more indulgent to Philip's advocates than to their own? The same which operates with you. They who advise for the best cannot always gratify their audience, though they would; for the safety of the state must be attended to: their opponents by the very counsel which is agreeable advance Philip's interest. One party required contribution; the

other said there was no necessity: one was for war and mistrust; the other for peace, until they were ensnared. And so on for everything else (not to dwell on particulars); the one made speeches to please for the moment, and gave no annoyance; the other offered salutary counsel that was offensive. Many rights did the people surrender at last, not from any such motive of indulgence or ignorance, but submitting in the belief that all was lost. Which, by Jupiter and Apollo, I fear will be your case, when on calculation you see that nothing can be done. I pray, men of Athens, it may never come to this! Better die a thousand deaths than render homage to Philip, or sacrifice any of your faithful counsellors. A fine recompense have the people of Oreus got, for trusting themselves to Philip's friends and spurning Euphræus! Finely are the Eretrian commons rewarded, for having driven away your ambassadors and yielded to Clitarchus! Yes; they are slaves, exposed to the lash and the torture. Finely he spared the Olynthians, who appointed Lasthenes to command their horse, and expelled Apollonides! It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, and, while you take evil counsel and shirk every duty, and even listen to those who plead for your enemies, to think you inhabit a city of such magnitude, that you cannot suffer any serious misfortune. Yea, and it is disgraceful to exclaim on any occurrence, when it is too late, "Who would have expected it? However—this or that should have been done, the other left undone." Many things could the Olynthians mention now, which, if foreseen at the time, would have prevented their destruction. Many could the Orites mention, many the Phocians, and each of the ruined states. But what would it avail them? As long as the vessel is

safe, whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every man in turn should exert himself, and prevent its being overturned either by accident or design: but when the sea hath rolled over it, their efforts are vain. And we, likewise, O Athenians, while we are safe, with a magnificent city, plentiful resources, lofty reputation—what¹⁸ must we do? Many of you, I dare say, have been longing to ask. Well then, I will tell you; I will move a resolution: pass it, if you please.

First, let us prepare for our own defence; provide ourselves, I mean, with ships, money, and troops—for surely, though all other people consented to be slaves, we at least ought to struggle for freedom. When we have completed our own preparations and made them apparent to the Greeks, then let us invite the rest, and send our ambassadors everywhere with the intelligence, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king, I say (for it concerns his interests not to let Philip make universal conquest); that, if you prevail, you may have partners of your dangers and expenses, in case of necessity, or at all events that you may delay the operations. For, since the war is against an individual,¹⁹ not against the collected power of a state, even this may be useful; as were the embassies last year to Peloponnesus, and the remonstrances with which I and Polyeuctus, that excellent man, and Hegesippus, and Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other envoys went round and arrested Philip's progress, so that he neither attacked

¹⁸ Smead remarks here on the adroitness of the orator, who, instead of applying the simile of the ship to the administration of the state, which he felt that his quick-minded hearers had already done, suddenly interrupts himself with a question, which would naturally occur to the audience.

¹⁹ Because a state is a permanent power; a single man is liable to a variety of accidents, and his power terminates with his life.

Ambracia nor started for Peloponnesus. I say not, however, that you should invite the rest without adopting measures to protect yourselves: it would be folly, while you sacrifice your own interest, to profess a regard for that of strangers, or to alarm others about the future, while for the present you are unconcerned. I advise not this: I bid you send supplies to the troops in Chersonesus, and do what else they require; prepare yourselves and make every effort first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of the Greeks. That is the duty of a state possessing a dignity such as yours. If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece, while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong. Well for any of those people if they are safe themselves. This work belongs to you: this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many perilous exertions. But if every one will sit seeking his pleasure, and studying to be idle himself, never will he find others to do his work, and more than this, I fear we shall be under the necessity of doing all that we like not at one time. Were proxies to be had, our inactivity would have found them long ago; but they are not.

Such are the measures which I advise, which I propose: adopt them, and even yet, I believe, our prosperity may be re-established. If any man has better advice to offer, let him communicate it openly. Whatever you determine, I pray to all the gods for a happy result.

THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

THE ARGUMENT

THE subject of this oration is the same as the last; viz., the necessity of resistance to Philip. The time of its delivery would appear to have been a little later, while Philip was yet in Thrace, and before he commenced the siege of the Propontine towns. No new event is alluded to, except the seizure of Hermias by the satrap Mentor, the exact date of which is uncertain. The orator urges here, still more strongly than he had done in the third Philippic, the necessity of applying to Persia for assistance. His advice was followed, and a negotiation was opened with that monarchy, which led to the effective relief of Perinthus. There is a remarkable passage in this speech, on the importance of general unanimity, which seems to imply that disputes had arisen between the richer and poorer classes, chiefly in regard to the application of the public revenue. The view which is here taken on the subject of the Theoric distributions is so different from the argument in the Olynthiacs, that modern critics have generally considered this oration to be spurious. Another ground for such opinion is, that it contains various passages borrowed from other speeches, and not very skilfully put together. Yet the genuineness seems not to have been doubted by any of the ancient grammarians.

BELIEVING, men of Athens, that the subject of your consultation is serious and momentous to the state, I will endeavor to advise what I think important. Many have been the faults, accumulated for some time past, which have brought us to this wretched condition; but none is under the circumstances so distressing as this, men of Athens; that your minds are alienated from public business; you are attentive just while you sit listening to some news, afterward you all go away, and, so far from caring for what you heard, you forget it altogether.

Well; of the extent of Philip's arrogance and ambition, as evinced in his dealings with every people, you have been informed. That it is not possible to restrain him in such course by speeches and harangues, no man can be

ignorant; or, if other reasons fail to convince you, reflect on this. Whenever we have had to discuss our claims, on no occasion have we been worsted or judged in the wrong; we have still beaten and got the better of all in argument. But do his affairs go badly on this account, or ours well? By no means. For as Philip immediately proceeds, with arms in his hand, to put all he possesses boldly at stake, while with our equities, speakers as well as hearers, we are sitting still, actions (naturally enough) outstrip words, and people attend not to what we have argued or may argue, but to what we do. And our doings are not likely to protect any of our injured neighbors: I need not say more upon the subject. Therefore, as the states are divided into two parties, one that would neither hold arbitrary government nor submit to it, but live under free and equal laws; another desiring to govern their fellow-citizens, and be subject to some third power, by whose assistance they hope to accomplish that object; the partisans of Philip, who desire tyranny and despotism, have everywhere prevailed, and I know not whether there is any state left, besides our own, with a popular constitution firmly established. And those that hold the government through him have prevailed by all the means efficacious in worldly affairs; principally and mainly, by having a person to bribe the corruptible; secondly, a point no less important, by having at their command, at whatever season they required, an army to put down their opponents. We, men of Athens, are not only in these respects behindhand; we cannot even be awaked; like men that have drunk mandrake¹ or some other sleeping potion; and methinks—for

¹ Used for a powerful opiate by the ancients. It is called Mandragora also in English.

I judged the truth must be spoken—we are by reason thereof held in such disrepute and contempt, that, among the states in imminent danger, some dispute with us for the lead, some for the place of congress; others have resolved to defend themselves separately rather than in union with us.

Why am I so particular in mentioning these things? I seek not to give offence; so help me all the powers of heaven! I wish, men of Athens, to make it clear and manifest to you all, that habitual sloth and indolence, the same in public matters as in private life, is not immediately felt on every occasion of neglect, but shows itself in the general result. Look at Serrium and Doriscus; which were first disregarded after the peace. Their names, perhaps, are unknown to many of you: yet your careless abandonment of these lost Thrace and Cersobleptes, your ally. Again, seeing these places neglected and unsupported by you, he demolished Porthmus, and raised a tyrant in Eubœa like a fortress against Attica. This being disregarded, Megara was very nearly taken. You were insensible, indifferent to all his aggressions; gave no intimation that you would not permit their continuance. He purchased Antrones,² and not long after had got Oreus into his power. Many transactions I omit; Phæræ, the march against Ambracia, the massacres at Elis,³

² A town in Thessaly. We do not know all the details of Philip's proceedings in that country, but we have seen enough to show, that under the guise of a protector he was not far short of being the master of the Thessalian people. Some of their towns were actually in his possession, as Phæræ and Pagasæ. But that the Thessalians were never entirely subjugated to Macedonia, and still retained a hankering after independence, was proved at a later period by their desertion of Antipater.

³ The Elean exiles, having engaged in their service a body of the Phocian mercenaries, made an irruption into Elis, but were defeated. A large number of prisoners were taken and put to death. This happened B.C. 343. The government of Elis was at that time in the hands of a Macedonian party.

and numberless others: for I have not entered upon these details to enumerate the people whom Philip has oppressed and wronged, but to show you that Philip will not desist from wronging all people and pursuing his conquests, until an effort is made to prevent him.

There are persons whose custom it is, before they hear any speech in the debate, to ask immediately—"What must we do?—not with the intention of doing what they are told (or they would be the most serviceable of men), but in order to get rid of the speaker. Nevertheless, you should be advised what to do. First, O my countrymen, you must be firmly convinced in your minds that Philip is at war with our state, and has broken the peace; that, while he is inimical and hostile to the whole of Athens, to the ground of Athens, and, I may add, to the gods in Athens (may they exterminate him!), there is nothing which he strives and plots against so much as our constitution, nothing in the world that he is so anxious about as its destruction. And thereunto he is driven in some sort by necessity. Consider. He wishes for empire: he believes you to be his only opponents. He has been a long time injuring you, as his own conscience best informs him; for by means of your possessions, which he is able to enjoy, he secures all the rest of his kingdom: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidæa, he would not have deemed himself safe even in Macedonia. He knows, therefore, both that he is plotting against you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have common-sense, he judges that you detest him as you ought. Besides these important considerations, he is assured that, though he became master of everything else, nothing can be safe for him while you are under popular government:

should any reverse ever befall him (and many may happen to a man), all who are now under constraint will come for refuge to you. For you are not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; but famous rather for checking the usurper or depriving him of his conquests, ever ready to molest the aspirants for empire, and vindicate the liberty of all nations. He would not like that a free spirit should proceed from Athens, to watch the occasions of his weakness; nor is such reasoning foolish or idle. First, then, you must assume that he is an irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy; secondly, you must be convinced that all his operations and contrivances are designed for the injury of our state. None of you can be so silly as to suppose that Philip covets those miseries in Thrace (for what else can one call Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira and the places which he is said now to occupy?), and that to get possession of them he endures hardships and winters and the utmost peril, but covets not the harbors of Athens, the docks, the galleys, the silver mines, the revenues of such value, the place and the glory—never may he or any other man obtain these by the conquest of our city!—or that he will suffer you to keep these things, while for the sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in the midst of horrors. Impossible. The object of that and every other enterprise of Philip is to become master here.

So should every man be persuaded and convinced; and, therefore, I say, should not call upon your faithful and upright counsellor to move a resolution for war:⁴ such were

⁴ He deprecates here, as elsewhere, the factious proceedings of certain opponents, who sought to fasten the responsibility of a war on the orator, by forcing him to propose a decree. This, argues Demosthenes, was unnecessary, as they were at war already.

the part of men seeking an enemy to fight with, not men forwarding the interests of the state. Only see. Suppose for the first breach of the treaty by Philip, or for the second or third (for there is a series of breaches), any one had made a motion for war with him, and Philip, just as he has now without such motion, had aided the Cardians, would not the mover have been sacrificed? would not all have imputed Philip's aid of the Cardians to that cause? Don't, then, look for a person to vent your anger on for Philip's trespasses, to throw to Philip's hirelings to be torn in pieces. Do not, after yourselves voting for war, dispute with each other whether you ought or ought not to have done so. As Philip conducts the war, so resist him: furnish those who are resisting him now^{*} with money and what else they demand; pay your contributions, men of Athens, provide an army, swift-sailing galleys, horses, transports, all the materials of war. Our present mode of operation is ridiculous; and, by the gods, I believe that Philip could not wish our republic to take any other course than what ye now pursue. You miss your time, waste your money, look for a person to manage your affairs, are discontented, accuse one another. How all this comes about, I will explain, and how it may cease, I will inform you.

Nothing, O men of Athens, have you ever set on foot or contrived rightly in the beginning: you always follow the event, stop when you are too late, on any new occurrence prepare and bustle again. But that is not the way of proceeding. It is never possible with sudden levies to perform any essential service. You must establish an

^{*} Referring to Diopithes and his troops in the Chersonese.

army, provide maintenance for it, and paymasters, and commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care be taken of your funds; demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of the campaign; and leave not the general any excuse for sailing elsewhere or prosecuting another enterprise. If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel Philip to observe a just peace and remain in his own country, or will contend with him on equal terms; and, perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now inquire what Philip is doing, and whither marching, so he may be anxious to learn whither the troops of Athens are bound, and where they will make their appearance.

Should any man think that these are affairs of great expense and toil and difficulty, he thinks rightly enough: but let him consider what the consequences to Athens must be, if she refuse so to act, and he will find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose you had some god for your surety—for certainly no mortal could guarantee a thing so fortunate—that, although you kept quiet and sacrificed everything, Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all the gods, it would be disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the dignity of your state, and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish indolence to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my part, I would rather die than have advised such a course: however, if any other man advises it, and can prevail on you, be it so; make no defence, abandon all. But if no man holds such an opinion, if, on the contrary, we all foresee that, the more we permit Philip to conquer, the more fierce and formidable an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse

for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to act as becomes us? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long ago; and that of slaves you must surely deprecate. What is the difference? To a freeman shame for what is occurring is the strongest necessity; I know of none stronger that can be mentioned: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to name!

To be backward, men of Athens, in performing those services to which the person and property of every one are liable, is wrong, very wrong, and yet it admits of some excuse; but refusing even to hear what is necessary to be heard, and fit to be considered, this calls for the severest censure. Your practice, however, is neither to attend until the business actually presses, as it does now, nor to deliberate about anything at leisure. When Philip is preparing, you, instead of doing the like and making counter-preparation, remain listless, and, if any one speaks a word, clamor him down: when you receive news that any place is lost or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to have heard and consulted was then when you declined; the time to act and employ your preparations is now that you are hearing. Such being your habits, you are the only people who adopt this singular course: others deliberate usually before action, you deliberate after action.

One thing* remains, which should have been done long ago, but even yet is not too late: I will mention it. Nothing in the world does Athens need so much as money for

* He means negotiation with Persia, to obtain pecuniary assistance.

approaching exigencies. Lucky events have occurred, and if we rightly improve them, perhaps good service may be done. In the first place, those' whom the king trusts and regards as his benefactors are at enmity and war with Philip. Secondly, the agent and confidant* of all Philip's preparations against the king has been snatched off, and the king will hear all the proceedings, not from Athenian accusers, whom he might consider to be speaking for their own interests, but from the acting minister himself; the charges, therefore, will be credible, and the only remaining argument for our ambassadors will be, one which the Persian monarch will rejoice to hear, that we should take common vengeance on the injurer of both, and that Philip is much more formidable to the king if he attack us first; for, should we be left in the lurch and suffer any mishap, he will march against the king without fear.* On all these matters, then, I advise that you despatch an embassy to confer with the king, and put aside that nonsense which has so often damaged you—"the barbarian," forsooth, "the common enemy"—and the like. I confess, when I see a man alarmed at a prince in Susa and Ecbatana, and declaring him to be an enemy of Athens, him that formerly assisted in re-establishing her power, and lately made overtures"—if you did not accept them,

* The Thracians, who had always been regarded as benefactors of the Persian king since they assisted Darius on his invasion of Scythia. Philip was making war in Thrace at this time, and had subjected a considerable part of the country.

† Hermias, governor of Atarneus in Mysia, who for his treasonable practices against Artaxerxes was seized by Mentor and sent in chains to Susa, where he was put to death. He was a friend of Aristotle, who was at his court when he was taken prisoner. The philosopher afterward married his sister.

‡ In the confederate war, when the Persian fleet enabled Oconon to defeat the Lacedæmonians at Onidus, B.C. 394.

§ Artaxerxes had applied both to Athens and Lacedæmon to aid him in the

but voted refusal, the fault is not his—while the same man speaks a different language of one who is close at our doors, and growing up in the centre of Greece to be the plunderer of her people; I marvel, I dread this man, whoever he is, because he dreads not Philip.

There is another thing, too, the attacking of which by unjust reproach and improper language hurts the state, and affords an excuse to men who are unwilling to perform any public duty: indeed you will find that every failure to discharge the obligation of a citizen is attributable to this. I am really afraid to discuss the matter; however, I will speak out.

I believe I can suggest, for the advantage of the state, a plea for the poor against the rich, and for men of property against the indigent; could we remove the clamor which some persons unfairly raise about the theatric fund," and the fear that it cannot stand without some signal mischief. No greater help to our affairs could we introduce;" none that would more strengthen the whole community. Look at it thus. I will commence on behalf of those who are considered the needy class. There was a time with us, not long ago, when only a hundred and

recovery of Egypt, which for many years had been held in a state of revolt. Both these states refused to assist him. He then applied to Thebes and Argos, each of which sent an auxiliary force.

¹⁵ A different view is here taken on the subject of the Theoric fund than that which Demosthenes had expressed in the Olynthiacs. It is possible that circumstances may have induced him to modify his opinion, or he may have thought it dangerous to meddle with the law of Eubulus at the present crisis, which called for the greatest unanimity among all classes. We may partly gather from this speech, that there had been some agitation among the lower classes, occasioned by the complaints of the wealthy against this law. Any agitation tending to a spirit of communism must have been extremely dangerous at Athens, where the people had such power of mulcting the higher classes by their votes in the popular assembly and courts of justice. It might therefore be better to let the people alone with their theatrical treats, their fees and largesses, than to provoke retaliation by abridging such enjoyments.

¹⁵ Viz., than the removal of this clamor and alarm about the theatric fund.

thirty talents came into the state;" and among the persons qualified to command ships or pay property-tax, there was not one who claimed exemption from his duty because no surplus existed: galleys sailed, money was forthcoming, everything needful was done. Since that time fortune happily has increased the revenue, and four hundred talents come in instead of one, without loss to any men of property, but with gain to them; for all the wealthy come for their share of the fund, and they are welcome to it.¹³ Why, then, do we reproach one another on this account, and make it an excuse for declining our duties, unless we grudge the relief given by fortune to the poor? I would be sorry to blame them myself, and I think it not right. In private families I never see a young man behaving so to his elders, so unfeeling or so unreasonable, as to refuse to do anything himself, unless all the rest will do what he does. Such a person would certainly be amenable to the laws against undutiful conduct: ¹⁴ for I ween there is a tribute assigned to parents both by nature and by law, which ought to be cheerfully offered and amply paid. Accordingly, as each individual among us hath a parent, so should we regard the whole people as parents of the state, and, so far from depriving them of what the state bestows, we ought, in the absence of such bounty, to find other means to keep them from destitution. If the rich will adopt this principle, I think they will act both justly and wisely; for to deprive any class of a necessary provis-

¹³ This must be understood of the tribute only, which came in from the allies. The total revenue of Athens must have greatly exceeded this.

¹⁴ *I.e.*, the Theoric fund, in which every member of the commonwealth had a right to share.

¹⁵ Maltreatment was a technical term of the Attic law, denoting a failure of duty on the part of husbands, children or guardians, toward their wives, parents or wards, for which they were liable to be tried and punished.

ion is to unite them in disaffection to the commonwealth. To the poor I would recommend that they remove the cause, which makes men of property discontented with the present system, and excites their just complaints. I shall take the same course on behalf of the wealthy as I did just now, and not hesitate to speak the truth. There cannot, I believe, be found a wretch so hardhearted—I will not say among Athenians, but among any other people—who would be sorry to see poor men, men without the necessities of life, receiving these bounties. Where, then, is the pinch of the matter? where the difficulty? When they see certain persons transferring the usage established for the public revenue to private property, and the orator becoming immediately powerful with you, yea (so far as privilege can make him), immortal, and your secret vote contradicting your public clamor.¹⁶ Hence arises mistrust, hence indignation. We ought, O ye men of Athens, to have a just communion of political rights; the opulent holding themselves secure in their fortunes, and without fear of losing them, yet in time of danger imparting their substance freely for the defence of their country; while the rest consider the public revenue as public, and receive their share, but look on private property as belonging to the individual owner. Thus it is that a small commonwealth becomes great, and a great one is preserved. To speak generally, then, such are the obligations of each class; to

¹⁶ Having admonished the higher classes to pay their property-tax and perform their public services cheerfully, and without seeking to be relieved at the expense of the public revenue, he proceeds to remind the lower classes of their duty. He warns them that, while they receive a benefit from the funds of the state, they must not endeavor to increase those funds unduly by an invasion of the rights of property. His language is not open, but would easily be understood by his audience. The Athenians ought not to promote lawsuits to increase court fees; not to encourage prosecutions against wealthy citizens, in order to obtain fines and confiscations.

insure their performance according to law, some regulation should be made.

The causes of our present troubles and embarrassment are many and of ancient date: if you are willing to hear, I will declare them. You have quitted, O Athenians, the position in which your ancestors left you; you have been persuaded by these politicians that, to stand foremost of the Greeks, to keep a permanent force and redress injured nations, is all vanity and idle expense; you imagine that to live in quiet, to perform no duty, to abandon one thing after another and let strangers seize on all, brings with it marvellous welfare and abundant security. By such means a stranger has advanced to the post which you ought to have occupied, has become prosperous and great, and made large conquests; naturally enough. A prize there was, noble, great, and glorious, one for which the mightiest states were contending all along; but as the Lacedæmonians were humbled, the Thebans had their hands full through the Phocian war, and we took no regard, he carried it off without competition. The result has been, to others terror, to him a vast alliance and extended power; while difficulties so many and so distressing surround the Greeks that even advice is not easy to be found.

Yet, perilous as I conceive the present crisis to be for all, no people are in such danger as you, men of Athens; not only because Philip's designs are especially aimed at you, but because of all people you are the most remiss. If, seeing the abundance of commodities and cheapness in your market, you are beguiled into a belief that the state is in no danger, your judgment is neither becoming nor correct. A market or a fair one may, from such appearances, judge to be well or ill supplied: but for a state,

which every aspirant for the empire of Greece has deemed to be alone capable of opposing him, and defending the liberty of all—for such a state! verily her marketable commodities are not the test of prosperity, but this—whether she can depend on the goodwill of her allies; whether she is puissant in arms. On behalf of such a state these are the things to be considered; and in these respects your condition is wretched and deplorable. You will understand it by a simple reflection. When have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion? No other time could any man point out but the present. In former times Greece was divided into two parties, that of the Lacedæmonians and ours: some of the Greeks were subject to us, some to them. The Persian, on his own account, was mistrusted equally by all, but he used to make friends of the vanquished parties, and retain their confidence, until he put them on an equality with the other side; after which those that he succored would hate him as much as his original enemies. Now, however, the king is on friendly terms with all the Greeks though least friendly with us, unless we put matters right. Now, too, there are protectors¹⁷ springing up in every quarter, and all claim the precedence, though some, indeed, have abandoned the cause, or envy and distrust each other—more shame for them—and every state is isolated, Argives, Thebans, Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Arcadians, and ourselves. But, divided as Greece is among so many parties and so many leaderships, if I must speak the truth freely, there is no state whose offices and halls

¹⁷ This is said with some irony: many states offer to come forward as protectors, but only on condition of taking the lead: they will not join the common cause on fair terms.

of council appear more deserted by Grecian politics than ours. And no wonder; when neither friendship, nor confidence, nor fear leads any to negotiate with us.

This, ye men of Athens, has come not from any single cause (or you might easily mend it), but from a great variety and long series of errors. I will not stop to recount them, but will mention one, to which all may be referred, beseeching you not to be offended, if I boldly speak the truth.

Your interests are sold on every favorable opportunity: you partake of the idleness and ease, under the charm whereof you resent not your wrongs; while other persons get the reward. Into all these cases I could not enter now: but when any question about Philip arises, some one starts up directly and says—"We must have no trifling, no proposal of war"—and then goes on to say—"What a blessing it is to be at peace! what a grievance to maintain a large army!"—and again—"Certain persons wish to plunder the treasury"—and other arguments they urge, no doubt, in the full conviction of their truth.¹⁸ But surely there is no need of persuading you to observe peace, you that sit here persuaded already. It is Philip (who is making war) that needs persuasion: prevail on him, and all is ready on your part. We should consider as grievous, not what we expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of refusal. Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by devising a plan for its safe custody, not by abandoning our interests. Yet this very thing makes me indignant, that some of

¹⁸ There is no difficulty in this, if we understand it to be ironical, and no need of any amendment.

you are pained at the thought of your treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to guard it and to punish the criminal, but are not pained to see Philip plundering Greece, plundering, as he does, one people after another to forward his designs upon you.

How comes it, ye men of Athens, that of this flagrant aggressor, this capturer of cities, no one has ever declared that he commits hostility or injustice, while those who counsel against submission and sacrifice are charged as the authors of war? The reason is that people wish to cast upon your faithful counsellors the blame of any untoward events in the war; for war must necessarily be attended with many misfortunes. They believe that if you resist Philip with one heart and mind, you will prevail against him, and they can be hirelings no longer; but that if on the first outcry you arraign certain persons and bring them to trial, they, by accusing such persons, will gain a double advantage, repute among the Athenians and recompense from Philip; and that you will punish your friendly advisers for a cause for which you ought to punish the traitors. Such are the hopes, such the contrivance of these charges, "that certain persons wish to kindle a war." I am sure, however, that, without any Athenian moving a declaration of war, Philip has taken many of our possessions, and has recently sent succor to Cardia. If we choose to assume that he is not making war against us, he would be the simplest of mankind to convince us of our mistake: for when the sufferers disclaim the injury, what should the offenders do? But when he marches to attack us, what shall we say then? He will assure us that he is not making war, as he assured the Orites when his troops were in their country,

as he assured the Phœrians before he assaulted their walls, and the Olynthians in the first instance, until he was in their territories with his army. Shall we then say that persons who bid us defend ourselves kindle a war? If so, we must be slaves; for nothing else remains.

But remember: you have more at stake than some other people. Philip desires not to subjugate your city, but to destroy it utterly. He is convinced you will not submit to be slaves; if you were inclined you would not know how, having been accustomed to command: you will be able, should occasion offer, to give him more trouble than any people in the world. For this reason he will show us no mercy if he gets us into his power: and, therefore, you must make up your minds that the struggle will be one for life and death. These persons, who have openly sold themselves to Philip, you must execrate, you must beat their brains out: for it is impossible, I say impossible, to vanquish your foreign enemies, until you have punished your enemies within the city: these are the stumbling blocks that must cripple your efforts against the foreigner.

From what cause, do ye think, Philip insults you now (for his conduct, in my judgment, amounts to nothing less); and while he deceives other people by doing them services—this, at least, is something—you he threatens already? For example, the Thessalians, by many benefits, he seduced into their present servitude: no man can tell how he cheated the poor Olynthians, giving them first Potidæa and many other places: now he is luring the Thebans, having delivered up Bœotia to them, and freed them from a tedious and harassing war. Of these people,

who each got a certain advantage, some have suffered what is notorious to all, others have yet to suffer what may befall them. As to yourselves, the amount of your losses I do not mention: but in the very making of the peace how have you been deceived! how plundered! Lost you not the Phocians, Thermopylæ, country toward Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself? Holds he not Cardia now, and avows it? Why, then, does he behave thus to other people, and in a different way to you? Because our city is the only one where liberty is allowed to speak for the enemy, where a man taking a bribe may safely address the people, though they have been deprived of their possessions. It was not safe at Olynthus to advocate Philip's cause without the Olynthian people sharing the benefit by possession of Potidæa. It was not safe to advocate Philip's cause in Thessaly without the people of Thessaly sharing the benefit by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylæan Synod. It was not safe at Thebes until he restored Boeotia to them, and destroyed the Phocians. But at Athens, though Philip has taken from you Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, and is even turning Eubœa into a hostile post, and advancing to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip's behalf. Yea, among these men, some have risen rapidly from poverty to wealth, from meanness and obscurity to repute and honor, while you, on the contrary, have fallen from honor to obscurity, from wealth to indigence. For the riches of a state I consider to be allies, confidence, goodwill; of all which you are destitute. And by your neglecting these things, and suffering your interests thus to be swept away, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the Greeks and barbarians, while you are forlorn and abject, in the

abundance of your market magnificent, but in your national defences ridiculous."

Some of our orators, I observe, take not the same thought for you as for themselves. They say that you should keep quiet, though you are injured; but they cannot themselves keep quiet among you, though no one injures them. Come, raillery apart, suppose you were thus questioned, Aristodemus¹⁹—"Tell me, as you know perfectly well, what every one else knows, that the life of private men is secure and free from trouble and danger, while that of statesmen is exposed to scandal and misfortune, full of trials and hardships every day, how comes it that you prefer, not the quiet and easy life, but the one surrounded with peril?"—what should you say? If we admitted the truth of what would be your best possible answer, namely, that all you do is for honor and renown, I wonder what puts it into your head that you ought from such motives to exert yourself and undergo toil and danger, while you advise the state to give up exertion and remain idle. You cannot surely allege that Aristodemus ought to be of importance at Athens, and Athens to be of no account among the Greeks. Nor, again, do I see that for the commonwealth it is safe to mind her own affairs only, and hazardous for you, not to be a superlative busy-body. On the contrary, to you I see the utmost peril from your meddling and overmeddling, to the commonwealth peril

¹⁹ The whole of the foregoing passage is taken, with some little variation, from the speech on the Chersonese. It certainly would seem strange, if this oration had been forged by any grammarian, that he should have borrowed thus by wholesale from Demosthenes. There is perhaps less difficulty in the supposition that Demosthenes repeated his own words.

²⁰ This man was a tragic actor, and charged by Demosthenes with being a partisan of Philip. He was the first person who proposed peace with Macedonia, shortly before the embassy of ten.

from her inactivity. But I suppose you inherit a reputation from your father and grandfather, which it were disgraceful in your own person to extinguish, whereas the ancestry of the state was ignoble and mean. This, again, is not so. Your father was a thief, if he resembled you, whereas by the ancestors of the commonwealth, as all men know, the Greeks have twice been rescued from the brink of destruction. Truly, the behavior of some persons, in private and in public, is neither equitable nor constitutional. How is it equitable that certain of these men, returned from prison, should not know themselves, while the state, that once protected all Greece and held the foremost place, is sunk in ignominy and humiliation?

Much could I add on many points, but I will forbear. It is not, I believe, to lack of words that our distresses have been owing either now or heretofore. The mischief is when you, after listening to sound arguments, and all agreeing in their justice, sit to hear with equal favor those who try to defeat and pervert them; not that you are ignorant of the men (you are certain at the first glance, who speak for hire and are Philip's political agents, and who speak sincerely for your good); your object is to find fault with these, turn the thing into laughter and raillery, and escape the performance of your duty.

Such is the truth, spoken with perfect freedom, purely from goodwill and for the best: not a speech fraught with flattery and mischief and deceit, to earn money for the speaker, and to put the commonwealth into the hands of our enemies. I say, you must either desist from these practices, or blame none but yourselves for the wretched condition of your affairs.

THE ORATION ON THE LETTER

THE ARGUMENT

THE Athenians had been persuaded by the advice of Demosthenes to solicit the aid of Persia. This was accorded, and events had happened on the Propontine coast, which made it peculiarly needful. Toward the close of the year B.C. 342 Philip commenced the siege of Selymbria, and early in the following year, that city having been taken, laid siege to Perinthus. But here he met with an obstinate resistance: Perinthus was strong by nature and well fortified. The satraps of western Asia had supplied it with a stock of provisions and ammunition, and a large body of Greek mercenaries. Byzantium also had sent assistance. Philip, after making great efforts to take Perinthus by storm, turned the siege into a blockade, and marched northward against Byzantium. Here he was no more successful than he had been at Perinthus. The Byzantines had well prepared themselves to resist his attack, and received powerful aid not only from their old allies of Coe, Chios, and Rhodes, but also from other parts of Greece, and especially from Athens. In order to reconcile the Byzantines to his countrymen, with whom they had been at variance ever since the Social war, Demosthenes himself undertook a voyage to the Bosphorus. By his exertions an alliance was concluded, and an Athenian fleet was sent under the command of Chares; but Chares being feared and disliked by the Byzantines, they refused to admit him into the town; and afterward Phocion was despatched with a hundred and twenty ships and a considerable body of troops. The result of these effective measures was, that Philip was baffled in his attempts on both cities, and compelled to raise the siege.

In the meantime important operations had taken place elsewhere. An expedition had been sent under the command of Phocion to Euboea, of which we have no detailed account, but the result was, that the Macedonian party was overpowered, and Clitarchus and Philistides, the partisans of Philip, were expelled from the island. A fleet was then sent by the Athenians into the Pagasæan bay, which took some Thessalian towns, and seized Macedonian merchantmen on the coast. The island of Halonnesus was recovered from Philip by a sudden incursion of the Peparethians. This was revenged by Philip, who ravaged Peparethus, and compelled the islanders to restore their conquest.

Philip saw that peace with Athens could no longer be preserved even in name. Under this conviction, and not, as Mitford says, in alarm at the fourth Philippic, he wrote a letter to the Athenians (the letter which follows this oration) in which he reproaches them with the various acts of hostility which they had committed, and concludes with a virtual declaration

of war. An assembly was held, at which this letter was read, and Demosthenes is supposed to have delivered the following speech in reply to it. The exact time when the letter was received is uncertain; but it would appear, from the internal evidence, to have been after the siege of Perinthus had commenced, and before that of Byzantium. The arguments of Philip produced no effect; things had gone too far for reconciliation; and it was not difficult for Demosthenes to obtain a decree for the vigorous prosecution of the war.

It will be seen on a perusal of the letter and answer, that the orator does not attempt to meet the specific charges and complaints of Philip. We have nothing but the old arguments, showing the necessity of succoring Perinthus and Byzantium, as formerly of succoring Olynthus; the real weakness of Philip's empire, and the good chance that by vigorous measures it might be overturned. Mitford considers that it was impossible to confute the reasoning of Philip, and therefore that bold invective was the only thing that remained for the orator. And even Leland says, it would have been difficult to answer the letter particularly, because, though Athens had the better cause, she had committed many irregularities. I cannot agree with this view of the question. If Philip had been the good-natured easy person that Mitford represents, who was raised to the surface of Greek affairs by the merest accidents, and rather had greatness thrust upon him by the opposition of the Athenians, than either sought or desired it himself, then indeed the acts of hostility which Philip complains of might justly be regarded as breaches of good faith, and violations by Athens of the law of nations. But I read the history of the times very differently. Philip had been for many years pursuing his career of conquest steadily and successfully. The Chersonese, Euboea, all the possessions of the Athenians, their commerce and their corn trade, were at this time in imminent danger. War between Athens and Macedonia, if not open, was understood; argument was out of the question.

But why should Philip address a letter of complaint to a people so bent on hostilities? Why did the wolf complain of the lamb? An aggressive power has never lacked a pretext for making war in either ancient times or modern. It was a part of Philip's system, not only in his dealings with Athens, but with other states, to make friendly overtures and pacific professions, when he meditated some decisive blow. By this means he gained credit for moderation with neutral states, and he created a party for himself within the state which he had designs upon. He put colorable arguments into the mouths of his adherents, distracted the efforts of the people, and at all events gained time for the prosecution of his schemes. It is argued with much force and justice in the exordium of the Oration on Halonnesus, that the tendency of such correspondence was, to deter the adversaries of Philip from expressing their opinions freely.

But for motives of this kind, Philip would hardly have adopted the strain of remonstrance which we read in the Letter. He could never seriously believe,

that the Athenians would resign their claims on Amphipolis, because it belonged to Macedonia in very early times, or would give up the Persian alliance because it was a disgraceful connection. It should be observed however that the Athenians afforded him a handle for using such arguments, by declaiming in the same style themselves when it suited them; and Philip perhaps was pleased at the idea of beating them with their own weapons. The language of the epistle is simple and dignified, and may be regarded as a good specimen of a diplomatic paper. The pith lies in the last clause, which contains a threat of war.

For these reasons it could scarcely have been worth while for the orator to answer every particular charge contained in the Letter. Nor can such omission be deemed an argument against the genuineness of the Oration. This however has been doubted by many critics; and it may be allowed, that a good part of the speech is not very suitable to the occasion upon which it purports to have been spoken.

ATHENIANS! that Philip, instead of concluding peace with us, only deferred the war, has now become manifest to you all. Ever since he gave Halus to the Pharsalians,¹ and settled the Phocian business, and subdued all Thrace, making fictitious charges and inventing unjust pretexts, he has been actually carrying on war against Athens; and now in the letter which he has sent he avowedly declares it. That it becomes you, neither to fear his power nor to withstand him ignobly, but with men and money and ships, in short, with all you have unsparingly to prosecute the war, I will endeavor to show.

In the first place, O Athenians, you may expect that the gods are your greatest allies and defenders, when Philip, violating his faith and disregarding his oaths to them, has perfidiously broken the peace. In the second

¹ Parmenio was besieging Halus in Thessaly during the first embassy of the Athenians for peace. Philip told the ambassadors, he desired their mediation between the people of Halus and Pharsalus. He afterward took the former city, and gave it up to the Pharsalians, who were his devoted allies.

place, he has exhausted all the tricks by which he once rose to greatness, continually deceiving some people and promising them signal benefits. It is understood by the Perinthians and Byzantines and their allies, that he wishes to deal with them in the same manner that he dealt with the Olynthians formerly; it escapes not the Thessalians, that he designs to be the master of his allies and not their chief: he is suspected by the Thebans, for holding Nicaea^a with a garrison, for having crept into the Amphictyonic council, for drawing to himself the embassies from Peloponnesus,^b and stealing their confederacy from them: so that of his former friends some are at war with him irreconcilably, some are no longer hearty auxiliaries, all are jealous and complaining of him. Besides—what is of no small moment—the satraps of Asia have just thrown in mercenary troops for the relief of Perinthus, and now that hostility has begun between them, and the peril is imminent if Byzantium should be reduced, not only will they assist us with alacrity themselves, but they will urge the Persian king to supply us with money; and he possesses greater wealth than all nations put together; he has such influence over proceedings here, that in our former wars with Lacedæmon, whichever side he joined, he caused them to vanquish their opponents, and now siding with us he will easily beat down the power of Philip.

With these advantages, I will not deny, that Philip has by favor of the peace snatched from us many fortresses and harbors and other like conveniences for war;

^a On account of its neighborhood to the pass of Thermopylæ.

^b The Messenians and Arcadians. See the Argument to the second Philippic. Those people had been the allies of the Thebans since the time of Epaminondas, but were now more inclined to Philip, as being better able to protect them.

yet I observe, that if an alliance is consolidated by goodwill, and all who take part in the wars have a common interest, the union is firm and lasting; whereas, if it be kept up by deceit and violence, with insidious and ambitious views (as this of Philip is), any slight pretence, any accidental failure, shakes to pieces and destroys it all in a moment. And by much consideration, men of Athens, I find, not only that the allies of Philip have come to distrust and dislike him, but that even his own subjects are not well-disposed or loyal, or what people imagine. Generally speaking, the Macedonian power, as an auxiliary, is important and useful, but by itself it is feeble, and ridiculously disproportioned to these gigantic enterprises. Moreover this very man by his wars, his expeditions, and all the proceedings which may seem to establish his greatness, has rendered it more precarious for himself. Don't suppose, men of Athens, that Philip and his subjects delight in the same things. Bear in mind, that he desires glory, they security; he cannot gain his object without hazard; they want not to leave parents, wives, and children at home, to wear themselves out and risk their lives for him every day.

Hence one may judge, what the feelings of the Macedonian people toward Philip are. As to his guards and the leaders of his mercenaries, you will find they have a reputation for courage, yet live in greater terror than men of no repute. For those are in danger only from the enemy; these fear flatterers and calumniators more than battles: those together with the whole army fight their opponents in the field; these have their full share in the hardships of war, and it is also their peculiar lot to dread the humors of the king. Besides, if any common soldier

does wrong, he is punished according to his desert; but with these men, it is when they have achieved the most signal success that they are most outrageously vilified and abused. No reasonable man can disbelieve this statement; for he is reported by those who have lived with him to be so covetous of honor, that, wishing all the noblest exploits to be considered his own, he is more offended with the generals and officers who have achieved anything praiseworthy, than with those who have altogether miscarried.

How then, under such circumstances, have they for a long time faithfully adhered to him? Because for the present, men of Athens, success throws a shade over all this: good fortune covers the faults of men, screens them wonderfully: but let him fail in something, and all will be fully revealed. It is the same as in the human body. When a man is healthy, he has no feeling of local disorders; but when he falls ill, every sore is felt, whether he has a rupture, or a sprain, or any member not perfectly sound. Just so with monarchies or other states: while they are successful in war, their weaknesses are imperceptible to most men; but when they have suffered a reverse (which Philip very likely will, having taken on him a burden beyond his strength), all their difficulties become manifest to the world.

Yet if any Athenian, seeing that Philip has been fortunate, therefore thinks it hard and terrible to contend with him, such person, I grant, exercises a prudent forethought. For indeed fortune is the prime—nay, the sole mover in all the business of mankind. Nevertheless in many respects might our good fortune be preferred to Philip's. The leadership that we have received from our

ancestors takes its date, not before Philip only, but (let me say roundly) before all the kings that ever reigned in Macedonia. They have paid tribute to the Athenians, but Athens has never paid tribute to any nation. We have more title than Philip to the favor of the gods, inasmuch as we have invariably shown more regard to religion and justice.

How comes it, then, that Philip has obtained more successes than you in the former war? Because, O men of Athens (I will tell you candidly), he takes the field himself, he toils, he faces the danger, letting slip no opportunity, omitting no season of the year: while we—the truth must be spoken—sit idling here, delaying always and voting and asking in the market-place if there is any news. But what greater news could there be than a man of Macedonia contemning Athenians, and daring to send such an epistle as you have just heard? Again; he keeps soldiers in his pay, ay, and some of our orators besides, who, imagining they carry his presents home, are not ashamed to live for Philip, and perceive not that they are selling for petty lucre all that belongs to their country and themselves. We neither attempt to disturb any of his proceedings, nor like to maintain mercenaries, nor dare to take the field in person. It is no wonder, then, that he has gained advantages over us in the former war: it is rather strange that we, doing nothing that becomes a people at war, expect to vanquish one who pursues all the measures necessary to conquest.

You must reflect on all this, men of Athens, consider that we have not even the power of saying we are at peace—since Philip has now declared war and commenced it in earnest—spare not any treasures, public or private;

march eagerly all to battle, wherever occasion calls; and employ better generals than before. Let none of you suppose that by the same proceedings which have damaged the commonwealth it can again recover and improve. Imagine not, that while you are as remiss as you have been, others will strive zealously for your welfare. Bear in mind how disgraceful it is, that your fathers underwent numerous hardships and fearful dangers warring with the Lacedæmonians, while you will not courageously defend even the well-earned honors which they bequeathed you; and that a man springing from Macedonia is so enamoured of danger, that, to enlarge his empire, he has been wounded all over his body fighting with the enemy, while Athenians, whose birthright it is to submit to none, but to conquer all in war, through slackness or effeminacy desert the conduct of their ancestors and the interests of their country.

Not to be tedious, I say we must all prepare ourselves for war; the Greeks we must invite, not by words but by deeds, to espouse our alliance. All speech is idle, unattended by action; and Athenian speech the more so on this account, that we are reputed more dexterous in the use of it than any of the Greeks.

THE LETTER OF PHILIP

THE ARGUMENT

THIS is the Letter to which the preceding oration purports to be a reply. For the circumstances which gave rise to it, see the Argument of the Oration.

PHILIP to the senate and people of Athens greeting:
Whereas I have frequently sent ambassadors, that we may abide by our oaths and agreements, and you paid them no regard, I thought proper to write to you concerning the matters in which I consider myself aggrieved. Marvel not at the length of this epistle; for, there being many articles of complaint, it is necessary to explain myself clearly upon all.

First then; after Nicias the herald was snatched from my dominions, you chastised not the culprits, but imprisoned the injured party for ten months; and my letters, of which he was the bearer, you read on the hustings.¹

Secondly, when the Thasians were receiving in their port the Byzantine galleys and all pirates that chose to enter, you took no notice, although the treaty expressly declares, that whoever act thus shall be enemies.

Again, about the same time Diopithes made an irruption into my territory, carried off the inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis² for slaves, and ravaged the adjacent parts of Thrace; proceeding to such lawless extremities

¹ It is mentioned by Plutarch that a letter from Philip to his Queen Olympias, which fell into the hands of the Athenians, was returned unopened. But whether it was on this or another occasion does not appear.

² Crobyle must have been in Thrace. Tiristasis is mentioned by Pliny as a place in the Chersonese. Probably then it was near Cardia, not far from the isthmus.

that he seized Amphilochns, who came to negotiate about the prisoners, and, after putting on him the hardest dur-
ance, took from him a ransom of nine talents. And this he did with the approbation of the people. Howbeit, to offer violence to a herald and ambassadors is considered impious by all nations, and especially by you. Certain it is, when the Megarians killed Anthemocritus,* your people went so far as to exclude them from the mysteries, and erect a statue before their gates for a monument of the crime. Then is it not shameful that you are seen committing the same offence, for which, when you were the sufferers, you so detested the authors?

Further, Callias⁴ your general took all the towns situate in the Pagasæan bay, towns under treaty with you and in alliance with me; and sold all people bound for Macedonia, adjudging them enemies; and on this account you praised him in your decrees. So that I am puzzled to

* The Athenians, having charged the people of Megara with profaning a piece of consecrated ground, sent Anthemocritus to admonish them to desist from the sacrilege. The Megarians put him to death, and drew upon themselves the wrath of their powerful neighbors, who passed the decree of excommunication here referred to. The monument which recorded their impiety was to be seen in the time of Pausanias, on the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis.

⁴ This is the same Callias, ruler of Chalcis, who opposed the Athenians at the time when Phocion was sent to assist Plutarch of Eretria. At the battle of Tamynæ Callias had been aided by Macedonian troops; but after the departure of Phocion, and the decline of the Athenian interest in Eubœa, he formed the scheme of bringing the whole island under his own sway, or at least of making it independent. This did not suit the views of Philip, and Callias, having lost his favor, tried to form a connection with the Thebans. Failing in this attempt, he determined to unite himself to Athens, and accordingly came over and concerted with Demosthenes and his party a plan for a revolution in Eubœa. It was not possible to accomplish this by negotiation, owing to the strength of Macedonian influence, which was confirmed by the occurrences at Oreus and Eretria. At length, by the exertions of Demosthenes, a decree was passed to send troops into Eubœa; and Phocion, to whom the command was intrusted, overpowered the Macedonian garrisons, and expelled Clitarchus and Philistides from the island. This was B.C. 341. Afterward, it seems, an Athenian force, under the command of Callias, crossed the narrow strait that separates the north of Eubœa from Thessaly, and made the attack, which Philip here speaks of, on the towns in the bay of Pagasæ.

think, what worse could happen, if you were confessedly at war with me: for when we were in open hostility, you used to send out privateers and sell people sailing to our coast, you assisted my enemies, infested my country.

Yet more; you have carried your animosity and violence so far, that you have even sent ambassadors to the Persian, to persuade him to make war against me: a thing which is most surprising: for before he gained Egypt and Phœnicia, you resolved,* in case of any aggression on his part, to invite me as well as the other Greeks to oppose him; but now you have such an overflow of malice against me, as to negotiate with him for an offensive alliance. Anciently, as I am informed, your ancestors condemned the Pisistratids for bringing the Persian to invade Greece: yet you are not ashamed of doing the same thing, for which you continue to reproach the tyrants.

In addition to other matters, you write in your decrees, commanding me to let Teres⁶ and Cersobleptes rule in Thrace, because they are Athenians. I know nothing of them as being included in the treaty of peace with you, or as inscribed on the pillars, or as being Athenians; I know, however, that Teres took arms with me against you, and that Cersobleptes was anxious to take the oaths separately to my ambassadors, but was prevented by your generals pronouncing him an enemy of Athens. How can it be equitable or just, when it suits your purpose, to call

⁵ The time referred to is B.C. 354, when there was a rumor of a Persian invasion, and a proposal at Athens to declare war against Artaxerxes, upon which Demosthenes made the speech *de Symmoriis*. Phœnicia and Egypt were recovered some years after that. The argument of Philip is, that since the recovery of those provinces Persia was more dangerous than before, and therefore it was more disgraceful for a Greek state to be connected with that monarchy.

⁶ Of Teres nothing is known but from this passage: he must have been a prince in the interior of Thrace.

him an enemy of the state, and when you desire to calumniate me, to declare the same person your citizen—and on the death of Sitalces,⁷ to whom you imparted the freedom of your city, to make friendship immediately with his murderer, but on behalf of Cersobleptes to espouse a war with me?—knowing too as you must, that, of the persons who receive such gifts, none has the least regard for your laws or decrees? However—to omit all else and be concise—you bestowed citizenship on Evagoras of Cyprus,⁸ and Dionysius of Syracuse,⁹ and their descendants. If

⁷ It is impossible that this can refer to the Sitalces, King of the Odrysæ, and ally of the Athenians, whose wars and death are related by Thucydides. He fell in a battle with the Triballi, and was succeeded by his nephew Seuthes. It was his son Sadocus, and not he, that was made a citizen of Athens. Tournell tries to get over the difficulty by suggesting that Seuthes was suspected of murdering him; but there is no evidence that the Athenians entered into treaty with Seuthes till long afterward. However, the circumstances here mentioned exactly apply to Cotys, father of Cersobleptes, who had the honor of Athenian citizenship conferred on him, for which he showed very little gratitude in his subsequent conduct, and accordingly, when he was murdered by Python and Heraclides of Ænus, the Athenians rewarded them with citizenship and a golden crown. Sitalces therefore may have been a mistake, or a slip of the pen, for Cotys.

⁸ Evagoras, the friend of Conon, who assisted the Athenians in the re-establishment of their independence, was made a citizen of Athens, and statues of him and of Conon were placed side by side in the Ceramicus. He aimed at becoming absolute master of Cyprus, and was engaged in a long war against the Persian king, in which he was ultimately overpowered, but, on submission to Artaxerxes, was permitted to rule in Salamis. On his death, B.C. 374, he was succeeded by his son Nicocles, who was father of the Evagoras here referred to. Nicocles did not reign long, and the young Evagoras was afterward driven from Salamis by a successful usurper. Cyprus was at this period divided among several princes, who afterward joined the great rebellion of Phœnicia and Egypt against Artaxerxes. Meanwhile Evagoras had passed into the service of the Persian king, and was perhaps dwelling in Caria, when Idrieus the prince of Caria appointed him, together with Phocion the Athenian, to command the armament collected for the reduction of Cyprus. This was B.C. 351. Cyprus was reduced in the following year; but Evagoras, instead of being rewarded, as he expected, with the principality of his native town, was appointed to a government in Asia. In this he miscondacted himself, and fled to Cyprus, where he was arrested and put to death. The honor which it appears he received, of Athenian citizenship, may have been owing to respect to his grandfather's memory and his connection with Phocion. Or perhaps the honor inherited from his grandfather may be referred to or possibly Philip may be confounding the elder and younger Evagoras. At all events, the comparison is not a happy one.

⁹ This refers to the younger Dionysius, twice expelled from Syracuse, first

you can persuade the people who expelled each of those princes to reinstate them in their government, then recover Thrace from me, all that Teres and Cersobleptes reigned over. But if against the parties, who mastered Evagoras and Dionysius, you will not utter a word of complaint, and yet continue to annoy me, how can I be wrong in resisting you?

On this head I have many arguments yet remaining, which I purposely omit. But as to the Cardians, I avow myself their auxiliary; for I was allied to them before the peace, and you refused to come to an arbitration, although I made many offers, and they are not a few. Surely I should be the basest of men, if, deserting my allies, I paid more regard to you, who have harassed me all along, than to those who have always been my steadfast friends.

Another thing I must not leave unnoticed. You have arrived at such a pitch of arrogance that, while formerly you did but remonstrate with me on the matters aforesaid, in the recent case, where the Peparethians complained of harsh treatment, you ordered your general to obtain satisfaction from me on their account.¹⁰ Yet I punished them less severely than they deserved. For they in time of peace seized Halonnesus, and would restore neither the place nor the garrison, though I sent many times about them. You objected not to the injury which the Peparethians had done me, but only to their punishment, well knowing that I took the island neither from them nor

by Dion, B.C. 356, afterward by Timoleon, B.C. 343. He was in alliance with Sparta, and sent troops to her assistance against Epaminondas. His connection with Athens began after she had made common cause with Sparta: from that time many Athenians resorted to his court, and (among others) Plato is said to have visited him.

¹⁰ Peparethus is in the same group of islands with Halonnesus. Philip's ravaging of Peparethus is spoken of in the Oration on the Crown.

from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If now you declare that you gave it up to Sostratus, you acknowledge to having commissioned pirates; but if he got possession against your will, what hardship have you suffered by my taking it and rendering the coast safe for navigators? I had such regard for your state that I offered you the island; yet your orators would not let you accept it, but counselled you to obtain restitution, in order that, if I submitted to your command, I might confess my occupation to be unlawful, if I refused to abandon the place your commonalty might suspect me. Perceiving which, I challenged you to a reference of the question, so that, if it were decided to be mine, the place should be given by me to you, if it were adjudged yours, then I should restore it to the people. This I frequently urged; you would not listen; and the Peparethians seized the island. What, then, became it me to do? Not to punish the violators of their oaths? not to avenge myself on the perpetrators of these gross outrages? If the island belonged to the Peparethians, what business had Athenians to demand it? If it was yours, why resent you not their unlawful seizure?

To such a degree of enmity have we advanced that, wishing to pass with my ships into the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort them along the coast through the Chersonese with my army, as your colonists, according to the resolution of Polycrates, were making war against me, and you were sanctioning it by your decrees, and your general was inviting the Byzantines to join him, and proclaiming everywhere that he had your instructions to commence war on the first opportunity. Notwithstanding these injuries, I refrained from attacking

either your fleet or your territory," though I was in a condition to take the greater part, if not all; and I have persisted in offering to submit our mutual complaints to arbitration. Consider, now, whether it is fairer to decide by arms or by argument, to pronounce the award yourselves or persuade others to do so: reflect, also, how unreasonable it is that Athens should compel Thasians and Maronites to a judicial settlement of their claims to Stryme,¹¹ yet refuse to determine her disputes with me in the same manner, especially when you know that, if beaten, you will lose nothing, if successful, you will get what is in my possession.

The most unaccountable thing of all, in my opinion, is this—when I sent ambassadors from the whole confederacy,¹² that they might be witnesses, and desired to make a just arrangement with you on behalf of the Greeks, you would not even hear what the deputies had to propose on the subject, though it was in your power, either to secure against all danger the parties mistrustful of me, or plainly to prove me the basest of mankind. That was the interest of the people, but it suited not the orators. To them—as persons acquainted with your gov-

¹¹ There is, apparently, no reference here to any measures against Attica or the city of Athens, nor to any other hostilities against her but such as might have been taken in the neighborhood of the Hellespont. Philip says: "I did not attack either the ships or the territory of your state"; that is, "I neither attacked your fleet which was watching in the Hellespont to prevent the passage of mine into the Propontis, nor did I commit any hostilities in the Chersonese, but only marched through it, as a measure of necessity, passing along the coast to protect my fleet."—The presence of a land force on the coast, to protect a fleet, was not uncommon in Greek warfare.

¹² Maronea and Stryme were neighboring towns, on the coast of Thrace, northeast of the Island of Thasos. Stryme was founded by the Thasians, whom the Maronites endeavored to deprive of their colony.

¹³ This seems to have been the embassy that led to the second Philippic. See the argument to that oration. By "the whole confederacy," he means the Amphictyonic union, and affects to treat the Athenians as belonging to it.

ernment say—peace is war, and war is peace: for they always get something from the generals, either by supporting or calumniating them, and also, by railing on your hustings at the most eminent citizens and most illustrious foreigners, they acquire credit with the multitude for being friends of the constitution.

Easy were it for me, at a very small expense, to silence their invectives, and make them pronounce my panegyric.¹⁴ But I should be ashamed to purchase your goodwill from these men, who—besides other things—have reached such a point of assurance as to contest Amphipolis with me, to which I conceive I have a far juster title than the claimants. For if it belongs to the earliest conquerors, how can my right be questioned, when Alexander, my ancestor, first occupied the place, from which, as the firstfruits of the captive Medes, he brought the offering of a golden statue to Delphi?¹⁵ Or, should this be disputed, and the argument be that it belongs to the last possessors, so likewise I have the best title; for I besieged and took the place from a people

¹⁴ This observation laid Philip open to a severe retort. What experience had he of the facility of bribing orators at Athens or elsewhere? If he had none, it was a gratuitous piece of slander, and an insult to the Athenians, to suppose their leading statesmen so corruptible. If he spoke from experience, he proved the justice of what Demosthenes asserted of him, and the danger to be apprehended from his intrigues.

¹⁵ Auger has justly remarked, that Philip's assertion here is contrary to the historical evidence which has been handed down to us. The city of Amphipolis did not exist in the time of this Alexander, but was founded many years after by Hagnon the Athenian. Nor is there any account of his having gained a victory over the Persians, though Herodotus speaks of the golden statue which he erected at Delphi. He was at first compelled to follow in the train of Xerxes, though he afterward came over to the Greeks, and his desertion was considered by them as highly meritorious. It is not unlikely, that there were traditions concerning him in Macedonia, unknown to the southern Greeks, and Philip himself might well put faith in them. Supposing the facts here asserted to be true, the argument, as against the Athenians, who set up a prior title in point of time, was conclusive. But, except as an *argumentum ad hominem*, it could be worth little or nothing.

who expelled you and were planted by the Lacedæmonians." But we all hold cities either by inheritance from our ancestors, or by conquest in war. You claim this city, not being either the first occupants or the present possessors, having abode for a very short period in the district, and after having yourselves given the strongest testimony in my favor. For I have frequently written in letters concerning it, and you have acknowledged the justice of my tenure, first by making the peace while I held the city, and next by concluding alliance on the same terms. How can any property stand on a firmer title than this, which was left to me originally by my forefathers, has again become mine in war, and, thirdly, has been conceded by you, who are accustomed to claim what you have not the least pretensions to?

Such are the complaints which I prefer. As you are the aggressors, as by reason of my forbearance you are making new encroachments, and doing me all the mischief you can, I will, in a just cause, defend myself, and, calling the gods to witness, bring the quarrel between us to an issue.

¹⁶ After the death of Brasidas, the Amphipolitans paid divine honors to his memory, and treated him as their founder, destroying every vestige of Hagnon the Athenian. Therefore they are spoken of as being a Lacedæmonian colony.

THE ORATION ON THE DUTIES OF THE STATE

THE ARGUMENT

THE object of this oration is, to show the necessity of making a proper application of the public revenue, and compelling every citizen to perform service to the state. With respect to the first point, the advice given in the first and third Olynthiacs is in substance repeated, viz., that the theoric distributions should be put on a different footing; that the fund should either not be distributed at all, or that every man should accept his share as a remuneration for service in the army and navy, or the discharge of some other duty. This was but a circuitous way of proposing (as before observed) that the law of Eubulus should be repealed. It is here further recommended, that the duties required by the state should be systematically divided among all classes, and performed with regularity.

At what time or on what occasion this speech was delivered, we cannot determine. It is mentioned in the exordium, that an assembly of the people was held to consider how certain public moneys should be disposed of. But this gives us no clew to the circumstances. There is no mention of Philip, or of any historical event in connection with the subject. It is stated by the orator, that he had discussed the same question before; and perhaps it may be inferred from hence, that the present speech was later than the Olynthiacs. Again, it may be presumed to have been earlier than the fourth Philippic, in which Demosthenes appears to have changed or modified his views on the subject of the Theoric fund. If, however, the fourth Philippic be not genuine, as some persons contend, the last argument can have no weight.

WITH respect to the present money and the purpose for which you hold the assembly, men of Athens, it appears to me that two courses are equally easy; either to condemn those who distribute and give away the public funds, to gain their esteem who think the commonwealth is injured by such means, or to advocate and recommend the system of allowances, to gratify those who are pressing in need of them. Both parties praise or blame the practice, not out of regard to the public interest, but according to their several condi-

tions of indigence or affluence. For my part, I would neither propose that the allowances be discontinued, nor speak against them; yet I advise you to consider and reflect in your minds that this money about which you are deliberating is a trifle, but the usage that grows up with it is important. If you will ordain it so that your allowances be associated with the performance of duty, so far from injuring, you will signally benefit the commonwealth and yourselves. But if for your allowances a festival or any excuse be sufficient, while about your further obligations you will not even hear a word, beware lest what you now consider a right practice you may hereafter deem a grievous error.

My opinion is—don't clamor at what I am going to say, but hear and judge—that, as we appointed an assembly for the receiving of money, so should we appoint an assembly for the regulation of duties and the making provision for war; and every man should exhibit not only a willingness to hear the discussion, but a readiness to act, that you may derive your hopes of advantage from yourselves, Athenians, and not be inquiring what this or that person is about. All the revenue of the state, what you now expend out of your private fortunes to no purpose, and what is obtained from your allies, I say you ought to receive, every man his share, those of the military age as pay, those exempt from the roll¹ as inspection-money,² or what you please to call it; but you must take the field yourselves, yield that privilege to none; the force of the state

¹ The roll in which were inscribed the names of all citizens qualified to serve in the cavalry or heavy-armed infantry. Men past the military age were exempt.

² It would be the duty of these persons who received such fees to inspect the militia roll, see that it was complete, that all the qualified citizens took their turns of service, were properly armed and equipped, etc.

must be native, and provided from these resources; that you may want for nothing while you perform your obligations. And the general should command^{*} that force, so that you, Athenians, may experience not the same results as at present—you try the generals, and the issue of your affairs is, "Such a one, the son of such a one, impeached such a one"; nothing else—but what results?—first, that your allies may be attached to you not by garrisons, but by community of interest; secondly, that your generals may not have mercenaries to plunder the allies, without even seeing the enemy (a course from which the emoluments are theirs in private, while the odium and reproach fall upon the whole country), but have citizens to follow them, and do unto the enemy what they now do unto your friends. Besides, many operations require your presence, and (not to mention the advantage of employing our own army for our own wars) it is necessary also for other purposes. If indeed you were content to be quiet, and not to meddle with the politics of Greece, it would be a different matter: but you assume to take the lead and determine the rights of others, and yet have not provided, nor endeavor to provide for yourselves, a force to guard and maintain that superiority. While you never stirred, while you kept entirely aloof, the people of Mitylene have lost their constitution; while you never stirred, the Rhodians have lost theirs—our enemies, it may be said, true, men of Athens; but a strife with oligarchies for the principle of government should be considered more deadly than a strife with popular states on any account whatsoever.

^{*} *I.e.*, really and effectually command it; not be reduced by their necessities to relax the discipline of the troops, or to employ them on a service foreign to the interests of Athens.

But let me return to the point—I say, your duties must be marshalled; there must be the same rule for receiving money and performing what service is required. I have discussed this question with you before, and shown the method of arranging you all, you of the heavy-armed, you of the cavalry, and you that are neither, and how to make a common provision for all. But what has caused me the greatest despondency, I will tell you without reserve. Amid such a number of important and noble objects, no man remembers any of the rest, but all remember the two obols.* Yet two obols can never be worth more than two obols; while what I proposed in connection therewith is worth the treasures of the Persian king—that a state possessing such a force of infantry, such a navy, cavalry, and revenue, should be put in order and preparation.

Why, it may be asked, do I mention these things now? For this reason. There are men shocked at the idea of enlisting all the citizens on hire, while the advantage of order and preparation is universally acknowledged. Here then, I say, you should begin, and permit any person that pleases to deliver his opinion upon the subject. For thus it is. If you can be persuaded to believe that now is the time for making arrangements, when you come to want them, they will be ready: but if you neglect the present time as unseasonable, you will be compelled to make preparations when you have occasion for their use.

It has been said before now, I believe, Athenians, not by you the multitude, but by persons who would burst if these measures were carried into effect—"What benefit

* The sum distributed as the price of admittance to the theatres.

have we got from the harangues of Demosthenes? He comes forward when he likes, he stuffs our ears with declamation, he abuses the present state of things, he praises our forefathers, he excites and puffs up our imaginations, and then sits down." I can only say, could I persuade you to follow some of my counsels, I should confer upon the state such important benefits as, if I now attempted to describe them, would appear incredible to many, as exceeding possibility. Yet even this I conceive to be no small advantage, if I accustom you to hear the best advice. For it is necessary, O men of Athens, that whosoever desires to render your commonwealth a service should begin by curing your ears. They are corrupted: so many falsehoods have you been accustomed to hear, anything indeed rather than what is salutary. For instance—let me not be interrupted by clamor, before I have finished—certain persons lately, you know, broke open the treasury: and all the orators cried out, that the democracy was overthrown, the laws were annihilated; or to that effect. Now, ye men of Athens—only see whether I speak truly—the guilty parties committed a crime worthy of death; but the democracy is not overthrown by such means. Again, some oars were stolen: and people clamored for stripes and torture, saying the democracy was in danger. But what do I say? I agree with them that the thief merits death; but I deny that the constitution is by such means overturned. How indeed it is in danger of subversion, no man is bold enough to tell you; but I will declare. It is when you, men of Athens, are under bad leading, a helpless multitude, without arms, without order, without unanimity; when neither general nor any other person pays regard to your resolutions, no one will inform

you of your errors, or correct them, or endeavor to effect a change. This it is that happens now.

And by Jupiter, O Athenians, another sort of language is current among you, false and most injurious to the constitution; such as this, that your safety lies in the courts of justice, and you must guard the constitution by your votes. It is true, these courts are public tribunals for the decision of your mutual rights; but by arms must your enemies be vanquished, by arms the safety of the constitution must be maintained. Voting will not make your soldiers victorious, but they who by soldiership have overcome the enemy provide you with liberty and security for voting and doing what you please. In arms you should be terrible, in courts of justice humane.

If any one thinks I talk a language above my position, this very quality of the speech is laudable. An oration to be spoken for a state so illustrious, and on affairs so important, should transcend the character of the speaker, whoever he be; it should approximate to your dignity rather than his. Why none of your favorites speak in such a style, I will explain to you. The candidates for office and employment go about and cringe to the voting interest, each ambitious to be created general, not to perform any manlike deed. Or if there be a man capable of noble enterprise, he thinks now, that starting with the name and reputation of the state, profiting by the absence of opponents, holding out hopes to you, and nothing else, he shall himself inherit your advantages—which really happens—whereas, if you did everything by yourselves, you would share with the rest, not in the actions only, but also in their results. Your politicians and that class of men, neglecting to give you honest advice, ally them-

selves to the former class: and as you once had boards for taxes, so now you have boards for politics; an orator presiding, a general under him, and three hundred men to shout on either side; while the rest of you are attached some to one party, some to the other. Accordingly—this is what you get by the system—such and such a person has a brazen statue; here and there is an individual more thriving than the commonwealth; you, the people, sit as witnesses of their good fortune, abandoning to them for an ephemeral indolence your great and glorious heritage of prosperity.

But see how it was in the time of your ancestors; for by domestic (not foreign) examples you may learn your lesson of duty. Themistocles who commanded in the sea-fight at Salamis, and Miltiades who led at Marathon, and many others, who performed services unlike the generals of the present day—assuredly they were not set up in brass nor overvalued by your forefathers, who honored them, but only as persons on a level with themselves. Your forefathers, O my countrymen, surrendered not their part in any of those glories. There is no man who will attribute the victory of Salamis to Themistocles, but to the Athenians; nor the battle of Marathon to Miltiades, but to the republic. But now people say that Timotheus took Corcyra,⁵ and Iphicrates cut off the Spartan division,⁶ and

⁵ Timotheus brought back Corcyra to the Athenian alliance, B.C. 376. The Lacedæmonians attempted to recover it three years after, but were defeated.

⁶ At Lechæum near Corinth. The division of the Lacedæmonian army which Iphicrates defeated was little more than four hundred men. The fame of the exploit, so disproportioned to the numbers engaged, was owing, partly to the great renown of the Spartan infantry, which had not been defeated in a pitched battle for a long period before, and partly to the new kind of troops employed by the Athenian general. These were the *peltastæ* or *targeteers*, who were something between heavy-armed and light-armed soldiers, combining in some degree the advantages of both. Their shield (*pelta*) was lighter, their

Chabrias won the naval victory at Naxos:⁷ for you seem to resign the merit of these actions, by the extravagance of the honors which you have bestowed on their account upon each of the commanders.

So wisely did the Athenians of that day confer political rewards; so improperly do you. But how the rewards of foreigners? To Menon the Pharsalian, who gave twelve talents in money for the war at Eion⁸ by Amphipolis, and assisted them with two hundred horsemen of his own retainers,⁹ the Athenians then voted not the freedom of their city, but only granted immunity from imposts.¹⁰ And in earlier times to Perdiccas,¹¹ who reigned in Macedonia during the invasion of the Barbarian—when he had destroyed the Persians who retreated from Plataea after

spear and sword were longer. Until this occasion they had never been fairly tried against the heavy troops of the line. Afterward they came into more general use.

⁷ Which annihilated the Spartan navy, B.C. 376. In this battle Phocion first distinguished himself.

⁸ Eion is a city on the Strymon below Amphipolis. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, when Brasidas had taken Amphipolis, he sailed down the Strymon to attack Eion, but the town had been put in a posture of defence by Thucydides the historian, who came to its relief with some ships from Thasos. There is no mention in Thucydides of Menon the Pharsalian. Brasidas had partisans in Pharsalus, and marched through Thessaly on his expedition to Chalcidice, aided by some of the nobles of that country. But the Thessalian people in general sided with the Athenians, and an endeavor was made to prevent his march. Afterward they stopped the passage of the Spartan reinforcements. We can have no difficulty therefore in believing this story of Menon. There was little regular government in Thessaly; and the great families, among whom it was parcelled, would not always agree in their policy and alliances.

⁹ The *Penestæ* of Thessaly were serfs or vassals, whose condition was somewhat like, though superior to, that of the Laconian Helots. They were in fact the ancient inhabitants, reduced to a state of dependence by the Thessalian conquerors.

¹⁰ Such an immunity, when granted to a foreigner, would exempt him from customs and harbor dues. In the case of a person like Menon, it would be little more than an honorary distinction. But to a citizen or a foreigner residing at Athens an exemption from duties and taxes would be more important.

¹¹ It was Alexander who reigned in Macedonia at this time. This then is either a mistake of the orator, or we may suppose, with Lucchesini, that Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, was governor of a principality, and therefore dignified with the kingly title.

their defeat, and completed the disaster of the king—they voted not the freedom of their city, but only granted immunity from imposts; doubtless, esteeming their country to be of high value, honor, and dignity, surpassing all possible obligation. But now, ye men of Athens, ye adopt the vilest of mankind, menials and the sons of menials, to be your citizens, receiving a price as for any other salable commodity. And you have fallen into such a practice, not because your natures are inferior to your ancestors, but because they were in a condition to think highly of themselves, while from you, men of Athens, this power is taken away. It can never be, methinks, that your spirit is generous and noble, while you are engaged in petty and mean employments; no more than you can be abject and mean-spirited, while your actions are honorable and glorious. Whatever be the pursuits of men, their sentiments must necessarily be similar.

Mark what a summary view may be taken of the deeds performed by your ancestors and by you. Possibly from such comparison you may rise superior to yourselves. They, for a period of five-and-forty years, took the lead of the Greeks by general consent, and carried up more than ten thousand talents into the citadel; and many glorious trophies they erected for victories by land and sea, wherein even yet we take a pride. And, remember, they erected these, not merely that we may survey them with admiration, but also that we may emulate the virtues of the dedicators.¹² Such was their conduct: but for ours—

¹² The trophy, which consisted of armor and spoils taken from the enemy, was hung up, usually on a tree, near the field of battle, and consecrated to some god, with an inscription showing the names of the conquerors and the conquered. But sometimes pillars of brass and stone were erected, as lasting memorials of important victories.

fallen as we have on a solitude " manifest to you all—look if it bears any resemblance. Have not more than fifteen hundred talents been lavished ineffectually on the distressed people of Greece? " Have not all private fortunes, the revenues of the state, the contributions from our allies, been squandered? Have not the allies, whom we gained in the war, been lost recently in the peace? But, forsooth, in these respects only was it better anciently than now, in other respects worse. Very far from that! Let us examine what instances you please. The edifices which they left, the ornaments of the city in temples, harbors, and the like, were so magnificent and beautiful that room is not left for any succeeding generation to surpass them: yonder gateway,¹³ the Parthenon, docks, porticoes, and other structures, which they adorned the city withal and bequeathed to us. The private houses of the men in power were so modest and in accordance with the name of the constitution that if any one knows the style of house which Themistocles occupied, or Cimon, or Aristides, or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, he perceives it to be no grander than that of the neighbors. But now, ye men of Athens—as regards public measures—our government is content to furnish roads, fountains, white-washing, and trumpery; not that I blame the author of these works; far otherwise; I blame you, if you suppose that such measures are all you have to execute. As re-

¹³ *I.e.* an absence of competitors.

¹⁴ What this refers to is unknown. It has been suggested that Athens may have sent supplies of corn for the relief of certain Greek cities.

¹⁵ The Propylæa, which could be seen from the Pnyx, where the people assembled, and were pointed to by the orator. This was an ornamental fortification in front of the Acropolis, considered the most beautiful structure in Athens. It was constructed of white marble, at an immense expense, in the time of Pericles, and took five years in building.

gards individual conduct—your men in office have (some of them) made their private houses, not only more ostentatious than the multitude, but more splendid than the public buildings; others are farming land which they have purchased of such an extent as once they never hoped for in a dream.

The cause of this difference is that formerly the people were lords and masters of all; any individual citizen was glad to receive from them his share of honor, office, or profit. Now, on the contrary, these persons are the disposers of emoluments; everything is done by their agency; the people are treated as underlings and dependants, and you are happy to take what these men allow you for your portion.

Accordingly, the affairs of the republic are in such a state that, if any one read your decrees and recounted your actions directly afterward, no man would believe that both came from the same persons. Take, for example, the decrees that you passed against the accursed Megarians, when they were cultivating the sacred ground; that you would sally forth and prevent and not allow it: your decrees in regard to the Phliasians, when they were driven lately into exile; that you would assist, and not abandon them to the murderers, and invite the Peloponnesians who were inclined to join you. All these were honorable, men of Athens, and just and worthy of the country: but the deeds that followed them utterly worthless. Thus by decrees you manifest your hostility, yet cannot execute a single undertaking: for your decrees are proportioned to the dignity of the state, while your power corresponds not with them. I would advise you—and let no man be angry with me—to lower your pride and be

content with minding your own business, or to provide yourselves with a greater force. If I knew you to be Siphnians or Cythnians¹⁸ or any other people of that sort, I would have advised you to lower your pride; but, as you are Athenians, I recommend the providing a force. It were disgraceful, men of Athens, disgraceful, to desert that post of magnanimity which your ancestors bequeathed to you. Besides, even should you desire to withdraw from Grecian affairs, it is not in your power. For many feats have been performed by you from the earliest time; and your established friends it were disgraceful to abandon, your enemies you cannot trust and suffer to become great. In short, the position which your statesmen hold relative to you—they cannot retire when they choose—is precisely that which you have arrived at: for you have interfered in the politics of Greece.

I can sum up all that has been spoken, men of Athens. Your orators never make you either vicious or good, but you make them whichever you please: for you aim not at what they desire, but they at what they suppose to be your objects. You, therefore, must begin by having noble purposes, and all will be well. Either men will abstain from unworthy counsels, or will gain nothing by them, having none to follow their advice.

¹⁸ Siphnos and Cythnos are small islands in the *Ægean Sea*.

THE ORATION ON THE NAVY BOARDS

THE ARGUMENT

THIS was (according to Dionysius) the first speech delivered by Demosthenes before the popular assembly. The date of it was B.C. 354.

In this speech there is no effort to make a display of eloquence: it is confined to the giving of useful and simple advice. A definite plan is proposed for the regulation of the Athenian navy, by which the number of ships might be increased to three hundred, and a provision made for their speedy and punctual equipment. To effect this object, Demosthenes proposes a reform, from which the oration takes its title, in the system of *Symmoræ*, or *Boards for the Management of the Triarchy*. The details of the proposed scheme are plainly set forth in the oration itself.

Here is struck the keynote of that which for many years continued to be the policy of this great man; viz., to uphold the dignity of Athens on the basis of wise laws, to maintain her independence by the spirit and exertions of her own people, to rally round her, for empire and for safety, a host of willing confederates, united by the bonds of common interest, mutual confidence and esteem.

IT APPEARS to me, O Athenians, that the men who praise your ancestors adopt a flattering language, not a course beneficial to the people whom they eulogize. For attempting to speak on subjects which no man can fully reach by words, they carry away the reputation of clever speakers themselves, but cause the glory of those ancients to fall below its estimation in the minds of the hearers. For my part, I consider the highest praise of our ancestors to be the length of time which has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to excel the pattern of their deeds. I will myself endeavor to show in what way, according to my judgment, your preparations may most conveniently be made. For thus it is. Though all of us who intend to speak should

prove ourselves capital orators, your affairs, I am certain, would prosper none the more: but if any person whomsoever¹ came forward, and could show and convince you what kind and what amount of force will be serviceable to the state, and from what resources it should be provided, all our present apprehensions would be removed. This will I endeavor to do, as far as I am able, first briefly informing you what my opinion is concerning our relations with the king.

I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet not on this account would I advise you, without the rest, to undertake a war against him. For I do not observe that the Greeks themselves are common friends to one another; on the contrary, some have more confidence in him than in certain of their own people. Such being the case, I deem it expedient for you to look that the cause of war be equitable and just, that all necessary preparations should be made, and that this should be the groundwork of your resolution. For I think, men of Athens, if there were any clear and manifest proof that the Persian king was about to attack the Greeks, they would join alliance and be exceedingly grateful to those who sided with and defended them against him; but if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are declared, I fear, men of Athens, we shall be driven to a war with both the king and the people whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend his designs—if he really has resolved to attack the Greeks—will give money to some of them and promise friendship; they, desiring to carry on their private wars with better success, and intent

¹ This is a modest allusion to himself.

on projects of that kind, will disregard the common safety of all.

I beseech you not to betray our country into such embarrassment and folly. For you, I see, cannot adopt the same principles of action in reference to the king as the other Greeks can. It is open, I conceive, to many of them, to prosecute their selfish interests and neglect the body of the nation: it would be dishonorable in you, though you had suffered wrong, to punish the offenders in such a way as to let any of them fall under the power of the barbarian.

Under these circumstances, we must take care that we ourselves engage not in the war upon unequal terms, and that he, whom we suppose to entertain designs upon the Greeks, do not gain the credit of appearing their friend. How can it be managed? By giving proof to the world that the forces of our state are mustered and prepared, and that possessing such forces we espouse sentiments of justice. To the over-daring, who are vehement in urging you to war, I have this to say: It is not difficult, in the season for deliberation, to earn the repute of courage, or, when danger is nigh, to be exceeding eloquent: it is however both difficult and becoming, in the hour of danger to exhibit courage, in counsel to find better advice than other men.

It is my opinion, men of Athens, that a war with the king would distress our republic, though any action in the course of the war would be an easy affair. Why so? Because, methinks, every war necessarily requires a fleet and money and posts; and of all these things I perceive that he has a greater abundance than ourselves: but for action, I observe, nothing is so much needed as brave

soldiers, and of these, I imagine, we and our confederates have the greater number. My advice therefore is, that we should by no means begin the war, though for action we ought to be fully prepared. If indeed there were one description of force wherewith barbarians could be resisted, and another wherewith Greeks, we might reasonably perhaps be regarded as arraying ourselves against Persia; but since all arming is of the same character, and your force must amount to the same thing, namely, the means of resisting your enemies, of succoring your allies, of preserving your valuable possessions; why, when we have professed enemies,³ do we look out for others? why do we not rather prepare ourselves against the former, and be ready to resist the king also, if he attempt to injure us?

And now you invite the Greeks to join you. But if you will not act as they desire, some of them having no goodwill toward you, how can you expect they will obey your call? Because, forsooth, they will hear from you that the Persian has designs against them. And pray, do you imagine they don't foresee it themselves? I believe they do: but at present this fear outweighs not the enmity which some of them bear toward you and toward each other. Your ambassadors then will only travel round and rhapsodize. But when the time comes, if what we now expect be really brought to pass, I fancy none of the Greek community rate themselves so high, that, when they see you possessed of a thousand horse, as many infantry

³ This refers principally to the Thebans, between whom and the Athenians an enmity had subsisted ever since the severance of their alliance, when the Athenians, jealous of the growing power of Thebes under Epaminondas, went over to the side of Sparta. This enmity was increased by the events of the Sacred war, which had now been raging for two years, and in which the Thebans were engaged as principals on one side, while the Phocians received assistance from Athens and Lacedæmon.

soldiers as one could desire, and three hundred ships, they would not come with entreaties, and regard such aid as their surest means of deliverance. The consequences then are—by inviting them now, you are suppliants, and, if your petition be not granted, you fail: whereas, by waiting your time and completing your preparations, you save men at their own request, and are sure they will all come over to you.

Swayed by these and the like considerations, men of Athens, I sought not to compose a bold harangue of tedious length: but have taken exceeding pains in devising a plan, the best and the speediest, for getting your forces ready. It will be for you, to hear it, and, if it meet your approval, to vote for its adoption.

The first and most essential part of preparation, men of Athens, is to be so disposed in your minds, that every citizen is willing and earnest to perform his duty. For you see, O Athenians: whenever you have had a common wish, and every man has thought afterward, that the accomplishment belonged to himself, nothing has ever escaped you; but when you have wished only, and then looked to one another, each expecting to be idle while his neighbor did the work, none of your designs has been executed.

You being so animated and determined, I advise that we fill up the twelve hundred and make two thousand, adding eight hundred to them: for if you appoint that number, I reckon that after deducting the heiresses and wards, and holders of allotments and partnership property, and persons in reduced circumstances, you will still have your twelve hundred members. Of them I think you should make twenty boards, as at present, each having

sixty members. Each of these boards I would have you divide into five sections of twelve men, putting always with the wealthiest person some of the least wealth, to preserve equality. And thus I say the members ought to be arranged: the reason you will understand, when you have heard the whole scheme of arrangement. But how about the ships? I recommend you to fix the whole number at three hundred, and form twenty divisions of fifteen vessels each, giving five of the first hundred and five of the second hundred and five of the third hundred to each division; then allot one division of fifteen ships to every board of men, and let the board assign three ships to each of their own sections.

When these regulations have been made, I propose—as the ratable capital of the country is six thousand talents—in order that your supplies may be apportioned, you should divide this capital and make a hundred parts of sixty talents each; then allot five of these hundredth parts to each of the twenty larger boards, and let the board assign one hundredth part to each of their own sections; so that, if you have need of a hundred ships, sixty talents may be applied³ to the expense, and there may be twelve to serve as commanders; if of two hundred, there may be thirty talents applied to the expense, and six persons to serve; if of three hundred, there may be twenty talents defraying the expense, and four persons to serve.

In the same manner, O Athenians, I advise that all the furniture of the ships, which is out on loan,⁴ should

³ *I.e.* that shall be the proportion of the whole ratable capital, upon which a tax shall be levied to meet the expense. It is a short way of expressing this.

⁴ It was customary for individuals to borrow the naval implements and stores from the public arsenal, when the state had no occasion for them.

be valued according to the register, and divided into twenty parts; that you then allot one good portion to every large board; that every board distribute equal shares among their own sections; that the twelve in each section call their implements in, and get the ships which are severally allotted to them in readiness. Thus do I think the supplies, the vessels, the commanders, and the collection of implements, may be most effectually provided and arranged. How the manning may be made sure and easy, I proceed to explain.

I say the generals should divide the dockyards into ten departments, taking care that there be thirty docks in each as near as possible to one another; and when they have done this, let them attach two boards and thirty ships to each of these departments, then allot the tribes and the several commanders to each dockyard, so that there may be two boards, thirty ships, one tribe. And whichever department be allotted to a tribe, let them divide it in three and the ships likewise, and then allot the third of a tribe to each, so that of the whole dockyards there may be one division belonging to every tribe, and the third of a tribe may have the third part of every division, and you may know, in case of necessity, first, where the tribe is stationed, next, where the third of the tribe, next, who are the commanders and how many ships there are; and the tribe may have thirty ships, and every third of a tribe have ten. Let the system be only put in train, and though we should forget something now—for it is difficult to make all the details perfect—it will be ascertained in the working; and there will be one arrangement for all the ships and every division.

In regard to money and real supplies, I know that I

am about to make an extraordinary statement, yet still it shall be made; for I am persuaded that, on a correct view, I alone shall be found to have declared and predicted the truth. I say, we ought not at present to speak of money: a supply there is, if occasion require it, ample, honorable, and just: if we look for it immediately, we shall not think we have it even in reserve; so far shall we be from providing it now; but if we leave it alone, we shall have it. What, then, is this supply, which hath no being now, but will exist hereafter?—for certainly it is like a riddle. I will explain.

You see the extent of this city, men of Athens. It contains treasures equal, I may almost say, to the rest of the states put together. But the owners are so minded that—if all your orators alarmed them with intelligence that the king was coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was inevitable—if, besides the orators, an equal number of persons gave oracular warning—so far from contributing, they would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge the possession. Yet if they knew that these proceedings, so terrible in report, were actually begun, there is not a man so foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost to contribute. For who would rather perish with all his possessions than contribute a part of his possessions to preserve himself and the remainder? Thus, I say, we have money against the time of actual need, but not before. And, therefore, I advise you not to search for it now. Indeed, what you would raise, if you determined to raise it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at all. For example:—Let a tax be proposed of one per cent—there are sixty talents. Let twice as much, namely, two per cent, be proposed—there are a hundred

and twenty. But what is this to the twelve hundred camels, which, these men say, carry the king's gold? Let me suppose, however, that we contributed the twelfth of our property, five hundred talents. This you would not submit to; but if you did pay it, the sum would be insufficient for the war. Your proper course, then, is to complete your other preparations; let the owners retain their money for the present (it cannot be in better keeping^a for the state); and should the occasion ever arrive then take it from them in voluntary contributions.

These, O my countrymen, are practicable measures, these are honorable and advantageous, fit to be reported as your proceedings to the king; and by them no little terror would be excited in him. He knows right well that by three hundred galleys, whereof we furnished a hundred, his ancestors lost a thousand ships; and he will hear that we ourselves have now equipped three hundred; so that, were he ever so mad, he could hardly deem it a light matter to provoke the hostility of our republic. Should he, however, entertain an overweening confidence in his wealth, even this he will find to be a weaker support than yours. He is coming, they say, with gold. But if he give it away, he will lack supplies: for even wells and fountains are apt to fail, if you draw from them constantly and by wholesale. He will hear that the valuation of our land is a capital of six thousand talents. That we shall defend it against invaders from that quarter, his ancestors who were at Marathon would know best: and certainly, as long as we are victorious, money can never fail us.

^a Direct taxation in time of peace, when there is no urgent necessity, is like killing the goose for the golden eggs.

Nor is there, as it appears to me, any ground for what some persons fear, that having money he will collect a large body of mercenaries. I do, indeed, believe, that against Egypt and Orontes,* and any other barbarians, many of the Greeks would be willing to serve in his pay, not that he may subdue any of those adversaries, but in order to obtain supplies for themselves to relieve their several necessities. Against Greece, however, I do not believe that any Grecian would march. For whither could he betake himself afterward? Go to Phrygia and be a slave?—Remember, a war with the barbarian can be for no other stake than for country and life and customs and freedom and everything of the kind. Who, then, is so wretched that he would sacrifice himself, parents, sepulchres, fatherland, for the sake of a paltry pittance? I believe, no man. But further—it is not even the king's interest that mercenaries should conquer the Greeks. For they that conquer us must have been his masters already: and he desires, not to subdue us and then be dependent on others, but to rule, if possible, over all; if that be not possible, at least over his present subjects.

Should any one think the Thebans will be on his side—I know it is difficult to speak to you about that people: you hate them so, you will not like to hear even the truth or anything favorable of them—however, men who are considering important questions must not omit any useful argument on any pretext. My opinion, then is, the Thebans,

* Orontes was satrap of Mysia in the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon. He joined the great conspiracy of the satraps and the king of Egypt in the year B.C. 362. He was chosen to command their forces, and intrusted with a large fund which had been collected to carry on the war. He was induced however to change sides; and the trust which had been reposed in him enabled him to betray his party to the king most effectually.

so far from being likely to join him in any attack upon Greece, would give a large sum of money, if they had it, for the opportunity of repairing their former offences against her.' But supposing the Thebans to be so utterly wrongheaded, of this at least you are all aware, that if the Thebans are in his interest, their enemies must necessarily be in the interest of the Greeks.

I believe, then, that our cause (the cause of justice) and its adherents will be better armed against all adversaries than the traitors and the barbarian can be. And therefore my advice is—be not over-alarmed at the war; neither be led on to commence it. I do not see indeed that any other people of Greece have reason to fear this war. For which of them is ignorant, that while, looking on the Persian as a common enemy, they were in concord among themselves, they enjoyed many advantages; but since they have regarded him as a friend and quarrelled about private disputes with each other, they have suffered greater calamities than could have been wished in pronouncing a curse upon them? Then should we fear a man whom fortune and heaven declare to be unprofitable as a friend, and useful as an enemy? Let us do no such thing! Yet do him no injustice either; having regard to ourselves, and to the disturbances and jealousies among the other people of Greece. If it were possible with one heart and with combined forces to attack him alone, such an injury I would not have pronounced an injustice. But since this cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford the king a pretence for vindicating the rights of the other Greeks. As long as we remain quiet, any such attempt on his part

¹ The Thebans had always been reproached for siding with Xerxes against the Greeks.

would awaken suspicion; but if we are the first to commence hostilities, it will naturally be thought that he courts their friendship because of his enmity with us.

Do not expose the melancholy condition of Greece, by convoking her people when you cannot persuade them, and making war when you cannot carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and prepare yourselves. Let it be reported of you to the king—not (for heaven's sake) that all the Greeks and the Athenians are in distress and alarm and confusion; which is very far from the truth—but that, if falsehood and perjury were not considered as disgraceful by the Greeks, as by him they are considered honorable, you would have marched against him long ago; that you will forbear to do this for your own sakes, but you pray unto all the gods, that he may be inspired with the same madness that his ancestors were formerly. Should he come to reflect on these matters, he will find that your resolutions are taken with prudence. He knows assuredly, that Athens by her wars with his ancestors became prosperous and great, while by the repose which she enjoyed before, she was not raised above any Grecian state so much as she is at present. And as to the Greeks, he perceives that they stand in need of some mediator, either a voluntary or an involuntary one; and he knows that he should himself step in as such a mediator, if he stirred up war. Therefore the accounts that he will receive from his informants will be intelligible and credible.

Not to trouble you, men of Athens, with over-many words, I will give a summary of my advice and retire. I bid you prepare yourselves against existing enemies, and I declare that with this same force you should resist the king and all other people, if they attempt to injure you;

but never commence an injustice either in word or deed. Let us look that our actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course, you will do service, not only to yourselves, but also to them who give the opposite counsel; since you will not be angry with them afterward for your errors committed now.*

* The speech of Demosthenes was so far successful, that it calmed the excitement of the Athenians; and they were content to make a show of preparation, without adopting any actual measures of war. In the following oration he refers with some satisfaction to this result.

THE ORATION ON THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

THE ARGUMENT

THIS oration was delivered B.C. 351 on the following occasion.

In the island of Rhodes, as in divers other of the Grecian states, there had been many contests between the democratical party and the oligarchical. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it was in the hands of an oligarchy, under the protection of Lacedæmon. About the year 396 Conon, being at the head of a considerable fleet in that part of the Ægean, drove the Peloponnesians from the port of Rhodes, and compelled the islanders to renew their connection with Athens. Democracy was then re-established; but four years afterward the opposite faction again prevailed, a Spartan fleet made its appearance, the popular leaders and the friends of Athens were banished or put to death. For the next thirty years or more following that event little is known of Rhodian history. After the destruction of the Spartan navy, Rhodes with most of the Ægean isles returned to the Athenian confederacy, and we may fairly presume that a new democratical revolution was effected in the island during that period. But in the year 358 a rupture of a most serious kind took place between Rhodes and Athens, pregnant with disastrous consequences to both. This was the breaking out of the Social war.

We learn from various parts of Demosthenes how the Athenian commanders at this period, sent out with inadequate forces and supplies, were tempted or driven to commit irregularities, amounting often to acts of plunder and violence, in order to maintain their armaments or carry on their wars. Not confining their aggressions to the enemies of Athens, or even to neutrals, they harassed the allies, by extorting from them loans and contributions, and thus brought the name of their country into general odium and discredit. It seems that Chares, having the command of a fleet destined to act against Amphipolis, sailed to Rhodes, and by his vexatious and arbitrary proceedings so irritated the people, that they were ready on the first opportunity to throw off their connection with Athens. They entered into a league with Byzantium, and raising a fleet powerful enough set the Athenians at defiance, commenced the Social war, which, after a three years' continuance, was terminated by a peace humiliating to Athens, B.C. 355.

In the course of this war the allies received assistance from Mausolus, king of Caria. He had formed the design of annexing Rhodes to his own dominions, to which it was so conveniently adjacent; but there was little hope of accomplishing this purpose, unless he could sever it from the Athenian

alliance. The oligarchical party in Rhodes, still watching for a new revolution, were easily brought over to his views; and at the close of the war a Carian garrison was introduced into the island, which established the oligarchy, and in effect brought the island in subjection to a foreign yoke. The Rhodians had no hopes of recovering their liberty; they had lost the protection of a powerful state; while Mausolus could obtain effectual aid from the Persian king, whose vassal he was, and to whom it was important to acquire any of the islands near Asia Minor. Mausolus died in the year B.C. 353, and was succeeded by his queen Artemisia. In her reign the government of Rhodes became oppressive to the people; who at length resolving to throw off their yoke, sent a deputation to Athens, to implore her assistance. These petitioners, who were not very favorably received at Athens, found an advocate in Demosthenes.

It was natural to expect, that there would be a strong feeling at Athens against a people who had deeply injured her. A very few years had elapsed since the Social war, and the events were fresh in the memory of all. To overcome this feeling of resentment was the principal difficulty which an advocate of the Rhodian people had to encounter. Demosthenes appeals to the higher and nobler feelings of his countrymen. Motives of honor, generosity and compassion should influence Athenians: it was not worth while to remember the wrongs done them by so insignificant a people as the Rhodian; they should consider only what was due from them to Athens and to Greece.

I THINK, men of Athens, that on a consultation of such moment you ought to grant liberty of speech to every one of your advisers. For my own part, I have never thought it difficult to make you understand right counsel—for to speak plainly, you seem all to possess the knowledge yourselves—but to persuade you to follow it I have found difficult; for when any measure has been voted and resolved, you are then as far from the performance as you were from the resolution before.

One of the events, for which I consider you should be thankful to the gods, is that a people, who to gratify their own insolence went to war with you not long ago, now place their hopes of safety in you alone. Well may we be rejoiced at the present crisis: for if your measures there-

upon be wisely taken, the result will be that the calumnies of those who traduce our country you will practically and with credit and honor refute. The Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians accused us of a design to oppress them, and therefore combined to make the last war against us. It will turn out that Mausolus, who contrived and instigated these proceedings, pretending to be a friend of the Rhodians, has deprived them of their liberty; the Chians and Byzantines, who called them allies, have not aided them in misfortune; while you, whom they dreaded, are the only people who have wrought their deliverance. And, this being seen by all the world, you will cause the people in every state to regard your friendship as the token of their security: nor can there be a greater blessing for you, than thus to obtain from all men a voluntary attachment and confidence.

I marvel to see the same persons advising you to oppose the king on behalf of the Egyptians, and afraid of him in the matter of the Rhodian people. All men know that the latter are Greeks, the former a portion of his subjects. And I think some of you remember that, when you were debating about the king's business, I first came forward and advised—nay, I was the only one, or one of two, that gave such counsel—that your prudent course in my opinion was, not to allege your quarrel with the king as the excuse for your arming, but to arm against your existing enemies, and defend yourselves against him also, if he attempted to injure you. Nor did I offer this advice without obtaining your approval; for you agreed with me. Well then: my reasoning of to-day is consistent with the argument on that occasion. For, would the king take me to his counsels, I should advise him as I advise you, in

defence of his own possessions to make war upon any Greeks that opposed him, but not to think of claiming dominions to which he had no manner of title. If now it be your general determination, Athenians, to surrender to the king all places that he gets possession of, whether by surprise, or by deluding certain of the inhabitants, you have determined, in my judgment, unwisely: but if in the cause of justice you esteem it your duty, either to make war, if needful, or to suffer any extremity; in the first place, there will be the less necessity for such trials, in proportion as you are resolved to meet them; and secondly, you will manifest a spirit that becomes you.

That I suggest nothing new, in urging you to liberate the Rhodians—that you will do nothing new, in following my counsel—will appear, if I remind you of certain measures that succeeded. Once, O Athenians, you sent Timotheus out to assist Ariobarzanes,¹ annexing to the decree, “that he was not to infringe your treaty with the king.” Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from the king, and that Samos was garrisoned by Cypro-

¹ Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, was concerned in the rebellion of B.C. 362. It seems that, in soliciting Athenian aid, which he obtained the more easily on account of his connection with the state—he having received the honour of citizenship—Ariobarzanes had concealed the object of his preparations; and therefore the Athenians, in sending Timotheus, took the precaution of restricting his powers in the way mentioned by the orator. Timotheus, in return for some service which he had done, was helped by the satrap to get possession of Sestus and Crithote in the Chersonese. Cornelius Nepos praises the Athenian general, because, instead of getting any private recompense from Ariobarzanes, he had looked only to the advantage of his country; while Agesilaus, who had gone out on the same service, took a pecuniary reward for himself. Timotheus then proceeded to besiege Samos, which was occupied by a Persian garrison, and took it in the course of the following year. Isocrates, the orator, who acted as the secretary of Timotheus, was at the siege of Samos, and praises the general for having taken it with little or no cost to Athens.

The occupation of Samos by the Persians was an infringement of the peace of Antalcidas, by the terms of which the Greek islands were to be independent. Therefore the conduct of Timotheus, in wresting Samos from Persia, afforded an apt illustration for the argument of Demosthenes.

themis, under the appointment of Tigranes, the king's deputy, renounced the intention of assisting Ariobarzanes, but invested the island with his forces and delivered it. And to this day there has been no war against you on that account. Men will not fight for aggressive purposes so readily as for defensive. To resist spoliation they strive with all their might; not so to gratify ambition: this they will attempt, if there be none to hinder them; but, if prevented, they regard not their opponents as having done them an injury.

My belief is that Artemisia would not even oppose this enterprise now, if our state were embarked in the measure. Attend a moment and see whether my calculation be right or wrong. I consider—were the king succeeding in all his designs in Egypt, Artemisia would make a strenuous effort to get Rhodes into his power, not from affection to the king, but from a desire, while he tarried in her neighborhood, to confer an important obligation upon him, so that he might give her the most friendly reception: but since he fares as they report, having miscarried in his attempts, she judges that this island—and so the fact is—would be of no further use to the king at present, but only a fortress to overawe her kingdom and prevent disturbances. Therefore, it seems to me, she would rather you had the island, without her appearing to have surrendered it, than that he should obtain possession. I think, indeed, she will send no succors at all, but, if she do, they will be scanty and feeble. As to the king—what he will do I cannot pretend to know; but this I will maintain, that it is expedient for Athens to have it immediately understood whether he means to claim the Rhodian city or not: for, if he should, you will have to deliberate not on the con-

cerns of Rhodes only, but on those of Athens and all Greece.

Even if the Rhodians, who are now in the government, had held it by themselves, I would not have advised you to espouse their cause; not though they promised to do everything for you. But I see, that in the beginning, in order to put down the democracy, they gained over a certain number of citizens, and afterward banished those very men when they had accomplished their purpose. I think, therefore, that people who have been false to two parties² would be no steadier allies to you. And never would I have proffered this counsel, had I thought it would benefit the Rhodian people only; for I am not their state-friend, nor is any one of them connected with me by ties of private hospitality. And even if both these causes had existed, I would not have spoken, unless I had considered it for your advantage. Indeed, as far as the Rhodians are concerned, if the advocate for their deliverance may be allowed to say so, I am rejoiced at what has happened—that, after grudging to you the recovery of your rights, they have lost their own liberty; and, when they might have had an alliance on equal terms with Greeks and their betters, they are under subjection to barbarians and slaves, whom they have admitted into their fortresses.³ I would

² *I.e.* to the people at large, and to the select few whom they associated with themselves in the first instance.

³ Vitruvius relates a stratagem, by which Artemisia got complete dominion of Rhodes. The Rhodians had plotted with a party in Halicarnassus to overthrow the Carian government, and sent a fleet with troops to assist in the execution of their design. The troops landed and advanced to the city, where the inhabitants were ranged under the walls as if to give them a friendly reception. But this was done by order of Artemisia, who had discovered the plot and laid an ambush for the Rhodians. They were surrounded and slain. Artemisia took their ships, and put a Carian force on board, which sailing to Rhodes, and being mistaken by the people for their own armament returning, got possession of the Rhodian capital.

almost say that, if you determine to assist them, these events have turned out for their good. For, during prosperity, I doubt whether they would have learned discretion, being Rhodians; but since they are taught by experience, that folly is mightily injurious to men, they may possibly perhaps become wiser for the future; and this I think would be no small advantage to them. I say, therefore, you should endeavor to rescue these people, and not harbor resentment, considering that you too have often been deceived by miscreants, but for no such deceit would you allow that you merited punishment yourselves.

Observe also, men of Athens, that you have waged many wars both against democracies and against oligarchies—this indeed you know without my telling—but for what cause you have been at war with either, perhaps not one of you considers. What are the causes? Against democratical states your wars have been either for private grievances, when you could not make public satisfaction, or for territory, or boundaries, or a point of honor, or the leadership: against oligarchies, for none of these matters, but for your constitution and freedom. Therefore I would not hesitate to say, I think it better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with a popular government than your friends under oligarchal. For with freemen I consider you would have no difficulty in making peace when you chose; but with people under an oligarchy even friendship I hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the lovers of constitutional equality.

I marvel none of you conceive—when the Chians and Mitylenæans are governed by oligarchies, when the Rhodians and nearly all people are about being drawn into

this slavery—that our constitution is in the same peril: and none consider it is impossible, if all establishments are on the principle of oligarchy, that they will let your democracy alone. They know too well that no other people will bring things back to the state of liberty: therefore they will wish to destroy a government from which they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary doers of wrong you may regard as enemies to the sufferers only: they that subvert constitutions and transform them into oligarchies must be looked upon, I say, as the common enemies to all lovers of freedom. And besides, men of Athens, it is right that you, living under self-government, should show the same feeling for a free people in misfortune that you would expect others to have for you in case of a similar calamity; which, I trust, may never befall! Though, indeed, it may be said that the Rhodians have had their deserts, the occasion is not a fit one for triumph: the fortunate should always be seen to interest themselves for the benefit of the unfortunate, since the future is uncertain to all men.

I often hear it said before this assembly that, when our commonwealth was in misfortune, certain people were solicitous for its preservation; among whom—I will here mention a little circumstance of the Argives alone.⁴ I would not have you, famous as you have ever been for succoring the distressed, appear in a matter of this kind inferior to the Argives: who, inhabiting a country adjacent to the Lacedæmonians, seeing them to have dominion over land and sea, did not fear or hesitate to show their

⁴ This occurred soon after the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was under the dominion of the thirty tyrants, and a large number of Athenian citizens were compelled to seek safety in exile.

attachment to you, but even passed a vote—when ambassadors had come from Lacedæmon (as we are told) to demand certain Athenian refugees—that, unless they departed before sunset, they should be adjudged enemies. Would it not be disgraceful, my countrymen, if, when the commons of Argos dreaded not the power and empire of the Lacedæmonians in those times, you, who are Athenians, should be frightened at a person of barbarian origin, and a woman, too? They, indeed, might allege that they have often been defeated by the Lacedæmonians: whereas you have often vanquished the king, and not once been defeated either by the king himself or by his subjects; for, if ever the king has obtained an advantage over our state, he has obtained it in this way—and in no other—by bribing the betrayers of Greece and the basest of her people. And even such advantage has not benefited him. At the very time, when he had enfeebled Athens by aid of the Lacedæmonians, you will find him struggling for his kingdom with Clearchus and Cyrus.* Thus he has neither beaten us openly, nor done himself any good by his intrigues. There are some, I observe, who are used to slight Philip⁶ as a person of no account, but dread the king as an enemy terrible to any that he

⁵ It was to the pecuniary assistance of Persia; obtained by the management of Lysander, that the Spartans were mainly indebted for their success in the Peloponnesian war. A few years afterward Cyrus, who had been most active in the Spartan cause, marched from his province in Asia Minor to contend for the crown with his brother Artaxerxes. Clearchus commanded the Greek mercenaries in his service. The death of Cyrus, who was slain charging at the head of his troops in the battle of Cunaxa, delivered Artaxerxes and his kingdom from further danger.

⁶ About a year only had elapsed since the speaking of the first Philippic. Whatever effect that speech may have produced at the time, it seems to have made no lasting impression. The inaction of Philip in the two following years relieved the Athenians from any immediate apprehension of danger. They were roused to new alarm by the rupture of Philip with Olynthus.

chooses. However, if we are not to oppose the one, because he is contemptible, and yield everything to the other, because he is formidable, against whom shall we take the field, O Athenians?

There are persons here, men of Athens, famous for advocating the rights of others against you; to whom I would give one little piece of advice—to undertake the defence of your rights against others that they may set an example of dutiful conduct. It is absurd for any one to instruct you in the principles of justice, without acting justly himself: and it is not just that a citizen should have considered the arguments against you, and not the arguments in your favor. Look you, I pray! How happens it there is none in Byzantium, who will admonish them not to take possession of Chalcedon,¹ which belongs to the king, and you held it once, and by no manner of title is it there?—also that they are not to make Selymbria,² a city formerly in your alliance, tributary to themselves, and that Byzantium is not to determine the limits of the Selymbrian territory, contrary to the oaths and the treaties by which it is declared that the cities shall be independent? And none has there been to advise Mausolus in his lifetime, none since his death to advise Artemisia, not to seize upon Cos³ and Rhodes and other Grecian cities, which the

¹ Chalcedon, founded by the Megarians on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, was called the city of the blind, because the settlers had overlooked the more beautiful spot on the European coast, where afterward Byzantium (site of the modern Constantinople) was built. The fate of Chalcedon, like many other towns similarly situated, was to fall alternately under the dominion of Persia, Athens, and Lacedæmon. It was taken from the Lacedæmonians by Alcibiades, but surrendered to Lysander after the decisive battle of Ægos-Potamos. The peace of Antalcidas restored it to Persia.

² Selymbria is on the Propontine coast, between Byzantium and Perinthus.

³ The island of Cos, celebrated as the birthplace of Hippocrates the physician and Apelles the painter, lies a little off the coast of Caria, not far from Halicarnassus.

king, their master, ceded by his treaty to the Greeks, and for which the Greeks of that period sustained numerous perils and honorable contests. Or, if they have both of them¹⁰ such a monitor, yet seemingly there is none to follow his advice.

I esteem it a just measure to restore the Rhodian democracy: yet, granting it were not just, when I look at the conduct of these people, I conceive it right to advise the measure. And why? Because, O Athenians, if all men were inclined to observe justice, it would be disgraceful for us alone to refuse; but, when all the rest are seeking the power to do wrong, for us to profess high principle and undertake no enterprise, would, in my opinion, be not justice, but cowardice. I see that men have their rights allowed them in proportion to their power: of which I can produce an example familiar to you all. There are two treaties between the Greeks and the king; that which our republic made, which is universally praised, and this latter one, concluded by the Lacedæmonians, which is the subject of complaint. And the definition of rights in both the treaties is not the same. For, although private political rights are granted by the laws impartially to all, the same for the weak as for the strong; the rule of Hellenic right is prescribed by the greater powers to the less.

Since then it is your fixed resolution to pursue a just policy, you must look that you have the means to carry it out. Such means you will possess, if you are supposed to be the common protectors of Grecian liberty. It is, doubtless, very difficult for you to adopt proper measures. The rest of mankind have one battle to fight, namely,

¹⁰ *I.e.* the Byzantines and Artemisia.

against their avowed enemies: if they conquer those, nothing hinders them accomplishing their desires. You, Athenians, have a double contest; that which the rest have, and also another, prior to that, and more arduous: for you must in council overcome a faction, who act among you in systematic opposition to the state. Since therefore through these men it is impossible for any good measure to be effected without a struggle, the natural consequence is that you lose many advantages. Perhaps the chief cause why so many adopt this line of politics without scruple, is the support afforded them by their hirers: at the same time you are yourselves chargeable with blame. You ought, O Athenians, to hold the same opinion concerning the post of civil duty, as you hold concerning the military. What is that? You consider that one, who deserts the post assigned by his general, should be degraded and deprived of constitutional privileges. It is right, therefore, that men who desert the political post received from their ancestors, and support oligarchical measures, should be disabled to act as your counsellors. Among your allies you regard those to be the most attached, who have sworn to have the same friends and enemies with yourselves; and yet of your statesmen you esteem those the most faithful, who to your certain knowledge have sided with the enemies of Athens.

However—matter of accusation against these men, matter of censure against the people, is not hard to discover: the difficulty is to know, by what counsels or what conduct our present evils may be repaired. This perhaps is not the occasion to speak of all: could you only give effect to your policy by some useful effort, things in general perhaps, one after another, would go on improving. My

opinion is, that you should take this enterprise vigorously in hand, and act worthily of the state, remembering that you love to hear men praise your ancestors and recount their exploits and speak of their trophies. Consider then, your forefathers erected these, not that you may view and admire them only, but that you may imitate also the virtues of the dedicators."

" The speech of Demosthenes produced no effect. Athens abstained from interference; the Rhodians continued under the government of an oligarchy, and subjection to Caria.

THE ORATION FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

THE ARGUMENT

MEGALOPOLIS was an Arcadian city near the frontiers of Laconia. It was founded in the year B.C. 371, and, being designed for the metropolis of the whole Arcadian people, who then united themselves into one body, it was built on a scale of magnitude corresponding with that purpose, having a circumference of more than six miles, and received the name of the *great city*. Next to Athens, it is said to have been the most beautiful city in Greece. The population was obtained by migration from the existing Arcadian towns, no less than forty of which were required to contribute to it. Most of these were entirely deserted by their inhabitants, others were reduced to the condition of villages dependent on Megalopolis. A supreme council of ten thousand, taken from the whole Arcadian body, held their public deliberations in the capital. About half a century afterward, when it was besieged by Polysperchon, there were found to be fifteen thousand citizens capable of bearing arms in its defence.

The chief object of building this metropolis was to establish a permanent union among the Arcadians and preserve their national independence. Before that time, the Arcadians as a body had very little influence in the affairs of Peloponnesus, though they occupied a large portion of its territory. They had generally been in the alliance of Sparta, whose armies they strengthened by a brave and hardy race of soldiers. It was therefore the policy of Sparta to keep them feeble and divided among themselves. In the time of the Peloponnesian war Mantinea, then the principal city of Arcadia, formed a small confederacy among her neighbors, renounced her connection with the Lacedæmonians, and joined an offensive alliance with Athens and Argos. But this was soon put an end to. The Mantineans were compelled, by the success of the Lacedæmonian arms, to abandon their confederacy; and at a later period, B.C. 387, paid dearly for their disaffection to Sparta, by having their city dismantled and being dispersed into villages.

The defeat of the Spartans at Leuctra changed the aspect of affairs in Greece. The prestige of ancient victory was gone; and it was soon found that the vast alliance, of which Sparta had been the head, and which had enabled her for many years to give the law to Greece, would crumble almost entirely away. One of the first effects of this change in Peloponnesus was the rebuilding of Mantinea, which was soon followed by the establishment of Megalopolis. But the heaviest blow to the pride and power of Lacedæmon was the loss of her ancient province of Messenia, which for more than three

centuries had been the fairest portion of her domain. Whether the Arcadians could have maintained their independence against Sparta without foreign aid may perhaps be doubted; but this last revolution was wholly due to the arms of Thebes and the genius of Epaminondas.

That general, having assembled a large army in Boeotia, marched across the isthmus and was joined in Arcadia by his Peloponnesian allies. At the head of an overpowering force he invaded and ravaged Laconia. Troops of divers people—who not many years before had followed the Lacedæmonians in their wars, or would hardly have dared to face them in the field—Thebans, Phocians, Locrians, Eubœans, Thessalians, Acarnanians, Argives, Arcadians, Eleans, marched now almost without opposition to the gates of Sparta; and nothing but the shadow of the Spartan name preserved that haughty capital from destruction. Epaminondas did not venture to make a general assault upon the town, but, after continuing his ravages for some time longer, proceeded to execute his well-laid scheme, which he rightly judged would reduce Sparta to the condition of a second or third rate power in Greece.

The Messenian population had long been, like the Laconian helots, in a state of vassalage to Sparta, but were ripe for insurrection at any favorable opportunity, as they had proved during the Athenian occupation of Pylus. The march of Epaminondas into Laconia was the signal for a universal rising of that people, who were now again to form a nation, and to build a capital city under the protection of the Theban general. But it was not only the existing inhabitants of the country, by whom this task, of reconstituting the nation, was to be accomplished; for which, after their long servitude, they might not have been so well fitted by themselves. Messenian exiles from every quarter, and especially those of Naupactus, who had been expelled after the Peloponnesian war, and migrated to Sicily and Africa, were invited to return to their ancient home, and assist in the glorious restoration. It has been mentioned as a remarkable example of the love of country that these exiles, during so long an absence, had jealously preserved their ancestral usages and the purity of their original language. They returned in great numbers and formed the nucleus of a Messenian government. The new city was founded on the site of the ancient Ithome, Epaminondas laying the first stone, and received the name of Messene. This was B.C. 369.

The humiliation of Sparta was now complete. She had no power to disturb the new settlement. She was hemmed in by a chain of enemies, who cut off her communication with Peloponnesus; by the Messenians on the west, the Arcadians and Argives on the north. Her war with Thebes continued for eight more years. The succor of Athens and her few remaining allies saved her from further disasters; and the death of her great enemy, Epaminondas, brought on a general peace, B.C. 361.

From the negotiations of this peace the Lacedæmonians kept aloof, refusing to acknowledge the independence of Messenia, which they regarded as a deep

disgrace to themselves. Their spirit, though depressed, was not extinguished; and they only waited for an opportunity of recovering their lost dominion. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, who had acquired honor in the late war by the *tearless victory* (in which he defeated the Arcadians and Argives without losing a single Spartan life), kept alive the ambitious hopes of his countrymen, and continually stimulated them to fresh exertions. He was a man of ardent character; to recover Messenia was the principal object of his desire; in which he had even been encouraged by a pamphlet of Isocrates, entitled Archidamus, and still extant. In the course of seven or eight years events occurred which favored the views of this prince. There had been disturbances in Arcadia. The Sacred war had broken out, in which the principal parties were Phocis and Thebes. An obstinate struggle was yet going on; neither party had gained any decisive advantage, and both were greatly weakened. The Phocian generals had carried the war into the enemy's country; some of the Bœotian towns had been taken; and the Thebans, distressed at home, and burdened with heavy expenses, seemed no longer in a condition to assist their Peloponnesian allies.

Under these circumstances, about the year 353, Archidamus thought the time had arrived to effect a counter-revolution, which should restore the influence of his country. His real aim was the destruction of Megalopolis and Messene. But to avow this purpose, or attempt to execute it without further pretext than the desire to satisfy Spartan ambition, might have drawn on him the hostility of those states which were unconnected with the Theban alliance. Accordingly, he conceived the idea of announcing a principle, which would secure certain advantages to the states hostile to Thebes, and induce them to concur in his own scheme of aggrandizement. He gave it out that ancient rights ought to be resumed; that Athens should have Oropus, the towns of Thespiæ, Platæa and Orchomenus should be restored; Elis and Phlius should have certain claims conceded to them. While he published these declarations, he kept in the background that portion of the scheme in which Sparta was interested, viz., the recovery of Messenia and the dissolution of the Arcadian union.

Notwithstanding all the care which Archidamus took to conceal his views, they could not fail to be apparent; and it was soon understood that the warlike preparations in Laconia were designed against Megalopolis. Two embassies were sent at the same time to Athens, one by the Spartans, and one by the Megalopolitans, each to solicit assistance in the approaching war. The Spartan ambassadors reminded the Athenians of their former alliance, and showed what advantage would accrue to them from the plan of Archidamus, by which Thebes, their old enemy, would be depressed. The Megalopolitan deputies urged the justice of their own cause, and the danger that would result from the revival of Spartan supremacy.

There were many speakers on both sides in the Athenian assembly. Demosthenes espoused the cause of the Megalopolitans, and delivered what

Auger pronounces to be one of the most subtle of his orations. He begins by condemning the warmth with which both parties had assailed their adversaries. It became them (he argues), without any feeling or prejudice for or against either of the contending states, to decide the question by reference to justice and the good of Athens. Justice required that no people should be oppressed by another. Their alliance with Sparta had been based on that principle, and they had saved her from ruin; but if Sparta commenced ambitious enterprises inconsistent with the spirit of their alliance, they were justified in breaking it off. It was the interest of Athens that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too powerful. The dissolution of Megalopolis would lead to the reconquest of Messenia, and that would destroy the balance of power in Peloponnesus. The advantage offered to Athens might be obtained in a more honorable manner, without sacrificing the Peloponnesians; and as to Thebes, it was better to weaken her by conferring an obligation upon her allies, and attaching them to Athens, than by allowing them to suffer injustice.

IT APPEARS to me, O Athenians, that both are in fault, they who have spoken for the Arcadians and they who have spoken for the Lacedæmonians. For as if they were deputies from either people, not citizens of Athens, to which both direct their embassies, they accuse and attack one another. This might be the duty of the envoys; but to speak independently on the question, and consider your interests dispassionately, was the part of men who presume to offer counsel here. I really think—setting aside the knowledge of their persons and their Attic tongue—many would take them for either Arcadians or Laconians.

I see how vexatious a thing it is to advise for the best. For when you are carried away by delusion, some taking one view and some another, if any man attempts to advise a middle course, and you are too impatient to listen, he will please neither party and fall into disgrace with both. However, if this be my case, I will rather myself be thought a babbler, than leave you to be misled by certain

people, contrary to my notion of Athenian interests. On other points I will speak, with your permission, afterward; but will begin with principles admitted by all, and explain what I consider your wisest course.

Well then: no man will deny it to be good for Athens, that both the Lacedæmonians and our Theban neighbors should be weak. But things are in this sort of position, if we may form a conjecture from the statements repeatedly made in our assembly—the Thebans will be weakened by the re-establishment of Orchomenus,¹ Thespiæ, and Plataea; the Lacedæmonians will grow powerful again, if they subdue Arcadia and take Megalopolis. We must mind, therefore, that we suffer not the one people to wax mighty and formidable, before the other has become weak; that the power of Lacedæmon do not increase (unremarked by us) in a greater degree than it is well for that of Thebes to be reduced. For we shall hardly say this, that we should like to have Lacedæmonians instead of Thebans for our rivals. It is not this we are anxious for, but that neither may have the means of injuring us: so shall we enjoy the best security.

But granting this ought to be so²—it were scandalous forsooth, to take those men for allies, against whom we were arrayed at Mantinea, and then to assist them against the people, with whom we shared the peril of that day. I think so, too, but with one addition—"provided the others are willing to act justly." If all will choose to observe peace, we shall not help the Megalopolitans; for

¹ The Boeotian cities were at an early period connected by a federal union, each having an independent government. Thebes was at their head, and received a council of deputies from the league.

² *Viz.*, that neither Lacedæmonians nor Thebans should be powerful, etc.

there will be no necessity; and thus we shall be in no opposition to our fellows in arms: one people are, as they profess, our allies already, the other will become so now. And what more could we desire? But should they³ attempt injustice and determine on war—then—if this be the only question, whether we ought or ought not to abandon Megalopolis to the Lacedæmonians, although it would be unjust, I concede the point; let things take their course, don't oppose your former partners in danger: but if you all know that after taking that city they will march to attack Messene, let any of the speakers who are now so hard upon the Megalopolitans tell me what in that case he will advise us to do. None will declare. However, you all know, that you would be obliged to support them, whether these men recommend it or not, both by the oaths that we have sworn to the Messenians,⁴ and because it is expedient that their city should be preserved. Reflect therefore in your minds, whether it would be more noble and generous to begin your resistance to Lacedæmonian aggression with the defence of Megalopolis, or with that of Messene. You will now be considered as protectors of the Arcadians, and striving for the maintenance of that peace, for which you exposed yourselves in the battlefield: whereas then it will be manifest to the world that you desire Messene to stand not so much for the sake of justice as for fear of Lacedæmon. Our purposes and our actions should always be just; but we must also be careful that they are attended with advantage.

³ *I.e.*, the Lacedæmonians; whom the orator does not expressly name, because they are uppermost in his mind.

⁴ This engagement was probably entered into at the general peace, which was concluded after the battle of Mantinea, and by which the Athenians, as well as other states of Greece, recognized the independence of Messenia.

There is an argument of this kind urged by my opponents, that we should attempt to recover Oropus,⁵ and, if we now make enemies of the men who would assist us to gain it, we shall have no allies. I also say, we should try to recover Oropus: but, that Lacedæmon will be our enemy, if we join alliance with the Arcadians who wish to be our friends, they of all men, I consider, are not at liberty to assert, who persuaded you to assist the Lacedæmonians in their hour of danger. The men who argue thus actually persuaded you—when all the Peloponnesians⁶ came to Athens and desired to march with you against the Lacedæmonians—to reject their overtures (on which account, as a last resource, they applied to Thebes), and to contribute money and risk your lives for the safety of Lacedæmon. You would hardly, I think, have been disposed to save them, had they told you, that after their deliverance, unless you suffered them to have their own

⁵ Oropus was on the confines of Attica and Bœotia, on the coast opposite Eretria in Eubœa. It anciently belonged to Athens, but frequently changed masters. In the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war it was betrayed to the Bœotians and Eretrians. It became independent at the close of the war; but a few years after, the Thebans took advantage of some internal disturbances to seize upon the city, which they removed nearly a mile from the coast, and annexed to the Bœotian confederacy. A new revolution some time after restored it to Athens. But in the year 366 B.C. Themison, ruler of Eretria, got possession of it by the aid of some exiles. The Athenians marched against him, but, the Thebans also making their appearance with an army, they were induced to leave Oropus under Theban protection, until the dispute could be amicably settled. The Thebans however kept it in their own hands; and so it remained until after the battle of Chæronea, when Philip gave it up to the Athenians.

⁶ This statement accords not with the narrative of Xenophon, who makes no mention of such an application to Athens, though he states that the Athenians invited a congress to their own city, which was attended by many of the Peloponnesians. Diodorus however relates, that in the second year after the battle of Leuctra the Spartans sent a force into Arcadia and took possession of Orchomenus; that they were afterward defeated by Lycomedes of Mantinea, but the Arcadians, still fearing the power of Sparta, even after they had been joined by the Eleans and Argives, sent an embassy for assistance to Athens. The Athenians having refused their request, they applied to the Thebans, who sent an army under Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

way and commit injustice again, they should owe you no thanks for your protection. And, indeed, however repugnant it may be to the designs of the Spartans, that we should adopt the Arcadian alliance, surely their gratitude, for having been saved by us in a crisis of extreme peril, ought to outweigh their resentment for being checked in their aggression now. How then can they avoid assisting you to gain Oropus, or being thought the basest of mankind? By the gods I cannot see.

I wonder also to hear it argued that, if we espouse the Arcadian alliance and adopt these measures, our state will be chargeable with inconstancy and bad faith. It seems to me, O Athenians, the reverse. Why? Because no man, I apprehend, will question that in defending the Lacedæmonians, and the Thebans⁷ before them, and lastly the Eubœans,⁸ and making them afterward her allies, our republic has always had one and the same object. What is that? To protect the injured. If this be so, the inconstancy will not be ours, but theirs who refuse to adhere to justice; and it will appear, that while circumstances change, through people continually encroaching, Athens changes not.

It seems to me, the Lacedæmonians are acting the part of very crafty men. For now they say that the Eleans ought to recover a certain part of Triphylia, the Phliasians Tricaranum, certain other Arcadians their territory, and we Oropus: not from a desire to see us each possessing our own—far from this—it would be late for them to have become generous—but to make it appear as if they helped

⁷ He alludes to the war that followed the seizure of the Cadmea, commenced by the invasion of Oleombrotus B.C. 378.

⁸ When the Thebans attempted to get possession of the island.

all to recover their claims, so that, when they march themselves to attack Messene, all these people may readily join and assist them, or be deemed ungrateful, after having obtained their concurrence in the question of their own several claims, for not returning the obligation. My opinion is, first, that our state, even without sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedæmonians, may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are willing to be just, and that of others who hold that Theban usurpation ought not to be tolerated. Secondly, supposing it were evident to us, that, unless we permit the Lacedæmonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we cannot obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I deem it more advisable to let Oropus alone than to abandon Messene and Peloponnesus to the Lacedæmonians. I imagine the question between us and them would soon be about other matters. However—I will forbear to say what occurs to me—only I think, we should in many respects be endangered.

As to what the Megalopolitans have done against you (as they say) under the influence of Thebes, it is absurd to bring that now as a charge against them, and yet, when they proffer their friendship, with an intention of doing you good instead of harm, to mistrust and look for an excuse to reject them, without considering that, the more zealous they prove this people to have been in the Theban cause, the more will they themselves deserve your anger for having deprived Athens of such allies, when they applied to her before they applied to Thebes. It looks, indeed, as if they wished a second time to turn these people to another alliance.

I am sure—to judge from rational observation—and I think most Athenians will agree with me, that, if the

Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis, Messene will be in danger; and, if they take that also, I predict that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is much better and more honorable for us to receive the Theban confederacy as our friends, and resist Lacedæmonian ambition, than, out of reluctance to preserve the allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have afterward to preserve Thebes herself, and be in fear also for our own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our state should the Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis, and again become strong. For I see they have undertaken this war, not to defend themselves, but to recover their ancient power: what were their designs when they possessed that power, you, perhaps, know better than I, and, therefore, may have reason to be alarmed.

I would fain ask the men who tell us and say they detest the Thebans and the Lacedæmonians, whether they detest whom they detest respectively out of regard to you and your interests, or detest Thebans for the sake of Lacedæmonians, and Lacedæmonians for the sake of Thebans. If for their sakes, to neither as rational beings ought you to listen: if they say for your sake, wherefore do they exalt either people unduly? It is possible, surely possible, to humble Thebes without increasing the power of Lacedæmon. Ay; and it is much easier, too. I will endeavor to show you how.

It is well known that up to a certain point all men (however disinclined) are ashamed not to observe justice, and that they openly oppose the transgressors, especially where any people suffer damage: it will be found, moreover, that what mars everything, and originates every mischief, is the unwillingness to observe justice uni-

formly. Therefore, that no such obstacles may arise to the depression of Thebes, let us declare that Thespiæ and Orchomenus and Plataea ought to be re-established, and let us co-operate with their people and call on others to assist us—just and honorable were this, not to regard with indifference the extermination of ancient cities—but let us not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to the aggressors, nor, on the pretence of Thespiæ and Plataea, suffer existing and flourishing cities to be annihilated. If such be your declared policy, every one will desire that Thebes should no longer hold her neighbor's dominion. If not—in the first place, we may expect to find these men oppose the other scheme, when they see that the establishment of those towns would be their own ruin: secondly, we shall have an interminable business of it ourselves; for where, indeed, can it end, if we continually allow existing cities to be destroyed, and require those which are in ruins to be restored?

It is urged by the most plausible speakers that the pillars* of their treaty with Thebes must be taken down, if they mean to be our steadfast allies. These people say that with them it is not pillars, but interest that binds friendship, and they consider those who assist them to be allies. Granting such to be their views, my notion is this. I say we should both require of them the destruction of the pillars, and of the Lacedæmonians the observance of peace; if either party refuse to comply, whichever it be, we should side immediately with those that will. Should

* It was the practice among Grecian states to inscribe their treaties on pillars of stone or brass, which, so long as the treaties remained in force, were religiously preserved, and exposed to view in temples and other public places. And it was frequently provided in the treaty itself, where the pillars recording it should be deposited.

the Megalopolitans, notwithstanding the maintenance of peace, adhere to the Theban alliance, it will surely be evident to all that they favor the ambition of the Thebans instead of justice. On the other hand, if the Megalopolitans in good faith espouse our alliance, and the Lacedæmonians do not choose to observe peace, they will surely prove to the world that they are striving not only for the restoration of Thespiæ, but for an opportunity of conquering Peloponnesus while the Thebans are entangled in this war. One thing in certain men surprises me; that they dread the enemies of Lacedæmon becoming allies of Thebes, and yet see no danger in the Lacedæmonians conquering them; although we have actual experience furnished by the past that the Thebans always use these allies against Lacedæmon, whereas the Lacedæmonians, while they had the same people, used them against us.

I think, further, you ought to consider this. If you reject the Megalopolitans—should their city be destroyed and themselves dispersed," the Lacedæmonians at once become powerful: should they chance to escape (as unhoped-for events do happen), they will in justice be steadfast allies of the Thebans." If you accept them for allies,

¹⁰ Into villages

¹¹ The event proved the justice of this remark. Demosthenes could not prevail on the Athenians to follow his counsel. They joined the alliance of neither party. Archidamus commenced war against the Arcadians, who were assisted by Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. In the course of the same year, Philip having defeated Onomarchus in the great battle of Pagasæ, the Thebans were enabled to send forces to the succor of their old allies. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians were reinforced by some Phocian mercenaries; and the war was carried on for two years with various success, and at length terminated by a truce. The Arcadian confederacy, however, were alienated from Athens, and the bad effects of this were discovered some time after, when, alarmed at the designs of Sparta, they applied not to Athens, but to Philip, for assistance, and thus caused Macedonian influence to extend itself in Peloponnesus.

the immediate consequence to them will be deliverance by your means—but passing from their case—let us consider what may be looked for and apprehended with reference to Thebes and Lacedæmon. Well, then: if the Thebans be vanquished in war, as they ought to be, the Lacedæmonians will not be unduly great, having these Arcadians for their rivals living near them. If the Thebans chance to recover and come off safe they will, at all events, be the weaker for these men having become our allies and been preserved through us. So that in every point of view it is expedient that we should not abandon the Arcadians, and that they should not appear (in case they do escape) to have owed their deliverance to themselves, or to any other people but you.

I have spoken, O Athenians (heaven is my witness), not from private affection or malice toward either party, but what I consider advantageous for you: and I exhort you not to abandon the Megalopolitans, nor, indeed, any other of the weaker states to the stronger.

ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER

THE ARGUMENT

THIS is one of the orations which has generally been considered spurious, yet as it is published in Becker's and other editions of Demosthenes, it finds a place in this translation.

It purports to be an address to the Athenian people, rousing them to take arms against Alexander, king of Macedon, and shake off the ignominious yoke to which they were subjected, on account of certain injurious acts committed by that monarch in violation of his engagements. It appears that in the year B.C. 335, a treaty was entered into between Alexander and the Greek states, according to which a general peace was to be maintained by all the members of the Greek community, both with Macedonia and among themselves, every state enjoying political independence, and Alexander being the common protector of all. It is alleged that Alexander had broken the treaty by sundry acts of interference with Greek cities, more especially Messene, where the sons of Philides had by his influence regained possession of the government. Another complaint is, that some Athenian ships returning from the Euxine had been seized by Macedonian officers; and that Athens had been insulted by a Macedonian galley sailing into the Piræus without leave.

The date of the speech may have been B.C. 334, after Alexander had crossed over into Asia.

IT IS right, O Athenians, that those who bid you observe your oaths and engagements should, if they do so from conviction, have your entire concurrence. For I think nothing so becomes a people who enjoy self-government, as to be regardful of equity and justice. The persons then, who are so vehement in urging this course, should not trouble you with declamations on the principle, while their conduct is directly opposite; but should submit to inquiry now, and either have you under their direction in such matters for the future, or retire and leave you to advisers who expound the rules of justice

more truly—so that you may either tamely endure your wrongs, and let the aggressor have his way, or, preferring justice to every other consideration, you may be above all reproach, and consult your own interest without delay.¹ From the very terms of the treaty, from the oaths by which the common peace was ratified, you may see at once who the transgressors are—in what important particulars, I will briefly explain.

Were you asked, men of Athens, what would most strongly excite your indignation, methinks you would all say, that if you were constrained—I mean, if the Pisistratids were alive at this day, and an attempt were made to reinstate them by force—you would snatch up your arms and encounter every peril rather than receive them; or, yielding, you must be slaves, like those that are purchased in the market—and far worse, inasmuch as no man will kill a servant wantonly, while the subjects of tyrants are notoriously destroyed without trial, and have outrages also committed upon their wives and children. Well then—Alexander has, contrary to his oath and the express conditions of the general peace, brought back to Messene the sons of Philiades, her tyrants.² In so doing has he paid regard to justice—or has he not rather acted on his own arbitrary principles, in contempt of you and the common agreement? If then such violence done to

¹ *I.e.* by taking arms against Alexander, which is a measure of prudence as well as justice.

² Philiades was tyrant of Messene in the lifetime of Philip. His sons, Neon and Thrasylochus, were expelled for oppressive conduct, but afterward restored by Alexander. They are mentioned in the Oration on the Crown among the list of traitors, by whom, as Demosthenes contends, Grecian liberty was sold to Macedonia. Polybius however maintains that the reproaches of Demosthenes were unjust, and that the connection of these men with Macedonia was for their country's benefit.

yourselves would rouse your utmost resentment, you ought not to remain passive, when it has been committed elsewhere in violation of the oaths taken to you: nor should certain persons here require us to observe the oaths, yet leave to men who have so flagrantly broken them a liberty like this. It cannot indeed be permitted, if you mean to do your duty: for it is further declared in the articles, that whoever acts as Alexander has done shall be deemed an enemy by all parties to the peace, himself and his country, and that all shall take arms against him. Therefore, if we perform our engagements, we shall treat the restorer of these exiles as an enemy.

Perhaps these friends of tyranny may say, that the sons of Philiades reigned in Messene before the treaty was made, and therefore Alexander restores them. But the argument is ridiculous—to expel tyrants from Lesbos, who reigned before the treaty, that is, the tyrants of Antissa and Eresus,* on the plea that such form of government is oppressive; yet hold that it makes no difference in Messene, when the same nuisance is established!

Besides—the treaty prescribes in the very commencement, that the Greeks shall be free and independent. Would it not be the height of absurdity, that the clause making them free and independent should stand first in the treaty, yet that one who reduces them to servitude should not be deemed to have violated the compact? If then, O men of Athens, we mean to abide by our oaths and covenants, and do that act of justice which they require of you, as I just now mentioned, we must certainly take up arms and march against the offenders with such

* Antissa and Eresus are cities in Lesbos.

allies as will join us. Or think ye that opportunity has such force sometimes as to carry out policy without right—and now, when opportunity and policy meet together for the same right, will ye wait for any other time, to assert your own freedom and the freedom of all Greece?

I come to another point under the articles. It is written, that if any persons subvert the constitutions, which existed in the several states when they swore the oaths of ratification, they shall be deemed enemies by all parties to the peace. Now consider, men of Athens: the Achaïans, of Peloponnesus, were living under popular government. Among them, the Macedonian has overthrown the democracy of Pellene, expelling most of the citizens: their property he has given to their servants, and set up Chæron the wrestler as tyrant. We are parties to the treaty, which directs us to regard as enemies the authors of such proceedings. Then must we obey this article of the convention, and treat them as enemies—or will any of these hirelings be impudent enough to say no—these hirelings of the Macedonian, who have grown rich by betraying you? For assuredly they are not ignorant of these proceedings: but they have arrived at such a pitch of insolence, that, guarded by the armies of the tyrant, they exhort you to abide by the violated oaths, as if perjury were his prerogative; they compel you to abolish your own laws, releasing persons who have been condemned in courts of justice, and forcing you into numerous other unconstitutional acts. Naturally enough. It is impossible that men who have sold themselves to oppose their country's interests, should care for laws or oaths: they use their empty names to cajole people who assemble here for pastime, not for discussion, and who little think that the

calm of the moment will lead to strange disturbances hereafter. I repeat, as I declared at the outset—hearken to them who advise you to observe the treaty: unless they consider, in recommending observance of the oaths, that they forbid not the commission of injustice, or suppose that the establishment of despotism instead of democracy and the subversion of constitutional governments will be felt by none.

But what is yet more ridiculous—it is in the articles that all members of the congress,⁴ all guardians of the public safety, shall see that in the confederating states there be no bloodshed or banishment contrary to the laws established in each, no confiscations of property, nor divisions of land, nor abolishing of debts, nor liberating of slaves for revolutionary purposes. They however—so far from checking any of such proceedings—even help to bring them about. Are they not worthy of death, when they promote such plagues in our cities, plagues which (because they are so grievous) the whole body were commissioned to prevent?

I will show you a further breach of the articles. It is declared that it shall not be lawful for exiles⁵ to make an excursion with arms from any cities included in the peace, to attack any other city comprehended in the peace; if they do, the city from which they start shall be excluded from the treaty. Well! The Macedonian has carried his arms about with so little scruple that he has never yet laid

⁴ Which met at Corinth, where the treaty was made.

⁵ From most of the Greek cities there were exiles, banished for political causes, and ready to take advantage of any revolution, to return to their country. If these were many in number, more especially if they were connected with a party at home, or supported by a foreign power, they would cause considerable uneasiness to the government.

them down, but still marches wherever he can with arms in hand, and more now than before, inasmuch as by an edict he has restored various exiles in different places, and the wrestling-master in Sicyon. If we are bound then to obey the terms of the convention, as these men declare, the states guilty of such conduct are under treaty with us no longer. I allow, if the truth is to be suppressed, we must not say they are the Macedonian: but when these traitorous ministers of Macedonia never cease urging you to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, let us hearken to their counsel, as it is just, and let us deliberate—putting them under your ban, as the oath requires—how to treat people whose tempers are so imperious and insolent, who are always either forming or executing some designs, and making a mockery of the peace. How can my opponents dispute the propriety of this? Do they require the clauses against our country to be in force, and not allow those which are for our protection? Does this appear to be justice? Will they confirm whatever is against us in the oaths and favorable to our adversaries—yet think proper continually to oppose any fair advantage that is secured to us against them?

To convince you still more clearly, that the Greeks will never charge you with infringing any part of the convention, but will even thank you for taking upon yourselves to expose the guilty parties—I will, as the articles are numerous, glance cursorily at a few points.

I believe one article is that all the contracting parties may navigate the sea, that none shall molest them, that none of them shall force a vessel into port; that whoever breaks this condition shall be deemed an enemy by all parties. Now, men of Athens, you know perfectly well

that this has been done by the Macedonians. They have come to be so lawless, that they carried into Tenedos all our vessels from the Euxine, and under pretences refused to release them, until you determined to man a hundred ships of war and launch them immediately, and appointed Menestheus to the command. Is it not absurd, when the wrongs done by others are of such number and magnitude that their friends here, instead of restraining them the transgressors, should advise us to observe a compact so little regarded? As if it were further declared that trespass should be allowed to one party, and not even resistance to the other! Were not their acts both lawless and senseless, when they violated their oaths to such an extent as had wellnigh justly deprived them of their maritime supremacy? * And as it is, they have left you this plea beyond a question, when you choose to enforce it: for assuredly they have not the less broken the convention, because they left off committing trespasses: they are only fortunate in profiting by your indolence, that will not even take advantage of a right.

The most humiliating circumstance is this—that while all others, Greeks and barbarians, dread your enmity, these upstarts alone compel you to despise yourselves, either persuading or forcing you into measures, as if they were statesmen of Abdera or Maronea, not of Athens. At the same time they weaken your power and strengthen that of your adversaries; and yet (without perceiving it)

* Alexander having by the treaty been declared generalissimo of the Greeks, a supremacy both on land and sea was accorded to Macedonia, although that kingdom did not actually possess so large a fleet as Athens. The Athenians furnished twenty galleys to the armament which conveyed Alexander across the Hellespont.

† These were cities in Thrace. Abdera was famous for the stupidity of the inhabitants, though it produced Democritus the philosopher.

acknowledge our republic to be irresistible; for they forbid her to maintain justice justly,* as though she could easily vanquish her enemies if she chose to consult her own interests. And their notion is reasonable. For as long as we can be indisputably masters of the sea alone, we may find other defences for the land, in addition to our existing force, especially if by good fortune these men, who are now guarded by the tyrant's armies, should be put down, some of them destroyed, some proved to be utterly worthless.

So grave an offence (in addition to what I have mentioned before) has the Macedonian committed in the affair of the ships. But the most outrageous and overbearing act of the Macedonians is what has lately occurred—their daring to sail into the Piræus contrary to our convention with them. And you must not regard it as a light matter, men of Athens, because there was only one ship; but as an experiment on our patience, that they may have liberty to do it with more, and a contempt of the agreement, as in the former instances. That they meant to creep along by degrees, and accustom us to tolerate such intrusions, is evident from this only—the commander who put into port (who ought with his galley to have been instantly destroyed by you) asked permission to build small boats in our harbors—does it not show that their contrivance was, instead of sailing into port, to be inside at once? And if we allow small boats, we shall shortly allow vessels of war; if a small number at first, very soon a large. It is impossible, you know, to make this excuse, that in Athens there is plenty of ship-timber (which is brought

* Because they recommend that the Athenians should observe the treaty, and the Macedonians be allowed to break it.

with trouble from a distance) and a scarcity in Macedonia (which supplies it at the cheapest rate to all purchasers). No. They looked both to build vessels here, and to man them in the same harbor, although it was expressed in the treaty that nothing of the kind should be allowed. And these liberties will increase more and more. With such contempt in every way do they treat our republic, through their instructors here, who suggest to them what course to pursue. And such is the estimate which, in common with these men, they have formed of Athens, that she is inexpressibly feeble and imbecile, that she has no forethought for the future, nor takes any account how the tyrant observes the treaty.

That treaty, O Athenians, I exhort you to obey, in such manner as I explained, insisting (under the privilege of my age) that you might at the same time exercise your rights without reproach, and use without danger the opportunities which impel you to your good. For there is a further addition to the articles—"if we will be parties to the common peace." This, "if we will," means also a different thing—"if we ever ought to cease shamefully following others, and forgetting those honors, of which we, beyond all people, have won so many from the earliest time." Therefore, with your permission, men of Athens, I will move, as the treaty commands, to make war upon the transgressors.*

* Almost all critics, ancient and modern, have pronounced this oration to be spurious. Libanius ascribes it to Hyperides, Ulpian to Hegesippus. History affords no confirmation of the fact that such a speech ever was made. And it would also be strange, if Demosthenes had purposed to make war against Alexander, that there should be no allusion to it in either of the speeches on the Crown.

Francis says: "Our editors have preserved to us the Orations upon Halonnesus and Alexander's treaty with Athens, even while they hold them written

by other authors, and unworthy of our orator's character. The translator therefore hopes to be forgiven his not attempting to preserve what in themselves are confessedly spurious, and, if they were genuine, would be injurious to the reputation of his author. A painting would do little honor to the cabinet of the curious, merely because ignorance and false taste had once given it to the divine Raphael."

The only commentator who maintains the genuineness of this oration is Leland. It is but fair to hear his reasons: "Critics seem willing to ascribe this oration to Hegesippus, or to Hyperides. It is observed that the style is diffuse, languid, and disgraced by some affected phrases; and that the whole composition by no means breathes that spirit of boldness and freedom which appears in the orations of Demosthenes. But these differences may possibly be accounted for, without ascribing it to another author. Dejection and vexation, a consciousness of the fallen condition of his country, despair and terror at the view of the Macedonian power, might have naturally produced an alteration in the style and manner of the orator's address. A great epic genius, when in its decline, is said by Longinus to fall naturally into the fabulous. In like manner, a great popular speaker, when hopeless and desponding, checked and controlled by his fears, may find leisure to coin words, and naturally recur to affected expressions, when the torrent of his native eloquence is stopped. Nor is the oration now before us entirely destitute of force and spirit. It appears strong and vehement, but embarrassed. The fire of Demosthenes sometimes breaks forth through all obstacles, but is instantly allayed and suppressed, as if by fear and caution. The author, as Ulpian expresses it, speaks freely, and not freely; he encourages the citizens to war, and yet scruples to move for war in form; as if his mind was distracted between fear and confidence. In a word, I regard this Oration on the Treaty with Alexander as the real work of Demosthenes, but of Demosthenes dejected and terrified, willing to speak consistently with himself, yet not daring to speak all that he feels. It may be compared to the performance of an eminent painter, necessarily executed at a time when his hands or eyes labored under some disorder, in which we find the traces of his genius and abilities obscured by many marks of his present infirmity."

DINARCHUS

DINARCHUS, the latest and least important of the ten classic Attic orators, was born at Corinth about 361 B.C., but lived at Athens from his early youth. He studied oratory under Theophrastus, but being of alien birth was not allowed to declaim in the Athenian courts, and accordingly wrote orations for others to deliver, beginning this career when he was twenty-six years old. He was an adherent of the Macedonian party, and took an active part in the dispute whether Harpalus, who had openly deserted the cause of Alexander the Great, should be allowed to return to Athens or not. His period of greatest activity was in the decade between 317 and 307, during the administration of Demetrius Phalereus. In 307 Demetrius Poliorcetes came against Athens, Demetrius Phalereus took flight, and Dinarchus at the same time escaped to Chalcis in Eubœa. Fifteen years later he was permitted to return to Athens, where his death occurred about 291. Of the many orations attributed to him only three are preserved entire, those "Against Philocles," "Against Demosthenes," and "Against Aristogiton," all relating to Harpalus. It is, however, very possible that the speech against Theomenes, usually included among the orations of Demosthenes, is by Dinarchus. By some of his contemporaries Dinarchus was highly praised, but others were less favorable in their judgments; in his style he imitated Lysias, Demetrius, Hyperides and others, by turns.

SPEECH AGAINST ARISTOGITON

[Dinarchus delivered the following speech against Aristogiton, who had received bribes from one of the Anti-Macedonian party.]

ON occasions like the present, fellow Athenians, we ought not to be astonished at anything we see or hear. But what could be more astonishing than the audacity of Aristogiton? Basest of men in our city, nay, in all the world, he has dared to come before you to contend with the Council of the Areopagus about a question of truth and justice. And the Council that has denounced him is in greater danger than he, though for twenty minæ he has been bribed to betray you and to sell his freedom of speech in the cause of justice.

Such is the depravity of this man that nothing can appall him. Even death itself, should you condemn him, will have no terrors for him, since he has in the past committed many crimes deserving of death, and has spent more of his life in prison than out of it. Moreover, though still in the public debt, he has in violation of the law brought indictments against our citizens. Outrageous, however, as have been his past misdeeds, nothing causes me to feel greater indignation than that he should be thought by you to be an innocent man unjustly brought to trial by the Council. The truth is, fellow Athenians, that this man has come here to-day in confident expectation of an acquittal — this man who has already suffered all the punishments that fall to the lot of the wicked except death. To death, then, if the gods so will and you are wise, you will condemn this wretch to-day. Hope not to reform him; for if you pardon him now what assurance have you that he will not again betray your interests in the future? Depravity in its inception may be checked. But how can you hope to exercise a restraining influence over one who has been hardened in the ways of vice and has suffered all the ordinary forms of punishment? If, of course, you wish depravity to become ingrained in the state, protect Aristogiton and give free rein to lawlessness; but if you abhor depravity, and feel righteous indignation upon recalling Aristogiton's past misdeeds, condemn him now for daring to accept money from Harpalus as the price of treachery. To the excuses of such a man turn a deaf ear; and above all be not deceived by the impositions upon which he mainly relies for his defence.

Disquieting and annoying as has been the attempt of Harpalus to take our city by stratagem, it has not been wholly unproductive of good results; for it has shown us clearly who would, and who would not, betray us for gold and silver.

Why then are you supine, fellow Athenians, when it lies in your power to punish the hireling and to purge venality from our city? Do you doubt his guilt? If my words fail to convince you, you should at least put faith in the denunciation of the Council.

Why now do you suppose that we ask you to hear our accusation against Aristogiton? Is it because we fear that, unless we thunder loud and long against this traitor, caught in the very act of treason, you will think the denunciation of the Council false and groundless? No, it is because we feel with you that in receiving a bribe to betray his countrymen he has committed a crime worthy only of those abandoned wretches who seek to do their country all the harm they can.

Consider now the merits of this excellent man, and see what reason you have to spare him. Temperate in his habits, and of good ancestry, he has done you many noble acts both of a public and private nature. For who of you has not heard that, when Aristogiton's father, Cudimachus, was condemned to death and fled from the city, this excellent son suffered his father to be in want of the necessities of life, and after his death denied him the customary funeral rites? For these offences charges have frequently been preferred against him. Moreover, when he was first led off to prison, he committed such acts of wickedness there that the rest of the prisoners refused to give him a light, to eat with him, or to take part in any sacred rites with him. What redeeming trait, then, can you find in this miscreant, who was sentenced to imprisonment for his wickedness, and even to the inmates of the prison seemed so wicked that they deemed him unworthy of the same treatment with the rest. He was a thief among thieves, and had there been a viler dungeon, into that, they say, they would have cast the untamable beast. The truth

of what I say is amply attested by the fact that these misdeeds were all charged against him, when he was examined, after being appointed by lot Overseer of the Exchange, and was rejected by the judges as being unfit to discharge the duties of that office.

What claim to pity, fellow Athenians, has this man, who showed no pity for his starving father? Or why need I further urge the punishment of a man who you all know deserves to suffer the severest penalty imposed by law for both his past and present crimes? Was it not Aristogiton who indicted the priestess of Artemis Brauronia and her family on a false charge, for which offence you fined him five talents after you learned the truth from his prosecutors? Before paying this fine, did he not continually slander you in public both in speech and writing, and hold in contempt all the penalties prescribed by law against wrong-doers? Finally, when he had been accused by Lycurgus of haranguing the people, while he was still in the public debt, and had been convicted and given over to the jailers according to law, did he not walk about in front of the judges and even sit down in the place reserved for the presidents of the Council?

Surely, fellow Athenians, you will never hearken to the counsel of a man whom the law has given over to you for punishment, whom the people have condemned, and whom neither jailers nor prison walls have been able to keep in confinement. The law commands you to begin your deliberations on affairs of state only after the herald has offered solemn prayer to the gods. How then can you admit this accursed traitor and reprobate son into your assembly to deliberate with you and your kinsmen about matters affecting the public weal? Demades and Demosthenes you refused to pardon for receiving bribes, and justly so. Yet they showed good states-

manship, if not in all, at least in many matters. But this accursed wretch has never done you any good since he began his public career, but all the harm he could. Will you then pardon him? Or do you think that you will escape censure and reproach if you listen to his counsel? Whenever a man speaks before the people, who is notorious and has a widespread reputation for depravity, the bystanders ask in wonder whether the people listen to him because they have no better counsellors, or because they take pleasure in hearing such a man speak.

In this, as in other matters, you cannot do better than conform to the practice of your ancestors. To secure the best results in public speaking and the conduct of public affairs they spared no pains. First they publicly cursed the man who dared to speak in the assembly after he had received a bribe, and solemnly called upon the gods to doom him and his entire family to utter destruction. Such a man is Aristogiton. Then by law they made bribery and solicitation of bribery indictable offences, and provided a penalty, by way of fine, ten times as great as the amount of the bribe, believing that the man who received a price for his public utterances spoke not in the interest of his countrymen, but in the interest of his corruptor. For this very offence, of which you are all aware, the Council of the Areopagus has denounced Aristogiton. Finally they subjected to a rigid examination all who were to engage in the administration of public affairs. Each candidate's private character was brought to light. Of each they inquired whether he was kind to his parents; whether he had served in the armies of the commonwealth; whether he had erected a tomb to the memory of his father; and whether he had paid his taxes.

Such a test as this Aristogiton could never stand. For

instead of being kind to his parents he treated his father most shamefully. When, too, you served in the army, he served in prison. So far, moreover, from erecting any tomb or monument to the memory of his father, he did not even give him in Eretria, where he died, the customary rites of burial. Finally, though the rest of us have contributed to the support of the state out of our private means, he has not even paid up the fines imposed on him as the penalty of his misdeeds. In a word, he has continually acted in violation of all law and order; and him alone the Council of the Areopagus has denounced.

Remember, fellow Athenians, that your reputation is now at stake. For as you pronounce judgment on Aristogiton the world will pronounce judgment on you. If, then, you are prudent, you will not condemn yourselves, but will deliver this man to those whose duty it is to punish the guilty. The Council has denounced him for treason; his father has condemned him for the wrongs he did him, living and dead; and the people have given him over to you for punishment.

Such being the case, how can you acquit this man, who, to say nothing of his past crimes, has now been caught in the very act of treason? If you let him escape now, what reason will you give for having condemned men in the past? Or how does it happen that you urge the Council to denounce traitors, yet fail to punish them when denounced?

This is not, fellow Athenians, a private suit, but a public prosecution, far-reaching in its effects. On your judgment now much depends in the future. If you acquit Aristogiton now, you will give encouragement to bribery and treason; but if you condemn him, you will inspire fear in all would-be hirelings and traitors. Even now the fear of your judgment represses the zeal of those who would betray you for a bribe.

in 58 B.C. obtained a decree for his banishment four hundred miles from the city and for the destruction of his house on the Palatine Hill. Soon afterward, however, a resolution for Cicero's recall was carried in the popular assembly; the senate went forth to meet him, and the restoration of his house was undertaken by the state. The attainment of a seat in the College of Augurs (B.C. 53) placed him in a position of dignity suited to the taste of a constitutional antiquarian. In the next year he accepted the government of Cilicia for the following twelvemonth, and his conduct in this post seems to have been highly meritorious. When the civil war between Cæsar and Pompeius broke out, Cicero naturally threw himself into the ranks of the Senatorial or Conservative party. After the rout of the Senatorial forces at Pharsalia, however, he returned to Italy, and, being soon relieved from apprehensions for his personal safety by kind assurances from the victor, he withdrew for a time from public life. During this period he abstained from making advances to Cæsar, but the latter's clemency to Marcellus at last won Cicero's heart, and caused him to declare warmly in favor of the conqueror. In the plot which culminated in Cæsar's assassination, Cicero was not an accomplice, though, after the deed was done, he took part with its perpetrators in the hope that the freedom of Rome might be restored. Against Marc Antony, who seemed desirous of reviving Cæsar's part, Cicero delivered a series of orations which he called *Philippics*. These gave great offence to Antony, and, after a triumvirate was formed by the latter, in conjunction with Octavius and Lepidus, the name of Cicero was placed on the list of the proscribed. The orator fled, but he was overtaken at the door of one of his villas, and his throat was cut by a bravo. Thus perished Cicero, in B.C. 43, at the age of sixty-three. His head and hands were cut off and sent to Rome, where Antony caused them to be affixed to the Rostra, and Fulvia, the widow of Clovius and wife of Antony, pierced with her bodkin the tongue which had declaimed against both her husbands.

THE FIRST ORATION AGAINST LUCIUS CATILINE

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE

THE ARGUMENT

LUCIUS CATILINE, a man of noble extraction, and who had already been prætor, had been a competitor of Cicero's for the consulship; the next year he again offered himself for the office, practicing such excessive and open bribery, that Cicero published a new law against it, with the additional penalty of ten years' exile; prohibiting likewise all shows of gladiators from being exhibited by a candidate within two years of the time of his suing for any magistracy, unless they were ordered by the will of a person deceased. Catiline, who knew this law to be aimed chiefly at him, formed a design to murder Cicero and some others of the chief men of the senate,

on the day of election, which was fixed for the twentieth of October. But Cicero had information of his plans, and laid them before the senate, on which the election was deferred, that they might have time to deliberate on an affair of so much importance. The day following, when the senate met, he charged Catiline with having entertained this design, and Catiline's behavior had been so violent that the senate passed the decree to which they had occasionally recourse in times of imminent danger from treason or sedition: "Let the consuls take care that the republic suffers no harm." This decree invested the consuls with absolute power, and suspended all the ordinary forms of law, till the danger was over. On this Cicero doubled his guards, introduced some additional troops into the city, and when the elections came on, he wore a breastplate under his robe for his protection; by which precaution he prevented Catiline from executing his design of murdering him and his competitors for the consulship, of whom Decius Junius Silanus and Lucius Licinius Murena were elected.

Catiline was rendered desperate by this his second defeat, and resolved without further delay to attempt the execution of all his schemes. His greatest hopes lay in Sylla's veteran soldiers, whose cause he had always espoused. They were scattered about in the different districts and colonies of Italy; but he had actually enlisted a considerable body of them in Etruria, and formed them into a little army under the command of Manlius, a centurion of considerable military experience, who was only waiting for his orders. He was joined in his conspiracy by several senators of profligate lives and desperate fortunes, of whom the chiefs were Publius Cornelius Lentulus, Caius Cethegus, Publius Autronius, Lucius Cassius Longinus, Marcus Porcius Lecca, Publius Sylla, Servilius Sylla, Quintus Curius, Lucius Vargunteius, Quintus Annius, and Lucius Bestia. These men resolved that a general insurrection should be raised throughout all Italy; that Catiline should put himself at the head of the troops in Etruria; that Rome should be set on fire in many places at once; and that a general massacre should be made of all the senate, and of all their enemies, of whom none was to be spared but the sons of Pompey, who were to be kept as hostages, and as a check upon their father, who was in command in the East. Lentulus was to be president of their councils, Cassius was to manage the firing of the city, and Cethegus the massacre. But, as the vigilance of Cicero was the greatest obstacle to their success, Catiline desired to see him slain before he left Rome; and two knights, parties to the conspiracy, undertook to visit him early on pretence of business, and to kill him in his bed. The name of one of them was Caius Cornelius.

Cicero, however, had information of all the designs of the conspirators, as by the intrigues of a woman called Fulvia, the mistress of Curius, he had gained him over, and received regularly from him an account of all their operations. He sent for some of the chief men of the city, and informed them of the plot against himself, and even of the names of the knights who

were to come to his house, and of the hour at which they were to come. When they did come they found the house carefully guarded and all admission refused to them. He was enabled also to disappoint an attempt made by Catiline to seize on the town of Præneste, which was a very strong fortress, and would have been of great use to him. The meeting of the conspirators had taken place on the evening of the sixth of November. On the eighth Cicero summoned the senate to meet in the temple of Jupiter in the Capitol, a place which was only used for this purpose on occasions of great danger. (There had been previously several debates on the subject of Catiline's treasons and design of murdering Cicero, and a public reward had actually been offered to the first discoverer of the plot. But Catiline had, nevertheless, continued to dissemble; had offered to give security for his behavior, and to deliver himself to the custody of any one whom the senate chose to name, even to that of Cicero himself.) Catiline had the boldness to attend this meeting, and all the senate, even his own most particular acquaintance, were so astonished at his impudence that none of them would salute him; the consular senators quitted that part of the house in which he sat, and left the bench empty; and Cicero himself was so provoked at his audacity, that, instead of entering on any formal business, he addressed himself directly to Catiline in the following invective.

WHEN, O Catiline, do you mean to cease abusing our patience? How long is that madness of yours still to mock us? When is there to be an end of that unbridled audacity of yours, swaggering about as it does now? Do not the mighty guards placed on the Palatine Hill—do not the watches posted throughout the city—does not the alarm of the people, and the union of all good men—does not the precaution taken of assembling the senate in this most defensible place—do not the looks and countenances of this venerable body here present, have any effect upon you? Do you not feel that your plans are detected? Do you not see that your conspiracy is already arrested and rendered powerless by the knowledge which every one here possesses of it? What is there that you did last night, what the night before—where is it that you were—who was there that you summoned to

meet you—what design was there which was adopted by you, with which you think that any one of us is unacquainted?

Shame on the age and on its principles! The senate is aware of these things; the consul sees them; and yet this man lives. Lives! ay, he comes even into the senate. He takes a part in the public deliberations; he is watching and marking down and checking off for slaughter every individual among us. And we, gallant men that we are, think that we are doing our duty to the republic if we keep out of the way of his frenzied attacks.

You ought, O Catiline, long ago to have been led to execution by command of the consul. That destruction which you have been long plotting against us ought to have already fallen on your own head.

What? Did not that most illustrious man, Publius Scipio, the Pontifex Maximus, in his capacity of a private citizen, put to death Tiberius Gracchus, though but slightly undermining the constitution? And shall we, who are the consuls, tolerate Catiline, openly desirous to destroy the whole world with fire and slaughter? For I pass over older instances, such as how Caius Servilius Ahala with his own hand slew Spurius Mælius when plotting a revolution in the state. There was—there was once such virtue in this republic that brave men would repress mischievous citizens with severer chastisement than the most bitter enemy. For we have a resolution of the senate, a formidable and authoritative decree against you, O Catiline; the wisdom of the republic is not at fault, nor the dignity of this senatorial body. We, we alone—I say it openly—we, the consuls, are wanting in our duty.

The senate once passed a decree that Lucius Opimius,

the consul, should take care that the republic suffered no injury. Not one night elapsed. There was put to death, on some mere suspicion of disaffection, Caius Gracchus, a man whose family had borne the most unblemished reputation for many generations. There was slain Marcus Fulvius, a man of consular rank, and all his children. By a like decree of the senate the safety of the republic was intrusted to Caius Marius and Lucius Valerius, the consuls. Did not the vengeance of the republic, did not execution overtake Lucius Saturninus, a tribune of the people, and Caius Servilius, the prætor, without the delay of one single day? But we, for these twenty days, have been allowing the edge of the senate's authority to grow blunt, as it were. For we are in possession of a similar decree of the senate, but we keep it locked up in its parchment—buried, I may say, in the sheath; and according to this decree you ought, O Catiline, to be put to death this instant. You live—and you live, not to lay aside, but to persist in your audacity.

I wish, O conscript fathers, to be merciful; I wish not to appear negligent amid such danger to the state; but I do now accuse myself of remissness and culpable inactivity. A camp is pitched in Italy, at the entrance of Etruria, in hostility to the republic; the number of the enemy increases every day; and yet the general of that camp, the leader of those enemies, we see within the walls—ay, and even in the senate—planning every day some internal injury to the republic. If, O Catiline, I should now order you to be arrested, to be put to death, I should, I suppose, have to fear lest all good men should say that I had acted tardily, rather than that any one should affirm that I acted cruelly. But yet this, which ought to have been done long since, I have good reason for not doing as yet; I will put

you to death, then, when there shall be not one person possible to be found so wicked, so abandoned, so like yourself, as not to allow that it has been rightly done. As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live; but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall not perceive them.

For what is there, O Catiline, that you can still expect, if night is not able to veil your nefarious meetings in darkness, and if private houses cannot conceal the voice of your conspiracy within their walls—if everything is seen and displayed? Change your mind: trust me: forget the slaughter and conflagration you are meditating. You are hemmed in on all sides; all your plans are clearer than the day to us; let me remind you of them. Do you recollect that on the 21st of October I said in the senate, that on a certain day, which was to be the 27th of October, C. Manlius, the satellite and servant of your audacity, would be in arms? Was I mistaken, Catiline, not only in so important, so atrocious, so incredible a fact, but, what is much more remarkable, in the very day? I said also in the senate that you had fixed the massacre of the nobles for the 28th of October, when many chief men of the senate had left Rome, not so much for the sake of saving themselves as of checking your designs. Can you deny that on that very day you were so hemmed in by my guards and my vigilance, that you were unable to stir one finger against the republic; when you said that you would be content with the flight of the rest, and the slaughter of us who remained? What? when you made sure that you would be able to

seize Præneste on the 1st of November by a nocturnal attack, did you not find that that colony was fortified by my order, by my garrison, by my watchfulness and care? You do nothing, you plan nothing, think of nothing which I not only do not hear but which I do not see and know every particular of.

Listen while I speak of the night before. You shall now see that I watch far more actively for the safety than you do for the destruction of the republic. I say that you came the night before (I will say nothing obscurely) into the Scythe-dealers' street, to the house of Marcus Lecca; that many of your accomplices in the same insanity and wickedness came there, too. Do you dare to deny it? Why are you silent? I will prove it if you do deny it; for I see here in the senate some men who were there with you.

O ye immortal gods, where on earth are we? in what city are we living? what constitution is ours? There are here—here in our body, O conscript fathers, in this the most holy and dignified assembly of the whole world, men who meditate my death, and the death of all of us, and the destruction of this city, and of the whole world. I, the consul, see them; I ask them their opinion about the republic, and I do not yet attack, even by words, those who ought to be put to death by the sword. You were, then, O Catiline, at Lecca's that night; you divided Italy into sections; you settled where every one was to go; you fixed whom you were to leave at Rome, whom you were to take with you; you portioned out the divisions of the city for conflagration; you undertook that you yourself would at once leave the city, and said that there was then only this to delay you, that I was still alive. Two Roman

knights were found to deliver you from this anxiety, and to promise that very night, before daybreak, to slay me in my bed. All this I knew almost before your meeting had broken up. I strengthened and fortified my house with a stronger guard; I refused admittance, when they came, to those whom you sent in the morning to salute me, and of whom I had foretold to many eminent men that they would come to me at that time.

As, then, this is the case, O Catiline, continue as you have begun. Leave the city at last: the gates are open; depart. That Manlian camp of yours has been waiting too long for you as its general. And lead forth with you all your friends, or at least as many as you can; purge the city of your presence; you will deliver me from a great fear, when there is a wall between me and you. Among us you can dwell no longer—I will not bear it, I will not permit it, I will not tolerate it. Great thanks are due to the immortal gods, and to this very Jupiter Stator, in whose temple we are, the most ancient protector of this city, that we have already so often escaped so foul, so horrible, and so deadly an enemy to the republic. But the safety of the commonwealth must not be too often allowed to be risked on one man. As long as you, O Catiline, plotted against me while I was the consul elect, I defended myself not with a public guard, but by my own private diligence. When, in the next consular comitia, you wished to slay me when I was actually consul, and your competitors also, in the Campus Martius, I checked your nefarious attempt by the assistance and resources of my own friends, without exciting any disturbance publicly. In short, as often as you attacked me, I by myself opposed you, and that, too, though I saw that my ruin was connected with great dis-

aster to the republic. But now you are openly attacking the entire republic.

You are summoning to destruction and devastation the temples of the immortal gods, the houses of the city, the lives of all the citizens; in short, all Italy. Wherefore, since I do not yet venture to do that which is the best thing, and which belongs to my office and to the discipline of our ancestors, I will do that which is more merciful if we regard its rigor, and more expedient for the state. For if I order you to be put to death, the rest of the conspirators will still remain in the republic; if, as I have long been exhorting you, you depart, your companions, these worthless dregs of the republic, will be drawn off from the city too. What is the matter, Catiline? Do you hesitate to do that when I order you which you were already doing of your own accord? The consul orders an enemy to depart from the city. Do you ask me, Are you to go into banishment? I do not order it; but, if you consult me, I advise it.

For what is there, O Catiline, that can now afford you any pleasure in this city? for there is no one in it, except that band of profligate conspirators of yours, who does not fear you—no one who does not hate you. What brand of domestic baseness is not stamped upon your life? What disgraceful circumstance is wanting to your infamy in your private affairs? From what licentiousness have your eyes, from what atrocity have your hands, from what iniquity has your whole body ever abstained? Is there one youth, when you have once entangled him in the temptations of your corruption, to whom you have not held out a sword for audacious crime, or a torch for licentious wickedness?

What? when lately by the death of your former wife

you had made your house empty and ready for a new bridal, did you not even add another incredible wickedness to this wickedness? But I pass that over, and willingly allow it to be buried in silence, that so horrible a crime may not be seen to have existed in this city, and not to have been chastised. I pass over the ruin of your fortune, which you know is hanging over you against the ides of the very next month; I come to those things which relate not to the infamy of your private vices, not to your domestic difficulties and baseness, but to the welfare of the republic and to the lives and safety of us all.

Can the light of this life, O Catiline, can the breath of this atmosphere be pleasant to you, when you know that there is not one man of those here present who is ignorant that you, on the last day of the year, when Lepidus and Tullus were consuls, stood in the assembly armed; that you had prepared your hand for the slaughter of the consuls and chief men of the state, and that no reason or fear of yours hindered your crime and madness, but the fortune of the republic? And I say no more of these things, for they are not unknown to every one. How often have you endeavored to slay me, both as consul-elect and as actual consul? how many shots of yours, so aimed that they seemed impossible to be escaped, have I avoided by some slight stooping aside, and some dodging, as it were, of my body? You attempt nothing, you execute nothing, you devise nothing that can be kept hid from me at the proper time; and yet you do not cease to attempt and to contrive. How often already has that dagger of yours been wrested from your hands? how often has it slipped through them by some chance, and dropped down? and yet you cannot any longer do without it; and to what sacred mysteries it

is consecrated and devoted by you I know not, that you think it necessary to plunge it in the body of the consul.

But now, what is that life of yours that you are leading? For I will speak to you not so as to seem influenced by the hatred I ought to feel, but by pity, nothing of which is due to you. You came a little while ago into the senate: in so numerous an assembly, who of so many friends and connections of yours saluted you? If this in the memory of man never happened to any one else, are you waiting for insults by word of mouth, when you are overwhelmed by the most irresistible condemnation of silence? Is it nothing that at your arrival all those seats were vacated? that all the men of consular rank, who had often been marked out by you for slaughter, the very moment you sat down, left that part of the benches bare and vacant? With what feelings do you think you ought to bear this? On my honor, if my slaves feared me as all your fellow-citizens fear you, I should think I must leave my house. Do not you think you should leave the city? If I saw that I was even undeservedly so suspected and hated by my fellow-citizens, I would rather flee from their sight than be gazed at by the hostile eyes of every one. And do you, who, from the consciousness of your wickedness, know that the hatred of all men is just and has been long due to you, hesitate to avoid the sight and presence of those men whose minds and senses you offend? If your parents feared and hated you, and if you could by no means pacify them, you would, I think, depart somewhere out of their sight. Now your country, which is the common parent of all of us, hates and fears you, and has no other opinion of you than that you are meditating parricide in her case; and will you

neither feel awe of her authority, nor deference for her judgment, nor fear of her power?

And she, O Catiline, thus pleads with you, and after a manner silently speaks to you: There has now for many years been no crime committed but by you; no atrocity has taken place without you; you alone unpunished and unquestioned have murdered the citizens, have harassed and plundered the allies; you alone have had power not only to neglect all laws and investigations, but to overthrow and break through them. Your former actions, though they ought not to have been borne, yet I did bear as well as I could; but now that I should be wholly occupied with fear of you alone, that at every sound I should dread Catiline, that no design should seem possible to be entertained against me which does not proceed from your wickedness, this is no longer endurable. Depart, then, and deliver me from this fear; that, if it be a just one, I may not be destroyed; if an imaginary one, that at least I may at last cease to fear.

If, as I have said, your country were thus to address you, ought she not to obtain her request, even if she were not able to enforce it? What shall I say of your having given yourself into custody? what of your having said, for the sake of avoiding suspicion, that you were willing to dwell in the house of Marcus Lepidus? And when you were not received by him, you dared even to come to me, and begged me to keep you in my house; and when you had received answer from me that I could not possibly be safe in the same house with you, when I considered myself in great danger as long as we were in the same city, you came to Quintus Metellus, the prætor, and being rejected by him, you passed on to your associate, that most excel-

lent man, Marcus Marcellus, who would be, I suppose you thought, most diligent in guarding you, most sagacious in suspecting you, and most bold in punishing you; but how far can we think that man ought to be from bonds and imprisonment who has already judged himself deserving of being given into custody?

Since, then, this is the case, do you hesitate, O Catiline, if you cannot remain here with tranquillity, to depart to some distant land, and to trust your life, saved from just and deserved punishment, to flight and solitude? Make a motion, say you, to the senate (for that is what you demand), and if this body votes that you ought to go into banishment, you say that you will obey. I will not make such a motion, it is contrary to my principles, and yet I will let you see what these men think of you. Begone from the city, O Catiline, deliver the republic from fear; depart into banishment, if that is the word you are waiting for. What now, O Catiline? Do you not perceive, do you not see the silence of these men? they permit it, they say nothing; why wait you for the authority of their words, when you see their wishes in their silence?

But had I said the same to this worthy young man, Publius Sextius, or to that brave man, Marcus Marcellus, before this time the senate would deservedly have laid violent hands on me, consul though I be, in this very temple. But as to you, Catiline, while they are quiet they approve, while they permit me to speak they vote, while they are silent they are loud and eloquent. And not they alone, whose authority forsooth is dear to you, though their lives are unimportant, but the Roman knights, too, those most honorable and excellent men, and the other virtuous citizens who are now surrounding the senate, whose numbers you could see, whose

desires you could know, and whose voices you a few minutes ago could hear—ay, whose very hands and weapons I have for some time been scarcely able to keep off from you; but those, too, I will easily bring to attend you to the gates if you leave these places you have been long desiring to lay waste.

And yet, why am I speaking? that anything may change your purpose? that you may ever amend your life? that you may meditate flight or think of voluntary banishment? I wish the gods may give you such a mind; though I see, if alarmed at my words you bring your mind to go into banishment, what a storm of unpopularity hangs over me, if not at present, while the memory of your wickedness is fresh, at all events hereafter. But it is worth while to incur that, as long as that is but a private misfortune of my own, and is unconnected with the dangers of the republic. But we cannot expect that you should be concerned at your own vices, that you should fear the penalties of the laws, or that you should yield to the necessities of the republic, for you are not, O Catiline, one whom either shame can recall from infamy, or fear from danger, or reason from madness.

Wherefore, as I have said before, go forth, and if you wish to make me, your enemy as you call me, unpopular, go straight into banishment. I shall scarcely be able to endure all that will be said if you do so; I shall scarcely be able to support my load of unpopularity if you do go into banishment at the command of the consul; but if you wish to serve my credit and reputation, go forth with your ill-omened band of profligates; betake yourself to Manlius, rouse up the abandoned citizens, separate yourself from the good ones, wage war against your country, exult in your

impious banditti, so that you may not seem to have been driven out by me and gone to strangers, but to have gone invited to your own friends.

Though why should I invite you, by whom I know men have been already sent on to wait in arms for you at the forum Aurelium; who I know has fixed and agreed with Manlius upon a settled day; by whom I know that that silver eagle, which I trust will be ruinous and fatal to you and to all your friends, and to which there was set up in your house a shrine, as it were, of your crimes, has been already sent forward. Need I fear that you can long do without that which you used to worship when going out to murder, and from whose altars you have often transferred your impious hand to the slaughter of citizens?

You will go at last where your unbridled and mad desire has been long hurrying you. And this causes you no grief, but an incredible pleasure. Nature has formed you, desire has trained you, fortune has preserved you for this insanity. Not only did you never desire quiet, but you never even desired any war but a criminal one; you have collected a band of profligates and worthless men, abandoned not only by all fortune but even by hope.

Then what happiness will you enjoy! with what delight will you exult! in what pleasure will you revel! when in so numerous a body of friends you neither hear nor see one good man. All the toils you have gone through have always pointed to this sort of life; your lying on the ground not merely to lie in wait to gratify your unclean desires, but even to accomplish crimes; your vigilance, not only when plotting against the sleep of husbands, but also against the goods of your murdered victims, have all been preparations for this. Now you have an opportunity of displaying your

splendid endurance of hunger, of cold, of want of everything; by which in a short time you will find yourself worn out. All this I effected when I procured your rejection from the consulship, that you should be reduced to make attempts on your country as an exile, instead of being able to distress it as consul, and that that which had been wickedly undertaken by you should be called piracy rather than war.

Now that I may remove and avert, O conscript fathers, any in the least reasonable complaint from myself, listen, I beseech you, carefully to what I say, and lay it up in your inmost hearts and minds. In truth, if my country, which is far dearer to me than my life—if all Italy—if the whole republic were to address me, "Marcus Tullius, what are you doing? will you permit that man to depart whom you have ascertained to be an enemy? whom you see ready to become the general of the war? whom you know to be expected in the camp of the enemy as their chief, the author of all this wickedness, the head of the conspiracy, the instigator of the slaves and abandoned citizens, so that he shall seem not driven out of the city by you, but let loose by you against the city? Will you not order him to be thrown into prison, to be hurried off to execution, to be put to death with the most prompt severity? What hinders you? is it the customs of our ancestors? But even private men have often in this republic slain mischievous citizens. Is it the laws which have been passed about the punishment of Roman citizens? But in this city those who have rebelled against the republic have never had the rights of citizens. Do you fear odium with posterity? You are showing fine gratitude to the Roman people which has raised you, a man known only by your own actions, of no

ancestral renown, through all the degrees of honor at so early an age to the very highest office, if from fear of unpopularity or of any danger you neglect the safety of your fellow-citizens. But if you have a fear of unpopularity, is that arising from the imputation of vigor and boldness, or that arising from that of inactivity and indecision most to be feared? When Italy is laid waste by war, when cities are attacked and houses in flames, do you not think that you will be then consumed by a perfect conflagration of hatred?

To this holy address of the republic, and to the feelings of those men who entertain the same opinion, I will make this short answer: If, O conscript fathers, I thought it best that Catiline should be punished with death, I would not have given the space of one hour to this gladiator to live in. If, forsooth, those excellent men and most illustrious cities not only did not pollute themselves, but even glorified themselves by the blood of Saturninus, and the Gracchi, and Flaccus, and many others of old time, surely I had no cause to fear lest for slaying this parricidal murderer of the citizens any unpopularity should accrue to me with posterity. And if it did threaten me to ever so great a degree, yet I have always been of the disposition to think unpopularity earned by virtue and glory not unpopularity.

Though there are some men in this body who either do not see what threatens, or dissemble what they do see; who have fed the hope of Catiline by mild sentiments, and have strengthened the rising conspiracy by not believing it; influenced by whose authority many, and they not wicked, but only ignorant, if I punished him would say that I had acted cruelly and tyrannically. But I know that if he arrives at the camp of Manlius to which he is going, there will be no one so stupid as not to see that there has been

a conspiracy, no one so hardened as not to confess it. But if this man alone were put to death, I know that this disease of the republic would be only checked for a while, not eradicated forever. But if he banishes himself, and takes with him all his friends, and collects at one point all the ruined men from every quarter, then not only will this full-grown plague of the republic be extinguished and eradicated, but also the root and seed of all future evils.

We have now for a long time, O conscript fathers, lived among these dangers and machinations of conspiracy; but somehow or other, the ripeness of all wickedness, and of this long-standing madness and audacity, has come to a head at the time of my consulship. But if this man alone is removed from this piratical crew, we may appear, perhaps, for a short time relieved from fear and anxiety, but the danger will settle down and lie hid in the veins and bowels of the republic. As it often happens that men afflicted with a severe disease, when they are tortured with heat and fever, if they drink cold water, seem at first to be relieved, but afterward suffer more and more severely; so this disease which is in the republic, if relieved by the punishment of this man, will only get worse and worse, as the rest will be still alive.

Wherefore, O conscript fathers, let the worthless be gone—let them separate themselves from the good—let them collect in one place—let them, as I have often said before, be separated from us by a wall; let them cease to plot against the consul in his own house—to surround the tribunal of the city prætor—to besiege the senate house with swords—to prepare brands and torches to burn the city; let it, in short, be written on the brow of every citizen what are his sentiments about the republic. I promise

you this, O conscript fathers, that there shall be so much diligence in us the consuls, so much authority in you, so much virtue in the Roman knights, so much unanimity in all good men, that you shall see everything made plain and manifest by the departure of Catiline—everything checked and punished.

With these omens, O Catiline, begone to your impious and nefarious war, to the great safety of the republic, to your own misfortune and injury, and to the destruction of those who have joined themselves to you in every wickedness and atrocity. Then do you, O Jupiter, who were consecrated by Romulus with the same auspices as this city, whom we rightly call the stay of this city and empire, repel this man and his companions from your altars and from the other temples—from the houses and walls of the city—from the lives and fortunes of all the citizens; and overwhelm all the enemies of good men, the foes of the republic, the robbers of Italy, men bound together by a treaty and infamous alliance of crimes, dead and alive, with eternal punishments.

THE SECOND ORATION AGAINST LUCIUS CATILINE

ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE

THE ARGUMENT

CATILINE did not venture to make any reply to the former speech, but he begged the senate not to be too hasty in believing everything which was said to his prejudice by one who had always been his enemy, as Cicero had; and alleged his high birth, and the stake which he had in the prosperity of the commonwealth, as arguments to make it appear improbable that he should seek to injure it: and called Cicero a stranger, and a new inhabitant of Rome. But the senate interrupted him with a general outcry, calling him traitor and parricide. Upon which, being rendered furious and desperate, he declared aloud what he had before said to Cato, that since he was circumvented and driven headlong by his enemies, he would quench the flame which his enemies were kindling around him in the common ruin. And so he rushed out of the temple. On his arrival at his own house he held a brief conference with the other conspirators, in which it was resolved that he should go at once to the camp of Manlius, and return as speedily as he could at the head of the army which was there awaiting him. Accordingly, that night he left Rome with a small retinue, and made the best of his way toward Etruria. His friends gave out that he had gone into voluntary banishment at Marseilles, and spread that report through the city the next morning, in order to excite odium against Cicero, as having driven him out without any trial or proof of his guilt. But Cicero was aware of his motions, and knew that he had previously sent a quantity of arms, and military ensigns, and especially a silver eagle which he had been used to keep in his own house with a superstitious reverence, because it had been used by the great Marius in his expedition against the Cimbri. However, he thought it desirable to counteract the story of his having gone into exile, and therefore summoned the people into the forum, and made them the following speech.

AT length, O Romans, we have dismissed from the city, or driven out, or, when he was departing of his own accord, we have pursued with words, Lucius Catiline, mad with audacity, breathing wickedness, impiously planning mischief to his country, threatening fire and sword

to you and to this city. He is gone, he has departed, he has disappeared, he has rushed out. No injury will now be prepared against these walls within the walls themselves by that monster and prodigy of wickedness. And we have, without controversy, defeated him, the sole general of this domestic war. For now that dagger will no longer hover about our sides; we shall not be afraid in the campus, in the forum, in the senate house—ay, and within our own private walls. He was moved from his place when he was driven from the city. Now we shall openly carry on a regular war with an enemy without hindrance. Beyond all question we ruin the man; we have defeated him splendidly when we have driven him from secret treachery into open warfare. But that he has not taken with him his sword red with blood as he intended—that he has left us alive—that we wrested the weapon from his hands—that he has left the citizens safe and the city standing, what great and overwhelming grief must you think that this is to him! Now he lies prostrate, O Romans, and feels himself stricken down and abject, and often casts back his eyes toward this city, which he mourns over as snatched from his jaws, but which seems to me to rejoice at having vomited forth such a pest, and cast it out of doors.

But if there be any one of that disposition which all men should have, who yet blames me greatly for the very thing in which my speech exults and triumphs—namely, that I did not arrest so capital mortal an enemy rather than let him go—that is not my fault, O citizens, but the fault of the times. Lucius Catiline ought to have been visited with the severest punishment, and to have been put to death long since; and both the customs of our ancestors, and the rigor of my office, and the republic, demanded this of me;

but how many, think you, were there who did not believe what I reported? how many who out of stupidity did not think so? how many who even defended him? how many who, out of their own depravity, favored him? If, in truth, I had thought that, if he were removed, all danger would be removed from you, I would long since have cut off Lucius Catiline, had it been at the risk, not only of my popularity, but even of my life.

But as I saw that, since the matter was not even then proved to all of you, if I had punished him with death, as he had deserved, I should be borne down by unpopularity, and so be unable to follow up his accomplices, I brought the business on to this point that you might be able to combat openly when you saw the enemy without disguise. But how exceedingly I think the enemy to be feared now that he is out of doors, you may see from this—that I am vexed even that he has gone from the city with but a small retinue. I wish he had taken with him all his forces. He has taken with him Tongillus, with whom he had been said to have a criminal intimacy, and Publicius, and Munatius, whose debts contracted in taverns could cause no great disquietude to the republic. He has left behind him others—you all know what men they are, how overwhelmed with debt, how powerful, how noble.

Therefore, with our Gallic legions, and with the levies which Quintus Metellus has raised in the Picenian and Gallic territory, and with these troops which are every day being got ready by us, I thoroughly despise that army composed of desperate old men, of clownish profligates, and uneducated spendthrifts; of those who have preferred to desert their bail rather than that army, and which will fall to pieces if I show them not the battle array of our army,

but an edict of the prætor. I wish he had taken with him those soldiers of his, whom I see hovering about the forum, standing about the senate house, even coming into the senate, who shine with ointment, who glitter in purple; and if they remain here, remember that that army is not so much to be feared by us as these men who have deserted the army. And they are the more to be feared, because they are aware that I know what they are thinking of, and yet they are not influenced by it.

I know to whom Apulia has been allotted, who has Etruria, who the Picenian territory, who the Gallic district, who has begged for himself the office of spreading fire and sword by night through the city. They know that all the plans of the preceding night are brought to me. I laid them before the senate yesterday. Catiline himself was alarmed and fled. Why do these men wait? Verily, they are greatly mistaken if they think that former lenity of mine will last forever.

What I have been waiting for, that I have gained—namely, that you should all see that a conspiracy has been openly formed against the republic; unless, indeed, there be any one who thinks that those who are like Catiline do not agree with Catiline. There is not any longer room for lenity; the business itself demands severity. One thing, even now, I will grant—let them depart, let them begone. Let them not suffer the unhappy Catiline to pine away for want of them. I will tell them the road. He went by the Aurelian road. If they make haste, they will catch him by the evening. O happy republic, if it can cast forth these dregs of the republic! Even now, when Catiline alone is got rid of, the republic seems to me relieved and refreshed; for what evil or wicked-

ness can be devised or imagined which he did not conceive? What prisoner, what gladiator, what thief, what assassin, what parricide, what forger of wills, what cheat, what debauchee, what spendthrift, what adulterer, what abandoned woman, what corrupter of youth, what profligate, what scoundrel can be found in all Italy, who does not avow that he has been on terms of intimacy with Catiline? What murder has been committed for years without him? What nefarious act of infamy that has not been done by him?

But in what other man were there ever so many allurements for youth as in him, who both indulged in infamous love for others, and encouraged their infamous affections for himself, promising to some enjoyment of their lust, to others the death of their parents, and not only instigating them to iniquity, but even assisting them in it. But now, how suddenly had he collected, not only out of the city, but even out of the country, a number of abandoned men? No one, not only at Rome, but in every corner of Italy, was overwhelmed with debt whom he did not enlist in this incredible association of wickedness.

And, that you may understand the diversity of his pursuits, and the variety of his designs, there was no one in any school of gladiators, at all inclined to audacity, who does not avow himself to be an intimate friend of Catiline—no one on the stage, at all of a fickle and worthless disposition, who does not profess himself his companion. And he, trained in the practice of insult and wickedness, in enduring cold, and hunger, and thirst, and watching, was called a brave man by those fellows, while all the appliances of industry and instruments of virtue were devoted to lust and atrocity.

But if his companions follow him—if the infamous herd of desperate men depart from the city, O happy shall we be, fortunate will be the republic, illustrious will be the renown of my consulship. For theirs is no ordinary insolence—no common and endurable audacity. They think of nothing but slaughter, conflagration and rapine. They have dissipated their patrimonies, they have squandered their fortunes. Money has long failed them, and now credit begins to fail; but the same desires remain which they had in their time of abundance. But if in their drinking and gambling parties they were content with feasts and harlots, they would be in a hopeless state indeed; but yet they might be endured. But who can bear this—that indolent men should plot against the bravest; drunkards against the sober; men asleep against men awake; men lying at feasts, embracing abandoned women, languid with wine, crammed with food, crowned with chaplets, reeking with ointments, worn out with lust, belch out in their discourse the murder of all good men, and the conflagration of the city?

But I am confident that some fate is hanging over these men; and that the punishment long since due to their iniquity, and worthlessness, and wickedness, and lust, is either visibly at hand or at least rapidly approaching. And if my consulship shall have removed, since it can not cure them, it will have added, not some brief span, but many ages of existence to the republic. For there is no nation for us to fear—no king who can make war on the Roman people. All foreign affairs are tranquillized, both by land and sea, by the valor of one man. Domestic war alone remains. The only plots against us are within our own walls—the danger is within—the enemy is within.

We must war with luxury, with madness, with wickedness. For this war, O citizens, I offer myself as the general. I take on myself the enmity of profligate men. What can be cured, I will cure, by whatever means it may be possible. What must be cut away, I will not suffer to spread, to the ruin of the republic. Let them depart, or let them stay quiet; or if they remain in the city and in the same disposition as at present, let them expect what they deserve.

But there are men, O Romans, who say that Catiline has been driven by me into banishment. But if I could do so by a word, I would drive out those also who say so. Forsooth, that timid, that excessively bashful man could not bear the voice of the consul; as soon as he was ordered to go into banishment, he obeyed, he was quiet. Yesterday, when I had been all but murdered at my own house, I convoked the senate in the temple of Jupiter Stator; I related the whole affair to the conscript fathers; and when Catiline came thither, what senator addressed him? who saluted him? who looked upon him not so much even as an abandoned citizen, as an implacable enemy? Nay the chiefs of that body left that part of the benches to which he came naked and empty.

On this I, that violent consul, who drive citizens into exile by a word, asked of Catiline whether he had been at the nocturnal meeting at Marcus Lecca's, or not; when that most audacious man, convicted by his own conscience, was at first silent. I related all the other circumstances; I described what he had done that night, where he had been, what he had arranged for the next night, how the plan of the whole war had been laid down by him. When he hesitated, when he was convicted, I asked why he hesitated to go whither he had been long preparing to go; when I

knew that arms, that the axes, the fasces, and trumpets, and military standards, and that silver eagle to which he had made a shrine in his own house, had been sent on, did I drive him into exile who I knew had already entered upon war? I suppose Manlius, that centurion who has pitched his camp in the Fæsulan district, has proclaimed war against the Roman people in his own name; and that camp is not now waiting for Catiline as its general, and he, driven forsooth into exile, will go to Marseilles, as they say, and not to that camp.

Oh, the hard lot of those, not only of those who govern, but even of those who save the republic. Now, if Lucius Catiline, hemmed in and rendered powerless by my counsels, by my toils, by my dangers, should on a sudden become alarmed, should change his designs, should desert his friends, should abandon his design of making war, should change his path from this course of wickedness and war, and betake himself to flight and exile, he will not be said to have been deprived by me of the arms of his audacity, to have been astounded and terrified by my diligence, to have been driven from his hope and from his enterprise, but, uncondemned and innocent, to have been driven into banishment by the consul by threats and violence; and there will be some who will seek to have him thought not worthless but unfortunate, and me considered not a most active consul, but a most cruel tyrant. I am not unwilling, O Romans, to endure this storm of false and unjust unpopularity as long as the danger of this horrible and nefarious war is warded off from you. Let him be said to be banished by me as long as he goes into banishment; but, believe me, he will not go. I will never ask of the immortal gods, O Romans, for the sake of lightening my own

unpopularity, for you to hear that Lucius Catiline is leading an army of enemies, and is hovering about in arms; but yet in three days you will hear it. And I much more fear that it will be objected to me some day or other that I have let him escape, rather than that I have banished him. But when there are men who say he has been banished because he has gone away, what would these men say if he had been put to death?

Although those men who keep saying that Catiline is going to Marseilles do not complain of this so much as they fear it; for there is not one of them so inclined to pity, as not to prefer that he should go to Manlius rather than to Marseilles. But he, if he had never before planned what he is now doing, yet would rather be slain while living as a bandit than live as an exile; but now, when nothing has happened to him contrary to his own wish and design—except, indeed, that he has left Rome while we are alive—let us wish rather that he may go into exile than complain of it.

But why are we speaking so long about one enemy; and about that enemy who now avows that he is one; and whom I now do not fear, because, as I have always wished, a wall is between us; and are saying nothing about those who dissemble, who remain at Rome, who are among us? Whom, indeed, if it were by any means possible, I should be anxious not so much to chastise as to cure, and to make friendly to the republic; nor, if they will listen to me, do I quite know why that may not be. For I will tell you, O Romans, of what classes of men those forces are made up, and then, if I can, I will apply to each the medicine of my advice and persuasion.

There is one class of them, who, with enormous debts,

have still greater possessions, and who can by no means be detached from their affection to them. Of these men the appearance is most respectable, for they are wealthy, but their intention and their cause are most shameless. Will you be rich in lands, in houses, in money, in slaves, in all things, and yet hesitate to diminish your possessions to add to your credit? What are you expecting? War? What! in the devastation of all things, do you believe that your own possessions will be held sacred? do you expect an abolition of debts? They are mistaken who expect that from Catiline. There may be schedules made out, owing to my exertions, but they will be only catalogues of sale. Nor can these who have possessions be safe by any other means; and if they had been willing to adopt this plan earlier, and not, as is very foolish, to struggle on against usury with the profits of their farms, we should have them now richer and better citizens. But I think these men are the least of all to be dreaded, because they can either be persuaded to abandon their opinions, or if they cling to them, they seem to me more likely to form wishes against the republic than to bear arms against it.

There is another class of them, who, although they are harassed by debt, yet are expecting supreme power; they wish to become masters. They think that when the republic is in confusion they may gain those honors which they despair of when it is in tranquillity. And they must, I think, be told the same as every one else—to despair of obtaining what they are aiming at; that in the first place, I myself am watchful for, am present to, am providing for the republic. Besides that, there is a high spirit in the virtuous citizens, great unanimity, great numbers, and also a large body of troops. Above all that, the immortal gods

will stand by and bring aid to this invincible nation, this most illustrious empire, this most beautiful city, against such wicked violence. And if they had already got that which they with the greatest madness wish for, do they think that in the ashes of the city and blood of the citizens, which in their wicked and infamous hearts they desire, they will become consuls and dictators, and even kings? Do they not see that they are wishing for that which, if they were to obtain it, must be given up to some fugitive slave, or to some gladiator?

There is a third class, already touched by age, but still vigorous from constant exercise; of which class is Manlius himself, whom Catiline is now succeeding. These are men of those colonies which Sylla established at Fæsulæ, which I know to be composed, on the whole, of excellent citizens and brave men; but yet these are colonists, who, from becoming possessed of unexpected and sudden wealth, boast themselves extravagantly and insolently; these men, while they build like rich men, while they delight in farms, in litters, in vast families of slaves, in luxurious banquets, have incurred such great debts, that, if they would be saved, they must raise Sylla from the dead; and they have even excited some countrymen, poor and needy men, to entertain the same hopes of plunder as themselves. And all these men, O Romans, I place in the same class of robbers and banditti. But, I warn them, let them cease to be mad, and to think of proscriptions and dictatorships; for such a horror of these times is ingrained into the city, that not even men, but it seems to me that even the very cattle would refuse to bear them again.

There is a fourth class, various, promiscuous, and turbulent; who indeed are now overwhelmed; who will never

recover themselves; who, partly from indolence, partly from managing their affairs badly, partly from extravagance, are embarrassed by old debts; and worn out with bail-bonds, and judgments, and seizures of their goods, are said to be betaking themselves in numbers to that camp both from the city and the country. These men I think not so much active soldiers as lazy insolvents; who, if they cannot stand at first, may fall, but fall so, that not only the city but even their nearest neighbors know nothing of it. For I do not understand why, if they cannot live with honor, they should wish to die shamefully; or why they think they shall perish with less pain in a crowd, than if they perish by themselves.

There is a fifth class, of parricides, assassins, in short of all infamous characters, whom I do not wish to recall from Catiline, and indeed they cannot be separated from him. Let them perish in their wicked war, since they are so numerous that a prison cannot contain them.

There is a last class, last not only in number but in the sort of men and in their way of life; the especial body-guard of Catiline, of his levying; ay, the friends of his embraces and of his bosom; whom you see with carefully combed hair, glossy, beardless, or with well-trimmed beards; with tunics with sleeves, or reaching to the ankles; clothed with veils, not with robes; all the industry of whose life, all the labor of whose watchfulness, is expended in suppers lasting till daybreak.

In these bands are all the gamblers, all the adulterers, all the unclean and shameless citizens. These boys, so witty and delicate, have learned not only to love and to be loved, not only to sing and to dance, but also to brandish daggers and to administer poisons; and unless they are

driven out, unless they die, even should Catiline die, I warn you that the school of Catiline would exist in the republic. But what do those wretches want? Are they going to take their wives with them to the camp? How can they do without them, especially in these nights? and how will they endure the Apennines, and these frosts, and this snow? unless they think that they will bear the winter more easily because they have been in the habit of dancing naked at their feasts. O war much to be dreaded, when Catiline is going to have his bodyguard of prostitutes!

Array now, O Romans, against these splendid troops of Catiline, your guards and your armies; and first of all oppose to that worn-out and wounded gladiator your consuls and generals; then against that banished and enfeebled troop of ruined men lead out the flower and strength of all Italy: instantly the cities of the colonies and municipalities will match the rustic mounds of Catiline; and I will not condescend to compare the rest of your troops and equipments and guards with the want and destitution of that highwayman. But if, omitting all these things in which we are rich and of which he is destitute—the senate, the Roman knights, the people, the city, the treasury, the revenues, all Italy, all the provinces, foreign nations—if, I say, omitting all these things, we choose to compare the causes themselves which are opposed to one another, we may understand from that alone how thoroughly prostrate they are. For on the one side are fighting modesty, on the other wantonness; on the one chastity, on the other uncleanness; on the one honesty, on the other fraud; on the one piety, on the other wickedness; on the one consistency, on the other insanity; on the one honor, on the other base-

ness; on the one continence, on the other lust; in short, equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, all the virtues contend against iniquity with luxury, against indolence, against rashness, against all the vices; lastly, abundance contends against destitution, good plans against baffled designs, wisdom against madness, well-founded hope against universal despair. In a contest and war of this sort, even if the zeal of men were to fail, will not the immortal gods compel such numerous and excessive vices to be defeated by these most eminent virtues?

And as this is the case, O Romans, do ye, as I have said before, defend your house with guards and vigilance. I have taken care and made arrangements that there shall be sufficient protection for the city without distressing you and without any tumult. All the colonists and citizens of your municipal towns, being informed by me of this nocturnal sally of Catiline, will easily defend their cities and territories; the gladiators which he thought would be his most numerous and most trusty band, although they are better disposed than part of the patricians, will be held in check by our power. Quintus Metellus, whom I, making provision for this, sent on to the Gallic and Picenian territory, will either overwhelm the man, or will prevent all his motions and attempts; but with respect to the arrangement of all other matters, and maturing and acting on our plans, we shall consult the senate, which, as you are aware, is convened.

Now once more I wish those who have remained in the city, and who, contrary to the safety of the city and of all of you, have been left in the city by Catiline, although they are enemies, yet because they were born citizens, to be warned again and again by me. If my lenity has ap-

peared to any one too remiss, it has been only waiting that that might break out which was lying hid. As to the future, I cannot now forget that this is my country, that I am the consul of these citizens; that I must either live with them, or die for them. There is no guard at the gate, no one plotting against their path; if any one wishes to go, he can provide for himself; but if any one stirs in the city, and if I detect not only any action, but any attempt or design against the country, he shall feel that there are in this city vigilant consuls, eminent magistrates, a brave senate, arms, and prisons; which our ancestors appointed as the avengers of nefarious and convicted crimes.

And all this shall be so done, O Romans, that affairs of the greatest importance shall be transacted with the least possible disturbance; the greatest dangers shall be avoided without any tumult; an internal civil war, the most cruel and terrible in the memory of man, shall be put an end to by me alone in the robe of peace acting as general and commander-in-chief. And this I will so arrange, O Romans, that if it can be by any means managed, even the most worthless man shall not suffer the punishment of his crimes in this city. But if the violence of open audacity, if danger impending over the republic drives me of necessity from this merciful disposition, at all events I will manage this, which seems scarcely even to be hoped for in so great and so treacherous a war, that no good man shall fall, and that you may all be saved by the punishment of a few.

And I promise you this, O Romans, relying neither on my own prudence, nor on human counsels, but on many and manifest intimations of the will of the immortal gods; under whose guidance I first entertained this hope and this opinion; who are now defending their temples and

the houses of the city, not afar off, as they were used to, from a foreign and distant enemy, but here on the spot, by their own divinity and present help. And you, O Romans, ought to pray to and implore them to defend from the nefarious wickedness of abandoned citizens, now that all the forces of all enemies are defeated by land and sea, this city which they have ordained to be the most beautiful and flourishing of all cities.

THE THIRD ORATION AGAINST LUCIUS CATILINE

ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE

THE ARGUMENT

WHILE CICERO was addressing the preceding speech to the people, a debate was going on in the senate of which we have no account. In the meanwhile Catiline, after staying a few days on the road to raise the country as he passed along, where his agents had been previously busy among the people, proceeded to Manlius's camp with the fasces and all the ensigns of military command displayed before him. Upon this news the senate immediately declared him and Manlius public enemies; they offered pardon to all his followers who should return to their duty by a certain day; and ordered the consuls to make new levies, and that Antonius should follow Catiline with his army, and Cicero remain behind to protect the city.

In the meantime Lentulus, and the other conspirators who remained behind, were proceeding with their designs. And among other steps, they decided on endeavoring to tamper with some ambassadors from the Allobroges, who were at that moment within the city, as the Allobroges were supposed not to be very well affected to the Roman power. At first these ambassadors appear to have willingly given ear to their proposals; but after a while they began to consider the difficulty of the business proposed to them, and the danger which would ensue to their state if it failed after they had become implicated in it; and accordingly they revealed the business to Quintus Fabius Sanga, the patron of their city, who communicated it to Cicero. Cicero desired the ambassadors to continue to listen to the proposals of the conspirators, till they had become fully acquainted with the extent of the plot, and till they were able to furnish him with full evidence against the actors in it; and by his suggestion they required the conspirators to furnish them with credentials to show to their countrymen. This was thought reasonable by Lentulus and his party, and they accordingly appointed a man named Vulturcius to accompany them, who was to introduce them to Catiline on their road, in order to confirm the agreement, and to exchange pledges with him, and Lentulus also furnished them with a letter to Catiline under his own hand and seal, though not signed. Cicero being privately informed of all these particulars, concerted with the ambassadors the time and manner of their leaving Rome by night, and had them arrested on the Mulvian bridge, about a mile from the city, with these letters and papers in their possession. This was all done, and they brought as prisoners to Cicero's house early in the morning.

Cicero immediately summoned the senate; and at the same time he sent for Lentulus, Cethegus, and others of the conspirators who were more es-

pecially implicated, such as Gabinus and Statilius, who all came immediately to his house, being ignorant of the discovery that had taken place. Being informed also that a quantity of arms had been provided by Cethegus for the purpose of the conspiracy, he orders Caius Sulpicius, one of the prætors, to search his house, and he did so, and found a great number of swords and daggers ready cleaned and fit for use.

He then proceeds to meet the senate in the Temple of Concord, with the ambassadors and conspirators in custody. He relates the whole affair to them, and introduces Vulturcius to be examined before them. Cicero, by the order of the senate, promises him pardon and reward if he reveals what he knew. On which he confesses everything; tells them that he had letters from Lentulus to Catiline to urge him to avail himself of the assistance of the slaves, and to lead his army with all expedition against Rome; in order, when the city had been set on fire, and the massacre commenced, that he might be able to intercept and destroy those who fled.

Then the ambassadors were examined, who declared that they had received letters to the chief men of their nation from Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius; and that they, and Lucius Cassius also, begged them to send a body of cavalry into Italy, and that Lentulus assured them, from the Sibylline books, that he was the third Cornelius who was destined to reign at Rome. The letters were produced and opened. On the sight of them the conspirators respectively acknowledged them to be theirs, and Lentulus was even so conscience-stricken that he confessed his whole crime.

The senate passed a vote acknowledging the services of Cicero in the most ample terms, and voted that Lentulus should be deposed from his office of prætor, and, with all the other conspirators, committed to safe custody. Cicero, after the senate adjourned, proceeded to the forum and gave an account to the people of everything which had passed, both in regard to the steps that he had taken to detect the whole conspiracy, and to convict the conspirators; and also of what had taken place in the senate, and of the votes and resolutions which that body had just passed.

While the prisoners were before the senate he had copies of their examinations and confessions taken down, and dispersed through Italy and all the provinces. This happened on the third of December.

YOU see this day, O Romans, the republic, and all your lives, your goods, your fortunes, your wives and children, this home of most illustrious empire, this most fortunate and beautiful city, by the great love of the immortal gods for you, by my labors and counsels and dangers, snatched from fire and sword, and almost

from the very jaws of fate, and preserved and restored to you.

And if those days on which we are preserved are not less pleasant to us, or less illustrious, than those on which we are born, because the joy of being saved is certain, the good fortune of being born uncertain, and because we are born without feeling it, but we are preserved with great delight; ay, since we have, by our affection and by our good report, raised to the immortal gods that Romulus who built this city, he, too, who has preserved this city, built by him, and embellished as you see it, ought to be held in honor by you and your posterity; for we have extinguished flames which were almost laid under and placed around the temples and shrines, and houses and walls of the whole city; we have turned the edge of swords drawn against the republic, and have turned aside their points from your throats. And since all this has been displayed in the senate, and made manifest, and detected by me, I will now explain it briefly, that you, O citizens, that are as yet ignorant of it, and are in suspense, may be able to see how great the danger was, how evident and by what means it was detected and arrested. First of all, since Catiline, a few days ago, burst out of the city, when he had left behind the companions of his wickedness, the active leaders of this infamous war, I have continually watched and taken care, O Romans, of the means by which we might be safe amid such great and such carefully concealed treachery.

Further, when I drove Catiline out of the city (for I do not fear the unpopularity of this expression, when that is more to be feared than I should be blamed because he has departed alive), but then when I wished him to be removed, I thought either that the rest of the band of conspirators

would depart with him, or that they who remained would be weak and powerless without him.

And I, as I saw that those whom I knew to be inflamed with the greatest madness and wickedness were among us, and had remained at Rome, spent all my nights and days in taking care to know and see what they were doing, and what they were contriving; that, since what I said would, from the incredible enormity of the wickedness, make less impression on your ears, I might so detect the whole business that you might with all your hearts provide for your safety, when you saw the crime with your own eyes. Therefore, when I found that the ambassadors of the Allobroges had been tampered with by Publius Lentulus, for the sake of exciting a Transalpine war and commotion in Gaul, and that they, on their return to Gaul, had been sent with letters and messages to Catiline on the same road, and that Vulturcius had been added to them as a companion, and that he, too, had had letters given him for Catiline, I thought that an opportunity was given me of contriving what was most difficult, and which I was always wishing the immortal gods might grant, that the whole business might be manifestly detected not by me alone, but by the senate also, and by you.

Therefore, yesterday, I summoned Lucius Flaccus and C. Pomtinus, the prætors, brave men and well affected to the republic. I explained to them the whole matter, and showed them what I wished to have done. But they, full of noble and worthy sentiments toward the republic, without hesitation, and without any delay, undertook the business, and when it was evening, went secretly to the Mulvian bridge, and there so distributed themselves in the nearest villas, that the Tiber and the bridge were between them.

And they took to the same place, without any one having the least suspicion of it, many brave men, and I had sent many picked young men of the prefecture of Reate, whose assistance I constantly employ in the protection of the republic, armed with swords. In the meantime, about the end of the third watch, when the ambassadors of the Allobroges, with a great retinue and Vulturcius with them, began to come upon the Mulvian bridge, an attack is made upon them; swords are drawn both by them and by our people; the matter was understood by the prætors alone, but was unknown to the rest.

Then, by the intervention of Pomtinus and Flaccus, the fight which had begun was put an end to; all the letters which were in the hands of the whole company are delivered to the prætors with the seals unbroken; the men themselves are arrested and brought to me at daybreak. And I immediately summoned that most worthless contriver of all this wickedness, Gabinius, as yet suspecting nothing; after him, P. Statilius is sent for, and after him Cethegus; but Lentulus was a long time in coming—I suppose, because, contrary to his custom, he had been up a long time the night before, writing letters.

But when those most noble and excellent men of the whole city, who, hearing of the matter, came in crowds to me in the morning, thought it best for me to open the letters before I related the matter to the senate, lest, if nothing were found in them, so great a disturbance might seem to have been caused to the state for nothing, I said I would never so act as shrink from referring matter of public danger to the public council. In truth, if, O Romans, these things which had been reported to me had not been found in them, yet I did not think I ought, in such a crisis of the republic,

to be afraid of the imputation of over-diligence. I quickly summoned a full senate, as you saw; and meantime, without any delay, by the advice of the Allobroges, I sent Caius Sulpicius the prætor, a brave man, to bring whatever arms he could find in the house of Cethegus, whence he did bring a great number of swords and daggers.

I introduced Vulturcius without the Gauls. By the command of the senate, I pledged him the public faith for his safety. I exhorted him fearlessly to tell all he knew. Then, when he had scarcely recovered himself from his great alarm, he said: that he had messages and letters for Catiline, from Publius Lentulus, to avail himself of the guard of the slaves, and to come toward the city with his army as quickly as possible; and that was to be done with the intention that, when they had set fire to the city on all sides, as it had been arranged and distributed, and had made a great massacre of the citizens, he might be at hand to catch those who fled, and to join himself to the leaders within the city. But the Gauls being introduced, said that an oath had been administered to them, and letters given them by Publius Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius, for their nation; and that they had been enjoined by them, and by Lucius Cassius, to send cavalry into Italy as early as possible; that infantry should not be wanting; and that Lentulus had assured him, from the Sibylline oracles and the answers of soothsayers, that he was that third Cornelius to whom the kingdom and sovereignty over this city was fated to come; that Cinna and Sylla had been before him; and that he had also said that was the year destined to the destruction of this city and empire, being the tenth year after the acquittal of the virgins, and the twentieth after the burning of the Capitol. But they said there had

been this dispute between Cethegus and the rest—that Lentulus and others thought it best that the massacre should take place and the city be burned at the Saturnalia, but that Cethegus thought it too long to wait.

And, not to detain you, O Romans, we ordered the letters to be brought forward which were said to have been given them by each of the men. First, I showed his seal to Cethegus; he recognized it: we cut the thread; we read the letter. It was written with his own hand: that he would do for the senate and people of the Allobroges what he had promised their ambassadors; and that he begged them also to do what their ambassadors had arranged. Then Cethegus, who a little before had made answer about the swords and daggers which had been found in his house, and had said that he had always been fond of fine arms, being stricken down and dejected at the reading of his letters, convicted by his own conscience, became suddenly silent. Statilius, being introduced, owned his handwriting and his seal. His letters were read, of nearly the same tenor: he confessed it. Then I showed Lentulus his letters, and asked him whether he recognized the seal? He nodded assent. But it is, said I, a well-known seal—the likeness of your grandfather, a most illustrious man, who greatly loved his country and his fellow-citizens; and it, even though silent, ought to have called you back from such wickedness.

Letters are read of the same tenor to the senate and people of the Allobroges. I offered him leave, if he wished to say anything of these matters: and at first he declined to speak; but a little afterward, when the whole examination had been gone through and concluded, he rose. He asked the Gauls what he had had to do with them? why

they had come to his house? and he asked Vulturcius too. And when they had answered him briefly and steadily, under whose guidance they had come to him, and how often; and when they asked him whether he had said nothing to them about the Sibylline oracles; then he on a sudden, mad with wickedness, showed how great was the power of conscience; for though he might have denied it, he suddenly, contrary to every one's expectation, confessed it: so not only did his genius and skill in oratory, for which he was always eminent, but even, through the power of his manifest and detected wickedness, that impudence, in which he surpassed all men, and audacity deserted him.

But Vulturcius on a sudden ordered the letters to be produced and opened which he said had been given to him for Catiline, by Lentulus. And though Lentulus was greatly agitated at that, yet he acknowledged his seal and his handwriting; but the letter was anonymous, and ran thus: "Who I am you will know from him whom I have sent to you: take care to behave like a man, and consider to what place you have proceeded, and provide for what is now necessary for you: take care to associate to yourself the assistance of every one, even of the powerless." Then Gabinius being introduced, when at first he had begun to answer impudently, at last denied nothing of those things which the Gauls alleged against him. And to me, indeed, O Romans, though the letters, the seals, the handwriting, and the confession of each individual seemed most certain indications and proofs of wickedness, yet their color, their eyes, their countenance, their silence, appeared more certain still; for they stood so stupefied, they kept their eyes so fixed on the ground, at times looking stealthily

at one another, that they appeared now not so much to be informed against by others as to be informing against themselves.

Having produced and divulged these proofs, O Romans, I consulted the senate what ought to be done for the interests of the republic. Vigorous and fearless opinions were delivered by the chief men, which the senate adopted without any variety; and since the decree of the senate is not yet written out, I will relate to you from memory, O citizens, what the senate has decreed. First of all, a vote of thanks to me is passed in the most honorable words, because the republic has been delivered from the greatest dangers by my valor, and wisdom, and prudence. Then Lucius Flaccus and Caius Pomtinus, the prætors, are deservedly and rightly praised, because I had availed myself of their brave and loyal assistance. And also, praise is given to that brave man, my colleague, because he had removed from his counsels, and from the counsels of the republic, those who had been accomplices in this conspiracy. And they voted that Publius Lentulus, when he had abdicated the prætorship, should be given into custody; and also, that Caius Cethegus, Lucius Statilius, Publius Gabinus, who were all present, should be given into custody: and the same decree was passed against Lucius Cassius, who begged for himself the office of burning the city; against Marcus Caparius, to whom it had been proved that Apulia had been allotted for the purpose of exciting disaffection among the shepherds; against Publius Furius, who belongs to the colonies which Lucius Sylla led to Fæsulæ; against Quintus Manlius Chilo, who was always associated with this man Furius in his tampering with the Allobroges; against Publius Umbrenus, a freedman, by

whom it was proved that the Gauls were originally brought to Gabinus.

And the senate, O citizens, acted with such lenity, that, out of so great a conspiracy, and such a number and multitude of domestic enemies, it thought that since the republic was saved, the minds of the rest might be restored to a healthy state by the punishment of nine most abandoned men. And also a supplication was decreed in my name (which is the first time since the building of the city that such an honor has ever been paid to a man in a civil capacity), to the immortal gods, for their singular kindness. And it was decreed in these words, "because I had delivered the city from conflagration, the citizens from massacre, and Italy from war." And if this supplication be compared with others, O citizens, there is this difference between them—that all others have been appointed because of the successes of the republic; this one alone for its preservation. And that which was the first thing to be done, has been done and executed; for Publius Lentulus, though, being convicted by proofs and by his own confession, by the judgment of the senate he had lost not only the rights of a prætor, but also those of a citizen, still resigned his office; so that, though Caius Marcius, that most illustrious of men, had no scruples about putting to death Caius Glaucius the prætor, against whom nothing had been decreed by name, still we are relieved from that scruple in the case of Publius Lentulus, who is now a private individual.

Now, since, O citizens, you have the nefarious leaders of this most wicked and dangerous war taken prisoners and in your grasp, you ought to think that all the resources of Catiline—all his hopes and all his power, now that these

dangers of the city are warded off, have fallen to pieces. And, indeed, when I drove him from the city, I foresaw in my mind, O citizens, that if Catiline were removed, I had no cause to fear either the drowsiness of Publius Lentulus, or the fat of Lucius Cassius, or the mad rashness of Cassius Cethegus. He alone was to be feared of all these men, and that only as long as he was within the walls of the city. He knew everything, he had access to everybody. He had the skill and the audacity to address, to tempt, and to tamper with every one. He had acuteness suited to crime; and neither tongue nor hand ever failed to support that acuteness. Already he had men he could rely on, chosen and distributed for the execution of all other business; and when he had ordered anything to be done, he did not think it was done on that account. There was nothing to which he did not personally attend and see to—for which he did not watch and toil. He was able to endure cold, thirst, and hunger.

Unless I had driven this man, so active, so ready, so audacious, so crafty, so vigilant in wickedness, so industrious in criminal exploits, from his plots within the city to the open warfare of the camp (I will express my honest opinion, O citizens), I should not easily have removed from your necks so vast a weight of evil. He would not have determined on the Saturnalia to massacre you—he would not have announced the destruction of the republic, and even the day of its doom so long beforehand—he would never have allowed his seal and his letters, the undeniable witnesses of his guilt, to be taken, which now, since he is absent, has been so done that no larceny in a private house has ever been so thoroughly and clearly detected as this vast conspiracy against the republic. But if Catiline had

remained in the city to this day, although, as long as he was so, I met all his designs and withstood them; yet, to say the least, we should have had to fight with him, and should never, while he remained as an enemy in the city, have delivered the republic from such dangers, with such ease, such tranquillity, and such silence.

Although all these things, O Romans, have been so managed by me, that they appear to have been done and provided for by the order and design of the immortal gods; and as we may conjecture this because the direction of such weighty affairs scarcely appears capable of having been carried out by human wisdom; so, too, they have at this time so brought us present aid and assistance, that we could almost behold them without eyes. For to say nothing of those things, namely, the firebrands seen in the west in the night time, and the heat of the atmosphere—to pass over the falling of thunderbolts and the earthquakes—to say nothing of all the other portents which have taken place in such numbers during my consulship, that the immortal gods themselves have been seeming to predict what is now taking place; yet, at all events, this which I am about to mention, O Romans, must be neither passed over nor omitted.

For you recollect, I suppose, when Cotta and Torquatus were consuls, that many towers in the Capitol were struck with lightning, when both the images of the immortal gods were moved, and the statues of many ancient men were thrown down, and the brazen tablets on which the laws were written were melted. Even Romulus, who built this city, was struck, which, you recollect, stood in the Capitol, a gilt statue, little and sucking, and clinging to the teats of the wolf. And when at this time the soothsayers were

assembled out of all Etruria, they said that slaughter and conflagration, and the overthrow of the laws, and civil and domestic war, and the fall of the whole city and empire was at hand, unless the immortal gods, being appeased in every possible manner, by their own power turned aside, as I may say, the very fates themselves.

Therefore, according to their answers, games were celebrated for ten days, nor was anything omitted which might tend to the appeasing of the gods. And they enjoined also that we should make a greater statue of Jupiter, and place it in a lofty situation, and (contrary to what had been done before) turn it toward the east. And they said that they hoped that if that statue which you now behold looked upon the rising of the sun, and the forum, and the senate house, then those designs which were secretly formed against the safety of the city and empire would be brought to light, so as to be able to be thoroughly seen by the senate and by the Roman people. And the consuls ordered it to be so placed; but so great was the delay in the work, that it was never set up by the former consuls, nor by us before this day.

Here who, O Romans, can there be so obstinate against the truth, so headstrong, so void of sense, as to deny that all these things which we see, and especially this city, is governed by the divine authority and power of the immortal gods? Forsooth, when this answer had been given—that massacre, and conflagration, and ruin was prepared for the republic; and that, too, by profligate citizens, which, from the enormity of the wickedness, appeared incredible to some people, you found that it had not only been planned by wicked citizens, but had even been undertaken and commenced. And is not this fact so present that it appears to have taken place by the express will of the good and mighty

Jupiter, that, when this day, early in the morning, both the conspirators and their accusers were being led by my command through the forum to the Temple of Concord, at that very time the statue was being erected? And when it was set up, and turned toward you and toward the senate, the senate and you yourselves saw everything which had been planned against the universal safety brought to light and made manifest.

And on this account they deserve even greater hatred and greater punishment, for having attempted to apply their fatal and wicked fire, not only to your houses and homes, but even to the shrines and temples of the gods. And if I were to say that it was I who resisted them, I should take too much to myself, and ought not to be borne. He—he, Jupiter, resisted them. He determined that the Capitol should be safe, he saved these temples, he saved this city, he saved all of you. It is under the guidance of the immortal gods, O Romans, that I have cherished the intention and desires which I have, and have arrived at such undeniable proofs. Surely, that tampering with the Allobroges would never have taken place, so important a matter would never have been so madly intrusted, by Lentulus and the rest of our internal enemies, to strangers and foreigners, such letters would never have been written, unless all prudence had been taken by the immortal gods from such terrible audacity. What shall I say? That Gauls, men from a state scarcely at peace with us, the only nation existing which seems both to be able to make war on the Roman people, and not to be unwilling to do so—that they should disregard the hope of empire and of the greatest success voluntarily offered to them by patricians, and should prefer your safety to their own power—do you not think that that

was caused by divine interposition? especially when they could have destroyed us, not by fighting, but by keeping silence.

Wherefore, O citizens, since a supplication has been decreed at all the altars, celebrate those days with your wives and children; for many just and deserved honors have been often paid to the immortal gods, but juster ones never. For you have been snatched from a most cruel and miserable destruction, and you have been snatched from it without slaughter, without bloodshed, without an army, without a battle. You have conquered in the garb of peace, with me in the garb of peace for your only general and commander.

Remember, O citizens, all civil dissensions, and not only those which you have heard of, but those also which you yourselves remember and have seen. Lucius Sylla crushed Publius Sulpicius; he drove from the city Caius Marius the guardian of this city; and of many other brave men some he drove from the city, and some he murdered. Cnæus Octavius, the consul, drove his colleague by force of arms out of the city; all this place was crowded with heaps of carcasses and flowed with the blood of citizens; afterward Cinna and Marius got the upper hand; and then most illustrious men were put to death, and the lights of the state were extinguished. Afterward Sylla avenged the cruelty of this victory; it is needless to say with what a diminution of the citizens, and with what disasters to the republic. Marcus Lepidus disagreed with that most eminent and brave man, Quintus Catulus. His death did not cause as much grief to the republic as that of the others.

And these dissensions, O Romans, were such as concerned not the destruction of the republic, but only a change in the constitution. They did not wish that there should be

no republic, but that they themselves should be the chief men in that which existed; nor did they desire that the city should be burned, but that they themselves should flourish in it. And yet all those dissensions, none of which aimed at the destruction of the republic, were such that they were to be terminated not by a reconciliation and concord, but only by internecine war among the citizens. But in this war alone, the greatest and most cruel in the memory of man—a war such as even the countries of the barbarians have never waged with their own tribes—a war in which this law was laid down by Lentulus, and Catiline, and Cassius, and Cethegus, that every one, who could live in safety as long as the city remained in safety, should be considered as an enemy—in this war I have so managed matters, O Romans, that you should all be preserved in safety; and though your enemies had thought that only such a number of the citizens would be left as had held out against an interminable massacre, and only so much of the city as the flames could not devour, I have preserved both the city and the citizens unhurt and undiminished.

And for these exploits, important as they are, O Romans, I ask from you no reward of virtue, no badge of honor, no monument of my glory, beyond the everlasting recollection of this day. In your minds I wish all my triumphs, all my decorations of honor, the monuments of my glory, the badges of my renown, to be stored and laid up. Nothing voiceless can delight me, nothing silent—nothing, in short, such as even those who are less worthy can obtain. In your memory, O Romans, my name shall be cherished, in your discourses it shall grow, in the monuments of your letters it shall grow old and strengthen; and I feel assured that the same day which I hope will be for everlasting, will

be remembered forever, so as to tend both to the safety of the city and the recollection of my consulship; and that it will be remembered that there existed in this city at the same time two citizens, one of whom limited the boundaries of your empire only by the regions of heaven, not by those of the earth, while the other preserved the abode and home of that same empire.

But since the fortune and condition of those exploits which I have performed is not the same with that of those men who have directed foreign wars—because I must live among those whom I have defeated and subdued, they have left their enemies either slain or crushed—it is your business, O Romans, to take care, if their good deeds are a benefit to others, that mine shall never be an injury to me. For that the wicked and profligate designs of audacious men shall not be able to injure you, I have taken care; it is your business to take care that they do not injure me. Although, O Romans, no injury can be done to me by them—for there is a great protection in the affection of all good men, which is procured for me forever; there is great dignity in the republic, which will always silently defend me; there is great power in conscience, and those who neglect it, when they desire to attack me, will destroy themselves.

There is, moreover, that disposition in me, O Romans, that I not only will yield to the audacity of no one, but that I always voluntarily attack the worthless. And if all the violence of domestic enemies being warded off from you turns itself upon me alone, you will have to take care, O Romans, in what condition you wish those men to be for the future, who for your safety have exposed themselves to unpopularity and to all sorts of dangers. As for me, my-

alarm of you all. Now if the immortal gods have determined that there shall be this end to my consulship, that I should snatch you, O conscript fathers, and the Roman people from miserable slaughter, your wives and children and the vestal virgins from most bitter distress, the temples and shrines of the gods, and this most lovely country of all of us, from impious flames, all Italy from war and devastation; then, whatever fortune is laid up for me by myself, it shall be borne. If, indeed, Publius Lentulus, being led on by soothsayers, believed that his name was connected by destiny with the destruction of the republic, why should not I rejoice that my consulship has taken place almost by the express appointment of fate for the preservation of the republic?

Wherefore, O conscript fathers, consult the welfare of yourselves, provide for that of the republic; preserve yourselves, your wives, your children, and your fortunes; defend the name and safety of the Roman people; cease to spare me, and to think of me. For, in the first place, I ought to hope that all the gods who preside over this city will show me gratitude in proportion as I deserve it; and in the second place, if anything does happen to me, I shall fall with a contented and prepared mind; and, indeed, death cannot be disgraceful to a brave man, nor premature to one of consular rank, nor miserable to a wise man. Not that I am a man of so iron a disposition as not to be moved by the grief of a most dear and affectionate brother now present, and by the tears of all these men by whom you now see me surrounded. Nor does my fainting wife, my daughter prostrate with fear, and my little son whom the republic seems to me to embrace as a sort of hostage for my consulship, the son-in-law who, awaiting the end of that

day, is now standing in my sight, fail often to recall my mind to my home. I am moved by all these circumstances, but in such a direction as to wish that they all may be safe together with you, even if some violence overwhelms me, rather than that both they and we should perish together with the republic.

Wherefore, O conscript fathers, attend to the safety of the republic; look round upon all the storms which are impending, unless you guard against them. It is not Tiberius Gracchus, who wished to be made a second time a tribune of the people; it is not Caius Gracchus, who endeavored to excite the partisans of the agrarian law; it is not Lucius Saturninus, who slew Memmius, who is now in some danger, who is now brought before the tribunal of your severity. They are now in your hands who withstood all Rome, with the object of bringing conflagration on the whole city, massacre on all of you, and of receiving Catiline; their letters are in your possession, their seals, their handwriting, and the confession of each individual of them; the Allobroges are tampered with, the slaves are excited, Catiline is sent for; the design is actually begun to be put in execution, that all should be put to death, so that no one should be left even to mourn the name of the republic, and to lament over the downfall of so mighty a dominion.

All these things the witnesses have informed you of, the prisoners have confessed, you by many judgments have already decided; first, because you have thanked me in unprecedented language, and have passed a vote that the conspiracy of abandoned men has been laid open by my virtue and diligence; secondly, because you have compelled Publius Lentulus to abdicate the prætorship; again, because

you have voted that he and the others about whom you have decided should be given into custody; and above all, because you have decreed a supplication in my name, an honor which has never been paid to any one before acting in a civil capacity; last of all, because yesterday you gave most ample rewards to the ambassadors of the Allobroges and to Titus Vulturcius; all which acts are such that they, who have been given into custody by name, without any doubt seem already condemned by you.

But I have determined to refer the business to you as a fresh matter, O conscript fathers, both as to the fact, what you think of it, and as to the punishment, what you vote. I will state what it behooves the consul to state. I have seen for a long time great madness existing in the republic, and new designs being formed, and evil passions being stirred up, but I never thought that so great, so destructive a conspiracy as this was being meditated by citizens. Now to whatever point your minds and opinions incline, you must decide before night. You see how great a crime has been made known to you; if you think that but few are implicated in it you are greatly mistaken; this evil has spread wider than you think; it has spread not only throughout Italy, but it has even crossed the Alps, and creeping stealthily on, it has already occupied many of the provinces; it can by no means be crushed by tolerating it, and by temporizing with it; however you determine on chastising it, you must act with promptitude.

I see that as yet there are two opinions. One that of Decius Silanus, who thinks that those who have endeavored to destroy all these things should be punished with death; the other, that of Caius Cæsar, who objects to the punishment of death, but adopts the most extreme severity of all

other punishment. Each acts in a manner suitable to his own dignity and to the magnitude of the business with the greatest severity. The one thinks that it is not right that those who have attempted to deprive all of us and the whole Roman people of life, to destroy the empire, to extinguish the name of the Roman people, should enjoy life and the breath of heaven common to us all, for one moment; and he remembers that this sort of punishment has often been employed against worthless citizens in this republic. The other feels that death was not appointed by the immortal gods for the sake of punishment, but that it is either a necessity of nature, or a rest from toils and miseries; therefore wise men have never met it unwillingly, brave men have often encountered it even voluntarily. But imprisonment, and that too perpetual, was certainly invented for the extraordinary punishment of nefarious wickedness; therefore he proposes that they should be distributed among the municipal towns. This proposition seems to have in it injustice if you command it, difficulty if you request it; however, let it be so decreed if you like.

For I will undertake, and, as I hope, I shall find one who will not think it suitable to his dignity to refuse what you decide on for the sake of the universal safety. He imposes besides a severe punishment on the burgesses of the municipal town if any of the prisoners escape; he surrounds them with the most terrible guard, and with everything worthy of the wickedness of abandoned men. And he proposes to establish a decree that no one shall be able to alleviate the punishment of those whom he is condemning by a vote of either the senate or the people. He takes away even hope, which alone can comfort men in their miseries; besides this, he votes that their goods should be

whole matter, and of the cause. But Caius Cæsar considers that the Sempronian law was passed about Roman citizens, but that he who is an enemy of the republic can by no means be a citizen; and moreover that the very proposer of the Sempronian law suffered punishment by the command of the people. He also denies that Lentulus, a briber and a spendthrift, after he has formed such cruel and bitter plans about the destruction of the Roman people, and the ruin of this city, can be called a friend of the people. Therefore this most gentle and merciful man does not hesitate to commit Publius Lentulus to eternal darkness and imprisonment, and establishes a law to all posterity that no one shall be able to boast of alleviating his punishment, or hereafter to appear a friend of the people to the destruction of the Roman people. He adds also the confiscation of their goods, so that want also and beggary may be added to all the torments of mind and body.

Wherefore, if you decide on this you give me a companion in my address, dear and acceptable to the Roman people; or if you prefer to adopt the opinion of Silanus, you will easily defend me and yourselves from the reproach of cruelty, and I will prevail that it shall be much lighter. Although, O conscript fathers, what cruelty can there be in chastising the enormity of such excessive wickedness? For I decide from my own feeling. For so may I be allowed to enjoy the republic in safety in your company, as I am not moved to be somewhat vehement in this cause by any severity of disposition (for who is more merciful than I am?), but rather by a singular humanity and mercifulness. For I seem to myself to see this city, the light of the world and the citadel of all nations, falling on a sudden by one conflagration. I see in my mind's eye miserable and

unburied heaps of cities in my buried country; the sight of Cethegus and his madness raging amid your slaughter is ever present to my sight. But when I have set before myself Lentulus reigning, as he himself confesses that he had hoped was his destiny, and this Gabinus arrayed in the purple, and Catiline arrived with his army, then I shudder at the lamentation of matrons, and the flight of virgins and of boys, and the insults of the vestal virgins; and because these things appear to me exceedingly miserable and pitiable, therefore I show myself severe and rigorous to those who have wished to bring about this state of things. I ask, forsooth, if any father of a family, supposing his children had been slain by a slave, his wife murdered, his house burned, were not to inflict on his slaves the severest possible punishment, would he appear clement and merciful, or most inhuman and cruel? To me he would seem unnatural and hard-hearted who did not soothe his own pain and anguish by the pain and torture of the criminal. And so we, in the case of these men who desired to murder us, and our wives, and our children—who endeavored to destroy the houses of every individual among us, and also the republic, the home of all—who designed to place the nation of the Allobroges on the relics of this city, and on the ashes of the empire destroyed by fire; if we are very rigorous, we shall be considered merciful; if we choose to be lax, we must endure the character of the greatest cruelty, to the damage of our country and our fellow citizens.

Unless, indeed, Lucius Cæsar, a thoroughly brave man, and of the best disposition toward the republic, seemed to any one to be too cruel three days ago, when he said that the husband of his own sister, a most excellent woman (in

and for the preserving of the fortunes of all. All men of all ranks are present, and of all ages; the forum is full, the temples around the forum are full, all the approaches to this place and to this temple are full. For this is the only cause that has ever been known since the first foundation of the city, in which all men were of one and the same opinion—except those who, as they saw they must be ruined, preferred to perish in company with all the world rather than by themselves.

These men I except, and I willingly set them apart from the rest; for I do not think that they should be classed in the number of worthless citizens, but in that of the most bitter enemies. But, as for the rest; O ye immortal gods! in what crowds, with what zeal, with what virtue do they agree in defence of the common dignity and safety. Why should I here speak of the Roman knights? who yield to you the supremacy in rank and wisdom, in order to vie with you in love for the republic—whom this day and this cause now reunite with you in alliance and unanimity with your body, reconciled after a disagreement of many years. And if we can preserve forever in the republic this union now established in my consulship, I pledge myself to you that no civil and domestic calamity can hereafter reach any part of the republic. I see that the tribunes of the treasury—excellent men—have united with similar zeal in defence of the republic, and all the notaries. For as this day had by chance brought them in crowds to the treasury, I see that they were diverted from an anxiety for the money due to them, from an expectation of their capital, to a regard for the common safety. The entire multitude of honest men, even the poorest, is present; for who is there to whom these temples, the sight of the city, the possession

of liberty—in short, this light and this soil of his, common to us all, is not both dear and pleasant and delightful?

It is worth while, O conscript fathers, to know the inclinations of the freedmen; who, having by their good fortune obtained the rights of citizens, consider this to be really their country, which some who have been born here, and born in the highest rank, have considered to be not their own country, but a city of enemies. But why should I speak of men of this body whom their private fortunes, whom their common republic, whom, in short, that liberty which is most delightful has called forth to defend the safety of their country? There is no slave who is only in an endurable condition of slavery who does not shudder at the audacity of citizens, who does not desire that these things may stand, who does not contribute all the goodwill that he can, and all that he dares, to the common safety.

Wherefore, if this consideration moves any one, that it has been heard that some tool of Lentulus is running about the shops—is hoping that the minds of some poor and ignorant men may be corrupted by bribery; that, indeed, has been attempted and begun, but no one has been found either so wretched in their fortune or so abandoned in their inclination as not to wish the place of their seat and work and daily gain, their chamber and their bed, and, in short, the tranquil course of their lives, to be still preserved to them. And far the greater part of those who are in the shops—ay, indeed (for that is the more correct way of speaking), the whole of this class is of all the most attached to tranquillity; their whole stock, forsooth, their whole employment and livelihood, exists by the peaceful intercourse of the citizens, and is wholly supported by peace.

And if their gains are diminished whenever their shops are shut, what will they be when they are burned? And, as this is the case, O conscript fathers, the protection of the Roman people is not wanting to you; do you take care that you do not seem to be wanting to the Roman people.

You have a consul preserved out of many dangers and plots, and from death itself, not for his own life, but for your safety. All ranks agree for the preservation of the republic with heart and will, with zeal, with virtue, with their voice. Your common country, besieged by the hands and weapons of an impious conspiracy, stretches forth her hands to you; as a suppliant to you she recommends herself, to you she recommends the lives of all the citizens, and the citadel, and the capitol, and the altars of the household gods, and the eternal inextinguishable fire of Vesta, and all the temples of all the gods, and the altars and the walls and the houses of the city. Moreover, your own lives, those of your wives and children, the fortunes of all men, your homes, your hearths, are this day interested in your decision.

You have a leader mindful of you, forgetful of himself—an opportunity which is not always given to men; you have all ranks, all individuals, the whole Roman people (a thing which in civil transactions we see this day for the first time), full of one and the same feeling. Think with what great labor this our dominion was founded, by what virtue this our liberty was established, by what kind favor of the gods our fortunes were aggrandized and ennobled, and how nearly one night destroyed them all. That this may never hereafter be able not only to be done, but not even to be thought of, you must this day take care. And I have spoken thus, not in order to stir you up who almost out-

run me myself, but that my voice, which ought to be the chief voice in the republic, may appear to have fulfilled the duty which belongs to me as consul.

Now, before I return to the decision, I will say a few words concerning myself. As numerous as is the band of conspirators—and you see that it is very great—so numerous a multitude of enemies do I see that I have brought upon myself. But I consider them base and powerless and despicable and abject. But if at any time that band shall be excited by the wickedness and madness of any one, and shall show itself more powerful than your dignity and that of the republic, yet, O conscript fathers, I shall never repent of my actions and of my advice. Death, indeed, which they perhaps threaten me with, is prepared for all men; such glory during life as you have honored me with by your decrees no one has ever attained to. For you have passed votes of congratulation to others for having governed the republic successfully, but to me alone for having saved it.

Let Scipio be thought illustrious, he by whose wisdom and valor Hannibal was compelled to return into Africa, and to depart from Italy. Let the second Africanus be extolled with conspicuous praise, who destroyed two cities most hostile to this empire, Carthage and Numantia. Let Lucius Paullus be thought a great man, he whose triumphal car was graced by Perses, previously a most powerful and noble monarch. Let Marius be held in eternal honor, who twice delivered Italy from siege, and from the fear of slavery. Let Pompey be preferred to them all—Pompey, whose exploits and whose virtues are bounded by the same districts and limits as the course of the sun. There will be, forsooth, among the praises of these men, some room for

my glory, unless haply it be a greater deed to open to us provinces whither we may fly, than to take care that those who are at a distance may, when conquerors, have a home to return to.

Although in one point the circumstances of foreign triumph are better than those of domestic victory; because foreign enemies, either if they be crushed become one's servants, or if they be received into the state, think themselves bound to us by obligation; but those of the number of citizens who become depraved by madness and once begin to be enemies to their country—those men, when you have defeated their attempts to injure the republic, you can neither restrain by force nor conciliate by kindness. So that I see that an eternal war with all wicked citizens has been undertaken by me; which, however, I am confident can easily be driven back from me and mine by your aid, and by that of all good men, and by the memory of such great dangers, which will remain, not only among this people which has been saved, but in the discourse and minds of all nations forever. Nor, in truth, can any power be found which will be able to undermine and destroy your union with the Roman knights, and such unanimity as exists among all good men.

As, then, this is the case, O conscript fathers, instead of my military command—instead of the army—instead of the province which I have neglected, and the other badges of honor which have been rejected by me for the sake of protecting the city and your safety—in place of the ties of clientship and hospitality with citizens in the provinces, which, however, by my influence in the city, I study to preserve with as much toil as I labor to acquire them—in place of all these things, and in reward for my singular zeal

in your behalf, and for this diligence in saving the republic which you behold, I ask nothing of you but the recollection of this time and of my whole consulship. And as long as that is fixed in your minds, I shall think I am fenced round by the strongest wall. But if the violence of wicked men shall deceive and overpower my expectations, I recommend to you my little son, to whom, in truth, it will be protection enough, not only for his safety, but even for his dignity, if you recollect that he is the son of him who has saved all these things at his own single risk.

Wherefore, O conscript fathers, determine with care, as you have begun, and boldly, concerning your own safety, and that of the Roman people, and concerning your wives and children; concerning your altars and your hearths, your shrines and temples; concerning the houses and homes of the whole city; concerning your dominion, your liberty, and the safety of Italy and the whole republic. For you have a consul who will not hesitate to obey your decrees, and who will be able, as long as he lives, to defend what you decide on, and of his own power to execute it.¹

¹ This speech was spoken, and the criminals executed, on the fifth of December. But Catiline was not yet entirely overcome. He had with him in Etruria two legions—about twelve thousand men; of which, however, not above one quarter were regularly armed. For some time by marches and countermarches he eluded Antonius, but when the news reached his army of the fate of the rest of the conspirators, it began to desert him in great numbers. He attempted to escape into Gaul, but found himself intercepted by Metellus, who had been sent thither by Cicero with three legions. Antonius is supposed not to have been disinclined to connive at his escape, if he had not been compelled as it were by his quaestor Sextus and his lieutenant Petreius to force him to a battle, in which, however, Antonius himself, being ill of the gout, did not take the command, which devolved on Petreius, who after a severe action destroyed Catiline and his whole army, of which every man is said to have been slain in the battle. Subsequently, when Cicero's enemies got an opportunity to retaliate, he was temporarily banished from Rome for the violation of the laws passed by Porcius Lecca and by Caius Gracchus, to which reference has been previously made.

THE FIRST ORATION AGAINST VERRES

THE ARGUMENT

IT WAS decided that Cicero should conduct the prosecution against Verres for misconduct in Sicily; accordingly, a hundred and ten days were allowed him to prepare the evidence, with which object he went himself to Sicily to examine witnesses, and to collect facts in support of his charges, taking with him his cousin Lucius Cicero as an assistant, and in this journey, contrary to all precedent, he bore his own expenses, resolving to put the island to no charge on his account. At Syracuse the prætor, Metellus, endeavored to obstruct him in his inquiries, but the magistrates received him with great respect, and, declaring to him that all that they had previously done in favor of Verres (for they had erected a gilt statue of him, and had sent a testimonial of his good conduct and kind government of them to Rome) had been extorted from them by intrigue and terror, they delivered into his hands authentic accounts of many injuries their city had received from Verres, and they revoked by a formal decree the public praises which they had given him. Messana, however, continued firm in its engagements to Verres, and denied Cicero all the honors to which he was entitled. When he finished his investigations, apprehending that he might be waylaid by the contrivance of Verres, he returned by sea to Rome, where he found intrigues carrying on to protract the affair as much as possible, in order to delay the decision of it till the year following, when Hortensius and Metellus were to be the consuls, and the brother of Metellus was to be prætor, by whose united authority the prosecution might be stifled; and it was now so late in the year that there was not time to bring the trial to an end, if the ordinary course of proceeding was adhered to. But Cicero, determined to bring on the decision while Glabrio continued prætor, abandoned his idea of making a long speech, and of taking up time in dilating on and enforcing the different counts of the indictment, and resolved to do nothing more than produce his witnesses, and offer them to examination; and this novel method of conducting the case, together with the powerful evidence produced, which he could not invalidate, so confounded Hortensius, that he could find nothing to say in his client's defence, who in despair went of his own accord into banishment.

The object of Cicero in this oration is to show that it is out of sheer necessity that he does this, and that he is driven to such a proceeding by

the intrigues of the opposite party. He therefore exhorts the judges not to be intimidated or cajoled into a dishonest decision, and threatens the opposite party with punishment for endeavoring to corrupt the judges. The other orations against Verres were published, but not spoken. This single speech sufficed.

THAT which was above all things to be desired, O judges, and which above all things was calculated to have the greatest influence toward allaying the unpopularity of your order, and putting an end to the discredit into which your judicial decisions have fallen, appears to have been thrown in your way, and given to you, not by any human contrivance, but almost by the interposition of the gods, at a most important crisis of the republic.

For an opinion has now become established, pernicious to us, and pernicious to the republic, which has been the common talk of every one, not only at Rome, but among foreign nations also — that in the courts of law as they exist at present, no wealthy man, however guilty he may be, can possibly be convicted.

Now at this time of peril to your order and to your tribunals, when men are ready to attempt by harangues, and by the proposal of new laws, to increase the existing unpopularity of the senate, Caius Verres is brought to trial as a criminal, a man condemned in the opinion of every one by his life and actions, but acquitted by the enormousness of his wealth according to his own hope and boast.

I, O judges, have undertaken this cause as prosecutor with the greatest good wishes and expectation on the part of the Roman people, not in order to increase the unpopularity of the senate, but to relieve it from the discredit which I share with it. For I have brought before you a man, by acting

justly in whose case you have an opportunity of retrieving the lost credit of your judicial proceedings, of regaining your credit with the Roman people, and of giving satisfaction to foreign nations; a man, the embezzler of the public funds, the petty tyrant of Asia and Pamphylia, the robber who deprived the city of its rights, the disgrace and ruin of the province of Sicily. And if you come to a decision about this man with severity and a due regard to your oaths, that authority which ought to remain in you will cling to you still; but if that man's vast riches shall break down the sanctity and honesty of the courts of justice, at least I shall achieve this, that it shall be plain that it was rather honest judgment that was wanting to the republic, than a criminal to the judges, or an accuser to the criminal.

I, indeed, that I may confess to you the truth about myself, O judges, though many snares were laid for me by Caius Verres, both by land and sea, which I partly avoided by my own vigilance, and partly warded off by the zeal and kindness of my friends, yet I never seemed to be incurring so much danger, and I never was in such a state of great apprehension, as I am now in this very court of law. Nor does the expectation which people have formed of my conduct of this prosecution, nor this concourse of so vast a multitude as is here assembled, influence me (though, indeed, I am greatly agitated by these circumstances) so much as his nefarious plots which he is endeavoring to lay at one and the same time against me, against you, against Marcus Glabrio the prætor, and against the allies, against foreign nations, against the senate, and even against the very name of senator; whose favorite saying it is that they have got to fear who have stolen only as much as is enough for themselves, but that he has stolen so much that

not only in your ears, but in the very eyes of all men. He sees that many senators are witnesses of his audacity; he sees that many Roman knights are so too, and many citizens, and many of the allies besides to whom he has done unmistakable injuries. He sees also that very numerous and very important deputations have come here at the same time from most friendly cities, armed with the public authority and evidence collected by their states. And though this is the case, still he thinks so ill of all virtuous men, to such an extent does he believe the decisions of the senators to be corrupt and profligate, that he makes a custom of openly boasting that it was not without reason that he was greedy of money, since he now finds that there is such protection in money, and that he has bought (what was the hardest thing of all) the very time of his trial, in order to be able to buy everything else more easily; so that, as he could not by any possibility shirk the force of the accusations altogether, he might avoid the most violent gusts of the storm. But if he had placed any hope at all, not only in his cause, but in any honorable defence, or in the eloquence or in the influence of any one, he would not be so eager in collecting and catching at all these things; he would not scorn and despise the senatorial body to such a degree, as to procure a man to be selected out of the senate at his will to be made a criminal of, who should plead his cause before him, while he in the meantime was preparing whatever he had need of. And what the circumstances are on which he founds his hopes, and what hopes he builds on them, and what he is fixing his mind on, I see clearly. But how he can have the confidence to think that he can effect anything with the present prætor, and the present bench of judges, I cannot conceive. This one thing I know, which

the Roman people perceived, too, when he rejected the judges, that his hopes were of that nature that he placed all his expectations of safety in his money; and that if this protection were taken from him he thought nothing would be any help to him.

In truth, what genius is there so powerful, what faculty of speaking, what eloquence so mighty, as to be in any particular able to defend the life of that man, convicted as it is of so many vices and crimes, and long since condemned by the inclinations and private sentiments of every one. And, to say nothing of the stains and disgraces of his youth, what other remarkable event is there in his quæstorship, that first step to honor, except that Cnæus Carbo was robbed by his quæstor of the public money? that the consul was plundered and betrayed? his army deserted? his province abandoned? the holy nature and obligations imposed on him by lot violated?—whose lieutenantancy was the ruin of all Asia and Pamphylia, in which provinces he plundered many houses, very many cities, all the shrines and temples; when he renewed and repeated against Cnæus Dolabella his ancient wicked tricks when he had been quæstor, and did not only in his danger desert, but even attack and betray the man to whom he had been lieutenant, and proquæstor, and whom he had brought into odium by his crimes;—whose city prætorship was the destruction of the sacred temples and the public works, and, as to his legal decisions, was the adjudging and awarding of property contrary to all established rules and precedents. But now he has established great and numerous monuments and proofs of all his vices in the province of Sicily, which he for three years so harassed and ruined that it can by no possibility be restored to its

former condition, and appears scarcely able to be at all recovered after a long series of years, and a long succession of virtuous prætors. While this man was prætor the Sicilians enjoyed neither their own laws, nor the decrees of our senate, nor the common rights of every nation. Every one in Sicily has only so much left as either escaped the notice or was disregarded by the satiety of that most avaricious and licentious man.

No legal decision for three years was given on any other ground but his will; no property was so secure to any man, even if it had descended to him from his father and grandfather, but he was deprived of it at his command; enormous sums of money were exacted from the property of the cultivators of the soil by a new and nefarious system. The most faithful of the allies were classed in the number of enemies. Roman citizens were tortured and put to death like slaves; the greatest criminals were acquitted in the courts of justice through bribery; the most upright and honorable men, being prosecuted while absent, were condemned and banished without being heard in their own defence; the most fortified harbors, the greatest and strongest cities, were laid open to pirates and robbers; the sailors and soldiers of the Sicilians, our own allies and friends, died of hunger; the best built fleets on the most important stations were lost and destroyed, to the great disgrace of the Roman people. This same man while prætor plundered and stripped those most ancient monuments, some erected by wealthy monarchs and intended by them as ornaments for their cities; some, too, the work of our own generals, which they either gave or restored as conquerors to the different states in Sicily. And he did this not only in the case of public statues and ornaments, but he also plundered all the temples consecrated

in the deepest religious feelings of the people. He did not leave, in short, one god to the Sicilians which appeared to him to be made in a tolerably workmanlike manner, and with any of the skill of the ancients. I am prevented by actual shame from speaking of his nefarious licentiousness as shown in rapes and other such enormities; and I am unwilling also to increase the distress of those men who have been unable to preserve their children and their wives unpolluted by his wanton lust. But, you will say, these things were done by him in such a manner as not to be notorious to all men. I think there is no man who has heard his name who cannot also relate wicked actions of his; so that I ought rather to be afraid of being thought to omit many of his crimes than to invent any charges against him. And, indeed, I do not think that this multitude which has collected to listen to me wishes so much to learn of me what the facts of the case are, as to go over it with me, refreshing its recollection of what it knows already.

And as this is the case, that senseless and profligate man attempts to combat me in another manner. He does not seek to oppose the eloquence of any one else to me; he does not rely on the popularity, or influence, or authority of any one. He pretends that he trusts to these things; but I see what he is really aiming at (and, indeed, he is not acting with any concealment). He sets before me empty titles of nobility, that is to say, the names of arrogant men, who do not hinder me so much by being noble as assist me by being notorious—he pretends to rely on their protection; when he has in reality been contriving something else this long time. What hope he now has, and what he is endeavoring to do, I will now briefly explain to you, O

judges. But, first of all, remark, I beg you, how the matter has been arranged by him from the beginning. When he first returned from the province he endeavored to get rid of this prosecution by corrupting the judges at a great expense; and this object he continued to keep in view till the conclusion of the appointment of the judges. After the judges were appointed, because in drawing lots for them the fortune of the Roman people had defeated his hopes, and in the rejecting some my diligence had defeated his impudence, the whole attempt at bribery was abandoned. The affair was going on admirably; lists of your names and of the whole tribunal were in every one's hands. It did not seem possible to mark the votes of these men with any distinguishing mark or color or spot of dirt; and that fellow, from having been brisk and in high spirits, became on a sudden so downcast and humbled that he seemed to be condemned not only by the Roman people but even by himself. But lo! all of a sudden, within these few days, since the consular comitia have taken place, he has gone back to his original plan with more money, and the same plots are now laid against your reputation and against the fortunes of every one, by the instrumentality of the same people; which fact at first, O judges, was pointed out to me by a very slight hint and indication; but afterward, when my suspicions were once aroused, I arrived at the knowledge of all the most secret counsels of that party without any mistake.

For as Hortensius the consul elect was being attended home again from the Campus by a great concourse and multitude of people, Caius Curio fell in with that multitude by chance—a man whom I wish to name by way of honor rather than of disparagement. I will tell you what, if he had been unwilling to have it mentioned, he would

not have spoken of in so large an assembly so openly and undisguisedly; which, however, shall be mentioned by me deliberately and cautiously, that it may be seen that I pay due regard to our friendship and to his dignity. He sees Verres in the crowd by the arch of Fabius; he speaks to the man, and with a loud voice congratulates him on his victory. He does not say a word to Hortensius himself, who had been made consul, or to his friends and relations who were present attending on him; but he stops to speak to this man, embraces him, and bids him cast off all anxiety. "I give you notice," said he, "that you have been acquitted by this day's comitia." And as many most honorable men heard this, it is immediately reported to me; indeed, every one who saw me mentioned it to me the first thing. To some it appeared scandalous, to others ridiculous; ridiculous to those who thought that this cause depended on the credibility of the witnesses, on the importance of the charges, and on the power of the judges, and not on the consular comitia; scandalous to those who looked deeper, and who thought that this congratulation had reference to the corruption of the judge. In truth, they argued in this manner—the most honorable men spoke to one another and to me in this manner—that there were now manifestly and undeniably no courts of justice at all. The very criminal who the day before thought that he was already condemned, is acquitted now that his defender has been made consul. What are we to think then? Will it avail nothing that all Sicily, all the Sicilians, that all the merchants who have business in that country, that all public and private documents are now at Rome? Nothing, if the consul elect wills it otherwise. What! will not the judges be influenced by the accusation, by the evidence, by the

universal opinion of the Roman people? No. Everything will be governed by the power and authority of one man.

I will speak the truth, O judges. This thing agitated me greatly; for every good man was speaking in this way—"That fellow will be taken out of your hands; but we shall not preserve our judicial authority much longer; for who, when Verres is acquitted, will be able to make any objection to transferring it from us?" It was a grievous thing to every one, and the sudden elation of that profligate man did not weigh with them as much as that fresh congratulation of a very honorable one. I wished to dissemble my own vexation at it; I wished to conceal my own grief of mind under a cheerful countenance, and to bury it in silence. But lo! on the very days when the prætors elected were dividing their duties by lot, and when it fell to the share of Marcus Metellus to hold trials concerning extortion, information is given me that that fellow was receiving such congratulations that he also sent men home to announce it to his wife. And this too in truth displeased me; and yet I was not quite aware what I had so much to fear from this allotment of the prætor's duties. But I ascertained this one thing from trustworthy men from whom I received all my intelligence: that many chests full of Sicilian money had been sent by some senator to a Roman knight, and that of these about ten chests had been left at that senator's house, with the statement that they were left to be used in the comitia when I expected to be elected ædile, and that men to distribute this money among all the tribes had been summoned to attend him by night. Of whom one, who thought himself under the greatest obligations to me, came to me that same night; reports to me the speech which that fellow had addressed to them; that

he had reminded them how liberally he had treated them formerly when he was candidate for the prætorship, and at the last consular and prætorian comitia; and in the second place that he had promised them immediately whatever money they required, if they could procure my rejection from the ædileship. That on this some of them said that they did not dare attempt it; that others answered that they did not think it could be managed; but that one bold friend was found, a man of the same family as himself, Quintus Verres, of the Romilian tribe, of the most perfect school of bribers, the pupil and friend of Verres's father, who promised that, if five hundred thousand sesterces were provided, he would manage it; and that there were some others who said that they would co-operate with him. And as this was the case, he warned me beforehand with a friendly disposition, to take great care.

I was disquieted about many most important matters at one and the same moment, and with very little time to deliberate. The comitia were at hand; and at them I was to be opposed at immense expenditure of money. This trial was at hand; the Sicilian treasurers menaced that matter also. I was afraid, from apprehension about the comitia, to conduct the matters relating to the trial with freedom; and because of the trial, I was unable to attend with all my heart to my canvass. Threatening the agents of bribery was out of the question, because I saw that they were aware that I was hampered and fettered by this trial. And at this same moment I hear that notice has been given to the Sicilians by Hortensius to come to speak to him at his house; that the Sicilians behaved in that matter with a proper sense of their own liberty, and, when they understood on what account they were sent for, they would not

go. In the meantime my comitia began to be held; of which that fellow thought himself the master, as he had been of all the other comitia this year. He began to run about, that influential man, with his son, a youth of engaging and popular manners, among the tribes. The son began to address and to call on all the friends of his father, that is to say, all his agents for bribery; and when this was noticed and perceived, the Roman people took care with the most earnest goodwill that I should not be deprived of my honor through the money of that man, whose riches had not been able to make me violate my good faith. After that I was released from that great anxiety about my canvass, I began, with a mind much more unoccupied and much more at ease, to think of nothing and to do nothing except what related to this trial. I find, O judges, these plans formed and begun to be put in execution by them, to protract the matter, whatever steps it might be necessary to take in order to do so, so that the cause might be pleaded before Marcus Metellus as prætor. That by doing so they would have these advantages; first, that Marcus Metellus was most friendly to them; secondly, that not only would Hortensius be consul, but Quintus Metellus also: and listen while I show you how great a friend he is to them. For he gave him a token of his goodwill of such a sort that he seemed to be giving it as a return for the suffrages of the tribes which he had secured to him. Did you think that I would say nothing of such serious matters as these? and that, at a crisis of such danger to the republic and my own character, I would consult anything rather than my duty and my dignity? The other consul elect sent for the Sicilians; some came, because Lucius Metellus was prætor in Sicily. To them he speaks in this manner: that he is the consul;

that one of his brothers has Sicily for his province; that the other is to be judge in all prosecutions for extortion; and that care had been taken in many ways that there should be no possibility of Verres being injured.

I ask you, Metellus, what is corrupting the course of justice, if this is not—to seek to frighten witnesses, and especially Sicilians, timid and oppressed men, not only by your own private influence, but by their fear of the consul, and by the power of two prætors? What would you do for an innocent man or for a relation, when for the sake of a most guilty man, entirely unconnected with you, you depart from your duty and your dignity, and allow what he is constantly saying to appear true to any one who is not acquainted with you? For they said that Verres said, that you had not been made consul by destiny, as the rest of your family had been, but by his assistance. Two consuls, therefore, and the judge are to be such because of his will. We shall not only, says he, avoid having a man too scrupulous in investigating, too subservient to the opinion of the people, Marcus Glabrio, but we shall have this advantage also:—Marcus Cæsonius is the judge, the colleague of our accuser, a man of tried and proved experience in the decision of actions. It will never do for us to have such a man as that on the bench, which we are endeavoring to corrupt by some means or other; for before, when he was one of the judges on the tribunal of which Junius was president, he was not only very indignant at that shameful transaction, but he even betrayed and denounced it. After the first of January we shall not have this man for our judge—we shall not have Quintus Manlius and Quintus Cornificius, two most severe and upright judges, for judges, because they will then be tribunes of the people. Publius Sulpicius, a solemn and

upright judge, must enter on his magistracy on the fifth of November. Marcus Crepereius, of that renowned equestrian family and of that incorruptible character; Lucius Cassius, of a family renowned for its severity in all things, and especially as judges; Cnæus Tremellius, a man of the greatest scrupulousness and diligence;—these three men of ancient strictness of principle are all military tribunes elect. After the first of January they will not be able to act as judges. And besides this, we elect by lot a successor in the room of Marcus Metellus, since he is to preside over this very trial. And so after the first of January, the prætor, and almost the whole bench of judges being changed, we shall elude the terrible threats of the prosecutor, and the great expectations entertained of this trial, and manage it according to our own will and pleasure. To-day is the fifth of August. You began to assemble at the ninth hour. This day they do not even count. There are ten days between this and the votive games which Cnæus Pompey is going to celebrate. These games will take up fifteen days; then immediately the Roman games will follow. And so, when nearly forty days have intervened, then at length they think they shall have to answer what has been said by us; and they think that, what with speeches, and what with excuses, they will easily be able to protract the cause till the period of the games of Victory. With these the plebeian games are connected, after which there will be either no day at all, or very few for pleading in. And so, when the accusation has got stale and cold, the matter will come all fresh before Marcus Metellus as prætor. And if I had distrusted his good faith, I should not have retained him as a judge; but now I have such an opinion of him, that I would rather this matter was brought to a close while

he is judge than while he is prætor; and I would rather intrust to him his own tablet while he is on his oath than the tablets of others when he is restrained by no such obligation.

Now, O judges, I consult you as to what you think I ought to do. For you will, in truth, without speaking, give me that advice which I understand that I must inevitably adopt. If I occupy the time which I legitimately might in speaking, I shall reap the fruit of my labor, industry, and diligence; and by this prosecution I shall make it manifest that no one in the memory of man appears ever to have come before a court of justice better prepared, more vigilant, or with his cause better got up. But while I am getting this credit for my industry, there is great danger lest the criminal may escape. What, then, is there which can be done? I think it is neither obscure nor hidden. I will reserve for another time that fruit of praise which may be derived from a long uninterrupted speech. At present I must support this accusation by documentary evidence, by witnesses, by letters of private individuals and of public bodies, and by various other kinds of proof. The whole of this contest is between you and me, O Hortensius. I will speak openly. If I thought that you were contending with me in the matter of speaking, and of getting rid of the charges I bring against your client in this cause, I, too, would devote much pains to making an elaborate accusation, and to dilating on my charges. Now, since you have determined to contend against me with artifice, not so much in obedience to the promptings of your own nature as from consulting his occasions and his cause, it is necessary for me to oppose conduct of that sort with prudence. Your plan is to begin to answer me after two sets of games have been cel-

ebreated; mine is to have the adjournment over before the first games. And the result will be that that plan of yours will be thought crafty, but this determination of mine necessary.

But as for what I had begun to say—namely, that the contest is between you and me, this is it—I, when I had undertaken this cause at the request of the Sicilians, and had thought it a very honorable and glorious thing for me that they were willing to make experiment of my integrity and diligence, who already knew by experience my innocence and temperance: then, when I had undertaken this business, I proposed to myself some greater action also by which the Roman people should be able to see my goodwill toward the republic. For that seemed to me to be by no means worthy of my industry and efforts, for that man to be brought to trial by me who had been already condemned by the judgment of all men, unless that intolerable influence of yours, and that grasping nature which you have displayed for some years in many trials, was interposed also in the case of that desperate man. But now, since all this dominion and sovereignty of yours over the courts of justice delights you so much, and since there are some men who are neither ashamed of their licentiousness and their infamy, nor weary of it, and who, as if on purpose, seem to wish to encounter hatred and unpopularity from the Roman people, I profess that I have undertaken this—a great burden, perhaps, and one dangerous to myself, but still worthy of my applying myself to it with all the vigor of my age, and all diligence. And since the whole order of the senate is weighed down by the discredit brought on it by the wickedness and audacity of a few, and is overwhelmed by the infamy of the tribunals, I

profess myself an enemy to this race of men, an accuser worthy of their hatred, a persevering, a bitter adversary. I arrogate this to myself, I claim this for myself, and I will carry out this enmity in my magistracy, and from that post in which the Roman people has willed that from the next first of January I shall act in concert with it in matters concerning the republic, and concerning wicked men. I promise the Roman people that this shall be the most honorable and the fairest employment of my ædileship. I warn, I forewarn, I give notice beforehand to those men who are wont either to put money down, to undertake for others, to receive money, or to promise money, or to act as agents in bribery, or as go-betweens in corrupting the seat of judgment, and who have promised their influence or their impudence in aid of such a business, in this trial to keep their hands and inclinations from this nefarious wickedness.

Hortensius will then be consul with the chief command and authority, but I shall be ædile—that is, I shall be a little more than a private individual; and yet this business, which I promise that I am going to advocate, is of such a nature, so pleasing and agreeable to the Roman people, that the consul himself will appear in this cause, if that be possible, even less than a private individual in comparison of me. All those things shall not only be mentioned, but even, when certain matters have been explained, shall be fully discussed, which for the last ten years, ever since the office of the judge has been transferred to the senate, has been nefariously and wickedly done in the decision of judicial matters. The Roman people shall know from me why it is that when the equestrian body supplied the judges for nearly fifty years together, not even the slightest suspicion ever arose of

bribes having been accepted for the purpose of influencing a decision; why it is, I say, when the judicial authority was transferred to the senatorial body, and the power of the Roman people over every one of us was taken away, Quintus Calidius, when he was condemned, said that a man of prætorian rank could not honestly be condemned at a less price than three hundred thousand sesterces; why it is that when Publius Septimius, a senator, was condemned for extortion, when Quintus Hortensius was prætor, damages were assessed against him, including money which he had received as judge to decide causes which came before him; why it is that in the case of Caius Herennius, and in that of Caius Popillius, senators, both of whom were convicted of peculation—why it is that in the case of Marcus Atilius, who was convicted of treason (this was made plain) that they had all received money for the purpose of influencing their judicial decisions; why it is that senators have been found who, when Caius Verres, as prætor of the city, gave out the lots, voted against the criminal whom they were condemning without having inquired into his case; why it is that a senator was found who, when he was judge, took money in one and the same trial both from the defendant to distribute among the judges, and from the accuser to condemn the defendant. But how shall I adequately complain of that stain, that disgrace, that calamity of the whole senatorial order—that this thing actually happened in the city while the senatorial order furnished the judges, that the votes of men on their oaths were marked by colored tablets? I pledge myself that I will urge all these things with diligence and with strictness.

And what do you suppose will be my thoughts if I find in this very trial any violation of the laws committed in any

similar manner? especially when I can prove by many witnesses that Caius Verres often said in Sicily, in the hearing of many persons, "that he had a powerful friend in confidence in whom he was plundering the province; and that he was not seeking money for himself alone, but that he had so distributed the three years of his Sicilian prætorship that he should say he did exceedingly well if he appropriated the gains of one year to the augmentation of his own property, those of the second year to his patrons and defenders, and reserved the whole of the third year, the most productive and gainful of all, for the judges." From which it came into my mind to say that which, when I had said lately before Marcus Glabrio at the time of striking the list of judges, I perceived the Roman people greatly moved by; that I thought that foreign nations would send ambassadors to the Roman people to procure the abrogation of the law, and of all trials, about extortion; for, if there were no trials, they think that each man would only plunder them of as much as he would think sufficient for himself and his children; but now, because there are trials of that sort, every one carries off as much as it will take to satisfy himself, his patrons, his advocates, the prætor, and the judges; and that this is an enormous sum; that they may be able to satisfy the cupidity of one most avaricious man, but are quite unable to incur the expense of his most guilty victory over the laws. O trials worthy of being recorded! O splendid reputation of our order! when the allies of the Roman people are unwilling that trials for extortion should take place, which were instituted by our ancestors for the sake of the allies. Would that man ever have had a favorable hope of his own safety, if he had not conceived in his mind a bad opinion of you? on which account he ought, if possible,

to be still more hated by you than he is by the Roman people, because he considers you like himself in avarice and wickedness and perjury.

And I beg you, in the name of the immortal gods, O judges, think of and guard against this; I warn you, I give notice to you, of what I am well assured, that this most seasonable opportunity has been given to you by the favor of the gods, for the purpose of delivering your whole order from hatred, from unpopularity, from infamy, and from disgrace. There is no severity believed to exist in the tribunals, nor any scruples with regard to religion; in short, there are not believed to be any tribunals at all. Therefore, we are despised and scorned by the Roman people; we are branded with a heavy and now a long standing infamy. Nor, in fact, is there any other reason for which the Roman people has with so much earnestness sought the restoration of the tribunitian power: but when it was demanding that in words it seemed to be asking for that, but in reality it was asking for tribunals which it could trust? And this did not escape the notice of Quintus Catulus, a most sagacious and honorable man, who, when Cnæus Pompeius, a most gallant and illustrious man, made a motion about the tribunitian power, and when he was asked his opinion, began his speech in this manner, speaking with the greatest authority, "that the conscript fathers presided over the courts of justice badly and wickedly; but if in deciding judicial trials they had been willing to satisfy the expectations of the Roman people, men would not so greatly regret the tribunitian power." Lastly, when Cnæus Pompeius himself, when first he delivered an address to the people as consul elect, mentioned (what seemed above all things to be watched for)

that he would restore the power of the tribunes, a great shout was raised at his words, and a grateful murmur pervaded the assembly. And when he had said also in the same assembly "that the provinces were depopulated and tyrannized over, that the courts of justice were become base and wicked, and that he desired to provide for and to remedy that evil," the Roman people then signified their goodwill not with a shout, but with a universal uproar.

But now men are on the watch towers; they observe how every one of you behaves himself in respecting religion and in preserving the laws. They see that ever since the passing of the law for restoring the power of the tribunes, only one senator, and he too a very insignificant one, has been condemned. And though they do not blame this, yet they have nothing which they can very much commend. For there is no credit in being upright in a case where there is no one who is either able or who endeavors to corrupt one. This is a trial in which you will be deciding about the defendant, the Roman people about you;—by the example of what happens to this man it will be determined whether, when senators are the judges, a very guilty and a very rich man can be condemned. Moreover, he is a criminal of such a sort that there is absolutely nothing whatever in him except the greatest crimes, and excessive riches; so that if he be acquitted, no other opinion can be formed of the matter except that which is the most discreditable possible. Such numerous and enormous vices as his will not be considered to have been cancelled by influence, by family connection, by some things which may have been done well, or even by the minor vices of flattery and subservience; in short, I will conduct the cause in this manner; I will bring forward things of such

a sort, so well known, so proved by evidence, so important, and so undeniable, that no one shall venture to use his influence to obtain from you the acquittal of that man; for I have a sure path and method by which I can investigate and become acquainted with all their endeavors. The matter will be so managed by me that not only the ears but even the eyes of the Roman people shall seem to be present at all their counsels. You have in your power to remove and to eradicate the disgrace and infamy which has now for many years attached to your order. It is evident to all men, that since these tribunals have been established which we now have, there has never been a bench of judges of the same splendor and dignity as this. If anything is done wrongly in this case, all men will think not that other more capable judges should be appointed of the same order of men, which is not possible; but that another order must be sought for, from which to select the judges for the future.

On which account, in the first place, I beg this of the immortal gods, which I seem to myself to have hopes of too, that in this trial no one may be found to be wicked except him who has long since been found to be such; secondly, if there are many wicked men, I promise this to you, O judges, I promise this to the Roman people, that my life shall fail rather than my vigor and perseverance in prosecuting their iniquity. But that iniquity, which, if it should be committed, I promise to prosecute severely, with however much trouble and danger to myself, and whatever enmities I may bring on myself by so doing, you, O Marcus Glabrio, can guard against ever taking place by your wisdom, and authority, and diligence. Do you undertake the cause of the tribunals. Do you

undertake the cause of impartiality, of integrity, of good faith and of religion. Do you undertake the cause of the senate; that, being proved worthy by its conduct in this trial, it may come into favor and popularity with the Roman people. Think who you are, and in what a situation you are placed; what you ought to give to the Roman people, what you ought to repay to your ancestors. Let the recollection of the Acilian law passed by your father occur to your mind, owing to which law the Roman people has had this advantage of most admirable decisions and very strict judges in cases of extortion. High authorities surround you which will not suffer you to forget your family credit; which will remind you day and night that your father was a most brave man, your grandfather a most wise one, and your father-in-law a most worthy man. Wherefore, if you have inherited the vigor and energy of your father Glabrio in resisting audacious men; if you have inherited the prudence of your grandfather Scævola in foreseeing intrigues which are prepared against your fame and that of your fellow-judges; if you have any share of the constancy of your father-in-law Scaurus, so that no one can move you from your genuine and deliberate opinion, the Roman people will understand that with an upright and honorable prætor, and a carefully selected bench of judges, abundance of wealth has more influence in bringing a criminal into suspicion, than in contributing to his safety.

I am resolved not to permit the prætor or the judges to be changed in this cause. I will not permit the matter to be delayed till the lictors of the consuls can go and summon the Sicilians, whom the servants of the consuls elect did not influence before, when by an unprecedented

course of proceeding they sent for them all; I will not permit those miserable men, formerly the allies and friends of the Roman people, now their slaves and suppliants, to lose not only their rights and fortunes by their tyranny, but to be deprived of even the power of bewailing their condition; I will not, I say, when the cause has been summed up by me, permit them, after a delay of forty days has intervened, then at last to reply to me when my accusation has already fallen into oblivion through lapse of time; I will not permit the decision to be given when this crowd collected from all Italy has departed from Rome, which has assembled from all quarters at the same time on account of the comitia, of the games, and of the census. The reward of the credit gained by your decision, or the danger arising from the unpopularity which will accrue to you if you decide unjustly, I think ought to belong to you; the labor and anxiety to me; the knowledge of what is done and the recollection of what has been said by every one, to all. I will adopt this course, not an unprecedented one, but one that has been adopted before, by those who are now the chief men of our state—the course, I mean, of at once producing the witnesses. What you will find novel, O judges, is this, that I will so marshal my witnesses as to unfold the whole of my accusation; that when I have established it by examining my witnesses, by arguments, and by my speech, then I shall show the agreement of the evidence with my accusation: so that there shall be no difference between the established mode of prosecuting, and this new one, except that, according to the established mode, when everything has been said which is to be said, then the witnesses are produced; here they shall be produced as each count is brought forward; so that the other side shall have the

same opportunity of examining them, of arguing and making speeches on their evidence. If there be any one who prefers an uninterrupted speech and the old mode of conducting a prosecution without any break, he shall have it in some other trial. But for this time let him understand that what we do is done by us on compulsion (for we only do it with the design of opposing the artifice of the opposite party by our prudence). This will be the first part of the prosecution. We say that Caius Verres has not only done many licentious acts, many cruel ones, toward Roman citizens and toward some of the allies, many wicked acts against both gods and men; but especially that he has taken away four hundred thousand sesterces out of Sicily contrary to the laws. We will make this so plain to you by witnesses, by private documents, and by public records, that you shall decide that, even if we had abundant space and leisure days for making a long speech without any inconvenience, still there was no need at all of a long speech in this matter.

FOURTH BOOK OF THE SECOND PLEADING IN THE
PROSECUTION OF VERRES

ABOUT THE STATUES

I COME now to what Verres himself calls his passion; what his friends call his disease, his madness; what the Sicilians call his rapine; what I am to call it, I know not. I will state the whole affair to you, and do you consider it according to its own importance and not by the importance of its name. First of all, O judges, suffer me to make you acquainted with the description of this conduct of his; and then, perhaps, you will not be very much puzzled to know by what name to call it. I say that in all Sicily, in all that wealthy and ancient province, that in that number of towns and families of such exceeding riches, there was no silver vessel, no Corinthian or Delian plate, no jewel or pearl, nothing made of gold or ivory, no statue of marble or brass or ivory, no picture whether painted or embroidered that he did not seek out, that he did not inspect, that, if he liked it, he did not take away. I seem to be making a very extensive charge; listen now to the manner in which I make it. For I am not embracing everything in one charge for the sake of making an impression, or of exaggerating his guilt. When I say that he left nothing whatever of the sort in the whole province, know that I am speaking according to the strict meaning of the words, and not in the spirit of an accuser. I will speak even more plainly; I will say that he has left nothing in any one's

house, nothing even in the towns, nothing in public places, not even in the temples, nothing in the possession of any Sicilian, nothing in the possession of any Roman citizen; that he has left nothing, in short, which either came before his eyes or was suggested to his mind, whether private property or public, or profane or sacred, in all Sicily.

Where, then, shall I begin rather than with that city which was above all others in your affection, and which was your chosen place of enjoyment? or with what class of men rather than with your flatterers? For by that means it will be the more easily seen how you behaved among those men who hate you, who accuse you, who will not let you rest, when you are proved to have plundered among the Mamertines, who are your friends, in the most infamous manner.

Caius Heius is a Mamertine—all men will easily grant me this who have ever been to Messina; the most accomplished man in every point of view in all that city. His house is the very best in all Messina—most thoroughly known, most constantly open, most especially hospitable to all our fellow-citizens. That house before the arrival of Verres was so splendidly adorned, as to be an ornament even to the city. For Messina itself, which is admirable on account of its situation, its fortifications, and its harbor, is very empty and bare of those things in which Verres delights. There was in the house of Heius a private chapel of great sacredness, handed down to him from his ancestors, very ancient; in which he had four very beautiful statues, made with the greatest skill, and of very high character; calculated not only to delight Verres, that clever and accomplished man, but even any one of us whom he calls the mob:—one, a statue of Cupid, in

marble, a work of Praxiteles; for, in truth, while I have been inquiring into that man's conduct, I have learned the names of the workmen; it was the same workman, as I imagine, who made that celebrated Cupid of the same figure as this which is at Thespiæ, on account of which people go to see Thespiæ, for there is no other reason for going to see it; and, therefore, that great man Lucius Mummius, when he carried away from that town the statues of the Muses which are now before the temple of Good Fortune, and the other statues which were not consecrated, did not touch this marble Cupid, because it had been consecrated.

But to return to that private chapel; there was this statue, which I am speaking of, of Cupid, made of marble. On the other side there was a Hercules, beautifully made of brass; that was said to be the work of Myron, as I believe, and it undoubtedly was so. Also before those gods there were little altars, which might indicate to any one the holiness of the chapel. There were besides two brazen statues, of no very great size, but of marvellous beauty, in the dress and robes of virgins, which with uplifted hands were supporting some sacred vessels which were placed on their heads, after the fashion of the Athenian virgins. They were called the Canephoræ, but their maker was (who? who was he? thank you, you are quite right) . . . they called him Polycleetus. Whenever any one of our citizens went to Messana, he used to go and see these statues. They were open every day for people to go to see them. The house was not more an ornament to its master than it was to the city.

Caius Claudius, whose ædileship we know to have been a most splendid affair, used this statue of Cupid as long as

he kept the forum decorated in honor of the immortal gods and the Roman people. And as he was connected by ties of hospitality with the Heii, and was the patron of the Mamertine people—as he availed himself of their kindness to lend him this, so he was careful to restore it. There have lately been noble men of the same kind, O judges—why do I say lately? Ay, we have seen some very lately, a very little while ago, indeed, who have adorned the forum and the public buildings, not with the spoils of the provinces, but with ornaments belonging to their friends—with splendid things lent by their own connections, not with the produce of the thefts of guilty men—and who afterward have restored the statues and decorations, each to its proper owner; men who have not taken things away out of the cities of our allies for the sake of a four-day festival, under pretence of the shows to be exhibited in their ædileship, and after that carried them off to their own homes, and their own villas. All these statues which I have mentioned, O judges, Verres took away from Heius, out of his private chapel. He left, I say, not one of those things, nor anything else, except one old wooden figure—Good Fortune, as I believe; that, forsooth, he did not choose to have in his house!

Oh! for the good faith of gods and men! What is the meaning of all this? What a cause is this! What impudence is this! The statues which I am speaking of, before they were taken away by you, no commander ever came to Messana without seeing. So many prætors, so many consuls as there have been in Sicily, in time of peace, and in time of war; so many men of every sort as there have been—I do not speak of upright, innocent, conscientious men, but so many covetous, so many audacious,

so many infamous men as there have been, not one of them all was violent enough, or seemed to himself powerful enough or noble enough, to venture to ask for, or to take away, or even to touch anything in that chapel. Shall Verres take away everything which is most beautiful everywhere? Shall it not be allowed to any one besides to have anything? Shall that one house of his contain so many wealthy houses? Was it for this reason that none of his predecessors ever touched these things that he might be able to carry them off? Was this the reason why Caius Claudius Pulcher restored them, that Caius Verres might be able to steal them? But that Cupid had no wish for the house of a pimp and the establishment of a harlot; he was quite content to stay in that chapel where he was hereditary; he knew that he had been left to Heius by his ancestors, with the rest of the sacred things which he inherited; he did not require the heir of a prostitute. But why am I borne on so impetuously? I shall in a moment be refuted by one word. "I bought it," says he. O ye immortal gods, what a splendid defence! we sent a broker into the province with military command, and with the forces, to buy up all the statues, all the paintings, all the silver plate and gold plate, and ivory, and jewels, and to leave nothing to anybody. For this defence seems to me to be got ready for everything; that he bought them. In the first place, if I should grant to you that which you wish, namely, that you bought them, since against all this class of accusations you are going to use this defence alone, I ask what sort of tribunals you thought that there would be at Rome, if you thought that any one would grant you this, that you in your prætorship and in your command bought up so many and such valuable things—everything,

in short, which was of any value in the whole province. Remark the care of our ancestors, who as yet suspected no such conduct as this, but yet provided against the things which might happen in affairs of small importance. They thought that no one who had gone as governor or as lieutenant into a province would be so insane as to buy silver, for that was given him out of the public funds; or raiment, for that was afforded him by the laws; they thought he might buy a slave, a thing which we all use, and which is not provided by the laws. They made a law, therefore, "that no one should buy a slave except in the room of a slave who was dead." If any slave had died at Rome? No, if any one had died in the place where his master was. For they did not mean you to furnish your house in the province, but to be of use to the province in its necessities. What was the reason why they so carefully kept us from making purchases in the provinces? This was it, O judges, because they thought it a robbery, not a purchase, when the seller was not allowed to sell on his own terms. And they were aware that, in the provinces, if he who was there with the command and power of a governor wished to purchase what was in any one's possession, and was allowed to do so, it would come to pass that he would get whatever he chose, whether it was to be sold or not, at whatever price he pleased. Some one will say, "Do not deal with Verres in that manner; do not try and examine his actions by the standard of old-fashioned conscientiousness; allow him to have bought them without being punished for it, provided he bought them in a fair way, not through any arbitrary exercise of power, nor from any one against his will, or by violence." I will so deal with him. If Heius had anything for sale,

if he sold it for the price at which he valued it, I give up inquiring why you bought it.

What then are we to do? Are we to use arguments in a case of this sort? We must ask, I suppose, whether Heius was in debt, whether he had an auction—if he had, whether he was in such difficulties about money matters, whether he was oppressed by such want, by such necessity, as to strip his private chapel, to sell his paternal gods. But I see that the man had no auction; that he never sold anything except the produce of his land; that he not only had no debts, but that he had always abundance of ready money. Even if all these things were contrary to what I say they were, still I say that he would not have sold things which had been so many years in the household and chapel of his ancestors. "What will you say if he was persuaded by the greatness of the sum given him for them?" It is not probable that a man, rich as he was, honorable as he was, should have preferred money to his own religious feelings and to the memorials of his ancestors. "That may be, yet men are sometimes led away from their habits and principles by large sums of money." Let us see, then, how great a sum this was which could turn Heius, a man of exceeding riches, by no means covetous, away from decency, from affection, and from religion. You ordered him, I suppose, to enter in his account-books, "All these statues of Praxiteles, of Myron, of Polycletus, were sold to Verres for six thousand five hundred sesterces." Read the extracts from his accounts—

[*The accounts of Heius are read*]

I am delighted that the illustrious names of these workmen, whom those men extol to the skies, have fallen so

low in the estimation of Verres—the Cupid of Praxiteles for sixteen hundred sesterces. From that forsooth has come the proverb, “I had rather buy it than ask for it.”

Some one will say, “What! do you value those things at a very high price?” But I am not valuing them according to any calculation of my own, or any need which I have for them; but I think that the matter ought to be looked at by you in this light—what is the value of these things in the opinion of those men who are judges of these things; at what price they are accustomed to be sold; at what price these very things could be sold, if they were sold openly and freely; lastly, at what price Verres himself values them. For he would never have been so foolish, if he had thought that Cupid worth only four hundred denarii, as to allow himself to be made a subject for the common conversation and general reproach of men. Who then of you all is ignorant at how great a price these things are valued? Have we not seen at an auction a brazen statue of no great size sold for a hundred and twenty thousand sesterces? What if I were to choose to name men who have bought similar things for no less a price, or even for a higher one? Can I not do so? In truth, the only limit to the valuation of such things is the desire which any one has for them, for it is difficult to set bounds to the price unless you first set bounds to the wish. I see then that Heius was neither led by his inclination, nor by any temporary difficulties, nor by the greatness of the sum given, to sell these statues; and that you, under the pretence of purchase which you put forward, in reality seized and took away these things by force, through fear, by your power and authority, from that man, whom, along with the rest of our allies in that country, the Roman people

had intrusted not only to your power, but also to your upright exercise of it. What can there be, judges, so desirable for me in making this charge, as that Heius should say this same thing? Nothing certainly; but let us not wish for what is difficult to be obtained. Heius is a Mamertine. The state of the Mamertines alone, by a common resolution, praises that man in the name of the city. To all the rest of the Sicilians he is an object of hatred; by the Mamertines alone is he liked. But of that deputation which has been sent to utter his praises, Heius is the chief man; in truth, he is the chief man of his city, and too much occupied in discharging the public duties imposed upon him to speak of his private injuries. Though I was aware of and had given weight to these considerations, still, O judges, I trusted myself to Heius. I produced him at the first pleading; and indeed I did it without any danger, for what answer could Heius give even if he turned out a dishonest man, and unlike himself? Could he say that these statues were at his house, and not with Verres? How could he say anything of that sort? If he were the basest of men, and were inclined to lie most shamelessly, he would say this; that he had had them for sale, and that he had sold them at the price he wanted for them. The man the most noble in all his city, who was especially anxious that you should have a high opinion of his conscientiousness and of his worth, says first, that he spoke in Verres's praise by the public authority of his city, because that commission had been given to him; secondly, that he had not had these things for sale, and that, if he had been allowed to do what he wished, he could never have been induced by any terms to sell those things which were in his private chapel, having

been left to him and handed down to him from his ancestors.

Why are you sitting there, O Verres? What are you waiting for? Why do you say you are hemmed in and overwhelmed by the cities of Centuripa, of Catina, of Halesa, of Tyndaris, of Enna, of Agyrium, and by all the other cities of Sicily? Your second country, as you used to call it, Messana herself attacks you; your own Messana, I say; the assistant in your crimes, the witness of your lusts, the receiver of your booty and your thefts. For the most honorable man of that city is present, a deputy sent from his home on account of this very trial, the chief actor in the panegyric on you; who praises you by the public order of his city, for so he has been charged and commanded to do. Although you recollect, O judges, what he answered when he was asked about the ship; that it had been built by public labor, at the public expense, and that a Mamertine senator had been appointed by the public authority to superintend its building. Heius in his private capacity flees to you for aid, O judges; he avails himself of this law, the common fortress of our allies, by which this tribunal is established. Although there is a law for recovering money which has been unjustly extorted, he says that he does not seek to recover any money; which, though it has been taken from him, he does not so much care about; but he says he does demand back from you the sacred images belonging to his ancestors, he does demand back from you his hereditary household gods. Have you any shame, O Verres? have you any religion? have you any fear? You have lived in Heius's house at Messana; you saw him almost daily performing sacred rites in his private chapel before those

gods. He is not influenced by money; he does not even ask to have those things restored which were merely ornaments. Keep the Canephoraë; restore the images of the gods. And because he said this, because after a given time he, an ally and friend of the Roman people, addressed his complaints to you in a moderate tone, because he was very attentive to religious obligation not only while demanding back his paternal gods, but also in giving his evidence on oath; know that one of the deputies has been sent back to Messana, that very man who superintended the building of that ship at the public expense, to demand from the senate that Heius should be condemned to an ignominious punishment.

O most insane of men, what did you think? that you should obtain what you requested? Did you not know how greatly he was esteemed by his fellow-citizens; how great his influence was considered? But suppose you had obtained your request; suppose that the Mamertines had passed any severe vote against Heius, what do you think would have been the authority of their panegyric, if they had decreed punishment to the man who it was notorious had given true evidence? Although, what sort of praise is that, when he who utters it, being questioned, is compelled to give answers injurious to him whom he is praising? What! are not those who are praising you my witnesses? Heius is an encomiast of yours; he has done you the most serious injury. I will bring forward the rest; they will gladly be silent about all that they are allowed to suppress; they will say what they cannot help saying, unwillingly. Can they deny that a transport of the largest size was built for that man at Messana? Let them deny it if they can. Can they deny that a Mamertine senator

was appointed by the public authority to superintend the building of that ship? I wish they would deny it. There are other points also which I prefer reserving unmentioned at present, in order to give as little time as possible to them for planning and arranging their perjury. Let this praise, then, be placed to your account; let these men come to your relief with their authority, who neither ought to help you if they were able, nor could do so if they wished; on whom in their private capacity you have inflicted many injuries, and put many affronts, while in their city you have dishonored many families forever by your adulteries and crimes. "But you have been of public service to their city." Not without great injury to the republic and to the province of Sicily. They were bound to supply and they used to supply sixty thousand modii of wheat to the Roman people for payment; that was remitted by you of your own sole authority. The republic was injured because by your means its right of dominion over one city was disparaged; the Sicilians were injured, because this quantity was not deducted from the total amount of the corn to be provided by the island, but was only transferred to the cities of Centuripa and Halesa, whose inhabitants were exempt from that tax; and on them a greater burden was imposed than they were able to bear. It was your duty to require them to furnish a ship, in compliance with the treaty. You remitted it for three years. During all those years you never demanded one soldier. You acted as pirates are accustomed to act, who, though they are the common enemies of all men, still select some friends, whom they not only spare, but even enrich with their booty; and especially such as have a town in a convenient situation, where they

often, and sometimes even necessarily, put in with their vessels.

The town of Phaselis, which Publius Servilius took, had not been in former times a city of Cilicians and pirates. The Lycians, a Greek tribe, inhabited it; but because it was in such a situation as it was, and because it projected into the sea, so that pirates from Cilicia often necessarily touched at it when departing on an expedition, and were also often borne thither on their retreats, the pirates connected that city with themselves; at first by commercial intercourse, and afterward by a regular alliance. The city of the Mamertines was not formerly of bad character; it was even a city hostile to dishonest men, and detained the luggage of Caius Cato, the one who was consul. But then what sort of a man was he? a most eminent and most influential man; who, however, though he had been consul, was convicted. So Caius Cato, the grandson of two most illustrious men, Lucius Paullus and Marcus Cato, and the son of the sister of Publius Africanus, who, even when convicted, at a time when severe judgments were in the habit of being passed, found the damages to which he was liable only estimated at eighteen thousand sesterces; with this man, I say, the Mamertines were angry, who have often expended a greater sum than the damages in the action against Cato were laid at, in one banquet for Timarchides. But this city was the Phaselis for that robber and pirate of Sicily. Hither everything was brought from all quarters; with them it was left; whatever required to be concealed, they kept separate and stored away. By their agency he contrived everything which he wished put on board ship privily, and exported secretly; and in their harbor he contrived to have a vessel

of the largest size built, for him to send to Italy loaded with plunder. In return for these services, he gave them immunity from all expense, all labor, all military service, in short, from everything. For three years they were the only people, not only in Sicily, but, according to my opinion, in the whole world at such a time, who enjoyed excuse, relief, freedom, and immunity from every sort of expense, and trouble, and office. Hence arose that Verrean festival; hence it was that he ventured to order Sextus Cominius to be dragged before him at a banquet, at whom he attempted to throw a goblet, whom he ordered to be seized by the throat, and to be hurried from the banquet and thrown into a dark prison; hence came that cross, on which, in the sight of many men, he suspended a Roman citizen; that cross which he never ventured to erect anywhere except among that people, whom he had made sharers in all his crimes and robberies.

Do you, O Mamertines! dare to come to praise any one? By what authority? by that which you ought to have with the senatorial order? by that which you ought to have with the Roman people? Is there any city, not only in our provinces, but in the most distant nations, either so powerful, or so free, or so savage and uncivilized? is there any king, who would not invite a senator of the Roman people to his house and to his home? An honor which is paid not only to the man, but in the first place to the Roman people, by whose indulgence we have risen to this order, and secondly to the authority of this order; and unless that is respected among our allies, where will be the name and dignity of the empire among foreign nations? The Mamertines did not give me any public invitation—when I say me, that is a trifle; but when they did not

invite a senator of the Roman people, they withheld an honor due not to the man but to his order. For to Tullius himself, the most splendid and magnificent house of Cnæus Pompeius Basilicus was opened; with whom he would have lodged even if he had been invited by you. There was also the most honorable house of the Percennii, who are now also called Pompeius; where Lucius my brother lodged and was received by them with the greatest eagerness. A senator of the Roman people, as far as depended on you as a body, lay in your town, and passed the night in the public streets. No other city ever did such a thing. "Yes," say you, "for you were instituting a prosecution against our friend." Will you put your own interpretation on what private business I have of my own, by diminishing the honor due to the senate? But I will make my complaint of this conduct, if ever the time comes that there is any discussion concerning you among that body, which, up to this time, has been affronted by no one but you. With what face have you presented yourself before the eyes of the Roman people? when you have not yet pulled down that cross, which is even now stained with the blood of a Roman citizen, which is fixed up in your city by the harbor, and have not thrown it into the sea and purified all that place, before you came to Rome, and before this tribunal. On the territory of the Mamertines, connected with us by treaty, at peace with us, is that monument of your cruelty raised. Is not your city the only one where, when any one arrives at it from Italy, he sees the cross of a Roman citizen before he sees any friend of the Roman people? which you are in the habit of displaying to the people of Rhegium, whose city you envy, and to your inhabitants, Roman citizens as they are, to

make them think less of themselves and be less inclined to despise you, when they see the privileges of our citizenship extinguished by such a punishment.

But you say you bought these things? What? did you forget to purchase of the same Heius that Attalic tapestry, celebrated over the whole of Sicily? You might have bought them in the same way as you did the statues. For what did you do? Did you wish to spare the account-books? This escaped the notice of that stupid man; he thought that what he stole from the wardrobe would be less notorious than what he had stolen from the private chapel. But how did he get it? I cannot relate it more plainly than Heius himself related it before you. When I asked, whether any other part of his property had come to Verres, he answered that he had sent him orders to send the tapestry to Agrigentum to him. I asked whether he had sent it. He replied as he must, that is, that he had been obedient to the prætor; that he had sent it.—I asked whether it had arrived at Agrigentum; he said it had arrived.—I asked in what condition it had returned; he said it had not returned yet.—There was a laugh and a murmur from all the people. Did it never occur to you in this instance to order him to make an entry in his books that he had sold you this tapestry, too, for six thousand five hundred sesterces? Did you fear that your debts would increase, if these things were to cost you six thousand five hundred sesterces, which you could easily sell for two hundred thousand? It was worth that, believe me. You would have been able to defend yourself if you had given that sum for it. No one would then have asked how much it was worth. If you could only prove

that you had bought it, you could easily make your cause and your conduct appear reasonable to any one. But as it is, you have no way of getting out of your difficulty about the tapestry. What shall I say next? Did you take away by force some splendid harness, which is said to have belonged to King Hiero, from Philarchus of Centuripa, a wealthy and high-born man, or did you buy it of him? When I was in Sicily this is what I heard from the Centuripans and from everybody else, for the case was very notorious; people said that you had taken away this harness from Philarchus of Centuripa, and other very beautiful harness from Aristus of Panormus, and a third set from Cratippus of Tyndarus. Indeed, if Philarchus had sold it to you, you would not, after the prosecution was instituted against you, have promised to restore it. But because you saw that many people knew of it, you thought that if you restored it to him, you would only have so much the less, but the original transaction would be proved against you nevertheless; and so you did not restore it. Philarchus said in his evidence that when he became acquainted with this disease of yours, as your friends call it, he wished to conceal from you the knowledge of the existence of this harness; that when he was summoned by you, he said that he had not got any; and, indeed, that he had removed them to another person's house, that they might not be found; but that your instinct was so great that you saw them by the assistance of the very man in whose custody they were deposited; that then he could not deny that you had found him out, and so that the harness was taken from him against his will, and without any payment.

Now, O judges, it is worth your while to know how

he was accustomed to find and trace out all these things. There are two brothers, citizens of Cibra, Tlepolemus and Hiero, one of whom, I believe, was accustomed to model in wax, the other was a painter. I fancy these men, as they had become suspected by their fellow-citizens of having plundered the temple of Apollo at Cibra, fearing a trial and the punishment of the law, had fled from their homes. As they had known that Verres was a great connoisseur of such works as theirs, at the time that he, as you learned from the witnesses, came to Cibra with fictitious bills of exchange, they, when flying from their homes as exiles, came to him when he was in Asia. He has kept them with him ever since that time; and in the robberies he committed, and in the booty he acquired during his lieutenancy, he greatly availed himself of their assistance and their advice. These are the men who were meant when Quintus Tadius made an entry in his books that he had given things by Verres's order to some Greek painters. They were already well known to, and had been thoroughly tried by him, when he took them with him into Sicily. And when they arrived there they scented out and tracked everything in so marvellous a manner (you might have thought they were bloodhounds) that, wherever anything was, they found it out by some means or other. Some things they found out by threatening, some by promising; this by means of slaves, that through freemen; one thing by a friend, another by an enemy. Whatever pleased them was sure to be lost. They whose plate was demanded had nothing else to hope than that Tlepolemus and Hiero might not approve of it.

I will relate to you this fact, O judges, most truly. I

recollect that Pamphilus of Lilybæum, a connection of mine by ties of hospitality, and a personal friend of mine, a man of the highest birth, told me that when that man had taken from him, by his absolute power, a ewer made by the hand of Boethus, of exquisite workmanship and great weight, he went home very sad, in truth, and greatly agitated, because a vessel of that sort, which had been left to him by his father and his forefathers, and which he was accustomed to use on days of festival, and on the arrival of ancient friends, had been taken from him. While I was sitting at home, said he, in great indignation, up comes one of the slaves of Venus; he orders me immediately to bring to the prætor some embossed goblets. I was greatly vexed, said he; I had two; I order them both to be taken out of the closet, lest any worse things should happen, and to be brought after me to the prætor's house. When I got there the prætor was asleep; the Cibratic brothers were walking about, and when they saw me, they said, Pamphilus, where are the cups? I show them with great grief;—they praise them.—I begin to complain that I shall have nothing left of any value at all, if my cups, too, were taken away. Then they, when they see me vexed, say, What are you willing to give us to prevent these from being taken from you? To make my story short, I said that I would give six hundred sesterces. Meantime the prætor summons us; he asks for the cups. Then they began to say to the prætor that they had thought, from what they had heard, that Pamphilus's cups were of some value, but that they were miserable things, quite unworthy of Verres's having them among his plate. He said, he thought so, too. So Pamphilus saved his exquisite goblets. And, indeed, before I heard

this, though I knew that it was a very trifling sort of accomplishment to understand things of that sort, yet I used to wonder that he had any knowledge of them at all, as I knew that in nothing whatever had he any qualities like a man.

But when I heard this, I then for the first time understood that that was the use of these two Cibratic brothers; that in his robberies he used his own hands, but their eyes. But he was so covetous of that splendid reputation of being thought to be a judge of such matters that lately (just observe the man's madness), after his case was adjourned, when he was already as good as condemned, and civilly dead, at the time of the games of the circus, when early in the morning the couches were spread in preparation for a banquet at the house of Lucius Sisenna, a man of the first consideration, and when the plate was all set out, and when, as was suited to the dignity of Lucius Sisenna, the house was full of honorable men, he came to the plate, and began in a leisurely way to examine and consider every separate piece. Some marvelled at the folly of the man, who, while his trial was actually going on, was increasing the suspicion of that covetousness of which he was accused; others marvelled at his insensibility that any such things could come into his head when the time for judgment in his cause was so near at hand, and when so many witnesses had spoken against him. But Sisenna's servants, who, I suppose, had heard the evidence which had been given against him, never took their eyes off him, and never departed out of reach of the plate. It is the part of a sagacious judge, from small circumstances to form his opinion of every man's covetousness or incontinence. And will any one believe that this man, when prætor, was able to

keep either his covetousness or his hands from the plate of the Sicilians, when, though a defendant, and a defendant within two days of judgment, a man in reality, and in the opinion of all men, as good as already condemned, he could not in a large assembly restrain himself from handling and examining the plate of Lucius Sisenna?

But that my discourse may return to Lilybæum, from which I have made this digression, there is a man named Diocles, the son-in-law of Pamphilus, of that Pamphilus from whom the ewer was taken away, whose surname is Popillius. From this man he took away every article on his sideboard where his plate was set out. He may say, if he pleases, that he had bought them. In fact, in this case, by reason of the magnitude of the robbery, an entry of it, I imagine, has been made in the account-books. He ordered Timarchides to value the plate. How did he do it? At as low a price as any one ever valued anything presented to an actor. Although I have been for some time acting foolishly in saying so much about your purchases, and in asking whether you bought the things, and how, and at what price you bought them, when I can settle all that by one word. Produce me a written list of what plate you acquired in the province of Sicily, from whom, and at what price you bought each article. What will you do? Though I ought not to ask you for these accounts, for I ought to have your account-books and to produce them. But you say that you never kept any accounts of your expenses in these years. Make me out at least this one which I am asking for, the account of the plate, and I will not mind the rest at present. "I have no writings of the sort; I cannot produce any accounts." What, then, is to be done? What do you think that

these judges can do? Your house was full of most beautiful statues already, before your prætorship; many were placed in your villas, many were deposited with your friends; many were given and presented to other people; yet you have no accounts speaking of any single one having been bought. All the plate in Sicily has been taken away. There is nothing left to any one that can be called his own. A scandalous defence is invented that the prætor bought all that plate; and yet that cannot be proved by any accounts. If you do produce any accounts, still there is no entry in them how you have acquired what you have got. But of these years during which you say that you bought the greatest number of things, you produce no accounts at all. Must you not inevitably be condemned, both by the accounts which you do, and by those which you do not, produce?

You also took away at Lilybæum whatever silver vessels you chose from Marcus Cælius, a Roman knight, a most excellent young man. You did not hesitate to take away the whole furniture of Caius Cacurius, a most active and accomplished man, and of the greatest influence in his city. You took away, with the knowledge of everybody, a very large and very beautiful table of citron-wood from Quintus Lutatius Diodorus, who, owing to the kind exertion of his interest by Quintus Catulus, was made a Roman citizen by Lucius Sylla. I do not object to you that you stripped and plundered a most worthy imitator of yours in his whole character, Apollonius, the son of Nico, a citizen of Drepanum, who is now called Aulus Clodius, of all his exquisitely wrought silver plate—I say nothing of that. For he does not think that any injury has been done to him, because you came to his assistance when he was a ruined

man, with the rope round his neck, and shared with him the property belonging to their father, of which he had plundered his wards at Drepanum. I am even very glad if you took anything from him, and I say that nothing was ever better done by you. But it certainly was not right that the statue of Apollo should have been taken away from Lyso of Lilybæum, a most eminent man, with whom you have been staying as a guest. But you will say that you bought it—I know that—for six hundred sesterces. So I suppose: I know it, I say; I will produce the accounts; and yet that ought not to have been done. Will you say that the drinking-vessels with emblems of Lilybæum on them were bought from Heius, the minor to whom Marcellus is guardian, whom you had plundered of a large sum of money, or will you confess that they were taken by force?

But why do I enumerate all his ordinary iniquities in affairs of this sort, which appear to consist only in robberies committed by him, and in losses borne by those whom he plundered? Listen, if you please, O judges, to an action of such a sort as will prove to you clearly his extraordinary madness and frenzy, rather than any ordinary covetousness.

There is a man of Melita, called Diodorus, who has already given evidence before you. He has been now living at Lilybæum many years; a man of great nobility at home, and of great credit and popularity with the people among whom he has settled, on account of his virtue. It is reported to Verres of this man that he has some exceedingly fine specimens of chased work; and among them two goblets called Thericlean, made by the hand of Mentor with the most exquisite skill. And when Verres heard of

this, he was inflamed with such a desire, not only of beholding, but also of appropriating them, that he summoned Diodorus, and demanded them. He replied, as was natural for a man who took great pride in them, that he had not got them at Lilybæum; that he had left them at Melita. in the house of a relation of his. On this he immediately sends men on whom he can rely to Melita; he writes to certain inhabitants of Melita to search out those vessels for him; he desires Diodorus to give them letters to that relation of his—the time appeared to him endless till he could see those pieces of plate. Diodorus, a prudent and careful man, who wished to keep his own property, writes to his relation to make answer to those men who came from Verres, that he had sent the cups to Lilybæum a few days before. In the meantime he himself leaves the place. He preferred leaving his home, to staying in it and losing that exquisitely wrought silver work. But when Verres heard of this, he was so agitated that he seemed to every one to be raving, and to be beyond all question mad. Because he could not steal the plate himself, he said that he had been robbed by Diodorus of some exquisitely wrought vessels; he poured out threats against the absent Diodorus; he used to roar out before people; sometimes he could not restrain his tears. We have heard in the mythology of Eriphyla being so covetous that when she had seen a necklace, made, I suppose, of gold and jewels, she was so excited by its beauty, that she betrayed her husband for the sake of it. His covetousness was similar; but in one respect more violent and more senseless, because she was desiring a thing which she had seen, while his wishes were excited not only by his eyes, but even by his ears.

He orders Diodorus to be sought for over the whole province. He had by this time struck his camp, packed up his baggage, and left Sicily. Verres, in order by some means or other to bring the man back to the province, devises this plan, if it is to be called a plan, and not rather a piece of madness. He sets up one of the men he calls his hounds, to say that he wishes to institute a prosecution against Diodorus of Melita for a capital offence. At first all men wondered at such a thing being imputed to Diodorus, a most quiet man, and as far removed as any man from all suspicion, not only of crime, but of even the slightest irregularity. But it soon became evident that all this was done for the sake of his silver. Verres does not hesitate to order the prosecution to be instituted; and that, I imagine, was the first instance of his allowing an accusation to be made against an absent man. The matter was notorious over all Sicily, that men were prosecuted for capital offences because the prætor coveted their chased silver plate; and that prosecutions were instituted against them not only when they were present, but even in their absence. Diodorus goes to Rome, and putting on mourning, calls on all his patrons and friends; relates the affair to every one. Earnest letters are written to Verres by his father, and by his friends, warning him to take care what he did, and what steps he took respecting Diodorus; that the matter was notorious and very unpopular; that he must be out of his senses; that this one charge would ruin him if he did not take care. At that time he considered his father, if not in the light of a parent, at least in that of a man. He had not yet sufficiently prepared himself for a trial; it was his first year in the province; he was not, as he was by the time of the affair of Sthenius,

loaded with money. And so his frenzy was checked a little, not by shame, but by fear and alarm. He does not dare to condemn Diodorus; he takes his name out of the list of defendants while he is absent. In the meantime Diodorus, for nearly three years, as long as that man was prætor, was banished from the province and from his home. Every one else, not only Sicilians, but Roman citizens, too, settled this in their minds, that, since he had carried his covetousness to such an extent, there was nothing which any one could expect to preserve or retain in his own possession if it was admired ever so little by Verres.

But after they understood that that brave man, Quintus Arrius, whom the province was eagerly looking for, was not his successor, they then settled that they could keep nothing so carefully shut up or hidden away as not to be most open and visible to his covetousness. After that, he took away from an honorable and highly esteemed Roman knight, named Cnæus Calidius, whose son he knew to be a senator of the Roman people and a judge, some beautiful silver horses which had belonged to Quintus Maximus. I did not mean to say this, O judges, for he bought those, he did not steal them; I wish I had not mentioned them. Now he will boast, and have a fine ride on these horses. "I bought them, I have paid the money for them." I have no doubt account-books also will be produced. It is well worth while. Give me then the account-books. You are at liberty to get rid of this charge respecting Calidius, as long as I can get a sight of these accounts; still, if you had bought them, what ground had Calidius for complaining at Rome, that, though he had been living so many years in Sicily as a trader, you were

the only person who had so despised and so insulted him as to plunder him in common with all the rest of the Sicilians? what ground had he for declaring that he would demand his plate back again from you, if he had sold it to you of his own free will? Moreover, how could you avoid restoring it to Cnæus Calidius; especially when he was such an intimate friend of Lucius Sisenna, your defender, and as you had restored their property to the other friends of Sisenna? Lastly, I do not suppose you will deny that by the intervention of Potamo, a friend of yours, you restored his plate to Lucius Cordius, an honorable man, but not more highly esteemed than Cnæus Calidius; and it was he who made the cause of the rest more difficult to plead before you; for though you had promised many men to restore them their property, yet, after Cordius had stated in his evidence that you had restored him his, you desisted from making any more restorations, because you saw that you lost your plunder, and yet could not escape the evidence against you. Under all other prætors Cnæus Calidius, a Roman knight, was allowed to have plate finely wrought; he was permitted to be able from his own stores to adorn and furnish a banquet handsomely, when he had invited a magistrate or any superior officer. Many men in power and authority have been with Cnæus Calidius at his house; no one was ever found so mad as to take from him that admirable and splendid plate; no one was found bold enough to ask for it; no one impudent enough to beg him to sell it. For it is an arrogant thing, an intolerable thing, O judges, for a prætor to say to an honorable, and rich, and well-appointed man in his province, "Sell me those chased goblets." For it is saying, "You do not deserve to have things which are so beautifully made;

they are better suited to a man of my stamp." Are you, O Verres, more worthy than Calidius? whom (not to compare your way of life with his, for they are not to be compared, but) I will compare you with in respect of this very dignity owing to which you make yourself out his superior. You gave eighty thousand sesterces to canvassing agents to procure your election as prætor; you gave three hundred thousand to an accuser not to press hardly upon you: do you, on that account, look down upon and despise the equestrian order? Is it on that account that it seemed to you a scandalous thing that Calidius should have anything that you admired rather than that you should?

He has been long boasting of this transaction with Calidius, and telling every one that he bought the things. Did you also buy that censor of Lucius Papirius, a man of the highest reputation, wealth, and honor, and a Roman knight? who stated in his evidence that when you had begged for it to look at you returned it with the emblems torn off; so that you may understand that it is all taste in that man, not avarice; that it is the fine work that he covets, not the silver. Nor was this abstinence exercised only in the case of Papirius; he practiced exactly the same conduct with respect to every censor in Sicily; and it is quite incredible how many beautifully wrought censers there were. I imagine that, when Sicily was at the height of its power and opulence, there were extensive workshops in that island; for before that man went thither as prætor there was no house tolerably rich, in which there were not these things, even if there was no other silver plate besides; namely, a large dish with figures and images of the gods embossed on it, a goblet which the women used for sacred purposes, and a censor. And all these were an-

tique, and executed with the most admirable skill, so that one may suspect everything else in Sicily was on a similar scale of magnificence; but that though fortune had deprived them of much, those things were still preserved among them which were retained for purposes of religion. I said just now, O judges, that there were many censers, in almost every house, in fact; I assert, also, that now there is not even one left. What is the meaning of this? what monster, what prodigy did we send into the province? Does it not appear to you that he desired, when he returned to Rome, to satisfy not the covetousness of one man, not his own eyes only, but the insane passion of every covetous man; for, as soon as he ever came into any city, immediately those Cibyrtic hounds of his were slipped, to search and find out everything. If they found any large vessel, any considerable work, they brought it to him with joy; if they could hunt out any smaller vessel of the same sort, they looked on those as a sort of lesser game, whether they were dishes, cups, censers, or anything else. What weepings of women, what lamentations do you suppose took place over these things? things which may, perhaps, seem insignificant to you, but which excite great and bitter indignation, especially among women, who grieve when those things are torn from their hands which they have been accustomed to use in religious ceremonies, which they have received from their ancestors, and which have always been in their family.

Do not now wait while I follow up this charge from door to door, and show you that he stole a goblet from *Æschylus* the Tyndaritan; a dish from another citizen of Tyndaris named Thraso; a censer from Nymphodorus of Agrigentum. When I produce my witnesses from Sicily he may

select whom he pleases for me to examine about dishes, goblets, and censers. Not only no town, no single house that is tolerably well off will be found to have been free from the injurious treatment of this man; who, even if he had come to a banquet, if he saw any finely wrought plate, could not, O judges, keep his hands from it. There is a man named Cnæus Pompeius Philo, who was a native of Tyndaris; he gave Verres a supper at his villa in the country near Tyndaris; he did what Sicilians did not dare to do, but what, because he was a citizen of Rome, he thought he could do with impunity, he put before him a dish on which were some exceedingly beautiful figures. Verres, the moment he saw it, determined to rob his host's table of that memorial of the Penates and of the gods of hospitality. But yet, in accordance with what I have said before of his great moderation, he restored the rest of the silver after he had torn off the figures; so free was he from all avarice! What want you more? Did he not do the same thing to Eupolemus of Calacta, a noble man, connected with, and an intimate friend of the Luculli; a man who is now serving in the army under Lucius Lucullus? He was supping with him; the rest of the silver which he had set before him had no ornament on it, lest he himself should also be left without any ornament; but there were also two goblets, of no large size, but with figures on them. He, as if he had been a professional diner-out, who was not to go away without a present, on the spot, in the sight of all the other guests, tore off the figures. I do not attempt to enumerate all his exploits of this sort; it is neither necessary nor possible. I only produce to you tokens and samples of each description of his varied and universal rascality. Nor did he behave in these affairs as if he

would some day or other be called to account for them, but altogether as if he was either never likely to be prosecuted, or else as if the more he stole, the less would be his danger when he was brought before the court; inasmuch as he did these things which I am speaking of not secretly, not by the instrumentality of friends or agents, but openly, from his high position, by his own power and authority.

When he had come to Catina, a wealthy, honorable, influential city, he ordered Dionysiarchus, the proagorus, that is to say, the chief magistrate, to be summoned before him; he openly orders him to take care that all the silver plate which was in anybody's house at Catina was collected together and brought to him. Did you not hear Philarchus of Centuripa, a man of the highest position as to noble birth, and virtue, and riches, say the same thing on his oath; namely, that Verres had charged and commanded him to collect together, and order to be conveyed to him, all the silver plate at Centuripa, by far the largest and wealthiest city in all Sicily? In the same manner at Agyrum, all the Corinthian vessels there were there, in accordance with his command, were transported to Syracuse by the agency of Apollodorus, whom you have heard as a witness. But the most extraordinary conduct of all was this; when that painstaking and industrious prætor had arrived at Haluntium, he would not himself go up into the town, because the ascent was steep and difficult; but he ordered Archagathus of Haluntium, one of the noblest men, not merely in his own city, but in all Sicily, to be summoned before him, and gave him a charge to take care that all the chased silver that there was at Haluntium, and every specimen of Corinthian

work, too, should be at once taken down from the town to the seaside. Archagathus went up into the town. That noble man, as one who wished to be loved and esteemed by his fellow-citizens, was very indignant at having such an office imposed upon him, and did not know what to do. He announces the commands he has received. He orders every one to produce what they had. There was great consternation, for the tyrant himself had not gone away to any distance; lying on a litter by the seaside below the town he was waiting for Archagathus and the silver plate. What a gathering of people do you suppose took place in the town? what an uproar? what weeping of women? they who saw it would have said that the Trojan horse had been introduced, and that the city was taken. Vessels were brought out without their cases; others were wrenched out of the hands of women; many people's doors were broken open, and their locks forced. For what else can you suppose? Even if ever, at a time of war and tumult, arms are demanded of private citizens, still men give them unwillingly, though they know that they are giving them for the common safety. Do not suppose, then, that any one produced his carved plate out of his house for another man to steal without the greatest distress. Everything is brought down to the shore. The Cibyritic brothers are summoned; they condemn some articles; whatever they approve of has its figures in relief or its embossed emblems torn off. And so the Haluntines, having had all their ornaments wrenched off, returned home with the plain silver.

Was there ever, O judges, a drag-net of such a sort as this in that province? People have sometimes, during their year of office, diverted some part of the public

property to their own use in the most secret manner; sometimes they even secretly plundered some private citizen of something; and still they were condemned. And if you ask me, though I am detracting somewhat from my own credit by saying so, I think those were the real accusers who traced the robberies of such men as this by scent, or by some lightly imprinted footsteps; for what is it that we are doing in respect of Verres, who has wallowed in the mud till we can find him out by the traces of his whole body? Is it a great undertaking to say anything against a man who, while he was passing by a place, having his litter put down to rest for a little time, plundered a whole city, house by house, without condescending to any pretences, openly, by his own authority, and by an absolute command? But still, that he might be able to say that he had bought them, he orders Archagathus to give those men, to whom the plate had belonged, some little money, just for form's sake. Archagathus found a few who would accept the money, and those he paid.—And still Verres never paid Archagathus that money. Archagathus intended to claim it at Rome; but Cnæus Lentulus Marcellinus dissuaded him, as you heard him state himself. Read the evidence of Archagathus, and of Lentulus—and that you may not imagine that the man wished to heap up such a mass of figures without any reason, just see at what rate he valued you, and the opinion of the Roman people, and the laws, and the courts of justice, and the Sicilian witnesses and traders. After he had collected such a vast number of figures that he had not left one single figure to anybody, he established an immense shop in the palace at Syracuse; he openly orders all the manufacturers, and carvers, and goldsmiths to be summoned—

and he himself had many in his own employ; he collects a great multitude of men; he kept them employed uninterruptedly for eight months, though all that time no vessels were made of anything but gold. In that time he had so skillfully wrought the figures which he had torn off the goblets and censers, into golden goblets, or had so ingeniously joined them into golden cups that you would say that they had been made for that very purpose; and he, the prætor, who says that it was owing to his vigilance that peace was maintained in Sicily, was accustomed to sit in his tunic and dark cloak the greater part of the day in this workshop.

I would not venture, O judges, to mention these things, if I were not afraid that you might perhaps say that you had heard more about that man from others in common conversation than you had heard from me in this trial; for who is there who has not heard of this workshop, of the golden vessels, of Verres's tunic and dark cloak? Name any respectable man you please out of the whole body of settlers at Syracuse, I will produce him; there will not be one person who will not say that he has either seen this or heard of it. Alas for the age! alas for the degeneracy of our manners! I will not mention anything of any great antiquity; there are many of you, O judges, who knew Lucius Piso, the father of this Lucius Piso, who was prætor. When he was prætor in Spain—in which province he was slain—some how or other, while he was practicing his exercises in arms, the golden ring which he had was broken and crushed. As he wanted to get himself another ring, he ordered a goldsmith to be summoned into the forum before his throne of office, at Corduba, and openly weighed him out the gold. He ordered the man to set up his bench in

the forum, and to make him a ring in the presence of every one. Perhaps, in truth, some may say that he was too exact, and to this extent any one who chooses may blame him, but no further. Still such conduct was allowable for him, for he was the son of Lucius Piso, of that man who first made the law about extortion and embezzlement. It is quite ridiculous for me to speak of Verres now, when I have just been speaking of Piso the Thrifty; still, see what a difference there is between the men; that man, while he was making some sideboards full of golden vessels, did not care what his reputation was, not only in Sicily, but also at Rome in the court of justice; the other wished all Spain to know to half an ounce how much gold it took to make a prætor's ring. Forsooth, as the one proved his right to his name, so did the other to his surname.

It is utterly impossible for me either to retain in my memory, or to embrace in my speech, all his exploits. I wish just to touch briefly on the different kinds of deeds done by him, just as here the ring of Piso reminded me of what had otherwise entirely escaped my recollection. From how many honorable men do you imagine that that man tore the golden rings from off their fingers? He never hesitated to do so whenever he was pleased with either the jewels or the fashion of the ring belonging to any one. I am going to mention an incredible fact, but still one so notorious that I do not think that he himself will deny it. When a letter had been brought to Valentius his interpreter from Agrigentum, by chance Verres himself noticed the impression on the seal; he was pleased with it, he asked where the letter came from; he was told, from Agrigentum. He sent letters to the men with whom he was accustomed

to communicate, ordering that ring to be brought to him as soon as possible. And accordingly, in compliance with his letter, it was torn off the finger of a master of a family, a certain Lucius Titius, a Roman citizen. But that covetousness of his is quite beyond belief. For as he wished to provide three hundred couches beautifully covered, with all other decorations for a banquet, for the different rooms which he has, not only at Rome, but in his different villas, he collected such a number that there was no wealthy house in all Sicily where he did not set up an embroiderer's shop.

There is a woman, a citizen of Segesta, very rich, and nobly born, by name Lamia. She, having her house full of spinning jennies, for three years was making him robes and coverlets, all dyed with purple; Attalus, a rich man at Netum; Lyso at Lilybæum; Critolaus at Enna; at Syracuse Æschrio, Cleomenes, and Theomnastus; at Elorum Archonides and Megistus. My voice will fail me before the names of the men whom he employed in this way will; he himself supplied the purple—his friends supplied only the work, I dare say; for I have no wish to accuse him in every particular, as if it were not enough for me, with a view to accuse him, that he should have had so much to give, that he should have wished to carry away so many things; and, besides all that, this thing which he admits, namely, that he should have employed the works of his friends in affairs of this sort. But now do you suppose that brazen couches and brazen candelabra were made at Syracuse for any one but for him the whole of that three years? He bought them, I suppose; but I am informing you so fully, O judges, of what that man did in his province as prætor, that he may not by chance appear to any

one to have been careless, and not to have provided and adorned himself sufficiently when he had absolute power.

I come now, not to a theft, not to avarice, not to covetousness, but to an action of that sort that every kind of wickedness seems to be contained in it, and to be in it; by which the immortal gods were insulted, the reputation and authority of the name of the Roman people was impaired, hospitality was betrayed and plundered, all the kings who were most friendly to us, and the nations which are under their rule and dominion, were alienated from us by his wickedness. For you know that the kings of Syria, the boyish sons of King Antiochus, have lately been at Rome. And they came not on account of the kingdom of Syria; for that they had obtained possession of without dispute, as they had received it from their father and their ancestors; but they thought that the kingdom of Egypt belonged to them and to Selene their mother. When they, being hindered by the critical state of the republic at that time, were not able to obtain the discussion of the subject as they wished before the senate, they departed for Syria, their paternal kingdom. One of them—the one whose name is Antiochus—wished to make his journey through Sicily. And so, while Verres was prætor, he came to Syracuse. On this Verres thought that an inheritance had come to him, because a man whom he had heard, and on other accounts suspected, had many splendid things with him, had come into his kingdom and into his power. He sends him presents—liberal enough—for all domestic uses; as much wine and oil as he thought fit; and as much wheat as he could want, out of his tenths. After that he invites the king himself to supper. He decorates a couch abundantly and magnificently. He sets

out the numerous and beautiful silver vessels, in which he was so rich; for he had not yet made all those golden ones. He takes care that the banquet shall be splendidly appointed and provided in every particular. Why need I make a long story of it? The king departed thinking that Verres was superbly provided with everything, and that he himself had been magnificently treated. After that, he himself invites the prætor to supper. He displays all his treasures; much silver, also not a few goblets of gold, which, as is the custom of kings, and especially in Syria, were studded all over with most splendid jewels. There was also a vessel for wine, a ladle hollowed out of one single large precious stone, with a golden handle, concerning which, I think, you heard Quintus Minutius speak, a sufficiently capable judge, and sufficiently credible witness. Verres took each separate piece of plate into his hands, praised it—admired it. The king was delighted that that banquet was tolerably pleasant and agreeable to a prætor of the Roman people. After the banquet was over, Verres thought of nothing else, as the facts themselves showed, than how he might plunder and strip the king of everything before he departed from the province. He sends to ask for the most exquisite of the vessels which he had seen at Antiochus's lodgings. He said that he wished to show them to his engravers. The king, who did not know the man, most willingly sent them, without any suspicion of his intention. He sends also to borrow the jewelled ladle. He said that he wished to examine it more attentively; that also is sent to him.

Now, O judges, mark what followed; things which you have already heard, and which the Roman people will not hear now for the first time, and which have been reported

abroad among foreign nations to the furthest corners of the earth. The kings, whom I have spoken of, had brought to Rome a candelabrum of the finest jewels, made with most extraordinary skill, in order to place it in the Capitol; but as they found that temple not yet finished, they could not place it there. Nor were they willing to display it and produce it in common, in order that it might seem more splendid when it was placed at its proper time in the shrine of the great and good Jupiter; and brighter, also, as its beauty would come fresh and untarnished before the eyes of men. They determined, therefore, to take it back with them into Syria, with the intention, when they should hear that the image of the great and good Jupiter was dedicated, of sending ambassadors who should bring that exquisite and most beautiful present, with other offerings, to the Capitol. The matter, I know not how, got to his ears. For the king had wished it kept entirely concealed; not because he feared or suspected anything, but because he did not wish many to feast their eyes on it before the Roman people. He begs the king, and entreats him most earnestly to send it to him; he says that he longs to look at it himself, and that he will not allow any one else to see it. Antiochus, being both of a child-like and royal disposition, suspected nothing of that man's dishonesty, and orders his servants to take it as secretly as possible, and well wrapped up, to the prætor's house. And when they brought it there, and placed it on a table, having taken off the coverings, Verres began to exclaim that it was a thing worthy of the kingdom of Syria, worthy of being a royal present, worthy of the Capitol. In truth, it was of such splendor as a thing must be which is made of the most brilliant and beautiful jewels; of such variety

of pattern that the skill of the workmanship seemed to vie with the richness of the materials; and of such a size that it might easily be seen that it had been made not for the furniture of men, but for the decoration of a most noble temple. And when he appeared to have examined it sufficiently, the servants begin to take it up to carry it back again. He says that he wishes to examine it over and over again; that he is not half satiated with the sight of it; he orders them to depart and to leave the candelabrum. So they then return to Antiochus empty-handed.

The king at first feared nothing, suspected nothing. One day passed—two days—many days. It was not brought back. Then the king sends to Verres to beg him to return it, if he will be so good. He bids the slaves come again. The king begins to think it strange. He sends a second time. It is not returned. He himself calls on the man; he begs him to restore it to him. Think of the face and marvellous impudence of the man! That thing which he knew, and which he had heard from the king himself was to be placed in the Capitol, which he knew was being kept for the great and good Jupiter, and for the Roman people, that he began to ask and entreat earnestly to have given to him. When the king said that he was prevented from complying by the reverence due to Jupiter Capitolinus, and by his regard for the opinion of men, because many nations were witnesses to the fact of the candelabrum having been made for a present to the god, the fellow began to threaten him most violently. When he sees that he is no more influenced by threats than he had been by prayers, on a sudden he orders him to leave his province before night. He says that he has found out that pirates from his kingdom were coming against Sicily.

The king, in the most frequented place in Syracuse, in the forum—in the forum at Syracuse, I say (that no man may suppose I am bringing forward a charge about which there is any obscurity, or imagining anything which rests on mere suspicion), weeping, and calling gods and men to witness, began to cry out that Caius Verres had taken from him a candelabrum made of jewels, which he was about to send to the Capitol, and which he wished to be in that most splendid temple as a memorial to the Roman people of his alliance with and friendship for them. He said that he did not care about the other works made of gold and jewels belonging to him which were in Verres's hands, but that it was a miserable and scandalous thing for this to be taken from him. And that, although it had long ago been consecrated in the minds and intentions of himself and his brother, still, that he then, before that assembled body of Roman citizens, offered, and gave, and dedicated, and consecrated it to the great and good Jupiter, and that he invoked Jupiter himself as a witness of his intention and of his piety.

What voice, what lungs, what power of mine can adequately express the indignation due to this atrocity? The King Antiochus, who had lived for two years at Rome in the sight of all of us, with an almost royal retinue and establishment—though he had been the friend and ally of the Roman people; though his father, and his grandfather, and his ancestors, most ancient and honorable sovereigns, had been our firmest friends; though he himself is monarch of a most opulent and extensive kingdom, is turned headlong out of a province of the Roman people. How do you suppose that foreign nations will take this? How do you suppose the news of this exploit of yours will be received

in the dominions of other kings, and in the most distant countries of the world, when they hear that a king has been insulted by a prætor of the Roman people in his province? that a guest of the Roman people has been plundered? a friend and ally of the Roman people insultingly driven out? Know that your name and that of the Roman people will be an object of hatred and detestation to foreign nations. If this unheard-of insolence of Verres is to pass unpunished, all men will think, especially as the reputation of our men for avarice and covetousness has been very extensively spread, that this is not his crime only, but that of those who have approved of it. Many kings, many free cities, many opulent and powerful private men, cherish intentions of ornamenting the Capitol in such a way as the dignity of the temple and the reputation of our empire require. And if they understand that you show a proper indignation at this kingly present being intercepted, they will then think that their zeal and their presents will be acceptable to you and to the Roman people. But if they hear that you have been indifferent to the complaint of so great a king, in so remarkable a case, in one of such bitter injustice, they will not be so crazy as to spend their time, and labor, and expense on things which they do not think will be acceptable to you.

And in this place I appeal to you, O Quintus Catulus; for I am speaking of your most honorable and most splendid monument. You ought to take upon yourself not only the severity of a judge with respect to this crime, but something like the vehemence of an enemy and an accuser. For, through the kindness of the senate and people of Rome, your honor is connected with that temple. Your name is conse-

crated at the same time as that temple in the everlasting recollection of men. It is by you that this case is to be encountered; by you that this labor is to be undergone, in order that the Capitol, as it has been restored more magnificently, may also be adorned more splendidly than it was originally; that then that fire may seem to have been sent from heaven not to destroy the temple of the great and good Jupiter, but to demand one for him more noble and more magnificent. You have heard Quintus Minucius Rufus say that King Antiochus stayed at his house while at Syracuse; that he knew that this candelabrum had been taken to Verres's house; that he knew that it had not been returned. You heard, and you shall hear from the whole body of Roman settlers at Syracuse, that they will state to you that in their hearing it was dedicated and consecrated to the good and great Jupiter by King Antiochus. If you were not a judge, and this affair were reported to you, it would be your especial duty to follow it up; to reclaim the candelabrum, and to prosecute this cause. So that I do not doubt what ought to be your feelings as judge in this prosecution, when before any one else as judge you ought to be a much more vehement advocate and accuser than I am.

And to you, O judges, what can appear more scandalous or more intolerable than this? Shall Verres have at his own house a candelabrum, made of jewels and gold, belonging to the great and good Jupiter? Shall that ornament be set out in his house at banquets which will be one scene of adultery and debauchery, with the brilliancy of which the temple of the great and good Jupiter ought to glow and to be lighted up? Shall the decorations of the Capitol be placed in the house of that most

infamous debauché with the other ornaments which he has inherited from Chelidon? What do you suppose will ever be considered sacred or holy by him, when he does not now think himself liable to punishment for such enormous wickedness? who dares to come into this court of justice, where he cannot, like all others who are arraigned, pray to the great and good Jupiter, and entreat help from him? from whom even the immortal gods are reclaiming their property, before that tribunal which was appointed for the benefit of men, that they might recover what had been extorted unjustly from them? Do we marvel that Minerva at Athens, Apollo at Delos, Juno at Samos, Diana at Perga, and that many other gods besides all over Asia and Greece, were plundered by him, when he could not keep his hands off the Capitol? That temple which private men are decorating and are intending to decorate out of their own riches, that Caius Verres would not suffer to be decorated by a king; and, accordingly, after he had once conceived this nefarious wickedness, he considered nothing in all Sicily afterward sacred or hallowed; and he behaved himself in his province for three years in such a manner that war was thought to have been declared by him, not only against men, but also against the immortal gods.

Segesta is a very ancient town in Sicily, O judges, which its inhabitants assert was founded by Æneas when he was flying from Troy and coming to this country. And, accordingly, the Segestans think that they are connected with the Roman people, not only by a perpetual alliance and friendship, but even by some relationship. This town, as the state of the Segestans was at war with the Carthaginians on its own account and of its own ac-

cord, was formerly stormed and destroyed by the Carthaginians; and everything which could be any ornament to the city was transported from thence to Carthage. There was among the Segestans a statue of Diana, of brass, not only invested with the most sacred character, but also wrought with the most exquisite skill and beauty. When transferred to Carthage, it only changed its situation and its worshippers; it retained its former sanctity. For on account of its eminent beauty it seemed, even to their enemies, worthy of being most religiously worshipped. Some ages afterward Publius Scipio took Carthage, in the third Punic war; after which victory (remark the virtue and carefulness of the man, so that you may both rejoice at your national examples of most eminent virtue, and may also judge the incredible audacity of Verres, worthy of the greater hatred by contrasting it with that virtue), he summoned all the Sicilians, because he knew that during a long period of time Sicily had repeatedly been ravaged by the Carthaginians, and bids them seek for all they had lost, and promises them to take the greatest pains to insure the restoration to the different cities of everything which had belonged to them. Then those things which had formerly been removed from Himera, and which I have mentioned before, were restored to the people of Thermæ; some things were restored to the Gelans, some to the Agrigentines; among which was that noble bull, which that most cruel of all tyrants, Phalaris, is said to have had, into which he was accustomed to put men for punishment, and to put fire under. And when Scipio restored that bull to the Agrigentines, he is reported to have said that he thought it reasonable for them to consider whether it was more advantageous to the Sicilians to

be subject to their own princes, or to be under the dominion of the Roman people, when they had the same thing as a monument of the cruelty of their domestic masters, and of our liberality.

At that time, the same Diana of which I am speaking is restored with the greatest care to the Segestans. It is taken back to Segesta; it is replaced in its ancient situation, to the greatest joy and delight of all the citizens. It was placed at Segesta on a very lofty pedestal, on which was cut in large letters the name of Publius Africanus; and a statement was also engraved that "he had restored it after having taken Carthage." It was worshipped by the citizens; it was visited by all strangers; when I was quæstor it was the very first thing they showed me. It was a very large and tall statue, with a flowing robe, but in spite of its large size it gave the idea of the age and dress of a virgin; her arrows hung from her shoulder, in her left hand she carried her bow, her right hand held a burning torch. When that enemy of all sacred things, that violator of all religious scruples saw it, he began to burn with covetousness and insanity, as if he himself had been struck with that torch. He commands the magistrates to take the statue down and give it to him; and declares to them that nothing can be more agreeable to him. But they said it was impossible for them to do so; that they were prevented from doing so, not only by the most extreme religious reverence, but also by the greatest respect for their own laws and courts of justice. Then he began to entreat this favor of them, then to threaten them, then to try and excite their hopes, then to arouse their fears. They opposed to his demands the name of Africanus; they said that it was the gift of the Roman people; that

they themselves had no right over a thing which a most illustrious general, having taken a city of the enemy, had chosen to stand there as a monument of the victory of the Roman people. As he did not relax in his demand, but urged it every day with daily increasing earnestness, the matter was brought before their senate. His demand raises a violent outcry on all sides. And so at that time, and at his first arrival at Segesta, it is refused. Afterward, whatever burdens could be imposed on any city in respect of exacting sailors and rowers, or in levying corn, he imposed on the Segestans beyond all other cities, and a good deal more than they could bear. Besides that, he used to summon their magistrates before him; he used to send for all the most noble and most virtuous of the citizens, to hurry them about with him to all the courts of justice in the province, to threaten every one of them separately to be the ruin of him, and to announce to them all in a body that he would utterly destroy their city. Therefore, at last, the Segestans, subdued by much ill treatment and by great fear, resolved to obey the command of the prætor. With great grief and lamentation on the part of the whole city, with many tears and wailings on the part of all the men and women, a contract is advertised for taking down the statue of Diana.

See now with what religious reverence it is regarded. Know, O judges, that among all the Segestans none was found, whether free man or slave, whether citizen or foreigner, to dare to touch that statue. Know that some barbarian workmen were brought from Lilybæum; they at length, ignorant of the whole business, and of the religious character of the image, agreed to take it down for a sum of money, and took it down. And when it was be-

ing taken out of the city, how great was the concourse of women! how great was the weeping of the old men! some of whom even recollected that day when that same Diana being brought back to Segesta from Carthage, had announced to them, by its return, the victory of the Roman people. How different from that time did this day seem! Then the general of the Roman people, a most illustrious man, was bringing back to the Segestans the gods of their fathers, recovered from an enemy's city; now a most base and profligate prætor of the same Roman people was taking away, with the most nefarious wickedness, those very same gods from the city of his allies. What is more notorious throughout all Sicily than that all the matrons and virgins of Segesta came together when Diana was being taken out of their city? that they anointed her with precious unguents? that they crowned her with chaplets and flowers? that they attended her to the borders of their territory with frankincense and burning perfumes? If at the time you, by reason of your covetousness and audacity, did not, while in command, fear these religious feelings of the population, do you not fear them now, at a time of such peril to yourself and to your children? What man, against the will of the immortal gods, or what god, when you so trample on all the religious reverence due to them, do you think will come to your assistance? Has that Diana inspired you, while in quiet and at leisure, with no religious awe—she, who though she had seen two cities, in which she was placed, stormed and burned, was yet twice preserved from the flames and weapons of two wars; she who, though she changed her situation owing to the victory of the Carthaginians, yet did not lose her holy character; and who, by the valor of Publius Africanus, after-

ward recovered her old worship, together with her old situation? And when this crime had been executed, as the pedestal was empty, and the name of Publius Africanus carved on it, the affair appeared scandalous and intolerable to every one, that not only was religion trampled on, but also that Caius Verres had taken away the glory of the exploits, the memorial of the virtues, the monument of the victory of Publius Africanus, that most gallant of men. But when he was told afterward of the pedestal and the inscription, he thought that men would forget the whole affair, if he took away the pedestal too, which was serving as a sort of sign-post to point out his crime. And so, by his command, the Segestans contracted to take away the pedestal too; and the terms of that contract were read to you from the public registers of the Segestans, at the former pleading.

Now, O Publius Scipio, I appeal to you; to you, I say, a most virtuous and accomplished youth; from you I request and demand that assistance which is due to your family and to your name. Why do you take the part of that man who has embezzled the credit and honor of your family? Why do you wish him to be defended? Why am I undertaking what is properly your business? Why am I supporting a burden which ought to fall on you?—Marcus Tullius is reclaiming the monuments of Publius Africanus; Publius Scipio is defending the man who took them away. Though it is a principle handed down to us from our ancestors, for every one to defend the monuments of his ancestors, in such a way as not even to allow them to be decorated by one of another name, will you take the part of that man who is not charged merely with having in some degree spoiled the view of the monuments of Publius Scipio,

but who has entirely removed and destroyed them? Who then, in the name of the immortal gods, will defend the memory of Publius Scipio now that he is dead? who will defend the memorials and evidences of his valor, if you desert and abandon them; and not only allow them to be plundered and taken away, but even defend their plunderer and destroyer? The Segestans are present, your clients, the allies and friends of the Roman people. They inform you that Publius Africanus, when he had destroyed Carthage, restored the image of Diana to their ancestors; and that was set up among the Segestans and dedicated in the name of that general—that Verres has had it taken down and carried away, and, as far as that is concerned, has utterly effaced and extinguished the name of Publius Scipio. They entreat and pray you to restore the object of their worship to them, its proper credit and glory to your own family, so enabling them by your assistance to recover from the house of a robber what they recovered from the city of their enemies by the beneficence of Publius Africanus.

What can you reply to them with honor, or what can they do but implore the aid of you and your good faith? They are present, they do implore it. You, O Publius, can protect the honor of your family renown; you can, you have every advantage which either fortune or nature ever gives to men. I do not wish to anticipate you in gathering the fruit that belongs to you; I am not covetous of the glory which ought to belong to another. It does not correspond to the modesty of my disposition, while Publius Scipio, a most promising young man, is alive and well, to put myself forward as the defender and advocate of the memorials of Publius Scipio. Wherefore, if you

will undertake the advocacy of your family renown, it will behoove me not only to be silent about your monuments, but even to be glad that the fortune of Publius Africanus, though dead, is such that his honor is defended by those who are of the same family as himself, and that it requires no adventitious assistance. But if your friendship with that man is an obstacle to you—if you think that this thing which I demand of you is not so intimately connected with your duty—then I, as your *locum tenens*, will succeed to your office, I will undertake that business which I have thought not to belong to me. Let that proud aristocracy give up complaining that the Roman people willingly gives, and at all times has given, honors to new and diligent men. It is a foolish complaint that virtue should be of the greatest influence in that city which by its virtue governs all nations. Let the image of Publius Africanus be in the houses of other men; let heroes now dead be adorned with virtue and glory. He was such a man, he deserved so well of the Roman people, that he deserves to be recommended to the affection, not of one single family, but of the whole state. And so it partly does belong to me also to defend his honors with all my power, because I belong to that city which he rendered great, and illustrious, and renowned; and especially, because I practice, to the utmost of my power, those virtues in which he was pre-eminent—equity, industry, temperance, the protection of the unhappy, and hatred of the dishonest; a relationship in pursuits and habits which is almost as important as that of which you boast, the relationship of name and family.

I reclaim from you, O Verres, the monument of Publius Africanus; I abandon the cause of the Sicilians, which I

undertook; let there be no trial of you for extortion at present; never mind the injuries of the Segestans; let the pedestal of Publius Africanus be restored; let the name of that invincible commander be engraved on it anew; let that most beautiful statue, which was recovered when Carthage was taken, be replaced. It is not I, the defender of the Sicilians—it is not I, your prosecutor—they are not the Segestans who demand this of you; but he who has taken on himself the defence and the preservation of the renown and glory of Publius Africanus. I am not afraid of not being able to give a good account of my performance of this duty to Publius Servilius the judge; who, as he has performed great exploits, and raised very many monuments of his good deeds, and has a natural anxiety about them, will be glad, forsooth, to leave them an object of care and protection not only to his own posterity, but to all brave men and good citizens; and not as a mark for the plunder of rogues. I am not afraid of its displeasing you, O Quintus Catulus, to whom the most superb and splendid monument in the whole world belongs, that there should be as many guardians of such monuments as possible, or that all good men should think it was a part of their duty to defend the glory of another. And indeed I am so far moved by the other robberies and atrocities of that fellow as to think them worthy of great reproof; but that might be sufficient for them. But in this instance I am roused to such indignation that nothing appears to me possible to be more scandalous or more intolerable. Shall Verres adorn his house, full of adultery, full of debauchery, full of infamy, with the monuments of Africanus? Shall Verres place the memorial of that most temperate and religious man, the image of the ever virgin Diana, in that house in

which the iniquities of harlots and pimps are incessantly being practiced?

But is this the only monument of Africanus which you have violated? What! did you take away from the people of Tyndaris an image of Mercury most beautifully made, and placed there by the beneficence of the same Scipio? And how? O ye immortal gods! How audaciously, how infamously, how shamelessly did you do so! You have lately, O judges, heard the deputies from Tyndaris, most honorable men, and the chief men of that city, say that the Mercury, which in their sacred anniversaries was worshipped among them with the extremest religious reverence, which Publius Africanus, after he had taken Carthage, had given to the Tyndaritans, not only as a monument of his victory, but as a memorial and evidence of their loyalty to and alliance with the Roman people, had been taken away by the violence, and wickedness, and arbitrary power of this man; who, when he first came to their city, in a moment, as if it were not only a becoming, but an indispensable thing to be done—as if the senate had ordered it and the Roman people had sanctioned it—in a moment, I say, ordered them to take the statue down and to transport it to Messana. And as this appeared a scandalous thing to those who were present and who heard it, it was not persevered in by him during the first period of his visit; but when he departed, he ordered Sopater, their chief magistrate, whose statement you have heard, to take it down. When he refused, he threatened him violently; and then he left the city. The magistrate refers the matter to the senate; there is a violent outcry on all sides. To make my story short, some time afterward he comes to that city again. Immediately he asks about the statue.

He is answered that the senate will not allow it to be removed; that capital punishment is threatened to any one who should touch it without the orders of the senate: the impiety of removing is also urged. Then says he, "What do you mean by talking to me of impiety? or about punishment? or about the senate? I will not leave you alive; you shall be scourged to death if the statue is not given up." Sopater with tears reports the matter to the senate a second time, and relates to them the covetousness and the threats of Verres. The senate gives Sopater no answer, but breaks up in agitation and perplexity. Sopater, being summoned by the prætor's messenger, informs him of the state of the case, and says that it is absolutely impossible.

And all these things (for I do not think that I ought to omit any particular of his impudence) were done openly in the middle of the assembly, while Verres was sitting on his chair of office, in a lofty situation. It was the depth of winter; the weather, as you heard Sopater himself state, was bitterly cold; heavy rain was falling; when that fellow orders the lictors to throw Sopater headlong from the portico on which he himself was sitting, and to strip him naked. The command was scarcely out of his mouth before you might have seen him stripped and surrounded by the lictors. All thought that the unhappy and innocent man was going to be scourged. They were mistaken. Do you think that Verres would scourge without any reason an ally and friend of the Roman people? He is not so wicked. All vices are not to be found in that man; he was never cruel. He treated the man with great gentleness and clemency. In the middle of the forum there are some statues of the Marcelli, as there are in most of the other

towns of Sicily; out of these he selected the statue of Caius Marcellus, whose services to that city and to the whole province were most recent and most important. On that statue he orders Sopater, a man of noble birth in his city, and at that very time invested with the chief magistracy, to be placed astride and bound to it. What torture he suffered when he was bound naked in the open air, in the rain and in the cold, must be manifest to everybody. Nor did he put an end to this insult and barbarity till the people and the whole multitude, moved by the atrocity of his conduct and by pity for his victim, compelled the senate by their outcries to promise him that statue of Mercury. They cried out that the immortal gods themselves would avenge the act, and that in the meantime it was not fit that an innocent man should be murdered. Then the senate comes to him in a body, and promises him the statue. And so Sopater is taken down scarcely alive from the statue of Marcellus, to which he had almost become frozen. I cannot adequately accuse that man if I were to wish to do so; it requires not only genius, but an extraordinary amount of skill.

This appears to be a single crime, this of the Tyndaritan Mercury, and it is brought forward by me as a single one; but there are many crimes contained in it—only I do not know how to separate and distinguish them. It is a case of money extorted, for he took away from the allies a statue worth a large sum of money. It is a case of embezzlement, because he did not hesitate to appropriate a public statue belonging to the Roman people, taken from the spoils of the enemy, placed where it was in the name of our general. It is a case of treason, because he dared to overturn and to carry away monuments of our

empire, of our glory, and of our exploits. It is a case of impiety, because he violated the most solemn principles of religion. It is a case of inhumanity, because he invented a new and extraordinary description of punishment for an innocent man, an ally and friend of our nation. But what the other crime is, that I am unable to say; I know not by what name to call the crime which he committed with respect to the statue of Caius Marcellus. What is the meaning of it? Is it because he was the patron of the Sicilians? What then? What has that to do with it? Ought that fact to have had influence to procure assistance, or to bring disaster on his clients and friends? Was it your object to show that patrons were no protection against your violence? Who is there who would not be aware that there is greater power in the authority of a bad man who is present, than the protection of good men who are absent? Or do you merely wish to prove by this conduct, your unprecedented insolence, and pride, and obstinacy? You thought, I imagine, that you were taking something from the dignity of the Marcelli? And therefore now the Marcelli are not the patrons of the Sicilians. Verres has been substituted in their place. What virtue or what dignity did you think existed in you, that you should attempt to transfer to yourself, and to take away from these most trusty and most ancient patrons, so illustrious a body of clients as that splendid province? Can you with your stupidity, and worthlessness, and laziness defend the cause, I will not say of all Sicily, but even of one, the very meanest of the Sicilians? Was the statue of Marcellus to serve you for a pillory for the clients of the Marcelli? Did you out of his honor seek for punishments for those very men who had held him in

honor? What followed? What did you think would happen to your statues? was it that which did happen? For the people of Tyndaris threw down the statue of Verres, which he had ordered to be erected in his own honor near the Marcelli, and even on a higher pedestal, the very moment that they heard that a successor had been appointed to him.

The fortune of the Sicilians has then given you Caius Marcellus for a judge, so that we may now surrender you, fettered and bound, to appease the injured sanctity of him to whose statue Sicilians were bound while you were prætor. And in the first place, O judges, that man said that the people of Tyndaris had sold this statue to Caius Marcellus Æserninus, who is here present. And he hoped that Caius Marcellus himself would assert thus much for his sake, though it never seemed to me to be very likely that a young man born in that rank, the patron of Sicily, would lend his name to that fellow to enable him to transfer his guilt to another. But still I made such provision, and took such precaution against every possible bearing of the case, that if any one had been found who was ever so anxious to take the guilt and crime of Verres upon himself, still he would not have taken anything by his motion, for I brought down to court such witnesses, and I had with me such written documents, that it could not have been possible to have entertained a doubt about that man's actions. There are public documents to prove that that Mercury was transported to Messana at the expense of the state. They state at what expense; and that a man named Poleas was ordered by the public authority to superintend the business—what more would you have? Where is he? He is close at hand, he is a witness, by the command of

Sopater the Proagorus.—Who is he? The man who was bound to the statue. What! where is he? He is a witness—you have seen the man, and you have heard his statement. Demetrius, the master of the gymnastic school, superintended the pulling down of the statue, because he was appointed to manage that business. What? is it we who say this? No, he is present himself; moreover, that Verres himself lately promised at Rome that he would restore that statue to the deputies, if the evidence already given in the affair were removed, and if security were given that the Tyndaritans would not give evidence against him, has been stated before you by Zosippus and Hismenias, most noble men, and the chief men of the city of Tyndaria.

What? did you not also at Agrigentum take away a monument of the same Publius Scipio, a most beautiful statue of Apollo, on whose thigh there was the name of Myron, inscribed in diminutive silver letters, out of that most holy temple of *Æsculapius*? And when, O judges, he had privily committed that atrocity, and when in that most nefarious crime and robbery he had employed some of the most worthless men of the city as his guides and assistants, the whole city was greatly excited. For the Agrigentines were regretting at the same time the kindness of Africanus, and a national object of their worship, and an ornament of their city, and a record of their victory, and an evidence of their alliance with us. And therefore a command is imposed on those men who were the chief men of the city, and a charge is given to the quæstors and ædiles to keep watch by night over the sacred edifices. And, indeed, at Agrigentum (I imagine, on account of the great number and virtue of these men, and because great numbers of Roman citizens, gallant and in-

trepid and honorable men, live and trade in that town among the Agrigentines in the greatest harmony) he did not dare openly to carry off, or even to beg for the things that took his fancy. There is a temple of Hercules at Agrigentum, not far from the forum, considered very holy and greatly revered among the citizens. In it there is a brazen image of Hercules himself, than which I cannot easily tell where I have seen anything finer (although I am not very much of a judge of those matters, though I have seen plenty of specimens); so greatly venerated among them, O judges, that his mouth and his chin are a little worn away, because men in addressing their prayers and congratulations to him are accustomed not only to worship the statue but even to kiss it. While Verres was at Agrigentum, on a sudden, one stormy night, a great assemblage of armed slaves, and a great attack on this temple by them, takes place, under the leading of Timarchides. A cry is raised by the watchmen and guardians of the temple. And, at first, when they attempted to resist them and to defend the temple, they are driven back much injured with sticks and bludgeons. Afterward, when the bolts were forced open, and the doors dashed in, they endeavor to pull down the statue and to overthrow it with levers; meantime, from the outcries of the keepers, a report got abroad over the whole city, that the national gods were being stormed, not by the unexpected invasion of enemies, or by the sudden irruption of pirates, but that a well-armed and fully-equipped band of fugitive slaves from the house and retinue of the prætor had attacked them. No one in Agrigentum was either so advanced in age, or so infirm in strength, as not to rise up on that night, awakened by that news, and to seize whatever

weapon chance put into his hands. So in a very short time men are assembled at the temple from every part of the city. Already, for more than an hour, numbers of men had been laboring at pulling down that statue; and all that time it gave no sign of being shaken in any part; while some, putting levers under it, were endeavoring to throw it down, and others, having bound cords to all its limbs, were trying to pull it toward them. On a sudden all the Agrigentines collect together at the place; stones are thrown in numbers; the nocturnal soldiers of that illustrious commander run away—but they take with them two very small statues, in order not to return to that robber of all holy things entirely empty-handed. The Sicilians are never in such distress as not to be able to say something facetious and neat; as they did on this occasion. And so they said that this enormous boar had a right to be accounted one of the labors of Hercules, no less than the other boar of Erymanthus.

The people of Assorum, gallant and loyal men, afterward imitated this brave conduct of the Agrigentines, though they did not come of so powerful or so distinguished a city. There is a river called Chrysas, which flows through the territories of Assorum. Chrysas, among that people, is considered a god and is worshipped with the greatest reverence. His temple is in the fields, near the road which goes from Assorum to Enna. In it there is an image of Chrysas, exquisitely made of marble. He did not dare to beg that of the Assorians on account of the extraordinary sanctity of that temple; so he intrusts the business to Tlepolemus and Hiero. They, having prepared and armed a body of men, come by night; they break in the doors of the temple; the keepers of

the temple and the guardians hear them in time. A trumpet, the signal of alarm well known to all the neighborhood, is sounded; men come in from the country. Telepolemus is turned out and put to flight; nor was anything missed out of the temple of Chrysas except one very diminutive image of brass. There is a temple of the mighty mother Cybele at Enguinum, for I must now not only mention each instance with the greatest brevity, but I must even pass over a great many, in order to come to the greater and more remarkable thefts and atrocities of this sort which this man has committed. In this temple that same Publius Scipio, a man excelling in every possible good quality, had placed breastplates and helmets of brass of Corinthian workmanship, and some huge ewers of a similar description, and wrought with the same exquisite skill, and had inscribed his own name upon them. Why should I make any more statements or utter any further complaints about that man's conduct? He took away, O judges, every one of those things. He left nothing in that most holy temple except the traces of the religion he had trampled on, and the name of Publius Scipio. The spoils won from the enemy, the memorials of our commanders, the ornaments and decorations of our temples, will hereafter, when these illustrious names are lost, be reckoned in the furniture and appointments of Caius Verres. Are you, forsooth, the only man who delights in Corinthian vases? Are you the best judge in the world of the mixture of that celebrated bronze, and of the delicate tracery of that work? Did not the great Scipio, that most learned and accomplished man, understand it too? But do you, a man without one single virtue, without education, without natural ability, and without any information, understand them and value them? Beware lest

he be seen to have surpassed you and those other men who wished to be thought so elegant, not only in temperance, but in judgment and taste; for it was because he thoroughly understood how beautiful they were that he thought that they were made not for the luxury of men, but for the ornamenting of temples and cities, in order that they might appear to our posterity to be holy and sacred monuments.

Listen, also, O judges, to the man's singular covetousness, audacity and madness, especially in polluting those sacred things, which not only may not be touched with the hands, but which may not be violated even in thought. There is a shrine of Ceres among the Cateans of the same holy nature as the one at Rome, and worshipped as the goddess is worshipped among foreign nations, and in almost every country in the world. In the inmost part of that shrine there was an extremely ancient statue of Ceres, as to which men were not only ignorant of what sort it was, but even of its existence. For the entrance into that shrine does not belong to men, the sacred ceremonies are accustomed to be performed by women and virgins. Verres's slaves stole this statue by night out of that most holy and most ancient temple. The next day the priestesses of Ceres, and the female attendants of that temple, women of great age, noble, and of proved virtue, report the affair to their magistrates. It appeared to all a most bitter, and scandalous, and miserable business. Then that man, influenced by the atrocity of the action, in order that all suspicion of that crime might be removed from himself, employs some one connected with him by ties of hospitality to find a man that he might accuse of having done it, and bids him take care that he be convicted of the accusation, so that he himself

might not be subject to the charge. The matter is not delayed. For when he had departed from Catina an information is laid against a certain slave. He is accused; false witnesses are suborned against him; the whole senate sits in judgment on the affair, according to the laws of the Catenans. The priestesses are summoned; they are examined secretly in the senate house, and asked what had been done, and how they thought that the statue had been carried off. They answered that the servants of the prætor had been seen in the temple. The matter, which previously had not been very obscure, began to be clear enough by the evidence of the priestesses. The judges deliberate; the innocent slave is acquitted by every vote, in order that you may the more easily be able to condemn this man by all your votes. For what is it that you ask, O Verres? What do you hope for? What do you expect? What god or man do you think will come to your assistance? Did you send slaves to that place to plunder a temple, where it was not lawful for free citizens to go, not even for the purpose of praying? Did you not hesitate to lay violent hands on those things from which the laws of religion enjoined you to keep even your eyes? Although it was not even because you were charmed by the eye that you were led into this wicked and nefarious conduct; for you coveted what you had never seen. You took a violent fancy, I say, to that which you had not previously beheld. From your ears did you conceive this covetousness, so violent that no fear, no religious scruple, no power of the gods, no regard for the opinion of men could restrain it. Oh! but you had heard of it, I suppose, from some good man, from some good authority. How could you have done that, when you could never

have heard of it from any man at all? You heard of it, therefore, from a woman; since men could not have seen it, nor known of it. What sort of woman do you think that she must have been, O judges? What a modest woman must she have been to converse with Verres? What a pious woman, to show him a plan for robbing a temple! But it is no great wonder if those sacred ceremonies which are performed by the most extreme chastity of virgins and matrons were violated by his adultery and profligacy.

What, then, are we to think? Is this the only thing that he began to desire from mere hearing, when he had never seen it himself? No, there were many other things besides; of which I will select the plundering of that most noble and ancient temple, concerning which you heard witnesses give their evidence at the former pleading. Now, I beseech you, listen to the same story once more, and attend carefully as you hitherto have done. There is an island called Melita, O judges, separated from Sicily by a sufficiently wide and perilous navigation, in which there is a town of the same name, to which Verres never went, though it was for three years a manufactory to him for weaving women's garments. Not far from that town, on a promontory, is an ancient temple of Juno, which was always considered so holy that it was not only always kept inviolate and sacred in those Punic wars, which in those regions were carried on almost wholly by the naval forces, but even by the bands of pirates which ravage those seas. Moreover, it has been handed down to us by tradition that once, when the fleet of King Masinissa was forced to put into these ports, the king's lieutenant took away some ivory teeth of an incredible size out of

the temple, and carried them into Africa, and gave them to Masinissa; that at first the king was delighted with the present, but afterward, when he heard where they had come from, he immediately sent trustworthy men in a quinquereme to take those teeth back; and that there was engraved on them in Punic characters, "that Masinissa, the king, had accepted them ignorantly; but that, when he knew the truth, he had taken care that they should be replaced and restored." There was, besides, an immense quantity of ivory, and many ornaments, among which were some ivory Victories of ancient workmanship, and wrought with exquisite skill. Not to dwell too long on this, he took care to have all these things taken down and carried off at one swoop by means of the slaves of the Venus whom he had sent thither for that purpose.

O ye immortal gods! what sort of man is it that I am accusing? Whom is it that I am prosecuting according to our laws, and by this regular process? Concerning whom is it that you are going to give your judicial decision? The deputies from Melita, sent by the public authority of their state, say that the shrine of Juno was plundered; that that man left nothing in that most holy temple; that that place, to which the fleets of enemies often came, where pirates are accustomed to winter almost every year, and which no pirate ever violated, no enemy ever attacked before, was so plundered by that single man that nothing whatever was left in it. What, then, now, are we to say of him as a defendant, of me as an accuser, of this tribunal? Is he proved guilty of grave crimes, or is he brought into this court on mere suspicion? Gods are proved to have been carried off, temples to have been plundered, cities to have been stripped of everything. And of those actions

he has left himself no power of denying one, no plea for defending one. In every particular he is convicted by me; he is detected by the witnesses; he is overwhelmed by his own admissions; he is caught in the evident commission of guilt; and even now he remains here, and in silence recognizes his own crimes as I enumerate them.

I seem to myself to have been too long occupied with one class of crime. I am aware, O judges, that I have to encounter the weariness of your ears and eyes at such a repetition of similar cases; I will, therefore, pass over many instances. But I entreat you, O judges, in the name of the immortal gods, in the name of these very gods of whose honor and worship we have been so long speaking, refresh your minds so as to attend to what I am about to mention, while I bring forward and detail to you that crime of his by which the whole province was roused, and in speaking of which you will pardon me if I appear to go back rather far, and trace the earliest recollections of the religious observances in question. The importance of the affair will not allow me to pass over the atrocity of his guilt with brevity.

It is an old opinion, O judges, which can be proved from the most ancient records and monuments of the Greeks, that the whole island of Sicily was consecrated to Ceres and Libera. Not only did all other nations think so, but the Sicilians themselves were so convinced of it that it appeared a deeply-rooted and innate belief in their minds. For they believe that these goddesses were born in these districts, and that corn was first discovered in this land, and that Libera was carried off, the same goddess whom they call Proserpine, from a grove in the territory of Enna, a place which, because it is situated in the centre

of the island, is called the navel of Sicily. And when Ceres wished to seek her and trace her out, she is said to have lighted her torches at those flames which burst out at the summit of *Ætna*, and carrying these torches before her to have wandered over the whole earth. But Enna, where those things which I am speaking of are said to have been done, is in a high and lofty situation, on the top of which is a large level plain, and springs of water which are never dry. And the whole of the plain is cut off and separated, so as to be difficult of approach. Around it are many lakes and groves, and beautiful flowers at every season of the year; so that the place itself appears to testify to that abduction of the virgin which we have heard of from our boyhood. Near it is a cave turned toward the north, of unfathomable depth, where they say that Father Pluto suddenly rose out of the earth in his chariot, and carried the virgin off from that spot, and that on a sudden, at no great distance from Syracuse, he went down beneath the earth, and that immediately a lake sprang up in that place; and there to this day the Syracusans celebrate anniversary festivals with a most numerous assemblage of both sexes.

On account of the antiquity of this belief, because in those places the traces and almost the cradles of those gods are found, the worship of Ceres of Enna prevails to a wonderful extent, both in private and in public over all Sicily. In truth, many prodigies often attest her influence and divine powers. Her present help is often brought to many in critical circumstances, so that this island appears not only to be loved, but also to be watched over and protected by her. Nor is it the Sicilians only, but even all other tribes and nations greatly worship Ceres of Enna.

In truth, if initiation into those sacred mysteries of the Athenians is sought for with the greatest avidity, to which people Ceres is said to have come in that long wandering of hers, and then she brought them corn, how much greater reverence ought to be paid to her by those people among whom it is certain that she was born, and first discovered corn. And, therefore, in the time of our fathers, at a most disastrous and critical time to the republic, when, after the death of Tiberius Gracchus, there was a fear that great dangers were portended to the state by various prodigies, in the consulship of Publius Mucius and Lucius Calpurnius, recourse was had to the Sibylline books, in which it was found set down, "that the most ancient Ceres ought to be appeased." Then, priests of the Roman people, selected from the most honorable college of decemvirs, although there was in our own city a most beautiful and magnificent temple of Ceres, nevertheless went as far as Enna. For such was the authority and antiquity of the reputation for holiness of that place, that when they went thither, they seemed to be going not to a temple of Ceres, but to Ceres herself. I will not din this into your ears any longer. I have been some time afraid that my speech may appear unlike the usual fashion of speeches at trials, unlike the daily method of speaking. This I say, that this very Ceres, the most ancient, the most holy, the very chief of all sacred things which are honored by every people, and in every nation, was carried off by Caius Verres from her temple and her home. Ye who have been to Enna, have seen a statue of Ceres made of marble, and in the other temple a statue of Libera. They are very colossal and very beautiful, but not exceedingly ancient. There was one of brass, of moderate size,

but extraordinary workmanship, with the torches in its hands, very ancient, by far the most ancient of all those statues which are in that temple; that he carried off, and yet he was not content with that. Before the temple of Ceres, in an open and an uncovered place, there are two statues, one of Ceres, the other of Triptolemus, very beautiful, and of colossal size. Their beauty was their danger, but their size their safety; because the taking of them down and carrying them off appeared very difficult. But in the right hand of Ceres there stood a beautifully-wrought image of Victory; and this he had wrenched out of the hand of Ceres and carried off.

What now must be his feelings at the recollection of his crimes, when I, at the mere enumeration of them, am not only roused to indignation in my mind, but even shudder over my whole body? For thoughts of that temple, of that place, of that holy religion come into my mind. Everything seems present before my eyes—the day on which, when I had arrived at Enna, the priests of Ceres came to meet me with garlands of vervain, and with fillets; the concourse of citizens, among whom, while I was addressing them, there was such weeping and groaning that the most bitter grief seemed to have taken possession of the whole. They did not complain of the absolute way in which the tenths were levied, nor of the plunder of property, nor of the iniquity of tribunals, nor of that man's unhallowed lusts, nor of his violence, nor of the insults by which they had been oppressed and overwhelmed. It was the divinity of Ceres, the antiquity of their sacred observances, the holy veneration due to their temple, which they wished should have atonement made to them by the punishment of that most atrocious and

audacious man. They said that they could endure everything else; that to everything else they were indifferent. This indignation of theirs was so great, that you might suppose that Verres, like another king of hell, had come to Enna and had carried off, not Proserpine, but Ceres herself. And, in truth, that city does not appear to be a city, but a shrine of Ceres. The people of Enna think that Ceres dwells among them; so that they appear to me not to be citizens of that city, but to be all priests, to be all ministers and officers of Ceres. Did you dare to take away out of Enna the statue of Ceres? Did you attempt at Enna to wrench Victory out of the hand of Ceres? to tear one goddess from the other?—nothing of which those men dared to violate, or even to touch, whose qualities were all more akin to wickedness than to religion. For while Publius Popillius and Publius Rupilius were consuls, slaves, runaway slaves, and barbarians, and enemies, were in possession of that place; but yet the slaves were not so much slaves to their own masters as you are to your passions; nor did the runaways flee from their masters as far as you flee from all laws and from all right; nor were the barbarians as barbarous in language and in race as you are in your nature and your habits; nor were the enemies as much enemies to men as you are to the immortal gods. How, then, can a man beg for any mercy who has surpassed slaves in baseness, runaway slaves in rashness, barbarians in wickedness, and enemies in inhumanity?

You heard Theodorus and Numinus and Nicasio, deputies from Enna, say, in the name of their state, that they had this commission from their fellow-citizens, to go to Verres, and to demand from him the restoration of the

statues of Ceres and of Victory. And if they obtained it, then they were to adhere to the ancient customs of the state of Enna, not to give any public testimony against him, although he had oppressed Sicily, since these were the principles which they had received from their ancestors. But if he did not restore them, then they were to go before the tribunal, to inform the judges of the injuries they had received, but, far above all things, to complain of the insults to their religion. And, in the name of the immortal gods, I entreat you, O judges, do not you despise, do not you scorn or think lightly of their complaints. The injuries done to our allies are the present question; the authority of the laws is at stake; the reputation and the honesty of our courts of justice is at stake. And though all these are great considerations, yet this is the greatest of all—the whole province is so imbued with religious feeling, such a superstitious dread arising out of that man's conduct has seized upon the minds of all the Sicilians, that whatever public or private misfortunes happen, appear to befall them because of that man's wickedness. You have heard the Centuripans, the Agyrians, the Catenans, the Herbitans, the Ennans, and many other deputies say, in the name of their states, how great was the solitude in their districts, how great the devastation, how universal the flight of the cultivators of the soil; how deserted, how uncultivated, how desolate every place was. And although there are many and various injuries done by that man to which these things are owing, still this one cause, in the opinion of the Sicilians, is the most weighty of all; for, because of the insults offered to Ceres, they believe that all the crops and gifts of Ceres have perished in these districts. Bring remedies, O judges, to

the insulted religion of the allies; preserve your own, for this is not a foreign religion, nor one with which you have no concern. But even if it were, if you were unwilling to adopt it yourselves, still you ought to be willing to inflict heavy punishment on the man who violated it. But now that the common religion of all nations is attacked in this way, now that these sacred observances are violated which our ancestors adopted and imported from foreign countries, and have honored ever since—sacred observances, which they called Greek observances, as in truth they were—even if we were to wish to be indifferent and cold about these matters, how could we be so?

I will mention the sacking of one city, also, and that the most beautiful and highly decorated of all, the city of Syracuse. And I will produce my proofs of that, O judges, in order at length to conclude and bring to an end the whole history of offences of this sort. There is scarcely any one of you who has not often heard how Syracuse was taken by Marcus Marcellus, and who has not sometimes also read the account in our annals. Compare this peace with that war; the visit of this prætor with the victory of that general; the debauched retinue of the one with the invincible army of the other; the lust of Verres with the continence of Marcellus;—and you will say that Syracuse was built by the man who took it; was taken by the man who received it well established and flourishing. And for the present I omit those things which will be mentioned, and have been already mentioned by me in an irregular manner in different parts of my speech—that the marketplace of the Syracusans, which at the entrance of Marcellus was preserved unpolluted by slaughter, on the arrival of Verres overflowed with the blood of innocent Sicilians;

that the harbor of the Syracusans, which at that time was shut against both our fleets and those of the Carthaginians, was, while Verres was prætor, open to Cilician pirates, or even to a single piratical galley. I say nothing of the violence offered to people of noble birth, of the ravishment of matrons, atrocities which then, when the city was taken, were not committed, neither through the hatred of enemies, nor through military license, nor through the customs of war or the rights of victory. I pass over, I say, all these things which were done by that man for three whole years. Listen rather to acts which are connected with those matters of which I have hitherto been speaking. You have often heard that the city of Syracuse is the greatest of the Greek cities, and the most beautiful of all. It is so, O judges, as it is said to be; for it is so by its situation, which is strongly fortified, and which is on every side by which you can approach it, whether by sea or land, very beautiful to behold. And it has harbors almost inclosed within the walls, and in the sight of the whole city; harbors which have different entrances, but which meet together, and are connected at the other end. By their union a part of the town, which is called the island, being separated from the rest by a narrow arm of the sea, is again joined to and connected with the other by a bridge.

That city is so great that it may be said to consist of four cities of the largest size; one of which, as I have said, is that "Island," which, surrounded by two harbors, projects out toward the mouth and entrance of each. In it there is a palace which did belong to King Hiero, which our prætors are in the habit of using; in it are many sacred buildings, but two, which have a great pre-eminence over all the others—one a temple of Diana, and the other one,

which before the arrival of that man was the most ornamented of all, sacred to Minerva. At the end of this island is a fountain of sweet water, the name of which is Arethusa, of incredible size, very full of fish, which would be entirely overwhelmed by the waves of the sea, if it were not protected from the sea by a rampart and dam of stone. There is also another city at Syracuse, the name of which is Achradina, in which there is a very large forum, most beautiful porticoes, a highly decorated town hall, a most spacious senate house, and a superb temple of Jupiter Olympus; and the other districts of the city are joined together by one broad unbroken street, and divided by many cross-streets, and by private houses. There is a third city, which, because in that district there is an ancient temple of Fortune, is called Tyche, in which there is a spacious gymnasium, and many sacred buildings, and that district is the most frequented and the most populous. There is also a fourth city, which, because it is the last built, is called Neapolis, in the highest part of which there is a very large theatre, and, besides that, there are two temples of great beauty, one of Ceres, the other of Libera, and a statue of Apollo, which is called Temenites, very beautiful and of colossal size; which, if he could have moved them, he would not have hesitated to carry off.

Now I will return to Marcellus, that I may not appear to have entered into this statement without any reason. He, when with his powerful army he had taken this splendid city, did not think it for the credit of the Roman people to destroy and extinguish this splendor, especially as no danger could possibly arise from it; and therefore he spared all the buildings, public as well as private, sacred as well as ordinary, as if he had come with his army for

the purpose of defending them, not of taking them by storm. With respect to the decorations of the city, he had a regard to his own victory, and a regard to humanity; he thought it was due to his victory to transport many things to Rome which might be an ornament to this city, and due to humanity not utterly to strip the city, especially as it was one which he was anxious to preserve. In this division of the ornaments, the victory of Marcellus did not covet more for the Roman people than his humanity reserved to the Syracusans. The things which were transported to Rome we see before the temples of Honor and of Virtue, and also in other places. He put nothing in his own house, nothing in his gardens, nothing in his suburban villa; he thought that his house could only be an ornament to the city if he abstained from carrying the ornaments which belonged to the city to his own house. But he left many things of extraordinary beauty at Syracuse; he violated not the respect due to any god; he laid hands on none. Compare Verres with him; not to compare the man with the man—no such injury must be done to such a man as that, dead though he be; but to compare a state of peace with one of war, a state of law and order, and regular jurisdiction, with one of violence and martial law, and the supremacy of arms; to compare the arrival and retinue of the one with the victory and army of the other.

There is a temple of Minerva in the island, of which I have already spoken, which Marcellus did not touch, which he left full of its treasures and ornaments, but which was so stripped and plundered by Verres, that it seems to have been in the hands, not of an enemy—for enemies, even in war, respect the rights of religion, and the customs

of the country—but of some barbarian pirates. There was a cavalry battle of their king Agathocles, exquisitely painted in a series of pictures, and with these pictures the inside walls of the temple were covered. Nothing could be more noble than those paintings; there was nothing at Syracuse that was thought more worthy going to see. These pictures, Marcus Marcellus, though by that victory of his he had divested everything of its sacred inviolability of character, still, out of respect for religion, never touched; Verres, though, in consequence of the long peace, and the loyalty of the Syracusan people, he had received them as sacred and under the protection of religion, took away all those pictures, and left naked and unsightly those walls whose decorations had remained inviolate for so many ages, and had escaped so many wars: Marcellus, who had vowed that if he took Syracuse he would erect two temples at Rome, was unwilling to adorn the temple which he was going to build with these treasures which were his by right of capture; Verres, who was bound by no vows to Honor or Virtue, as Marcellus was, but only to Venus and to Cupid, attempted to plunder the temple of Minerva. The one was unwilling to adorn gods in the spoil taken from gods, the other transferred the decorations of the virgin Minerva to the house of a prostitute. Besides this, he took away out of the same temple twenty-seven more pictures beautifully painted; among which were likenesses of the kings and tyrants of Sicily, which delighted one, not only by the skill of the painter, but also by reminding us of the men, and by enabling us to recognize their persons. And see now, how much worse a tyrant this man proved to the Syracusans than any of the old ones, as they, cruel as they were, still adorned the temples of the

immortal gods, while this man took away the monuments and ornaments from the gods.

But now what shall I say of the folding-doors of that temple? I am afraid that those who have not seen these things may think that I am speaking too highly of, and exaggerating everything, though no one ought to suspect that I should be so inconsiderate as to be willing that so many men of the highest reputation, especially when they are judges in this cause, who have been at Syracuse, and who have seen all these things themselves, should be witnesses to my rashness and falsehood. I am able to prove this distinctly, O judges, that no more magnificent doors, none more beautifully wrought of gold and ivory, ever existed in any temple. It is incredible how many Greeks have left written accounts of the beauty of these doors; they, perhaps, may admire and extol them too much; be it so, still it is more honorable for our republic, O judges, that our general, in a time of war, should have left those things which appeared to them so beautiful, than that our prætor should have carried them off in a time of peace. On the folding-doors were some subjects most minutely executed in ivory; all these he caused to be taken out; he tore off and took away a very fine head of the Gorgon with snakes for hair; and he showed, too, that he was influenced not only by admiration for the workmanship, but by a desire of money and gain; for he did not hesitate to take away also all the golden knobs from these folding-doors, which were numerous and heavy; and it was not the workmanship of these, but the weight which pleased him. And so he left the folding-doors in such state, that, though they had formerly contributed greatly to the ornament of the temple, they now seemed to have been made only for

the purpose of shutting it up. Am I to speak also of the spears made of grass? for I saw that you were excited at the name of them when the witnesses mentioned them. They were such that it was sufficient to have seen them once, as there was neither any manual labor in them, nor any beauty, but simply an incredible size, which it would be quite sufficient even to hear of, and too much to see them more than once. Did you covet even those?

For the Sappho which was taken away out of the town hall affords you so reasonable an excuse, that it may seem almost allowable and pardonable. That work of Silanion, so perfect, so elegant, so elaborate (I will not say what private man, but), what nation could be so worthy to possess, as the most elegant and learned Verres? Certainly, nothing can be said against it. If any one of us, who are not as happy, who cannot be as refined as that man, should wish to behold anything of the sort, let him go to the temple of Good Fortune, to the monument of Catulus, to the portico of Metellus; let him take pains to get admittance into the Tusculan villa of any one of those men; let him see the forum when decorated, if Verres is ever so kind as to lend any of his treasures to the ædiles. Shall Verres have all these things at home? shall Verres have his house full of, his villas crammed with, the ornaments of temples and cities? Will you still, O judges, bear with the hobby, as he calls it, and pleasures of this vile artisan? a man who was born in such a rank, educated in such a way, and who is so formed, both in mind and body, that he appears a much fitter person to take down statues than to appropriate them. And how great a regret this Sappho which he carried off left behind her, can scarcely be told; for in the first place it was admirably made, and, besides,

it had a very noble Greek epigram engraved upon the pedestal; and would not that learned man, that Grecian, who is such an acute judge of these matters, who is the only man who understands them, if he had understood one letter of Greek, have taken that away too? for now, because it is engraved on an empty pedestal, it both declares what was once on the pedestal, and proves that it has been taken away. What shall I say more? Did you not take away the statue of Pæan from out of the temple of Æsculapius, beautifully made, sacred, and holy as it was? a statue which all men went to see for its beauty, and worshipped for its sacred character. What more? was not the statue of Aristæus openly taken away by your command out of the temple of Bacchus? What more? did you not take away out of the temple of Jupiter that most holy statue of Jupiter Imperator, which the Greeks call *O'optos*, most beautifully made? What next? did you hesitate to take away out of the temple of Libera that most exquisite bust of Parian marble, which we used to go to see? And that Pæan used to be worshipped among that people together with Æsculapius, with anniversary sacrifices. Aristæus, who being, as the Greeks report, the son of Bacchus, is said to have been the inventor of oil, was consecrated among them together with his father Bacchus, in the same temple.

But how great do you suppose was the honor paid to Jupiter Imperator in his own temple? You may collect it from this consideration, if you recollect how great was the religious reverence attached to that statue of the same appearance and form which Flaminius brought out of Macedonia, and placed in the Capitol. In truth, there were said to be in the whole world three statues of Jupiter

Imperator, of the same class, all beautifully made: one was that one from Macedonia, which we have seen in the Capitol; a second was the one at the narrow straits, which are the mouth of the Euxine Sea; the third was that which was at Syracuse, till Verres came as prætor. Flaminius removed the first from its habitation, but only to place it in the Capitol, that is to say, in the house of Jupiter upon earth; but as to the one that is at the entrance of the Euxine, that, though so many wars have proceeded from the shores of that sea, and though so many have been poured into Pontus, has still remained inviolate and untouched to this day. This third one, which was at Syracuse, which Marcus Marcellus, when in arms and victorious, had seen, which he had spared to the religion of the place, which both the citizens of and settlers in Syracuse were used to worship, and strangers not only visited but often venerated, Caius Verres took away from the temple of Jupiter. To return again to Marcellus. Judge of the case, O judges, in this way; think that more gods were lost to the Syracusans owing to the arrival of Verres than even were owing to the victory of Marcellus. In truth, he is said to have sought diligently for the great Archimedes, a man of the highest genius and skill, and to have been greatly concerned when he heard that he had been killed; but that other man sought for everything which he did seek for, not for the purpose of preserving it, but of carrying it away.

At present, then, all those things which might appear more insignificant, I will, on that account, pass over—how he took away Delphic tables made of marble, beautiful goblets of brass, an immense number of Corinthian vases, out of every sacred temple at Syracuse; and, there-

fore, O judges, those men who are accustomed to take strangers about to all those things which are worth going to see, and to show them every separate thing, whom they call mystagogi (or cicerones), now have their description of things reversed; for, as they formerly used to show what there was in every place, so now they show what has been taken from every place.

What do you think, then? Do you think that those men are affected with but a moderate indignation? Not so, O judges: in the first place, because all men are influenced by religious feeling, and think that their paternal gods, whom they have received from their ancestors, are to be carefully worshipped and retained by themselves; and, secondly, because this sort of ornament, these works and specimens of art, these statues and paintings, delight men of Greek extraction to an excessive degree; therefore, by their complaints, we can understand that these things appear most bitter to those men which, perhaps, may seem trifling and contemptible to us. Believe me, O judges, although I am aware to a certainty that you yourselves hear the same things; that though both our allies and foreign nations have, during these past years, sustained many calamities and injuries, yet men of Greek extraction have not been, and are not, more indignant at any than at this ruthless plundering of their temples and altars. Although that man may say that he bought these things, as he is accustomed to say, yet, believe me in this, O judges—no city in all Asia or in all Greece has ever sold one statue, one picture, or one decoration of the city, of its own free will to anybody. Unless, perchance, you suppose that, after strict judicial decisions had ceased to take place at Rome, the Greeks then began to sell these things, which

they not only did not sell when there were courts of justice open, but which they even used to buy up; or unless you think that Lucius Crassus, Quintus Scævola, Caius Claudius, most powerful men, whose most splendid ædileships we have seen, had no dealings in those sort of matters with the Greeks, but that those men had such dealings who became ædiles after the destruction of the courts of justice.

Know also that that false pretence of purchase was more bitter to the cities than if any one were privily to filch things, or boldly to steal them and carry them off. For they think it the most excessive baseness that it should be entered on the public records that the city was induced by a price, and by a small price, too, to sell and alienate those things which it had received from men of old. In truth, the Greeks delight to a marvellous degree in those things which we despise. And, therefore, our ancestors willingly allowed those things to remain in numbers among the allies, in order that they might be as splendid and as flourishing as possible under our dominion; and among those nations whom they rendered taxable or tributary, still they left these things, in order that they who take delight in those things which, to us, seem insignificant, might have them as pleasures and consolations in slavery. What do you think that the Rhegians, who now are Roman citizens, would take to allow that marble Venus to be taken from them? What would the Tarentines take to lose the Europa sitting on the Bull? or the Satyr which they have in the temple of Vesta? or their other monuments? What would the Thespians take to lose the statue of Cupid, the only object for which any one ever goes to see Thespiæ? What would the men of Cnidos

take for their marble Venus? or the Coans for their picture of her? or the Ephesians for Alexander? the men of Cyzicus for their Ajax or Medea? What would the Rhodians take for Ialysus? the Athenians for their marble Bacchus, or their picture of Paralus, or their brazen Heifer, the work of Myron? It would be a long business, and an unnecessary one, to mention what is worth going to see among all the different nations in all Asia and Greece; but that is the reason why I am enumerating these things, because I wish you to consider that an incredible indignation must be the feeling of those men from whose cities these things are carried away.

And to say nothing of other nations, judge of the Syracusans themselves. For when I went to Syracuse, I originally believed what I had heard at Rome from that man's friends that the city of Syracuse, on account of the inheritance of Heraclius, was no less friendly to him than the city of the Mamertines, because of their participation in all his booty and robberies. And at the same time I was afraid that, owing to the influence of the high-born and beautiful women at whose will he had directed all the measures of his prætorship for three years, and of the men to whom they were married, I should be opposed not only by an excessive lenity, but even by a feeling of liberality toward that man, if I were to seek for any evidence out of the public records of the Syracusans. Therefore, when at Syracuse. I was chiefly with Roman citizens; I copied out their papers; I inquired into their injuries. As I was a long time occupied by that business, in order to rest a little and to give my mind a respite from care, I returned to those fine documents of Carpinatius; in which, in company with some of the most honor-

able knights of the body of Roman settlers, I unravelled the case of those Verrutii, whom I have mentioned before, but I expected no aid at all, either publicly or privately, from the Syracusans, nor had I any idea of asking for any. While I was doing this, on a sudden Heraclius came to me, who was in office at Syracuse, a man of high birth, who had been priest of Jupiter, which is the highest honor among the Syracusans; he requests of me and of my brother, if we have no objection, to go to their senate; that they were at that moment assembled in full numbers in the senate house, and he said that he made this request to us to attend by command of the senate. At first we were in doubt what to do; but afterward it soon occurred to us that we ought not to shun that assembly or that place.

Therefore we came to the senate house; they all rise at our entry to do us honor. We sat down at the request of the magistrates. Diodorus, the son of Timarchides, who was the first man in that body both in influence and in age, and also, as it seemed to me, in experience and knowledge of business, began to speak; and the first sentence of his speech was to this effect—That the senate and people of Syracuse were grieved and indignant that, though in all the other cities of Sicily I had informed the senate and people of what I proposed for their advantage or for their safety, and though I had received from them all commissions, deputies, letters and evidence, yet in that city I had done nothing of that sort. I answered that deputies from the Syracusans had not been present at Rome in that assembly of the Sicilians when my assistance was entreated by the common resolution of all the deputations, and when the cause of the whole of Sicily

was intrusted to me; and that I could not ask that any decree should be passed against Caius Verres in that senate house in which I saw a gilt statue of Caius Verres. And after I said that such a groaning ensued at the sight and mention of the statue that it appeared to have been placed in the senate house as a monument of his wickedness and not of his services. Then every one for himself, as fast as each could manage to speak, began to give me information of those things which I have just now mentioned; to tell me that the city was plundered—the temples stripped of their treasures—that of the inheritance of Heraclius, which he had adjudged to the men of the palæstra, he had taken by far the greatest share himself; and, indeed, that they could not expect that he should care for the men of the palæstra, when he had taken away even the god who was the inventor of oil; that that statue had neither been made at the public expense nor erected by public authority, but that those men who had been the sharers in the plunder of the inheritance of Heraclius had had it made and placed where it was; and that those same men had been the deputies at Rome, who had been his assistants in dishonesty, his partners in his thefts, and the witnesses of his debaucheries; and that, therefore, I ought the less to wonder if they were wanting to the unanimity of the deputies and to the safety of Sicily.

When I perceived that their indignation at that man's injuries was not only not less, but almost greater than that of the rest of the Sicilians, then I explained my own intentions to them, and my whole plan and system with reference to the whole of the business which I had undertaken; then I exhorted them not to be wanting to the common cause and the common safety, and to rescind that panegyric which they had voted a few days before, being com-

pelled, as they said, by violence and fear. Accordingly, O judges, the Syracusans, that man's clients and friends, do this. First of all, they produce to me the public documents which they had carefully stored up in the most sacred part of the treasury; in which they show me that everything, which I have said had been taken away, was entered, and even more things than I was able to mention. And they were entered in this way. "What had been taken out of the temple of Minerva. . . . This, . . . and that." "What was missing out of the temple of Jupiter." "What was missing out of the temple of Bacchus." As each individual had had the charge of protecting and preserving those things, so it was entered; that each, when according to law he gave in his accounts, being bound to give up what he had received, had begged that he might be pardoned for the absence of these things, and that all had accordingly been released from liability on that account, and that it was kept secret; all which documents I took care to have sealed up with the public seal and brought away. But concerning the public panegyric on him this explanation was given: that at first, when the letters arrived from Verres about the panegyric, a little while before my arrival, nothing had been decreed; and after that, when some of his friends urged them that it ought to be decreed, they were rejected with the greatest outcry and the bitterest reproaches; but when I was on the point of arriving, then he who at that time was the chief governor had commanded them to decree it, and that it had been decreed in such a manner that the panegyric did him more damage than it could have done him good. So now, judges, do you receive the truth of that matter from me just as it was shown to me by them.

It is the custom at Syracuse that, if a motion on any subject is brought before the senate, whoever wishes, gives his opinion on it. No one is asked by name for his sentiments; nevertheless, those are accustomed to speak first of their own accord, and, naturally, according as they are superior in honor or in age; and that precedence is yielded to them by the rest; but, if at any time all are silent, then they are compelled to speak by lot. This was the custom when the motion was made respecting the panegyric of Verres. On which subject at first great numbers speak, in order to delay coming to any vote, and interpose this objection, that formerly, when they had heard that there was a prosecution instituted against Sextus Peducæus, who had deserved admirably well of that city and of the whole province, and when, in return for his numerous and important services, they wished to vote a panegyric on him, they had been prohibited from doing so by Caius Verres; and that it would be an unjust thing, although Peducæus had now no need of their praise, still not to vote that which at one time they had been eager to vote, before decreeing what they would only decree from compulsion. All shout in assent, and say, approvingly, that that is what ought to be done. So the question about Peducæus is put to the senate. Each man gave his opinion in order, according as he had precedence in age and honor. You may learn this from the resolution itself; for the opinions delivered by the chief men are generally recorded. Read:

[The list of speeches made on the subject of Sextus Peducæus is read]

It says who were the chief supporters of the motion.

The vote is carried. Then the question about Verres is put. Tell me, I pray, what happened.

[The list of speeches made on the subject of Caius Verres. . . .]

Well, what comes next?

[As no one rose, and no one delivered his opinion . . .]

What is this?

[They proceed by lot]

Why was this? Was no one a willing praiser of your prætorship, or a willing defender of you from danger, especially when by being so he might have gained favor with the prætor? No one. Those very men who used to feast with you, your advisers and accomplices, did not venture to utter a word. In that very senate house in which a statue of yourself and a naked statue of your son were standing, was there no one whom even your naked son in a province stripped naked could move to compassion? Moreover, they inform me also of this, that they had passed the vote of panegyric in such a form that all men might see that it was not a panegyric, but rather a satire, to remind every one of his shameful and disastrous prætorship. For, in truth, it was drawn up in these words: "Because he had scourged no one." From which you are to understand that he had caused most noble and innocent men to be executed. "Because he had administered the affairs of the province with vigilance," when all his vigils were well known to have been devoted to debauchery and adultery; moreover, there was this clause added, which the defendant could never venture to produce, and the accuser would never cease to dwell upon: "Because Verres had kept all pirates at a distance from the island

of Sicily"; men who, in his time, had entered even into the "island" of Syracuse. And, after I had received this information from them, I departed from the senate house with my brother, in order that they might decree what they chose.

Immediately they pass a decree. First, "That my brother Lucius should be connected with the city by ties of hospitality"; because he had shown the same goodwill to the Syracusans that I had always felt myself. That they not only wrote at that time, but also had engraved on brazen tablets and presented to us. Truly very fond of you are your Syracusans whom you are always talking of, who think it quite a sufficient reason for forming an intimate connection with your accuser, that he is going to be your accuser, and that he has come among them for the purpose of prosecuting inquiries against you. After that a decree is passed, not with any difference of opinion, but almost unanimously, "That the panegyric which had been decreed to Caius Verres be rescinded." But, when not only the vote had been come to, but when it had even been drawn up in due form and entered in the records, an appeal is made to the prætor. But who makes this appeal? Any magistrate? No. Any senator? Not even that. Any Syracusan? Far from it. Who, then, appeals to the prætor? The man who had been Verres's quæstor, Cæsetius. Oh, the ridiculous business! Oh, the deserted man! O man despaired of and abandoned by the Sicilian magistracy! In order to prevent the Sicilians passing a resolution of the senate, or from obtaining their rights according to their own customs and their own laws, an appeal is made to the prætor, not by any friend of his, not by any

connection, not, in short, by any Sicilian, but by his own quæstor. Who saw this? Who heard it? That just and wise prætor orders the senate to be adjourned. A great multitude flocks to me. First of all, the senators cry out that their rights are being taken away; that their liberty is being taken away. The people praise the senate and thank them. The Roman citizens do not leave me. And on that day I had no harder task than with all my exertions to prevent violent hands being laid on the man who made that appeal. When we had gone before the prætor's tribunal, he deliberates, forsooth, diligently and carefully what decision he shall give; for, before I say one word, he rises from his seat and departs. And so we departed from the forum when it was now nearly evening.

The next day, the first thing in the morning, I beg of him to allow the Syracusans to give me a copy of the resolution which they had passed the day before. But he refuses, and says that it is a great shame for me to have made a speech in a Greek senate; and that, as for my having spoken in the Greek language to Greeks, that was a thing which could not be endured at all. I answered the man as I could, as I chose, and as I ought. Among other things, I recollect that I said that it was easy to be seen how great was the difference between him and the great Numidicus, the real and genuine Metellus. That that Metellus had refused to assist with his panegyric Lucius Lucullus, his sister's husband, with whom he was on the very best terms, but that he was procuring panegyrics from cities for a man totally unconnected with himself, by violence and compulsion. But when I understood that it was many recent messengers, and many letters, not of introduction, but of credit that had had so much influence

over him, at the suggestion of the Syracusans themselves I make a seizure of those documents in which the resolutions of the senate were recorded. And now behold a fresh confusion and strife. That, however, you may not suppose that he was without any friends or connections at Syracuse, that he was entirely desolate and forsaken, a man of the name of Theomnastus, a man ridiculously crazy, whom the Syracusans call Theocratus, attempted to detain those documents; a man in such a condition that the boys follow him, and that every one laughs at him every time he opens his mouth. But his craziness, which is ridiculous to others, was then, in truth, very troublesome to me. For while he was foaming at the mouth, his eyes glaring, and he crying out as loud as he could that I was attacking him with violence, we came together before the tribunal. Then I began to beg to be allowed to seal up and carry away the records. He spoke against me; he denied that there had been any regular resolution of the senate passed since an appeal had been made to the prætor. He said that a copy of it ought not to be given to me. I read the act that I was to be allowed all documents and records. He, like a crazy man as he was, urged that our laws had nothing to do with him. That intelligent prætor decided that he did not choose, as the resolutions of the senate had no business ever to be ratified, to allow me to take a copy of it to Rome. Not to make a long story of it, if I had not threatened the man vigorously, if I had not read to him the provisions of the act passed in this case, and the penalties enacted by it, I should not have been allowed to have the documents. But that crazy fellow, who had declaimed against me most violently on behalf of Verres, when he found he did not

succeed, in order, I suppose, to recover my favor, gives me a book in which all Verres's Syracusan thefts were set down, which I had already been informed of by, and had a list of from them.

Now, then, let the Mamertines praise you, who are the only men of all that large province who wish you to get off; but let them praise you on condition that Heius, who is the chief man of that deputation, is present; let them praise you on condition that they are here ready to reply to me on those points concerning which they are questioned. And that they may not be taken by surprise on a sudden, this is what I shall ask them:—Are they bound to furnish a ship to the Roman people? They will admit it. Have they supplied it while Verres was prætor? They will say, No. Have they built an enormous transport at the public expense which they have given to Verres? They will not be able to deny it. Has Verres taken corn from them to send to the Roman people, as his predecessor did? They will say, No. What soldiers or sailors have they furnished during those three years? They will say, they furnished none at all. They will not be able to deny that Messana has been the receiver of all his plunder and all his robberies. They will confess that an immense quantity of things were exported from that city; and besides that, that this large vessel given to him by the Mamertines, departed loaded when the prætor left Sicily. You are welcome, then, to that panegyric of the Mamertines. As for the city of Syracuse, we see that that feels toward you as it has been treated by you; and among them that infamous Verrean festival, instituted by you, has been abolished. In truth, it was a most unseemly thing for honors such as belong to the gods to be paid to the man

who had carried off the images of the gods. In truth, that conduct of the Syracusans would be deservedly reproached if, when they had struck a most celebrated and solemn day of festival games out of their annals, because on that day Syracuse was said to have been taken by Marcellus, they should, notwithstanding, celebrate a day of festival in the name of Verres; though he had plundered the Syracusans of all which that day of disaster had left them. But observe the shamelessness and arrogance of the man, O judges, who not only instituted this disgraceful and ridiculous Verrean festival out of the money of Heraclius, but who also ordered the Marcellian festival to be abolished, in order that they might every year offer sacrifices to the man by whose means they had lost the sacred festivals which they had ever observed, and had lost their national deities, and that they might take away the festival days in honor of that family by whose means they had recovered all their other festivals.

END OF VOLUME TWO

